This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 007394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014 
TAGS: PREL PTER KISL BG IN
SUBJECT: PRE-SAARC INDIA GOES EASY ON BANGLADESH 
 
REF: A. CALCUTTA 449 
 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 6983 
     ¶C. DHAKA 1697 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Bangladesh Foreign Minister Morshed Khan's 
November 1 stop in New Delhi was officially scheduled to 
deliver India's invitation to January's SAARC Summit in 
Dhaka, but also provided an opportunity for bilateral 
discussions on festering cross-border issues.  The GOI 
resisted the temptation to use the visit to beat up on Khan, 
and this latest round did not yield any breakthroughs, but 
with a PM level meeting coming during the January SAARC 
Summit in Dhaka, it may have paved the way for a lowering of 
tensions then.  New Delhi has shown an increased willingness 
to share information with us about developments in 
Bangladesh, but like us is struggling to find a recipe for 
reversing the crisis of governance there.  End Summary. 
 
Only the Messenger 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Morshed Khan came to New Delhi as the special envoy of 
PM Khaleda Zia to deliver India's January SAARC Summit 
invitation, and although the visit included the full 
complement of bilateral interactions, the GOI did not take 
him to task over allegations that Bangladesh is becoming a 
safehaven to Indian separatists and Islamic terrorists. 
Rather, according to MEA Director (Bangladesh) TS Sandhu, the 
GOI "kept it positive."  Sandhu cautioned that Khan's 
forthcoming attitude would still have to be "matched on the 
ground."  Border issues, including resolution of the 
undemarcated portions and coordinated patrols, figured in the 
discussions, but without resolution.  In India, Khan also met 
with leaders of the Left parties, whose main power base is 
West Bengal, bordering Bangladesh.  Sandhu thought this was 
an important exchange because that state's connection with 
Bangladesh could act as a buffer in the Delhi-Dhaka 
relationship. 
 
"Growing Intolerance" 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Although he claimed to agree with PolCouns' assertion 
of the US point of view that the overriding issue in 
Bangladesh is one of governance, Sandhu focused on "growing 
intolerance" as the most important concern.  He added that 
Dhaka is creating a "breeding ground" for forces inimical to 
the BDG and potentially India and the US.  Sandhu noted that 
the GOI would like to see the BDG at a minimum apply 
"positive pressure" against these groups and thought the US 
could be effective in helping Bangladesh "see reality and not 
become boxed-in."  Like others in the GOI he was seized with 
the presence in Dhaka of ULFA leader Paresh Barua who he 
suggested had escaped from prison in Bangladesh by exploiting 
local political connections. 
 
GOI and UK Share Their Assessments 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Indian intelligence officials recently provided DIA 
a classified briefing on "Terrorism in Bangladesh" which 
offered some insights into Indian allegations.  The report 
indicated that the number of Jamaat Islami (JI) affiliated 
madrassas in Bangladesh has grown to 6,024 and reiterated a 
point the GOI had made to PDAS Don Camp in June that the 
jetty used in April's Chittagong arms haul was under the 
control of JI Amir Matiur Rahman Nizami.  The Indians also 
noted that Dhaka has called for the arrest of Bangla Bhai, 
the Islamist vigilante leader of the anti-BDG Jagrata Muslim 
Janat Bangladesh (JMJB) (ref C), but he remains at large with 
the aid of leaders of the governing Four Party Alliance. 
Intelligence officials cited a Saudi-based NGO, Al Harmain 
Islamic Foundation and Studies Institute, with offices in 
Dhaka operating in the capital and Cox's Bazaar.  The report 
concluded that democracy in Bangladesh has been "jeopardized 
by fundamentalist elements" and because of the JI's role in 
the governing coalition, the BDG cannot eradicate the 
extremists. 
 
¶5. (S) A report passed to us by the UK High Commission 
(strictly protect) corroborated concerns about the Cox's 
Bazaar region and foreign funding.  The GOI also asserted 
that the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) area is a base for 
Islamic extremist groups, including Al Qaeda, whereas the UK 
paper highlighted the CHT for not being home to such groups, 
although Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar are.  Rather than JI 
madrassas in these areas, the UK report continued, it is 
those linked to the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ, also part of the 
governing coalition) in which the problem is most acute.  The 
British report also noted the presence of Southeast Asian 
students in these areas. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6. (C) It will be interesting to watch how, if at all, the 
BDG response to Indian allegations of harboring militants 
changes in light of Burma's commitment to quashing 
cross-border insurgent activity during Than Shwe's New Delhi 
visit (ref B) and the seemingly connected crackdown in 
Manipur during the last few weeks (ref A).  The GOI's 
willingness to combine their allegations with specific 
information shared with us is an important move towards 
greater India-US CT cooperation in this area.  The 
inconsistencies with the British report, however, highlight 
the need for more ongoing dialogue with our various Indian 
interlocutors. 
 
¶7. (C) Khan's visit was his second to New Delhi since the UPA 
came to power in May, and in early January, Manmohan will 
meet PM Zia for the second time at the SAARC Summit.  If the 
PM continues his record of making last minute policy moves, 
as he did with the troop drawdown in Kashmir before his visit 
there, and the preferential trade agreement with Thailand 
when he reached Bangkok in July, continues, there is a 
possibility of a step forward in India-Bangladesh relations 
when the PMs sit down in Dhaka.  But for now, we have yet to 
see evidence that India and Bangladesh have found a recipe 
for reversing the downturn in their bilateral relations. 
BLAKE