This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 002178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO RW CG
SUBJECT: KABILA DISCUSSES EASTERN SITUATION WITH FOREIGN 
AMBASSADORS 
 
Classified By Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: President Kabila held a November 29 
discussion with Ambassadors from the UNSC Perm 5 countries, 
Belgium, South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria, and UN SRSG 
Swing.  While speaking in measured tones, Kabila made clear 
his frustration with Rwandan President Kagame, and in essence 
Kabila accused Kagame of seeking to wreck entirely the DRC,s 
transition. Kabila and close advisors outlined steps being 
taken by the GDRC to address the ex-FAR/Interahamwe threat, 
and appealed for united international community support for 
use of the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM), tripartite 
process, and other political and diplomatic means to address 
regional problems.  Kabila reported Rwandan and Congolese 
military chiefs should be meeting on the border this week. 
He also noted, however, that the government is deploying 
FARDC brigades to North Kivu to address threats both from 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe as well as from Rwanda.  In related 
activity, Nigerian President Obasanjo is coming to Kinshasa 
Dec 6., and MONUC is seeking to begin JVM operations this 
week.  A Joint Verification Commission meeting has been 
proposed for December 9 in Kinshasa.  The South African 
Ambassador suggested that Mbeki is exploring how SADC may be 
involved in solutions as well.  Other items discussed during 
the meeting will be reported septel.  End summary. 
 
Kabila Discusses the East 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Following his return to Kinshasa over the weekend from 
the Ouagadougou Francophonie summit, President Kabila 
convened the morning of November 29 what he characterized as 
an informal discussion with the Ambassadors of the UNSC Perm 
5 members, Belgium, South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria, plus 
UN SRSG Bill Swing.  Kabila was accompanied by Chief of Staff 
Boshab, Special Advisor Kaputo, Ambassador-at-Large Okitundu, 
Diplomatic Advisor Kapanaga, and his spokesperson. 
 
¶3. (C) Kabila opened by emphasizing his concern over the 
situation in the east, and specifically the threat of renewed 
invasion by Rwandan forces.  He noted that in recent weeks, 
the DRC and Rwanda had been parties to signature of the Joint 
Verification Mechanism (JVM) agreement and the 
U.S.-facilitated Tripartite Agreement, and had taken part in 
the Dar es Salaam summit and separate meetings with the 
visiting UNSC.  He and Rwandan President Kagama met in Dar. 
Only a short time after all of this, Kagame made new threats 
to send his forces across the DRC border, a possibility never 
mentioned in their meeting only a few days before.  Kabila 
said he found the timing strange, and later added that even 
though "some" do not believe Rwanda already has troops inside 
the DRC, in fact they do.  He asserted Kagame,s public 
threat was only a justification of a course of action already 
launched.  Kabila also noted that the new Rwandan threat 
occurred while 8th Military District Commander Obed is 
"absent" from the area. 
 
Meeting in Ouagadougou, Threats, Plans 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) Kabila reported that he had met again with Kagame in 
Ouagadougou.  He said that Kagame had asked "officially" for 
Rwandan troops to re-enter the DRC, possibly with 2-3 
brigades operating with the Congolese to disarm 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces in the region.  Kabila reported he 
deemed the proposal "inadmissible" as the Congolese people 
would simply not accept the renewed acknowledged presence of 
Rwandan troops on Congolese soil. Indeed, it would risk a 
potentially violent public reaction in various parts of the 
country. 
 
¶5. (C) Kabila noted his own intent to deal with the 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe, and had Special Advisor Kaputo expand. 
Kaputo ran through a brief recent history of the JVM and 
Tripartite processes, and said the GDRC had developed a plan 
to deal with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe within the time frame 
described in the Tripartite Agreement.  Specifically, actions 
were being taken to talk with Mai Mai and other local leaders 
to locate and identify ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces and 
specifically leaders.  In the meantime, brigades are to be 
trained at Kitona base within the next three months for 
deployment to use against those elements who resist voluntary 
disarmament and repatriation (DDRRR).  Also during this time, 
it is important for Rwanda to renew efforts in Rwanda to 
encourage return. 
 
¶6. (C) Given the current situation, Kaputo said that as an 
interim measure the government is undertaking an "interim" 
deployment of additional forces to North Kivu.  Kabila later 
added that just as significant new forces had earlier been 
sent to South Kivu in response to the destabilization threat 
posed by "dissident" Generals Nkunda and Mutebusi, 
significant new forces will be sent to North Kivu now to 
address the threat from both the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and from 
Rwanda across the border.  Kabila also reported that the 
Congolese and Rwandan military chiefs are to meet this week 
on the border, either on the border bridge near Bukavu, or in 
the "no-man's land" border area near Goma. 
 
Ambassadorial Responses 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) SRSG Swing led the responses from the foreign 
Ambassadors with three recommendations.  First, JVM 
operations in North Kivu should start immediately using 
personnel already stationed in Goma and Gisenyi.  He 
indicated that the final formal document, a concept of 
operations, had already been signed by GDRC 
Ambassador-at-Large Ghonda and was awaiting signature in 
Kigali by Great Lakes Special Envoy Sezibera.  (Note: MONUC 
DDR Chief told DCM and PolCouns later on Nov. 29 that 
Sezibera did indeed sign the JVM concept of operations 
today.)  Secondly, Swing said that he obtained agreement from 
both Kigali and Kinshasa to hold a meeting of the Joint 
Verification Commission on December 9 in Kinshasa, although 
it would be chaired by current incumbent Rwanda.  Swing 
noted, however, that Rwandan FM Murigande has recently 
commented that he did not see the need to hold the meeting 
before January.  Swing asserted he believes it now more 
important than ever to hold the meeting quickly.  Thirdly, 
Swing encouraged the Tripartite mechanism to be fully 
utilized for dialogue among the respective regional players. 
 
