This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 004865 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
EB/ESC/TFS, S/CT, INL/C, IO/PHO, TREASURY OFAC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KTFN KVPR EFIN PTER ETTC PREL SF
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA: FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE'S 
FIRST FULL YEAR REVIEW 
 
(U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified.  Not for 
Internet distribution. 
 
¶1. (U) Summary. South Africa's Financial Intelligence Centre 
(FIC) released its 2003-04 Annual Report in early October. 
In its first full year of operation, the FIC received almost 
7,500 suspicious transaction reports (STRs).  The FIC is now 
turning its attention to raising the quality of STRs, 
recruiting and training its employees, and improving 
coordination with law enforcement agencies.  Still pending is 
terrorist financing legislation that mandates the seizure of 
terrorist assets.  As they build their institution, FIC 
officials seem very open to U.S. training programs and 
exchanges.  The complete annual report may be found at: 
http://www.fic.gov.za under "Documents."  End Summary. 
 
Suspicious Transaction Reports 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) On October 4, South Africa's Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) released its annual report covering 2003-04.  In 
its first full year of operation the FIC received 7,480 
suspicious transaction reports (STRs) through March 2004. 
The number of reports exceeded what was anticipated and 
placed South Africa "at the higher end of international 
experience."  The critical statistic was how many STRs led to 
criminal investigations, but the FIC was not publicizing this 
figure.  (Comment: We believe that this number is very low. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶3. (U) An FIC official admitted to Econoff that the quality 
and consistency of STRs needed to be improved and that for 
this to happen, training was key.  While all South African 
banks received general guidelines on how to train their 
staff, it was up to each to implement a training program.  At 
the upper end, one of the largest South African banks had 
managed to train nearly 95% of its employees.  Training was 
essential if the FIC was to obtain complete information on 
suspected criminal activity. 
 
¶4. (U) During the past year, the FIC averaged between 500 and 
700 STRs monthly.  Money remitters (i.e., wire transfer 
services) and banks submitted the bulk of them -- 4,079 and 
2,732 reports, respectively.  Other reports came from coin 
dealers, individuals, casinos, brokers, and law enforcement 
agencies.  These sources mirrored international experience. 
Normally, financial institutions collected STR information 
manually before management determined whether a suspicious 
transaction should be reported.  The FIC received over 90% of 
all STRs electronically with the remaining sent by fax or 
delivered by hand.  Most South African banks were aware of 
automated software that could assist them with the internal 
information collection and reporting process, but have not 
yet invested in it. 
 
Complaints 
---------- 
 
¶5. (U) Both FIC and Banking Council officials commented on 
the difficulty that banks had transferring money if it went 
through a U.S. institution.  This difficulty was because of 
the disparity between the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List and 
the U.N. 1267 Sanctions Committee List (the one that South 
Africa adhered to).  The danger was that if a South African 
bank customer was entering into a transaction with a 
U.S.-identified suspected terrorist organization or 
individual, and the customer's transaction was handled in any 
way by a U.S. bank, the customer's assets could be frozen by 
that U.S. bank.  This caused some banks to simply avoid doing 
business with U.S. banks whenever possible. 
 
¶6. (U) Many banks felt as if the FIC reporting obligations 
were burdensome and hampered their efforts to attract new 
customers.  For example, "Know Your Customer" requirements 
mean that account holders must present identifying documents 
to their banking institutions in person or risk having their 
accounts frozen.  The measure was designed to prevent 
suspicious transactions, but has become an administrative 
nightmare.  At the banks request, the South African National 
Treasury extended the June 30, 2004 deadline according to a 
staggered timetable wherein higher risk customers must meet 
an earlier deadline and lower risk customers a later 
deadline.  October 31, 2004 was the deadline for banks to 
report on all nonresident account holders, trusts, and 
partnerships as well as 20% of high-risk clients.  Meeting 
this deadline was not a problem for the high-risk clients, 
but it has been for trusts and partnerships, where compliance 
appears to be very low.  Banks have 15 days to before they 
must freeze the non-compliant accounts or face large fines 
and prosecution, which could result in imprisonment.  The 
final "Know Your Customer" deadline is September 30, 2006. 
 
Legislation Needed 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (U) South Africa still does not have the legal means to 
deal comprehensively with suspected terrorist financing. 
Banks report to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) every 
six months on any U.N.-designated terrorist activity, but 
there is no law mandating that they freeze assets unless the 
activity has been linked to a specific crime in South Africa. 
 South African law also does not currently have cash 
threshold or cross-border reporting requirements for banks. 
The Parliamentary Select Committee on Security and 
Constitutional Affairs is debating draft legislation that 
recognizes terrorist activity as a threat to the country,s 
safety and mandates the seizure of terrorist assets.  This 
legislation could be approved by the end of the year, and 
would coincide with the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) 
evaluation recommendations for South Africa put forth last 
year. 
 
Institution Building 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) When the FIC became independent from the National 
Treasury in November 2003, it had to start from scratch to 
create a new agency.  It soon found that reaching its goal of 
hiring 75 employees by March 2005 without a personnel 
department was not going to happen.  Now, with a personnel 
department in place, the FIC has relaunched its recruitment 
drive and hopes to surpass its original goal of 75 employees. 
 
¶9. (U) In the last year, the FIC has made considerable 
headway in building its capabilities and credibility in the 
South African law enforcement community.  Initially, the 
FIC's nascent database on suspected criminal activities did 
not contain much information and law enforcement agencies 
were not aware of how the FIC might help them with their 
investigations.  The FIC's database is more useful now, 
enabling the FIC to adopt a proactive approach toward 
assisting law enforcement agencies by regularly searching for 
information on a known case to support a criminal 
investigation.  By showing that it can add value to an 
investigation, the FIC has been gaining credibility among law 
enforcement agencies.  During its first full year of 
operation, the FIC received 161 information requests from 
local (105) and international (56) law enforcement agencies. 
FIC officials expect these numbers to rise. 
 
Training: Detection of Terrorist Financing 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Ursula M'Crystal, Head of FIC Prevention and 
Compliance, told Econoff that the FIC welcomed future 
training opportunities from U.S. agencies, such as the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,s (FinCEN).  She 
specifically requested training on how to detect terrorist 
financing in the absence of specific intelligence.  (Note: 
M'Crystal also encouraged us to proactively share any 
intelligence information with the FIC that we can.  End 
note.) 
 
¶11. (U) FIC's Annual Report highlighted the important 
contribution that FinCEN,s analysis training made to FIC's 
development.  Other international training programs 
highlighted included the British High Commission's financial 
crimes investigator training and a future one-year university 
certificate program in financial crimes investigation.  We 
would add that the videoconference on October 13 with John 
Byrne of the American Bankers Association on the U.S. Patriot 
Act attracted more than 100 FIC officials, bankers, and 
regulators.  The event was co-hosted by the Money Laundering 
Forum and the Johannesburg Consulate and held at Investec (a 
South African investment bank). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) South Africa deliberately chooses to rely upon U.N. 
designation lists, rather than the U.S. OFAC list.  As far as 
we know, the FIC does not enter our list into its database. 
We will continue to encourage South Africa to use our lists 
as much as possible, track pending terrorist financing 
legislation in Parliament, and report on FIC's progress.  The 
FIC and banking industry have made significant progress in 
the detection of financial crimes, but could use some help. 
We believe that the FIC is open to further cooperation with 
FinCEN and to participating in international training 
programs. 
FRAZER