This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 003081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR EC
SUBJECT: GOE PRESSES ITS LUCK -- NEXT STEPS ON STABILITY 
 
REF: QUITO 3037 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney for reason 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  A concerted USG effort to promote political 
stability contributed to the lessening of political tension 
over impeachment, and will continue to be important in the 
aftermath.  Although the situation has calmed somewhat since 
the failure of an opposition initiative to impeach President 
Lucio Gutierrez on November 9, Congress remains fractured and 
conflictive.  Seeking to reverse its fortunes, but at the 
risk of making things worse, the Gutierrez government has 
launched a counter-offensive against the PSC and its leader, 
Leon Febres-Cordero, attacking his family's wealth, the PSC' 
sinecure in the courts, and working to deny the PSC or its 
allies top leadership positions in Congress.  The result of 
this counter-offensive will become apparent on January 5, 
when the Congress chooses new leadership.   In this context 
of continued conflict and political uncertainty, we believe 
it vital for the USG to continue to exploit opportunities to 
promote democratic stability in Ecuador.  End Summary. 
 
Background on USG Democracy Stabilization Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On the eve of a preliminary vote on impeachment 
proceedings, the Ambassador spoke to the press on the margins 
of a US company donation ceremony on November 5, noting 
strong USG support for constitutional democracy, our respect 
for the votes cast by Ecuadorians in 2002 in a free and fair 
election and our strong belief that stability favors economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  The Ambassador's remarks made 
headlines and contributed to the subsequent cooling of 
impeachment fervor inside and outside of Congress. 
 
¶3.  (C) Members of the country team and ConGen Guayaquil have 
echoed the Ambassador's message to key contacts in 
government, the military, and civil society.  We have also 
used a series of high-level USG visits to reinforce the 
Ambassador's public message with key players in private. 
SecDef Rumsfeld emphasized USG support for democratic 
institutions, including Congress, to President Gutierrez and 
Defense Minister Herrera on November 16.  General Craddock 
made similar points to the Ecuadorian high command on the 
margins of the Defense Ministerial of the Americas conclave. 
We enlisted visiting Commerce DAS Walter Bastian and USTR 
spokesman Richard Mills to include political/economic 
stability points in their appearance before an influential 
private sector audience on November 11. 
 
Opportunities/Next Steps 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) We will soon have other opportunities to stress USG 
support for Ecuadorian democracy and stability.  Former 
President Bush's visit to Guayaquil has been postponed until 
December; he had helpfully declined a private invitation from 
Febres-Cordero, and had earlier declined a meeting in Houston 
requested during the impeachment process by Vice President 
Alfredo Palacio.  Former President Bush has agreed to include 
an emphasis on political stability in his speech to 
influential private sector leaders in Febres-Cordero's 
presence.  Next, CoDel Weller is slated to visit in January, 
and can help encourage the new Congressional leadership get 
down to the business of governance after a long series of 
diversions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Meanwhile, the Gutierrez government faces a series 
of challenges/opportunities in coming months.  On November 
24, Gutierrez' PSP joined with a coalition reportedly 
including the PRE, PRIAN, independents, MPD, the Socialist 
Party, and others to propose that Jorge Montero, a Congress 
member for the coastal Concentration of Popular Forces party 
(CFP), be named second vice president of Congress.  Media 
speculated that the intent of this move to fill a seat left 
vacant since early 2003 is for Montero to assume the 
leadership in the absence of Congress President Landazuri to 
call an extraordinary session of Congress during the upcoming 
recess.  According to PRE sources, the motion on Montero was 
to be followed by a proposal to restructure the Supreme 
Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal to reduce the influence of the Social Christian 
Party in these institutions. 
 
¶6.  (C) The regular Congressional session will end on 
December 3, and be followed by the Quito founding 
celebrations and the holiday recess.  President Gutierrez is 
expected to make Cabinet changes in December which could also 
affect the political climate.  (See Ref A on the impeachment 
process against controversial Social Welfare minister Antonio 
Vargas.)  Next up would be the battle over Congress' 
leadership positions for 2005-6 (including the presidency, 
two vice presidencies, and committee chairs), to be decided 
by vote on January 5, the first day of the new session. 
After Congressional leadership is decided, the Congress will 
select a new Attorney General, currently under PSC control, 
and may move to fill the still-vacant Comptroller position. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) With the PSC damaged by the impeachment vote (down to 
22 seats from 25), the government is clearly seeking to take 
the offensive.  Though GoE leaders have backed away from 
earlier hints that the Congress might be dissolved, Gutierrez 
announced a hard-line "mano dura" approach to public debtors, 
including Febres-Cordero's relatives, and his Congressional 
supporters now seem intent on building a working anti-PSC 
coalition.  Our view is that prospects for a lasting 
pro-government coalition are remote.  Our sources put pro and 
anti-government forces even at 44 apiece, with the balance in 
the hands of the moderate Popular Democracy Party (4 votes), 
and the Marxist MPD and Socialists, with three votes each. 
While PRE leaders tell us the government has constructed a 
coalition which includes judicial reform and the January 5 
leadership vote, that may be wishful thinking.  Many agree 
that PSC influence in the courts must be reduced, while each 
party individually aspires to Congressional and committee 
leadership positions. 
 
¶8.  (C) The costs of ongoing political conflict are readily 
apparent here, and affect important U.S. interests.  Despite 
a pressing unmet agenda of national needs, Congress is 
unlikely to act on substance before January 5 (with the 
possible exception of the budget, which will take effect 
automatically if Congress does not act before December 30). 
Of greater concern, each subsequent effort to unseat the 
president builds on the previous and generates a highly 
conflictive aftermath, paralyzing the GoE policy process. 
KENNEY