This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PANAMA 002829 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN/PIERCE 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR MARR PINS PM POL CHIEF
SUBJECT: PANAMA GOVERNMENT WEATHERS FIERCE CRITICISM AS IT 
STRIVES TO MODERNIZE ITS PUBLIC FORCES 
 
 
REF: A. PANAMA 02033 
     ¶B. PANAMA 02553 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Linda E. Watt for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 

¶1.  (C) With apparent support from President Martin Torrijos, 
Minister of Government and Justice Hector Aleman is moving to 
centralize control of the Panamanian Public Forces (PPF). 
MOGJ sources contend that under the government of former 
president Mireya Moscoso, MOGJ exercised weak oversight of 
the Panamanian National Police (PNP), while the National 
Aviation Service (SAN) and National Maritime Service (SMN) 
were left to languish under poor leadership.  Aleman and MOGJ 
staffers believe that centralized management along with 
better accountability and clear missions will improve 
efficiency, discipline, and anti-corruption oversight; reduce 
duplication; save resources; and foster rational planning. 
The Embassy broadly supports those goals, which could improve 
MOGJ's coordination with the USG's law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism objectives in Panama.  The downside is that 
centralization could lead to MOGJ micro-management, red tape, 
and increased in-fighting between GOP departments.  Another 
underlying reality is that austerity may reduce already 
inadequate PPF budgets by 15%, which could adversely affect 
the GOP's ability to support U.S. security and law 
enforcement goals. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) MOGJ's centralizing plans come at a time when the 
local press has pilloried the Torrijos government for 
allegedly plotting to resurrect Panama's military, following 
a series of ill-considered miscues, which include airing 
Noriega-era military marches at public ceremonies, 
high-profile National Day parades of armed militarized 
police, the apparent creeping re-introduction of military 
ranks, and a refusal to disavow plans for a new law to permit 
the GOP to appoint a uniformed PNP head.  The USG also has 
been criticized for aiding and abetting this alleged 
"remilitarization."  The recent coincidental back-to-back 
visits of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and USARSO Commander 
John Gardner have added fuel to the fire.  The local press 
has forced Torrijos and Aleman both to publicly deny that 
they are trying to re-militarize Panama. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Panama has not had a military since Operation Just 
Cause ousted military dictator Manuel Noriega and the Panama 
Defense Forces (PDF) in 1989.  Panama's 1994 constitution 
banned the military.  The PPF's resulting lack of focus and 
dysfunctionality was not entirely unintentional but welcomed 
as a fail-safe system to preclude any possibility of a 
military coup.  Most Panamanians believe that Panama's 
military "virus" now is firmly eradicated.  But the strong 
sensitivities that remain mean that MOGJ will have to tread 
carefully.  So far, we have seen little evidence of the 
skillful public relations campaign the GOP will have to wage 
if it is to convince public opinion of the rightness of its 
reforms.  On the contrary, Torrijos officials seem to be 
handing their opponents a stick to beat them with.  For our 
part, Embassy is strategizing to protect U.S. equities as 
they relate to cooperation on security and law enforcement 
matters.  While we do not believe this latest media campaign 
will undermine the significant progress that we have made 
with the Panamanians over the past few years on security 
cooperation, this recent politically driven criticism of 
U.S.-GOP security re-engagement will force the Embassy to 
take a more measured approach on any security issues that 
could fuel the current feeding frenzy.  End Summary. 
 
 
Focus of MOGJ's New Plan 
------------------------ 

¶4.  (C) Minister of Government and Justice Hector Aleman, 
backed by President Martin Torrijos, is working to realign 
Panama's Public Forces (PPF) more firmly under his control to 
better define their missions, improve cooperation, and 
conserve limited resources.  The GOP believes that a lack of 
clear missions for the National Aviation Service (SAN) and 
National Maritime Service (SMN) and many of the 21 MOGJ 
agencies has duplicated efforts and caused insufficiencies in 
Panama's security that have allowed arms and drugs 
traffickers to enter Panama.  The key players in this process 
are Minister Aleman and his national security advisor, 
Severino Mejia.  A project to write new organic laws for 
almost all 21 MOGJ agencies (except the PNP, which has had an 
organic law since 1997) is one focus of the effort.  Another 
focus is MOGJ's recent demand for all agencies to report 
inventories and equipment condition.  MOGJ intends to hold 
managers accountable for state-owned equipment.  For each 
agency MOGJ has written 30-, 60-, 90-day plans and one-, 
three-, and five-year plans and, in some cases, 10-year 
plans.  Also, MOGJ is lobbying the Presidency for its budget 
proposals for all agencies. 
 
