This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TW
SUBJECT: SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES PROMINENT IN LY CAMPAIGN 
 
REF: TAIPEI 3521 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Both political camps are using national 
sovereignty and foreign policy issues to mobilize core 
supporters ahead of the December 11 Legislative Yuan (LY) 
elections.  In his first weekend of campaigning, President 
Chen Shui-bian played all sides of the ideological spectrum, 
defending the "Republic of China's" links with the Mainland 
in one breath and calling for entry into the United Nations 
under the title "Taiwan" in another.  Chen may have also 
undermined his recent calls for renewed dialogue with Beijing 
by denouncing the "1992 consensus" as a "consensus of 
surrender" fabricated by the former KMT government.  Vice 
President Annette Lu and members of Premier Yu Shyi-kun's 
cabinet have been even more vocal in their campaign stump 
challenges to the "ROC's" legitimacy in Taiwan.  While recent 
rhetoric may be destabilizing for cross-Strait relations, it 
appears to having some positive effects for the Pan-Green 
campaign.  Senior KMT moderates complain to AIT that Pan-Blue 
leaders Lien Chan and James Soong have once again left the 
opposition vulnerable on nationalist themes by espousing 
positions that appeal only to hard-core Blue voters.  End 
Summary. 
 
Nationalism and Negativism 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In the first weekend of the official campaign period, 
both camps sharpened their messages in a bid to mobilize core 
supporters.  While individual candidates are mostly 
campaigning on local issues, senior party leaders on both 
sides are emphasizing basic ideological themes to complement 
a constant stream of negative personal attacks.  President 
Chen Shui-bian entered the fray on November 12, delivering 
the first of a planned series of 47 campaign speeches around 
the island.  Despite assurances to AIT by National Security 
Council (NSC) Secretary General Chiou I-jen that Chen would 
stick to "sentimental" domestic themes, Chen used his first 
set of campaign appearances to deliver a contradictory set of 
messages on Taiwan's sovereignty and foreign policy. 
 
¶3. (C) President Chen's decision to divide DPP campaign 
leadership among the four contenders for future party 
leadership had already created a split personality in the 
Pan-Green effort.  Both Premier Yu Shyi-kun's Executive Yuan 
(EY) campaign team and Vice President Annette Lu have 
regularly invoked sensitive issues like establishing a new 
constitution on the campaign trail in recent weeks.  Most 
recently, Education Minister Tu Cheng-sheng sparked a loud 
political debate on November 10 when he presented draft 
revisions to Taiwan's textbook guidelines that would require 
students to learn about the first decades of the "ROC" as 
part of Chinese (vice Taiwan) history.  Tu and Justice 
Minister Chen Ting-nan drew even harsher public criticism 
from the Pan-Blue camp after they supported an assertion by 
Examination Yuan (ExY) President (and pro-independence 
fundamentalist) Yao Chia-wen that ROC founder Sun Yat-sen was 
a "foreigner."  DPP officials, including LY Caucus Leader 
Tsai Huang-lang, tried to distance the party from the history 
 
SIPDIS 
controversy, stressing the DPP's respect for Sun Yat-sen and 
his contributions to the "ROC's" history. 
 
CSB: Something for Everyone 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) President Chen Shui-bian entered the debate on 
November 11 by publicly rejecting the 
fundamentalist/Education Ministry attempts to cast doubts on 
the legitimacy of the "ROC."  Chen told a visiting group of 
European business leaders that it was important that Taiwan's 
people learn about the "Republic of China's" experience in 
Mainland China before 1949 as well as its rule in Taiwan 
after the Chinese civil war.  In a November 13 speech in 
Taipei City, Chen praised Sun Yat-sen as the "country's 
founder" and embraced the "ROC" flag as the "country's flag." 
 At a Taichung County rally, Chen touted his government's 
willingness to engage in dialogue with the PRC on the basis 
of the "Hong Kong talks."  However, Chen used the same speech 
to deny the existence of a "1992 consensus," terming the 
concept a KMT fabrication that amounted to a "surrender 
consensus."  At a November 12 speech in Tainan, Chen also 
reiterated his recent formulation (Reftel) that "the PRC is a 
different country... it is a foreign country," adding in the 
same breath that "we should learn about Taiwan history before 
we learn about foreign history."  Chen also brought out 
appeals last used before the presidential election for a "New 
Taiwan Constitution" that would allow the island to become a 
"normal country." 
 
