This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NEW DELHI 007061 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO NRC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2014 
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP ETTC IN NSSP
SUBJECT: NSSP PHASE TWO: CHARTING THE COURSE 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 7013 
 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 6500 
     ¶C. NEW DELHI 6733 
     ¶D. NEW DELHI 6599 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  After reviewing achievements made under 
Phase One (Ref A), the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 
(NSSP) Implementation Group discussed the way forward on 
Phase Two, including legislation, enforcement, outreach, and 
training to strengthen export controls; adherence to MCTR and 
NSG Guidelines; nuclear safety; space cooperation; and 
missile defense.  The Indians commented that work is already 
well-advanced on issues such as developing a framework for 
stronger export controls.  Considerable effort, however, must 
be sustained to ensure effective implementation such as 
introducing legislation that adequately covers "intangible" 
technology transfers and provides for "catch-all" controls. 
Other issues, such as formulation of an Indian missile 
defense doctrine, remain in the beginning stage.  The Indian 
side agreed to a further discussion of Phase Two issues in 
connection with the November 18-19 High-Tech Cooperation 
Group (HTCG) meeting.  See para 21 for a GOI-drafted list of 
issues for follow-up by the GOI and USG.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) A/S Rocca led the USG delegation comprised of 
Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary Borman, DCM, PolCouns, 
and representatives from the State Department's Bureaus for 
South Asia, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control, the 
Department of Defense, as well as the Science and Customs 
offices at Embassy New Delhi.  With similarly broad 
representation, the GOI delegation was led by MEA Additional 
Secretary for International Security Meera Shankar, with 
 
SIPDIS 
participation from MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S. 
Jaishankar, other MEA officials from the Americas and 
Disarmament Divisions as well as representatives from the 
Department of Atomic Energy, Department of Space, and the 
Defense Ministry's Defense Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO).  Because of scheduling constraints, not 
all participants were able to attend all sessions. 
Participant list follows in para 21. 
 
Ongoing End-User Verification 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In the October 21 session of the Implementation Group 
meeting, Joint Secretary Jaishankar expressed the GOI desire 
to respond in a timely manner to the end-user verification 
requests which Commerce U/S Juster gave the GOI on October 11 
(Reftel B), but requested better information on the following 
issues: 
 
-- Better contact information for the companies, e.g., name 
of specific subsidiary, location, etc.  (He noted the GOI 
used to receive this information regularly in the past); 
 
-- Purchase reference numbers to allow cases to be 
cross-checked between the Indian and US sytems; 
 
-- An indicative list of what information the US requires for 
post-shipment verification; 
 
-- Information about Indian license requests that have been 
denied in order to have a better understanding of what is 
acceptable; 
 
-- A contact person for export issues.  (Note: New 
MEA/Americas Under Secretary Raj Srivastava will be the GOI 
POC and Embassy New Delhi expects a DOC export attache to 
arrive shortly.) 
 
--  Amendment of the footnote to Commerce's missile catch-all 
regulation, citing India's missile program as an entity of 
concern. 
 
¶4.  (C) Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export 
Administration Matthew Borman responded that a number of 
these requests can be accommodated and some, such as the 
request for purchase numbers, will need review.  On amending 
the missile catch-all footnote, Borman said the amendment has 
not yet been published, but said he expected the rule, 
including removal of the missile footnote, to be published 
the week of October 25. 
 
Phase 2: GOI Steps on Legislation, Enforcement, Outreach, 
Training 
-------- ------------------------ ------------- 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) On strengthening the legislative framework for export 
controls, Russell noted that UNSCR 1540 calls on all 
countries to adopt the same kind of export control laws and 
practices that are outlined in the NSSP.   Shankar expressed 
confidence in the GOI system of export controls, but stressed 
that the resources India devotes to controls for high-tech 
goods should be proportional to its trade in that area, which 
she described as "infinitesimal."  She noted that the GOI has 
other government priorities and that steps taken need to be 
reasonable given resource constraints.  Shankar presented a 
non-paper on "India's System of Controls Over Exports of 
Dual-Use Materials, Equipment and Technology" (Reftel C). 
 