 
Draft Organic Laws 
------------------ 

¶5.  (C) MOGJ is circulating new draft organic laws for SMN, 
SAN, SINAPROC, Public Security (which controls civilian arms, 
explosives, and fireworks), fire departments, and others. 
The purpose is to assign clear missions and reduce future 
conflict between agencies.  The draft organic laws place the 
SAN and SMN for the first time on an equal footing with the 
PNP.  (Previous arrangements had subordinated them to the PNP 
and tasked them with providing transportation needs.)  The 
draft law proposes controversial, military-sounding name 
changes.  SMN would be renamed Panamanian Coast Guard Corps 
and would have sole responsibility for coastal patrol, Canal 
defense, port defense, and fishing violations.  SAN would be 
renamed Panamanian Air Guard would handle search and rescue 
and disaster response and would provide air support for the 
PNP and SMN in drug interdiction and border patrol 
activities.  (Comment: The use of the term "Guardia" conjures 
up negative connotations for many Panamanians who remember 
the National Guard ("Guardia Nacional") roots of the 
Torrijos/Noriega dictatorship.  See Para 9.  End comment.) 
 
 
Most Important Missions: Drugs, Arms 
------------------------------------ 

¶6.  (C) MOGJ National Security Advisor Severino Mejia 
Mosquera is Aleman's point man in reorganizing and 
coordinating the PPF.  He sees drug and weapons trafficking 
as the primary threats to Panama.  He becomes animated when 
speaking of Panama's need to have the means to combat 
terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, and criminal violence. 
To complement the draft laws, Mejia is writing a joint 
operations and training manual that provides regulations 
detailing how the SAN and SMN should carry out their duties. 
He told PolOff that MOGJ will expect the SAN and SMN to run 
joint drug and weapons interdiction efforts.  How all of that 
will play out in practice is unclear.  (Note: Air Service 
chief Fabrega has complained to PolOffs of Mejia's 
"interference" in his autonomy.  PNP chief Gustavo Perez has 
told EmbOffs that he wants no part of coordinating or 
cooperating with the SMN and SAN.  While interagency 
coordination and ministry oversight could improve management 
markedly, micro-management would not.  It is still uncertain 
how far central control will reach.  End Note.) 
 
 
Financial Weakness 
------------------ 

¶7.  (C) The most conspicuous weakness of the GOP's plan to 
modernize its public forces is financial.  The PNP, SMN, and 
SAN all require bigger budget outlays for increased equipment 
and personnel to take on the security tasks that the GOP 
wants to assign them.  (Already inadequate PPF budgets have 
faced across-the-board 15% budget cuts for the coming fical 
year.)  In addition, SMN is running an estimated $2 million 
deficit and the PNP reportedly has a $12 million deficit. 
Little wonder, then, that Mejia groused to PolOff that when 
forced to choose, the GOP ignores security in favor of its 
domestic agendas of health, social security, and other 
programs.  (Comment: Mejia's remark undercuts claims that the 
GOP is bent on re-militarizing Panama, although that fact is 
lost on an ill-informed, politically-driven local press.  End 
comment.) 
 
 
The Key Players: Aleman and Mejia 
--------------------------------- 

¶8.  (C) Minister Aleman has actively sought consultations 
from the USG during his first two months in office.  He 
participated actively in a USG-GOP bilateral security 
workshop in August, has asked for Embassy feedback on several 
organic laws, and traveled to Washington to consult with DHS, 
DOD, and USCG officials.  Most recently, he met with 
Secretary Rumsfeld during the Secretary's meeting with 
President Torrijos.  He has been actively collecting ideas 
for reinventing the structure of the agencies that fall under 
his mandate.  A former School of the Americas honor student, 
Severino Mejia makes no bones about his former close 
association with Manuel Noriega.  As a PDF captain during the 
1980's, Mejia was Noriega's aide-de-camp.  He also worked in 
Panama's mission to the United Nations.  (Bio Note: Mejia 
holds a University of Panama BA in International Relations 
and a master's degree in Business Administration.  End note.) 
 
 
Miscues and Missteps 
-------------------- 

¶9.  (C) Recurring public relations gaffes and/or ambiguities 
(see below) have raised questions about the GOP's intentions 
and have forced both Torrijos and Aleman to make public 
statements recently denying any attempt or intent to 
re-militarize the PPF. 
 
 
-The press has repeatedly speculated about plans that 
Torrijos announced prior to the May 2, 2004 election to 
appoint a uniformed chief to head the PNP, although Aleman 
recently said the plan is on hold "for now."  The law 
currently bars anyone but a civilian for that job.  Torrijos 
says he wants to name a PNP chief who has "come up through 
the ranks" but many fear that, once the law is changed, 
Torrijos will appoint a former high-ranking Panamanian 
Defense Forces (PDF) officer. 
 
 
-During the election campaign Torrijos frequently highlighted 
his family connection with his father, military dictator Omar 
Torrijos (d.1981).  Since Martin Torrijos took office on 
September 1, press reports have alleged that 19 former 
(unnamed) officers from Noriega's PDF are serving in the GOP. 
 
 
 
 
-At the September 2 swearing ceremony of PNP chief Gustavo 
Perez and again during the November 3 and November 4 parades 
marking Panama Independence Day, the PPF band shocked many 
Panamanians by playing "Todo Por La Patria," a military march 
that served as the PDF anthem.  The song had not been heard 
in public since Operation Just Cause toppled Noriega.  The 
song's composer, Antonio Fernandez Gomez (aka "Tony Fergo"), 
who also is Martin Torrijos's father-in-law, publicly 
criticized the playing of "Todo Por La Patria," saying that 
he wrote it for a different time and purpose. 
 
