This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002985 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2014 
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE YEMENI CENTRAL SECURITY FORCES 
COUNTER TERRORISM-UNIT 
 
REF: STATE 242948 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  This message is in response to reftel request for 
additional information on USG assistance for the Yemeni 
Central Security Forces for the purpose of assessing the best 
funding mechanism.  USG training for the CSF-CTU is an 
integral part of U.S.-ROYG cooperation in the GWOT. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Central Security Forces Counter Terrorism Unit 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (S)  The Yemeni Central Security Force (CSF) is a 
paramilitary counter-terrorism, emergency reaction, and 
counter-coup force that can provide reinforcement to the 
Yemeni armed forces.  Its primary missions are internal 
security and counter-terrorism operations.  Within the CSF, 
only the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU) is tasked with the 
primary domestic counter-terrorism mission; no CSF units 
conduct foreign internal defense.  The CSF-CTU does not 
expect to be used outside the territory or territorial waters 
of Yemen.  The CSF-CTU acknowledges that only the Yemeni 
Special Operations Forces (YSOF), who belong to the Ministry 
of Defense, will ever be used outside Yemen. 
 
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CSF-CTU Capabilities 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S)  Current Country Team planning does not contemplate 
assistance to any part of the CSF, other than the CSF-CTU. 
Similarly, Post is not aware of, and advises against, any 
plans to assist any other parts of the CSF, other than the 
CSF-CTU. 
 
¶4.  (S)  According to a National Ground Intelligence Center 
(NGIC) assessment, conducted in 2002, the CSF contains 
approximately 20,000 members organized into two different 
types of battalion-sized organizations: Special Forces 
Battalions (Al-Quwat al Khasa) and Commando/Ranger Battalions 
(Quwat Al-Sai,qa).  The general number of personnel in each 
battalion varies from 450-750.  Each battalion possesses 
several pick-up-type trucks with a 12.7mm machine gun mounted 
on the back.  Each truck is crewed by six personnel. 
Individual weapons are the AK-47-type assault rifle and 9mm 
Markarov pistol.  The CSF-CTU is separate from these 
organizations, but does draw recruits/volunteers from them. 
The CSF-CTU has approximately 150 members, divided between 
three CT platoons and a small headquarters element.  The 
CSF-CTU is equipped in a similar manner to the rest of the 
CSF.  Expertise and demonstrated capability in hostage 
rescue, high-value target operations, close quarters battle 
and forced entry are what differentiates the CSF-CTU from its 
parent organization. 
 
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Command and Control 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S)  The CSF falls under the authority of the Minister of 
Interior, Dr. Rashad al-Alimi.  The CSF Director is Brigadier 
General al-Tayyeb and the Chief of Staff is Colonel Yahya 
M.A. Saleh.  Colonel Yahya Saleh is the nephew of Yemeni 
President Ali Abdallah Saleh.  A ministerial-level committee 
comprised of the ministers of Interior, Defense, plus 
Military Intelligence and the director of the Political 
Security Organization (PSO) conducts planning for 
counter-terrorism operations.  Once a plan is created, it is 
given to the appropriate CSF unit for execution.  CSF units 
find it difficult to communicate operationally because their 
equipment lacks signal strength and the rough terrain limits 
their line of site (LOS) signal systems.  The CSF-CTU suffers 
from the same command control deficiencies as the generic 
CSF. CSF-CTU Command, Control and Communications (C3) 
deficiencies are excellent projects for future FMF, PKO or 
OGA funding. 
 
------------------------------------ 
CSF-CTU Training and Equipment Needs 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S)  CSF training requirements for the period of FY 05-07 
are as follows: 
 
-- FY 05 training requirements:  One 4-man Counter-Terrorism 
Training Team from November 2004 until May 2005.  One 6-man 
Counter-Terrorism Training Team from May to September 2005. 
Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (EEE) funding has been 
approved by the SECDEF in the amounts of $250,000 for this 
11-month period. 
-- FY 06:  One 6-man Counter-Terrorism Training Team from 
October 2005 to September 2006. 
 
-- FY 07: One 6-man Counter-Terrorism Training Team from 
October 2006 to September 2007. 
 
¶7.  (S)  CSF Equipment requirements for FY 05-07:  OGA has 
been solely responsible for equipping the CSF-CTU up until 
very recently.  It is Embassy Sanaa,s understanding that OGA 
is reconsidering equipment expenditures for CSF for FY 2005 
and beyond.  As of September 04, 4.1 million USD of PKO funds 
have been approved and used to open a &pseudo8 FMS case to 
procure ambulances, mobile C2 vans and both armored and 
un-armored vans for the transportation of the CSF-CT Unit. 
Use of these PKO funds was considered and approved as a 
&one-time8 occurrence.  If, however, normal FMF is to be 
the principal vehicle used to fund the CSF-CTU in the future, 
and OGA funding is in doubt, it will be necessary to request 
that 4.5 million USD be budgeted/ear-marked for the CSF-CTU 
for both FY,s 06 and 07.  FY 06 funds would be used to 
procure secure, tactical communications equipment and 
additional armored vehicles; FY 07 funds would be used to 
procure a new Yemeni National Terrorism Coordination Center. 
If CSF-CTU funding requirements are not reflected in 
increased FMF budgets, a re-prioritization of FMF funding 
allocations will be required. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Prioritization of CSF-CTU Funding Requests 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (S)  The CSF-CTU should be considered as the co-priority 
for FMF funds, along with the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) and 
before the Yemen Army, Navy and Air Force.  Yemen has 
under-utilized its FMF budget for the past several years. 
Because FMF funds are &5-year8 money, this has resulted in 
an un-allocated amount between 14-17 million USD remaining 
unspent and currently available for reallocation to new 
projects such as the CSF-CTU.  Including the CSF-CTU in 
out-year FMF budgets will have a negligible effect on current 
or future, Yemen Army, Navy and Air Force budgets since the 
Yemen Ministry of Defense is extremely unsophisticated in its 
understanding and use of FMF. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Point of Contact for further information is Colonel 
Mark J. Devlin, U.S. Army, OMC, Yemen, (967) (1) 303-155 ext. 
¶2879. 
KRAJESKI