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Viewing cable 04KINSHASA2115, CONGO/B - IS CONGO'S FUTURE ON THE RIGHT TRACK? IS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04KINSHASA2115 2004-11-18 14:44 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kinshasa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 002115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C - BARGERON AND EB -F. CHISHOLM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ASEC CF
SUBJECT: CONGO/B - IS CONGO'S FUTURE ON THE RIGHT TRACK? IS 
AN IMF PROGRAM DESERVED? 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1055 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBIN R. SANDERS FOR REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Below follows an analysis of current 
political and economic atmospherics in the Republic of Congo, 
including points recently noted by the country,s President, 
Denis Sassou Nguesso, regarding his efforts to truly put 
Congo on a &democratic path8 and change once and for all 
Congo,s lack of transparency culture, history of bad 
business practices, and - personally important to him - the 
country,s negative international image. In the Post,s view, 
there are many positive signs, but there also remain 
challenges on both the macro and micro level in both the 
political and economic sectors. It will be up to President 
Sassou whether the country can build on the current progress. 
All members of his government are not reformers, and he is 
surrounded by many hardliners still clinging to their old 
Soviet habits and perspectives.  Although for now, Sassou 
gets credit for trying to be a reformer.  He still needs to 
figure out how to either bring the hardliners on board and 
stop the ankle biting and undermining, or take a tougher more 
politically challenging path of removing them from government 
(The planned Cabinet reshuffle and reduction has yet to take 
place - reftel).  This will be the test of his leadership and 
legacy and whether he has truly changed his spots. 
 
 
OVERALL ATMOSPHERICS: 
 
2.  (C) The Republic of the Congo, with only three years 
since the end of major conflict behind it, wants to be viewed 
in the region and by the international community as having 
turned the corner to respectability, and good leadership both 
economically and politically.  Clearly there is surface 
evidence that things have improved.  Brazzaville city is 
showing signs that people believe the country is now stable. 
New construction starts are at an all time high, streets are 
clean, and new businesses (hotels, restaurants) are popping 
up all over town. Long gone also are the security checkpoints 
in the usually troubled BaCongo neighborhood (an area where 
many southerners live). Although there was a recent robbery 
on the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville train, by all accounts, it 
was a well-organized pirating commercial venture with likely 
complicity by individuals who are or were members of 
government, especially security force elements. The recent 
train attack was initially reported as a "Ninja Operation," 
referring to those previously or still connected to rebel 
leader Pastor Ntumi. However, the ragtag remnants of Ntumi's 
Ninjas do not have the capacity -- trucks, gasoline, 
organization, or  well-armed manpower -- to pull off such an 
operation, including moving tons of goods across the border 
to Democratic Republic of Congo. Outside of the train attack, 
Congo has been calm, and may be past the stage of Post using 
the term "fragile calm." The real question is whether Congo 
can make more political and economic progress and solidify 
the changes to date? 
 
ECONOMIC PROGRESS MUST CONTINUE: 
 
3.  (C) On the economic front, with President Sassou,s 
personal commitment using his very able Finance Minister, 
Congo has cleaned up transparency in its oil sector, 
presented decent budgets the last two years, appears to be on 
track for a positive December IMF Board vote, and is working 
out payment schedules with bilateral and multilateral 
creditors comparable with Paris and London Clubs. Most of 
these major changes, particularly in oil transparency, have 
been accomplished in the last 18 months.  Finance Minister 
Andely, who is respected by the international financial 
community as well as the diplomatic and NGO establishments in 
Congo, does not enjoy the same respect from many in the 
37-member cabinet. Many in the cabinet are hardliners who 
want cronyism and the culture of payoffs to remain, and make 
it their daily duty to ankle bite and undermine him at every 
turn.  Andely,s efforts are on target and Sassou has 
strongly supported his technician.  The much-needed changes 
include: more oil and overall transparency; streamed lined 
Ministerial and national budgets; working with creditors, 
paying down debt; and trying to end the culture of impunity 
and illicit enrichment every step of the way. Andley,s work 
to meet IMF measures, has taken on a term used by the 
hardliners called "Andely-ism," and the Finance Minister has 
survived solely because of Sassou's commitment to turn the 
country around and his desire to leave an image and legacy 
quite different from his past leadership during the 
mid-to-late 20th century. 
 
4.  (C) There are a number of hardliners in both the cabinet 
and national assembly who are resistant to these more 
transparent, good governance moves. The hardliners include: 
the Minister of Government Coordination and Transport Isidore 
Mvouba, who holds the PM-like position in Congo; Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and the Francophonie Rodolphe 
Adada; National Security Advisor Jean Dominque Okemba; 
Minister of Planning Pierre Moussa, Minister of Territorial 
Administration Francois Ibovi, Superior Education Minister 
Ossebi; Security Minister Pierre Oba; Senate President 
Noumazalaye, and National Assembly President Tchicaya ) to 
name just a few. Given the positions of these hardliners, 
sustained changes ) particularly politically ) will 
continue to be an uphill battle.  The balancing act for 
Sassou is that many of these hardliners not only represent 
key political support as a result of their clans being close 
to Sassou,s Mbochi, but also because Sassou could not have 
won the conflicts of 1997-1999 without the support of Likoula 
ethnic group leaders such as Senate President Noumzalaye and 
Security Minister Oba, in addition, of course to Angolan 
support. 
 