¶6.  (C) In the October 20 session, Shankar outlined the 
ongoing process of strengthening GOI export controls through 
legislative, policy, and administrative modifications. 
Legislative amendments include revising the Customs and 
Finance Acts to make violations punishable by imprisonment. 
Shankar offered to share GOI draft legislation, pending 
appropriate internal clearances.  Policy changes include 
mandatory licensing for export, re-export, and transit of all 
"Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and 
Technologies" (SCOMET) items, including damaged, defective, 
or used items; controls on intangible technology related to 
SCOMET items; and a "catch all" provision which affords the 
GOI latitude in interpreting which dual-use items may be used 
for suspect activities.  Administrative controls include 
better inter-ministerial coordination through high-level and 
working-level groups. 
 
¶7.  (C) As the GOI strengthens export controls, Shankar 
relayed private sector concern that new regulations would 
obstruct business, not proliferation.  Russell noted that all 
countries face this concern but offered that governments such 
as Hong Kong, which have tightened controls, have found that 
high tech trade has flourished, boosted by confidence that 
only legitimate businesses would be willing to operate in a 
regulated business environment. 
 
Preventive Enforcement 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Acknowledging India's basic legal framework governing 
export controls, A/S Rocca also suggested four areas in need 
of enhanced legislation and enforcement:  intangible 
technology transfers, brokering, transit and re-export, and 
"catch-all" controls.  DAS Borman gave the GOI a non-paper 
with suggestions for ways to strengthen GOI preventive 
enforcement capabilities. 
 
¶9.  (C) Under Secretary for Disarmament and International 
Security Affairs Nutan Kapoor listed GOI efforts to enhance 
their enforcement capabilities:  some pre-license checks on 
end-users, risk assessments, post-shipment/installation 
verification, and random inspections, all of which may result 
in confiscation or other penalties.  These measures also 
apply to brokering activities of authorized customs house 
agents.  To prevent the unauthorized transfer of intangible 
technology, Indian scientists going abroad for training must 
get GOI clearance, as do scholars, while visa applications 
for visiting scientists and scholars are subject to 
inter-ministerial approval.  On re-exports, Kapoor said that 
under all circumstances, SCOMET items can only be exported 
with a license and that the GOI undertakes pre-license 
checks.  Finally, training for Customs officials is ongoing. 
For example, India and the US have had 16 exchanges of export 
control experts since 2000, four in the past year.  Russell 
underscored the value of EXBS exchanges, and offered to 
provide more training as India increases its staffing in this 
area.  As this is an evolving process, Shankar also suggested 
examining best practices from other countries and regimes. 
 
Outreach Initiatives Complicated by Visa Problems 
-------------------- ---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) In the October 20 session, Shankar reported that 
relevant GOI departments, including the MEA, are in the 
process of conducting outreach to industry and related 
associations.  She also suggested that industry-to-industry 
outreach would be constructive.  However, the GOI is awaiting 
a response from the USG on several proposals for 
industry-to-industry exchanges, according to Jaishankar, 
complicated by the "hangover effect" of difficulties Indian 
scientists face in obtaining visas.  He recalled cases where 
individual scientists were granted visas but were then barred 
from visiting the labs that had invited them.  He said he 
spoke to A/S for Consular Affairs Maura Harty about the 
matter during her recent visit to New Delhi.  "The ongoing 
problem of visas poses a serious operational constraint on 
what we're trying to do," he said.  A/S Rocca assured him 
that the US is aware of these problems and is trying to 
streamline this process, which requires clearances from 
several agencies before a visa is issued. 
 
Adherence to MTCR and NSG Guidelines 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) An important step required of India in Phase Two is 
agreeing to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex and the 
NSG Guidelines, and its associated trigger list and dual-use 
list.  Russell described the MTCR as a non-treaty political 
understanding among 34 states sharing common interests in the 
non-proliferation of missiles, rocket and unmanned air 
vehicle systems and technology.  Other countries can "adhere" 
to the MTCR unilaterally without being a member of the 
regime, as have Israel and Romania, she said. 
 
¶12.  (C) Drawing from prepared points, Russell went on to 
explain that Part 1 of the NSG Guidelines requires that for 
transfers of Trigger List items or technology, the recipient 
state must have IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities 
("full-scope safeguards").  Part 2 of the Guidelines governs 
exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, technology and 
materials.  Actual adherence is not required in Phase Two, 
but rather, India should provide a firm commitment in Phase 
Two to adhere to these regimes in Phase Three.  Such a 
commitment would be in writing, similar to the policy 
statements that India provided in Phase One.  Actual 
adherence would come in Phase Three, and would involve the 
related actions by India in that phase, including: 
harmonization of its national control list with the export 
control lists of the regimes; and enactment of relevant 
legislation to conform to the accepted standard among regime 
members and adherents, including on intangible technology 
transfers and catch-all. 
 
