This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003608 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
A) "A Strategic Chess Piece That Can Be Given up 
Anytime" 
 
Professor Chu Yun-han of National Taiwan University's 
Department of Political Science noted in the "Weekly 
Comment" column of the centrist, pro-status quo "China 
Times" (11/15): 
 
". In the National Security Council, President Chen 
recently delivered a ten-point announcement in an 
attempt to diffuse the negative effects triggered by 
his `National Day Address.'  Although the Taipei 
administration tried to play down the striking remarks 
that Secretary of State Colin Powell made in Beijing, 
they have sensed the policy adjustment regarding the 
cross-Strait situation that is being initiated by 
Washington.  President Chen's `ten-point' initiative 
may clear up international worries that Taiwan might 
develop weapons of mass destruction and preclude the 
[possibility] that Beijing may use [these worries] as 
an excuse for a first strike.  However, in the midst of 
the political and cultural constructions in Taiwan that 
are aiming for the building of a new nation, these 
decorative declarations can neither extinguish the 
anger of Beijing leaders nor relieve the anxiety in 
Washington. 
 
"Top-level visits to Beijing from Washington have been 
frequent this year because the Americans are aware that 
preventive diplomacy as well as preventive defense 
measures have gradually grown ineffective.  Neither the 
strengthening of the forward military deployment in the 
West Pacific Region nor the management of seven carrier 
fleets for real time global exercises can successfully 
suppress the thought that `a cross-Strait war is 
unavoidable' in the Beijing leaders' minds.  Neither 
the sending of an envoy to persuade Taipei [to be 
prudent] nor the expression of disagreement by the U.S 
president can stop the Taiwanese from testing the 
bottom line of Beijing's tolerance.  Given the 
development of these trends, the United States will be 
forced, sooner or later, to choose between the worst 
scenarios, namely, either to compete with Beijing 
militarily and engage in an unlimited and unimaginable 
millennium war, or to force Taipei to sign a treaty in 
recognition of Beijing's sovereignty over Taiwan and, 
thus, reduce the leadership credentials in East Asia 
and [allow the beginning] of a hegemonic transition [in 
the region]. 
 
"Only the two worst options are left for the United 
States.  The reason is that once the People's 
Liberation Army takes the ASAP strategy to attack 
Taiwan, the [only] remaining effective option for the 
United States is militarily intervention due to 
Taiwan's weak defensive capabilities as well as the 
fragile domestic psychology and economic 
infrastructure.  Some experts have already made private 
predictions, after objective analysis, that the only 
realistic strategic option for the United States is to 
abandon Taiwan's position of self-determination [in the 
face of otherwise] unimaginable consequences, 
unbearable costs and risks that Americans would 
otherwise confront . . 
 
 
"It is expected that the decision-making circle in 
Washington is now very concerned about the cross-Strait 
situation, and this is not simply because the United 
States is already too busy handling the difficult 
situation in Iraq or because it needs to rely on China 
to help resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean 
Peninsula.  The cross-Strait issue will be the greatest 
diplomatic challenge for President George W. Bush 
during his second term because once this potential 
crisis breaks out, it will create the most severe 
challenge to the United States' strategic leadership in 
East Asia.  If the United States fails to control the 
situation and is forced to make a choice between the 
two worst scenarios, it would be practically like 
making an announcement of a major setback in U.S. 
foreign policy, and this is something that the current 
U.S. foreign policy makers would definitely try to 
avoid.  Thus, Washington needs to start taking some 
preventive measures that it did not want to take before 
to try every means it can to prevent the cross-Strait 
situation from getting out of control. 
 
"Secretary Powell's rigid remarks in Beijing that 
`Taiwan is not independent and it does not enjoy 
sovereignty as a nation' have reluctantly given away 
all the ambiguity that the United States hoped to 
maintain over the past two decades.  This means that 
for the decision makers in Washington, since they could 
not expect the leaders in Taipei to strictly abide by 
the `four No's' policy, the United States is then 
forced to set a clearer and tighter framework for 
Taipei.  The framework is quite obvious as [we] look at 
Powell's comments together with Assistant Secretary of 
State James Kelly's policy announcement that `the 
United States is opposed to any unilateral attempt to 
change the status quo, a status quo that is defined by 
the United States.'  To put it in plain language, it 
means that `the status quo as defined by the United 
States' is `Taiwan is not independent and that it does 
not enjoy sovereignty as a nation.'  If Taiwan tries to 
use political actions to assure its independence and 
sovereign status, it would mean it is attempting to 
alter the status quo defined by the United States. . 
 
". U.S. decision makers have began to sense that the 
situation's development has forced them to re-evaluate 
Taiwan's value on a strategic scale.  Once the costs 
and risks to protect Taiwan have evidently outweighed 
the limits that the United States can sustain, it would 
have to give up the strategic chess piece [Taiwan] 
overnight." 
 
B) "Seize the Opportunity for Peace" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
editorialized (11/13): 
 
". Taiwan saw Chen [Shui-bian] win a second term in 
March.  In the US, President George W. Bush has also 
just won a second term, and in China, President Hu 
Jintao recently consolidated party, government and 
military power in his hands.  In all three nations, 
power has been confirmed, making this the best time to 
seek cross-Strait peace. 
 
"The US has already said that Chen's 10-point 
initiative `lays the foundation' for progress toward 
resumption of dialogue.  But we hope that when Bush and 
Hu meet in Chile for APEC summit later this month, they 
will also accept the participation of Taiwan's special 
envoy Lee Yuan-tseh to engage in three-sided talks over 
the 10 points, opening up a new opportunity for peace 
across the Taiwan Strait." 
 
PAAL