 
POLITICAL FRONT - PROGRESS, BUT MORE CHANGES NEEDED: 
 
5.  (C) Clearly more improvement has been made on the 
economic side of the ledger than the political, although we 
have to note there has been improved governance over the last 
18 months in several areas such as: some outreach to NGOs; TV 
coverage of parliament sessions; ministers called to defend 
positions before Parliament and on occasions talking to the 
press; defense of the national budget before the national 
assembly; publishing national budget and oil sector 
contracts; and other government reports; Sassou holding 
western-style press conferences and making state of union 
speeches before parliament; and, so on. However, Congo must 
overcome a few more challenges in order to have sustained 
good governance and for the country,s image to truly change. 
For example, the opposition needs to be allowed to have more 
dialogue and access to the press, and the NGO and civil 
society communities need to be viewed as an asset to public 
policy, not threats. 
 
6.  (C) There is some evidence that Sassou is trying to do 
more to improve the political front and build on the 
governance improvement to date . He has tried to move forward 
on a much-needed cabinet reshuffle/size reduction, but has 
not yet found his legs to do so (reftel). Many of the 
hardliners who need to be removed so that more/more good 
governance can take place, helped and served Sassou over many 
years doing the communist era, including in later years 
during the 2002 elections. It is uncertain what kind of 
backlash would take place if any of these powerful, 
clan-based hardliners were removed from their post, and what 
effect ) if any ) this would have on emerging stability. 
What appears to be happening is change over several stages. 
Sassou's Peoples, Workers Party (PCT) is rumored to be on 
the verge of a split within the next 3-6 months, between 
reformers under the umbrella of a new party which will 
reportedly be called the &Union for the Republic,8 led by 
Sassou, and old hardliners of the PCT, which could include 
many of the current cabinet. Thus far, there is no single 
leader among the hardliners and their individual personal 
financial interests have, to date, outweighed any organized 
anti-Sassou efforts.  One of the biggest challenges in 
addition to addressing the inner circle leadership issues is 
to find ways to cut the undermining by the hardliners in the 
short term. 
 
7.  (C) In a recent conversation that Ambassador had with 
Sassou at his hometown in Oyo on November 4-5, 2004 he noted 
that he did not have enough people around him &ready to 
accept8 long term change. His daughter, close confidant and 
Public Relations Counselor, Mrs. Lemoumba, told Ambassador 
during same period that it was difficult to really identify 
who is inhibiting progress, transparency, and change because 
the blockage can be as far down as the director or office 
level of a Ministry. (Note: Ambassador was invited to spend 2 
informal days in Sassou,s hometown in Oyo to have a more 
one-on-one dialogue on Congo issues in general. Policy 
conversations in Oyo only included Sassou, Mrs. Lemoumba, and 
the Ambassador. End Note.) 
 
8.  (C) Despite what appears to be a commitment at the top 
with Sassou for more good governance and reform, political 
missteps continue and old habits die-hard.  Some in the inner 
circle clearly act in ways that fly in the face of 
transparency. That being said, the hardliners are smart 
enough to have learned to "talk the talk" about democracy, 
good governance and transparency, but when out of view do not 
"walk the walk," with the press, with the NGO community, and 
with the opposition.  For example, recently the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs called in freelance journalists linked to 
international press such as Reuters, PANA, AFP, Africa Number 
One, etc., many who also hold jobs in the national media, as 
well as the BBC correspondent, and "implied" that their 
accreditation could be pulled if they reported issues that 
sullied Congo,s image. BBC headquarters was later asked to 
pull its correspondent, the only independent reporter in 
Congo, seemingly without cause because of his reporting on 
the challenges that remain in Congo. In another case, one 
hardline Minister recently engaged with an NGO and implied 
that its exoneration could be pulled if it did not allow "its 
list of bidders" to receive contracts. These are just a few 
glimmers of the challenges that remain to transparency 
despite the progress noted thus far. 
 
 
NEXT STEPS: BUILD ON PROGRESS, CONTINUE TO REFORM, AND 
NEUTRALIZE HARDLINERS 
 
9.  (C) The near future for Congo has always been clear - it 
rests in the hands of President Sassou and how he continues 
to move forward on the issues noted above. Ambassador has had 
some discussions with other reformers to see where they think 
the country is going. It has come to light that Sassou seeks 
a lot of advice from former Ghanaian President Rawlings.  One 
could described this frequent contact as one former dictator 
turned "democrat of sorts" (Rawlings) giving advice to one 
(Sassou) who wants to be remembered in the same light -- 
dictator who changed his spots, wants to change his 
country,s image, and is trying to move in the right 
direction politically and economically.  Sassou still has 
some old habits, some he recognizes, however, others he does 
not -- at least yet. For example, he still dabbles in CEMAC 
regional issues in a desire to control or influence who is in 
leadership positions in neighboring countries.  Relations 
with DRC continue to have ups and downs, and in 2003, reports 
indicate that he played a role in removing Central African 
Republic President Patasse. For now, let,s give him the 
benefit of the doubt and put him in the reformer camp. We 
will need to watch and see if this is a faade or a true 
change of spots. Congo still has a ways to go, but in two 
years there have been some visible changes, but long-term 
success will be determined by continued and expanded changes 
and, in the end, the sustainability of these changes. For 
now, the IMF called for measures are in place, and the 
hardliners are unhappy. It is clear to Post that the 
reformers will need to be successful with the IMF and other 
good governance efforts in order to neutralize the hardliners 
enough that they no longer are a political risk. 
 
10.  (U) Brazzaville Embassy Office - Sanders 
 
MEECE