"Taiwan's" New Diplomatic Strategy 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) During the Tainan rally, Chen also suggested a new 
approach to foreign policy.  Criticizing the "sucker 
diplomatic strategy" he inherited from the KMT, Chen pledged 
to end the practice of paying for diplomatic relationships. 
Potentially more problematic was Chen's announcement at a 
November 14 rally in Keelung that Taiwan would seek entry 
into the United Nations under the name of "Taiwan."  Chen 
reportedly told the crowd that the issue of "China's 
representative" at the UN was resolved long ago, but the 
problem of "Taiwan's representative" remained outstanding. 
(Comment: Chen raised the possibility of applying for UNGA 
membership under the name "Taiwan" during a September 15 
videoconference with UN-based journalists, but at that time 
he asserted that this would be akin to the "two Germany's/two 
Koreas model" and would not preclude future PRC-Taiwan 
integration.  End Comment.) 
 
Pan-Blue: Self-Inflicted Wounds? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) KMT Senior Vice Chairman (and former Premier) Vincent 
Siew complained that Chen's campaign rhetoric would further 
undermine cross-Strait ties.  "Chen has never matured into 
the role of president," Siew continued, "he doesn't realize 
that at a certain point you need to remain above the fray and 
focus on the national interest."  However, Siew placed part 
of the blame on the Pan-Blue leadership's inability to 
articulate a position that would prevent the Chen and the DPP 
from constantly using the nationalism issue for electoral 
gain.  "The problem isn't a policy divide over independence 
or unification," Siew asserted, "it is simply that from 
Changhua County (in central Taiwan) on south, the Green is 
seen as the party of Taiwan and the Blue as the party of 
China."  Siew said that ethnic Mainlander, 
unification-leaning people make up only 20 percent of the 
traditional Pan-Blue support base, but a full 80 percent of 
the leadership, including key officials surrounding KMT 
Chairman Lien Chan and People First Party (PFP) Chairman 
James Soong.  "For most Taiwanese, they are the face of the 
Pan-Blue," Siew added.  Siew noted that in this election, 
candidates from central and southern Taiwan have asked that 
Lien and Soong not appear in public with them for fear of 
losing votes. 
 
¶7. (C) Fellow KMT Vice Chairman and LY President Wang 
Jin-pyng separately offered a similar assessment.  He blamed 
Soong's insistence on solidifying ethnic Mainlander votes 
behind the PFP for the Pan-Blue's decision to come out 
against the USD 18 billion special procurement budget for the 
purchase of U.S. weapons systems, a decision that has led 
Chen and other DPP officials to label the opposition parties 
as PRC puppets.  "Mainlanders oppose the budget in far 
greater numbers than ethnic Taiwanese," Wang asserted, "it 
was a decision based purely on electoral calculations."  Wang 
acknowledged that the KMT's acquiescence to Soong's hard-line 
position was opposed by many KMT moderates.  However, Wang 
told AIT that the senior KMT leadership decided it was more 
important to project an image of Pan-Blue unity by accepting 
the PFP's approach. 
 
Comment: Same Vicious Circle 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Electoral politics may once again have undermined 
prospects for cross-Strait progress.  In recent weeks Chen 
himself has publicly and privately emphasized the importance 
of taking a low profile between now and the election in order 
to create an environment for renewed cross-Strait contacts 
next Spring.  His actions on the campaign trail raise 
questions about his commitment to such an opening.  While the 
Pan-Blue may bear some responsibility for once again ceding 
the political center to the DPP, Chen could have easily sat 
this election out if his real priority were cross-Strait 
stability.  With both sides privately telling AIT that the 
election may hinge on mobilizing core supporters to get out 
and vote, divisive rhetoric is only likely to increase in the 
final three weeks of the campaign. 
PAAL