¶8. (C) Other Ambassadorial interventions fully supported the 
need to start immediately JVM operations, to make use of the 
Tripartite, and to avoid recourse to military actions.  While 
endorsing these sentiments, I also noted the long-standing 
seemingly intractable nature of the problem represented by 
Hutu extremist forces.  In addition to whatever problem they 
pose to Rwanda, they certainly threaten the security of 
Congolese in the east and general stability as well, but a 
solution has been hard to find.  While Congolese efforts to 
neutralize these forces are needed and welcome, I encouraged 
consideration of other potential offers that may be made by 
other countries (comment: thinking specifically of South 
Africa) which could be useful in this regard.  The French 
Ambassador pointed out the problem of the "expenditure chain" 
which has delayed many issues in the GDRC, including military 
integration and training, in reference to the planned 
training in Kitona.  (Comment: This is an allusion to control 
by Vice President Bemba of key portfolios, and the delays and 
political problems arising from the divided 
responsibilities.)  The UK Ambassador underscored the 
importance of concrete results in the east.  The Belgian 
Ambassador emphasized the importance of Rwandan actions to 
create an environment conducive to the return of Rwanda Hutu 
combatants in the DRC, commenting that Brussels does not 
believe the signals to-date "have been sufficiently clear". 
 
¶9. (C) The South African Ambassador made an allusion to my 
remarks, but did not describe any specific offers or ideas 
that President Mbeki may have made to Kabila in recent 
contacts.  He did say that Mbeki is exploring how SADC may be 
involved and helpful to a solution. 
 
¶10. (C) The Nigerian Ambassador reported that President 
Obasanjo will be arriving in Kinshasa on December 5 or 6 in 
follow-up to his participation in the Ouagadougou meeting. 
He reportedly plans to continue on to Kigali following his 
Kinshasa stop. 
 
 
Presidential Wrap-Up 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In his final summary, Kabila said that he has been 
trying to determine what the Rwandans really want.  While the 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe are a continuing problem, he does not 
believe they represent any longer a threat to fundamental GOR 
stability.  He opined that there may be three basic 
motivations.  Rwanda retains strong coltan mining and other 
commercial interests in North Kivu, and they presumably want 
to preserve them. Secondly, they may wish to derail the DRC 
transition process.  Surely they are aware that a renewed 
acknowledged large-scale troop presence in the DRC could set 
off major public violent demonstrations that could wreck the 
fragile transition process.  Thirdly, he wondered if in fact 
the Rwandans want the hard-line core of remaining Hutu 
extremists back.  A new military operation, or even threatof 
a military operation, acts as a motivator to stay away. 
Kabila also speculated about a DRC threat to enter Rwanda, 
for example to seize General Mutebusi or his people.  Would 
this be regarded in the same way? 
 
¶12. (C) Kabila also expressed frustration with meetings and 
declarations.  Kabila said he refused a Belgian request in 
Ouagadougou for a joint declaration with Kagame, adding that 
the Congolese people have seen too many statements that seem 
to mean nothing (comment: a clear allusion to the JVM and 
tripartite accords, and the Dar es Salaam regional 
conference).  Kabila noted again his intention to deploy new 
troops to North Kivu to address both threats, from the 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe and from Rwanda.  He appealed for support 
for these deployments, and for general international 
community support for political and diplomatic efforts to 
avoid renewed general warfare in the area. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶13. (C)  Kabila spoke in measured tones throughout the 
meeting, but clearly projected a sense of frustration and 
resentment over the Rwandan threat.  It is unclear which 
troops are to be involved in the Kitona training plan, but 
this may be linked to the Angolan government effort to train 
significant numbers of troops in Kitona, primarily 
Presidential GSSP.  The GGSP is widely viewed as the only 
potential FARDC force capable of undertaking any kind of 
sustained offensive military operations.  Kabila,s reference 
to 8th Military District Commander Obed,s "absence" from 
Goma likely reflects Kabila,s intent to block Obed,s return 
permanently.  Obed has been largely viewed in the Presidency 
as unresponsive to Kinshasa, and likely working in 
cooperation with Kigali.  Obed,s removal, much less a new 
deployment of supposedly Kinshasa-controlled troops into 
North Kivu, could certainly effect a major change in the 
overall balance of forces and influence in the province. 
This, along with the recent reported failure of the joint 
FARDC/MONUC operation against ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces in 
North Kivu due to the lack of FARDC logistical support 
capability, may indeed not be unrelated to the timing of the 
current threat and general situation.  As reflected in our 
reporting, we have been aware for some weeks of significant 
new renewed political maneuvering in North Kivu by one or 
more key players, including the Kinshasa government, 
RCD-Goma, and North Kivu Governor Serufuli.  We may be 
witnessing the denouement. 
 
¶14. (C) Comment continued: Whatever the causes, the 
overriding priority from our perspective at this point must 
be the avoidance of renewed large-scale fighting that could 
engulf the region in a renewed period of warfare.  Such a 
development would certainly bring crashing down the overall 
DRC transition as well.  Insofar as a solution to neutralize 
the remaining Hutu extremist forces can be identified, 
possibly with South African or other foreign troops to help 
take on the task, so much the better to eliminate the 
long-stated GOR major concern, as well as an ongoing threat 
to the security of all in the region.  Clearly, we should 
also use our efforts to support the range of political 
efforts underway, including the JVM and tripartite, and what 
we hope will be coordinated efforts by Obasanjo and Mbeki. 
End comment. 
 
¶15. (U)  Bujumbura minimize considered. 
 
MEECE