This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 KINSHASA 002047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2014 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: THE CONGOLESE TRANSITION CURRENT AND FUTURE, AND 
THE U.S. ROLE 
 
 
Classified By: Roger Meece.  Reason 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  There has been major progress in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past few years, 
ending years of open warfare involving eight national armies 
and numerous domestic armed groups.  Peace accords have 
yielded the formal withdrawal of foreign troops, a domestic 
transition process leading to elections, and an unprecedented 
level in central Africa of international community 
involvement, including a major U.N. peacekeeping operation. 
The current peace is tenuous, however, and the transition 
structure is ungainly and fragile, liable to the risk of 
collapse from numerous internal and regional threats.  As 
well, any strategy to achieve long-term stability in the 
country must take into account the de facto lack of a unified 
coherent government in Kinshasa.  Our overriding policy 
priorities must be the success of the DRC transition process, 
and cessation of destabilizing inter-state activities.  There 
are four main areas for attention: 1) the security 
environment, 2) preparation and conduct of elections, 3) 
establishment of government authority across the country, and 
4) regional relations.  Success is by no means guaranteed; 
however, the U.S. has an important role to play to ensure 
positive outcomes in each of these areas.  This cable 
describes background developments leading to the current 
situation, summarizes the existing strategic framework and 
future plan, and outlines priority areas for USG support or 
intervention.  End summary. 
 
Background and Context 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Following decades of bad governance under the Mobutu 
dictatorship and an inconclusive &sovereign national 
conference,8 central government in then-Zaire had become 
largely irrelevant for the vast majority of its citizens by 
the mid-90's.  Despite immense natural resources, overall 
conditions had degraded to the point where one could no 
longer meaningfully speak of national infrastructure, GDP 
experienced a long-term decline, and a political vacuum had 
developed.  In essence, the country had no functional 
national government, with all the attendant negative economic 
and social consequences to be expected from that central 
reality.  The 1994 genocide and war in neighboring Rwanda 
generated enormous waves of primarily Hutu Rwandan citizens 
crossing the Zaire border, including ex-Kigali government 
extremists implicated in the genocide as well as civilian 
refugees.  Rather than seeking to address positively the 
growing eastern crisis, various Zairian leaders continued 
free-wheeling profit-oriented practices, dealing with and 
supporting the Rwandan extremist Hutu leaders. 
 
¶3. (C) Unfortunately, the international community also failed 
to take any meaningful action to bring under control the 
armed extremist elements that continued to operate in the 
vast camps established in eastern Zaire.  After two years, 
the Kigali government had had enough with what it viewed as 
an unacceptable status quo and ongoing security threat 
emanating from the eastern Zaire camps.  In 1996 Rwandan 
forces, acting in concert with other nations, moved to break 
up the camps with invasion forces.  Whether intended or not, 
the action also brought about as a corollary the collapse of 
the precarious Zairian equilibrium.  With a broad alliance of 
African states eventually joining in against the 
widely-disliked Mobutu, the Kinshasa government fell within 
months.  It was replaced by a government composed largely of 
Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed figures, with Laurent Kabila 
installed as President by mid-1997.  The new government in 
essence basically threw out all remaining vestiges of the 
Mobutu regime, readopted the name of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and began to build new government institutions 
from scratch. 
 
¶4. (C)  The Laurent Kabila government, however, proved itself 
also incapable of competent performance.  Perhaps inevitably, 
it increasingly chafed under continuing Rwandan influence, 
leading to growing tensions with its erstwhile patron. 
Eventually this led to renewed warfare in August 1998, and 
new invasions by Rwandan and Ugandan armies. Unlike 1996, 
however, other African states moved to support Kinshasa, 
eventually creating an alliance of Zimbabwean, Angolan, 
Namibian, and Chadian forces working with the Kabila 
government arrayed against Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian 
armies aligned with various Congolese rebel clients.  Mixed 
into this picture was an overlay of Hutu/Tutsi conflicts, 
with Kinshasa embracing active support of Rwandan Hutu 
extremists (e.g., ex-FAR, Interahamwe) in the war, and the 
continuing conflict reinforcing an already-widely prevalent 
anti-Tutsi sentiment in much of the DRC. 
 