 
-Militarized police with painted faces unnerved some 
observers when they marched in camouflage gear while holding 
automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades, and sniper 
rifles in this year's Independence Day parades.  (Such units 
first appeared in the November 3, 2003 Centennial parade 
attended by Secretary Powell but caused little ruckus.) 
 
 
-The SMN and SAN draft organic laws propose military-sounding 
name changes of SMN and SAN to "Panamanian Coast Guard Corps" 
and "Panamanian Air Guard."  One Torrijos confidant told POL 
Counselor that he had warned Torrijos that if the name 
changes go through, the PNP would soon demand to be called 
the "National Guard" or "Guardia Nacional."  (Note: In 1953, 
the name of Panama's Fuerza Publica was changed to Guardia 
Nacional, an act many Panamanians regard as the start of 
militarization.  Omar Torrijos confirmed the name "Guardia 
Nacional" in Panama's 1972 constitution.  Panama's 1983 
constitution under Manuel Noriega dropped Guardia Nacional in 
favor of "Fuerzas de Defensa de Panama" or PDF in English. 
End note.) 
 
 
-The two draft laws also establish titles military sounding 
"Comandante" for the SMN and SAN successor chiefs.  SMN chief 
Traad is already signing official correspondence as 
"Comandante."  Panamanians have complained about hearing 
former PDF officials now serving in the GOP being addressed 
as "mi coronel," a military rank that does not now exist. 
Although it might have an innocuous explanation, people have 
overheard former PDF Colonel Daniel Delgado (now at the 
foreign ministry) being addressed as "Coronel Delgado" during 
Secretary Rumsfeld's visit and before, whereas before taking 
office he was always called "Licenciado Delgado." 
 
 
-Aleman's aide, Severino Mejia, told PolOff that after 
meeting with USG officials, MOGJ Aleman remarked that he 
wants to emulate the role of U.S. Secretary of Defense. 
Aleman probably meant he wants to have enough authority over 
the 21 PPF agencies to improve management, efficiency, and 
inter-agency coordination.  However, such seemingly innocent 
remarks in the current climate, especially if quoted by the 
press, could reinforce fears about "remilitarization." 
 
 
-USARSO Commander MG John Gardner visited Panama during 
November 16-17 to prepare for the 2005 humanitarian exercise 
"New Horizons."  Nonetheless, his visit, hard on the heels of 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's November 13-14 visit to Panama, 
has added fuel to the anti-military fire, leading some to 
theorize that the U.S. is encouraging the alleged 
re-militarization. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 

¶10.  (C) When U.S. military forces withdrew in 1999, Panama 
had to accept responsibility for border and Canal security. 
It was hardly prepared for the task then, and is only 
marginally better prepared now.  Panama's PPF needs a great 
deal more money, manpower, training, and equipment to 
adequately fulfill the minimum security requirements of the 
state.  The bottom line is that Panama does not have the 
money to re-militarize, even if it wanted to.  Although it 
does not need (or want) a military, Panama does need a well 
reasoned security strategy with broad public support and a 
well trained, properly funded and administered public force 
apparatus.  Panama's current concerns about transnational 
crime and terrorism mesh with many of our own priorities. 
Those imperatives have crashed head on with the Panamanian 
public's well founded mistrust of military organizations and 
its cynical expectation that local politicos will use 
military power, if they can, against their political 
opponents.  Panama's unsophisticated, sensationalist, and 
poorly trained press has fueled popular concerns. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) The new GOP under Torrijos, having downplayed those 
sensitivities in implementing its security strategy, has 
unleashed a storm of criticism, which it now is trying to 
ride out.  Panama's knee-jerk anti-militarism is being 
exploited by elements of the press and elite Panamanians who 
mistrust the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD).  A fair 
amount of hypocrisy, not to say schizophrenia, is involved. 
For instance, no one complained when former SMN Director 
General (until 9/1/2004) Jose Isaza wore a uniform and called 
himself "comandante." 
 
 
¶12.  (C) Despite lurid denunciations of military bogeymen 
which have been appearing daily in the local press, we do not 
believe the Torrijos government is aiming to re-militarize 
Panama, much less re-establish military rule.  What the GOP 
needs to do but what it is not yet doing is to publicize 
Panama's security needs in a forthright manner to build 
public support.  It is clear that the USG will be blamed in 
the public mind by any perception, false or otherwise, that 
the GOP intends to re-militarize.  The Embassy seeks to 
preserve the carefully calibrated security re-engagement 
strategy it has pursued over the past several years and must 
avoid being seen as pushing Panama toward accepting 
extraneous military responsibilities or capabilities.  To 
pursue this balancing act, to protect the USG's equities, and 
to avoid getting dragged down by GOP missteps, Embassy is 
working on a press strategy to protect U.S. equities in the 
bilateral security relationship. 
 
 
MCMULLEN