¶13.  (C) In response, GOI Department of Atomic Energy 
representative noted that the India already has stringent 
mechanisms in place that are analogous to the NSG guidelines, 
such as the Proscribed Equipment List, Proscribed Substances 
List, and Radioactive Items List. 
 
US Steps on License Requirements, Nuke Safety, Space, MD 
----------- --------------------- ---------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) DAS Borman listed what the US has committed to do 
under Phase Two:  Remove license requirements for EAR 999/99 
items to all safeguarded facilities in India; expand NRC 
dialogue to cover topics in Phase Two; and suggested a 
US-India cooperation on satellite development, production, 
marketing and operating.  Jaishankar asked for a paper 
clarifying what removal of EAR 99 license requirements 
entails, rather than "having to interpret US law for 
ourselves."  Removal of EAR 99 license requirements was the 
subject of a separate meeting between Borman, NP 
representative, and GOI officials (septel). 
 
Request for Flexibility on Nuclear Safety 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) In the October 20 session, Shankar expressed strong 
interest in examining how some US controls can be relaxed in 
Phase Two, specifically for NSG controlled safety-related 
equipment, perhaps under the NSG safety exemption. 
"Flexibility on this would make it easier to demonstrate 
progress to our constituency, so that they see that we are 
getting something in exchange for revising our laws," she 
argued.  The Department of Atomic Energy representative 
expressed hope that cooperation will be expanded beyond the 
nuclear island and include training related to fourth 
generation nuclear reactors. Russell noted that the trend in 
the NSG has been to strengthen the safety exemption rather 
than be more lenient.  Jaishankar added that he wanted to 
explore training opportunities for Indian scientists in 
nuclear safety and hopes to expand the dialogue on this issue 
to include the US Department of Energy. 
 
Expanded Cooperation on Civil Space Programs 
----------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶16.  (C) On expanding cooperation on civil space programs, 
DAS Borman said that Phase Three will involve the signing of 
a Space Launch Agreement, similar to that which the US signed 
with Russia and Ukraine.  Jaishankar expressed interest in 
this agreement, which in Phase Three would allow the launch 
of US satellites as well as indigenous satellites with US 
components.  Department of Space representative reaffirmed 
GOI intention to revise ISRO's Request for Proposals to 
require disclosure of US content and compliance with US 
licensing conditions (Reftel D).  Responding to ISRO 
questions about the US commitment to space cooperation, 
PolCouns underscored the end-state we seek for full scope 
US-Indian civilian space cooperation, including ability to 
launch US satellites and satellites with US components. 
 
¶17.  (C) Demonstrating the societal benefits of India's space 
program, Space Department representative said that the GOI 
recently initiated a program to link village council members 
around the country via satellite and communication equipment 
provided by ISRO.  ISRO representative also detailed several 
pending requests in the area of space cooperation.  DAS 
Borman suggested the GOI provide a list of the sort of 
specific cooperation that ISRO would like to see in Phase Two 
as well as a list of the pending requests mentioned. 
Finally, when asked when all ISRO subsidiaries would be 
removed from the Entity List, Borman responded that such an 
issue could not be reviewed until after Phase Three. 
 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
¶18.  (C) On continuing the missile defense dialogue, in the 
October 20 session, Shankar said the GOI will first undertake 
an internal exploratory meeting with its agencies. 
Responding to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) proposal (made 
at the June 2004 Defense Policy Group meeting) to conduct a 
series of planning events leading to a command post exercise 
in January 2006, Jaishankar said the GOI agrees with the 
proposal and would like to conduct the first planning meeting 
in the first quarter of CY 2005.  Regarding the US offer to 
sell India PAC-2 missile defense capability, Jaishankar said 
the GOI wants to "telescope" (combine) briefings on PAC-2 and 
PAC-3, so the &right set of people8 can look at the issue 
in its entirety. OSD India Country Director Alverson replied 
that he would convey the GOI requests to DOD officials in 
Washington.  Alverson noted that the MDA activities would be 
useful to India in helping India determine for itself what 
are its missile defense requirements, which should be the 
first element of conversation between our experts on the sale 
of a missile defense system. 
 