¶5. (C) A military stalemate developed in 1998/1999, resulting 
in de facto separation of DRC territorial administration, 
largely divided between the Kinshasa government backed by its 
southern Africa allies; a Ugandan-sponsored group, the 
Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) in the north; and a 
Rwandan-backed group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) 
controlling much of the east.  Foreign sponsors participated 
heavily in exploitation of Congo,s rich mineral wealth in 
all three zones.  Inevitable tensions among the various 
Congolese groups and their foreign backers, among the 
Congolese themselves, and between supposed allies (e.g., 
Rwanda and Uganda) produced splinter movements and an overall 
proliferation of various armed groups and militias. 
 
¶6. (C) Efforts by the U.S. and others to find a peaceful 
solution were hindered by the necessity to seek means to 
address simultaneously the varied, and largely unrelated, 
interests of the numerous foreign states involved in the 
conflict, as well as to redress the continuing political 
vacuum in the Congo, including a complete lack of coherent 
national DRC political structures and constituencies.  As a 
result of enormous efforts and substantial international 
pressure, and with critically important active intervention 
by the U.S., the Lusaka Accord was achieved in 1999.  While 
the Lusaka Accord was not sufficient to bring an immediate 
halt to the conflict, it did provide the basis for an 
eventual formal withdrawal of foreign troops from DRC 
territory, and establishment of an &Inter-Congolese8 
dialogue as a way to establish an internal process toward 
national governance.  The latter dialogue, again with heavy 
international engagement, eventually resulted in a &Global 
and All-Inclusive Accord8 (the Sun City Accord) in 2003 
establishing the basis for the formal DRC transition process 
incorporating all former Congolese belligerents, as well as 
other internal &non-armed8 groups leading to elections. 
These two agreements comprise the foundation for the end to 
active hostilities and they set the stage for the current 
environment. 
 
DRC Transition: Ungainly, Burdened by Mistrust, But Yielding 
Results 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Given the complexity of the domestic political 
environment, the required compromises among the varied 
Congolese groups and diverse foreign patrons, and the 
duration of active warfare, it is hardly surprising that the 
transition structures established by peace accords are 
ungainly and characterized by persistent deep mistrust among 
key officials and factions.  An additional impediment to 
transition success is residual suspicion between the 
&ex-government8 faction in Kinshasa, headed by President 
Joseph Kabila, and its perceived enemy neighbors on the 
eastern border, particularly Kampala and Kigali.  This is 
coupled with continuing links between the other former main 
Congolese belligerents and their respective foreign allies 
(the MLC and Uganda; the RCD-Goma and Rwanda).  In short, the 
Kinshasa transition government is not a coherent single 
entity, but rather more a collection of former adversaries 
existing in uneasy co-habitation.  It is essentially not 
capable of domestic or international long-term engagements 
routinely undertaken by established governments.    In 
addition, many in the DRC political class in all factions of 
the transition are not eager to see a successful electoral 
end to the transition, and it is likely that relatively few 
would find any popular base for electoral success. 
 
¶8. (C) Despite daunting challenges, the transition has been 
producing results, albeit at a slower pace than widely 
desired.  While many considered it highly unlikely three or 
four years ago, formal withdrawal of foreign national armies 
from DRC territory has been completed, ongoing combat has 
been stopped, and all major DRC political groups have been 
brought together into a transition government, however 
unwieldy that government may be.  Reversing decades of 
economic under-performance, important economic results have 
been achieved (e.g., stabilization of exchange rates, low 
inflation, three years of real GDP growth), and preparations 
for scheduled 2005 elections (including key pieces of 
legislation) have been moving forward.    Perhaps the most 
significant indicator of progress, political leaders of all 
major groups have increasingly been gauging their rhetoric 
and actions to what amounts to early electoral positioning, a 
reflection that the political leadership generally is 
increasingly thinking in terms of a political, and 
specifically electoral, process rather than renewed military 
operations.  Overall, the situation in most of the DRC stands 
in startlingly positive contrast to that existing a few years 
ago. 
 
