This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006998 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PK IZ IN
SUBJECT: JASWANT IN THE WILDERNESS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford, Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a warm and constructive November 1 
discussion with the Ambassador, Parliamentary Opposition 
Leader Jaswant Singh reaffirmed his commitment to the 
US-India relationship, remarking that "I have paid a 
political price for my support of better relations" between 
New Delhi and Washington, "but I will continue to do so 
because it's the right thing for India."  Not surprisingly, 
Jaswant was highly critical of Congress' performance in 
government, arguing that Manmohan Singh did not have the 
stature or temperament to hold together a multi-party 
coalition as Vajpayee did.  Jaswant cautioned that 
suggestions the BJP should support the UPA's efforts to 
continue economic reform were undercut by the "personal 
vendetta" that some in the Congress have been conducting. 
The former Foreign Minister was typically downbeat about US 
policy in Pakistan, complaining that Washington had granted 
President Musharraf "a veto" over the US-India relationship. 
On Iraq, Jaswant worried about the prospect of partition 
along ethnic and religious lines.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Reviving a relationship that began when Jaswant Singh 
was Finance Minister, the Ambassador, joined by PolCouns, 
called on the Rajya Sabha Opposition Leader at his New Delhi 
residence on November 1.  Jaswant was completely at ease in 
his role as an opposition politician, remarking wistfully on 
his official residence "in the servants' quarters" of the 
Prime Minister's compound.  Jaswant made only a passing 
reference to the recent controversy over the Secretary's 
description of the US role in helping to sustain efforts at 
Indo-Pak diplomacy in April 2003.  He recalled that Vajpayee 
had made three major efforts at rapprochement with Pakistan 
-- at Lahore (1999), Agra (2001) and Srinagar (2003).  In 
each instance, he argued, the only driver was the Prime 
Minister's personal resolve to make peace with Pakistan his 
lasting legacy.  Without going into details, Jaswant 
expressed concern that President Musharraf and the Pakistani 
leadership have still not made the strategic decision to 
abandon hostility to India. 
 
US-India 
-------- 
 
¶3. (C) On the broader US-India relationship, Jaswant was 
unequivocal, recalling how he and the Prime Minister resolved 
between themselves to make relations with Washington an NDA 
priority.  "I have paid a political price for my support of 
better relations" between New Delhi and Washington, Jaswant 
declared, joking that he had been labeled as a "CIA agent" 
within the NDA.  He declared that "I will continue (this 
support for US-India partnership) because it's the right 
thing for India."  Jaswant was completely gracious in his 
recollection of his early meetings with Bush Administration 
officials, describing in detail how touched he had been by 
the time that the President spent with him during his May 
2001 visit to Washington.  Echoing remarks he made earlier 
this year to former Deputy Secretary Talbott (and recounted 
in Talbott's memoirs), Jaswant offered a long soliloquy on 
the unfulfilled potential of the US-India relations.  He 
lamented that "Musharraf has been given a veto" over the pace 
of US-India relations, and complained that the war in Iraq 
and our respective election cycles have left both Washington 
and New Delhi too distracted to focus on our bilateral agenda. 
 
Arc of Crisis 
------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador cited the NSSP as evidence of 
Washington's commitment to the India relationship and 
challenged Jaswant's implication that Iraq was less than an 
urgent challenge to international security, which promoted 
the former Foreign Minister to back track from his comments. 
However, after acknowledging that policy makers must work 
with the world as they find it, Jaswant added that he is 
gravely concerned about the prospect that Iraq will fracture 
along ethnic and religious lines.  Pulling from his library a 
well thumbed copy of David Fromkin's "Peace to End All 
Peace," Jaswant cited the British legacy in the Middle East 
as the root of the region's current tumult, reiterating 
concern that an artificially drawn Iraq would eventually 
splinter. 
 
¶5. (C) Jaswant stayed in his Dickensian mode as the 
conversation turned to Afghanistan, arguing that despite 
surface appearances the situation there remained fragile.  He 
pointed to Karzai's US protection detail as an error of US 
tactics that created an image deeply offensive to Karzai's 
Pashtun constituency.  Drawing on his experience negotiating 
with Kabul for the release of a hijacked Indian airliner, 
Jaswant counseled against any compromise with the Taliban. 
 
¶6. (C) On Pakistan, Jaswant recounted the "sad history" of US 
engagement with Islamabad to argue that sooner or later India 
will be "presented with the bill" for the GOP's current 
cooperation with Washington in the war on terrorism.  As in 
the 1980's, he argued, the United States will eventually find 
itself at a dead end with its Pakistan policy. 
 
Whither Reform? 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Jaswant's enthusiastic interventions on foreign policy 
betrayed his preference for that dimension of his several 
previous portfolios.  But the former Finance and Defense 
Minister also spoke with authority on issues of governance in 
India.  Jaswant cautioned that the US might want to "aim off" 
of (discount) his remarks on Congress, since he speaks now as 
a leader of the opposition bench.  With that caveat, Jaswant 
criticized Manmohan Singh for lacking the stature or 
temperament to hold together a multi-party coalition as 
Vajpayee did.  He called the Home Minister "a disaster," 
described how Pranab Mukherjee had privately acknowledged 
that he knew nothing about the Defense portfolio, implied 
that Foreign Minister Natwar Singh had already been stripped 
of most authority by the PMO, and generally excoriated the 
UPA government. 
 
¶8. (C) Queried about the BJP's approach to economic issues 
now that they are back in opposition, Jaswant argued that 
Congress' "personal vendetta" against the BJP and other NDA 
alliance members made it difficult for people like him who 
would be inclined to support the government's effort to 
sustain the process of reform.  He implied that the BJP at 
least for now will be a relentless opposition, taking 
advantage of Congress missteps and contradictions with the 
Left to score easy political points.  He was silent on 
questions of BJP leadership, and the struggle between Hindu 
hard liners and moderates like himself who recognize that a 
middle course is essential to the BJP's hopes for returning 
to power. 
MULFORD