Issues for Follow-up 
-------------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) During the course of the 2-day discussions, the 
following issues arose for further follow-up: 
 
For joint action by the USG and GOI: 
 
-- Agreement on date for initial planning meeting with MDA on 
missile defense command post exercise; 
 
For action by the GOI: 
 
-- Formal response to U/S Grossman's letter on offer to sell 
the PAC-2 system; 
 
-- Copies of draft GOI legislation, laws, and procedures on 
export controls and preventive enforcement; 
 
-- GOI paper to clarify pending issues and proposals on space 
cooperation; and 
 
-- Formal letter of interest about the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI). 
 
For action by the USG: 
 
-- Provide comments on status of GOI list of pending cases of 
onward proliferation; 
 
-- Clarification about implications of removing restrictions 
on EAR 99 and XX 999 items without licenses for ISRO 
subsidiaries; 
 
-- Provide list of items that will be permitted as exports 
from the US to India under NSSP Phases One, Two, and Three, 
pursuant to EAR amendments; 
 
-- Notification of removal of missile from Commerce,s 
missile catch-all regulation; 
 
-- Response to GOI inquiry on specific industry outreach 
exchanges; 
 
-- Provide more contact information about companies (contact 
name, address, and telephone number) for end-use visits; 
 
-- Provide information about denied license applications; 
 
-- Provide purchase reference numbers for items for which a 
license has been approved; (this won,t be feasible, 
according to DOC) 
 
-- Provide information on status of Import Certificates under 
the 1984 MOU and their continuing relevance; 
 
-- Response to suggestion on harmonizing IAEA Convention on 
Nuclear Safety and NSG Guidelines on nuclear safety. 
Consider licensing of safety-related items for safeguarded 
plants; 
 
-- Response to GOI proposal to expand cooperation on reactor 
safety issues in DAE-DOE/NRC format; 
-- Provide position paper on adherence steps to NSG and MTCR 
Guidelines; 
 
-- Provide information about Russian and Ukrainian Space 
Launch Agreements; 
 
-- Respond to request to combine discussion of PAC-2 with 
classified briefing on PAC-3; 
 
-- Request to facilitate visas for Indian scientists; 
 
-- Request to provide more detail about information on which 
sanctions against Indian scientists Prasad and Surendra are 
based; 
 
-- Request to provide information about status of dismantling 
AQ Khan network; and 
 
-- Provide updates about changes to the Iran Sanctions Bill. 
 
Upcoming Meetings 
----------------- 
 
¶20.  (U) The next meetings for follow-up include the High 
Tech Cooperation Group (HTCG, November 18-19) in Washington, 
the meeting with MDA in the 1st quarter of CY 2005 to begin 
planning for the command post exercise, another round of the 
Strategic Stability Dialogue (Washington-November), and 
another round of Nonproliferation and Security  Talks 
(Washington-November). The US side urged the Indian team to 
come to the November HTCG meeting with papers responding to 
papers shared by the US on export control legislation, 
preventive enforcement, government-industry outreach, and 
space cooperation. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
 
¶21.  (U) USG Participants: 
 
State Assistant Secretary for South Asia Christina Rocca 
Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration 
Matthew Borman (Oct. 21) 
Embassy New Delhi DCM Bob Blake 
Embassy Political Counselor Geoffrey Pyatt 
Embassy Science Counselor Marco DiCapua (Oct. 21) 
Embassy DHS Customs Representative Jim Dozier (Oct. 21) 
State Non-Proliferation Bureau Caroline Russell 
State Arms Control Bureau Tom McIlvain 
State India DeskOff Jim Seevers 
Defense, OSD Country Director Jim Alverson (Oct. 21) 
Embassy PolMilOff Stacy Gilbert (notetaker) 
 
GOI Participants: 
 
MEA Additional Secretary (International Security) Meera 
Shankar (Oct. 20) 
MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar 
MEA Director (Americas) Renu Pall 
MEA Director (Disarmament and Int'l Security) Venu Rajamony 
(Oct. 20) 
MEA Deputy Secretary (Americas) Santosh Jha 
MEA Under Secretary (Disarmament and Int'l Security) Nutan 
Kapoor 
MOD Defense Research and Development Organization, Dr. Anup 
Chatterjee 
Dept of Atomic Energy, Dr. S.D. Misra 
Dept of Atomic Energy, Scientific Officer, Dr. A.B. Awati 
Dept of Space, ISRO Director, Dr. Rajeev Lochan 
Consultant to MEA, Dr. V. Siddhartha (Oct. 20) 
 
¶22.  (U) A/S Rocca and Commerce DAS Borman cleared this cable. 
MULFORD