Factors Supporting Progress 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) There are four major forces favoring transition 
progress.  First, there is general war-weariness among the 
large majority of Congolese, coupled with a continuing sense 
of national identity that broadly cuts across all factions. 
The war had largely stalemated with no major change in sight, 
and the de facto division of the country worked against both 
economic and political aspirations of most Congolese.  The 
transition process offers the only viable alternative. 
Secondly and related, there is a deeply-held desire by most 
Congolese for a durable peace.  This has crystallized into 
strong expectations for elections as the most visible symbol 
of the end to the transition - and the DRC,s long conflict. 
This represents a dramatic change from the stoic resignation 
characteristic of much of pre-war Zaire,s population, and 
represents a major and positive force to which political 
leaders are sensitive.  It also has a negative aspect, 
however, with a potentially explosive reaction should popular 
expectations not be satisfied.  Third, there is an 
unprecedented engagement in the DRC by the international 
community.  This is manifested in the 17-member International 
Committee To Accompany the Transition (CIAT), which is in 
fact a formal transition institution created by the 
underlying peace agreements.  The CIAT is widely credited as 
a beneficial and needed force to maintain progress.  Finally, 
the UN peacekeeping operation (MONUC), while far from 
perfect, brings a significant military force to help counter 
the influence of the many remaining armed groups and so 
provide at least a reasonable promise of needed adequate 
security conditions, and it has proved invaluable in numerous 
cases to keep the transition moving forward. 
 
But Major Threats Also Remain 
----------------------------- 
¶10. (C)  Progress to-date notwithstanding, there are 
innumerable ways for the transition process to derail, and 
even lead to a resumption of generalized warfare.  The 
continued existence of numerous armed groups, including 
formal armies, various armed militias, diverse localized Mai 
Mai factions and bands, and armed Rwandan Hutu extremists all 
create security threats and occasional flare-ups, especially 
in the volatile eastern regions.  The continuing severe 
weakness of central government institutions and the lack of 
any real government authority in many parts of the country 
leaves an on-going dangerous and destabilizing political void 
in the country.  In addition, the oft-displayed fecklessness 
of the Congolese political class always has the potential of 
producing gridlock, or worse.  Years of invasions, 
occupation, and conflict have left a degree of tension in the 
east between various communities, most notably the 
Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese Tutsis and Hutus and other 
Congolese ethnic groups.  Finally, continuing influence and 
reports of active intervention (including military forces) in 
the eastern region by neighboring countries, particularly 
Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda, and enduring commercial 
interests also reinforce the threat of renewed instability 
which would undoubtedly affect all of the DRC. 
 
The Way Forward 
--------------- 
¶11. (C) The CIAT, GDRC leaders, and most observers concur 
that the desired end-state of the transition period is a 
legitimate Kinshasa government elected through free and fair 
elections; a sound political, economic, and social basis for 
durable stability throughout the country; and regional 
international relationships that at minimum provide for 
normal diplomatic relations and resolution of differences 
through dialogue.  The overriding priorities for the short- 
to medium-term must be the success of the DRC transition 
process, and the end to destabilizing interstate activities. 
The analysis above and the transition structure suggest that 
the strategy to achieve these ends needs to be focused on 
four critical areas: security, elections, state 
authority/development, and regional relations.  The following 
paragraphs provide brief summaries of each critical area 
designed to indicate current or planned activities, but are 
not comprehensive descriptions.  The first three largely 
domestic issues are reflected in transition &road maps,8 
one adopted by and utilized by the CIAT, and a similar 
document recently approved by the GDRC.  The road map outline 
serves as the base line strategic transition plan as 
discussed within the local community. 
 
a) The Security Environment 
This includes two major components. The first deals with the 
existing multiple armies and combatant groups, estimated to 
include as many as 300,000-plus men under arms.  A major 
demobilization (DDR) program has been designed with heavy 
World Bank involvement, intended to demobilize roughly 
200,000 combatants.  A specialized but urgent sub-component 
of this program is one dealing with the substantial number of 
child soldiers.  Substantial support has already been 
committed to this effort, including World Bank funds, as well 
as the involvement of USAID and other donors.  Specifically, 
USAID's support is focused on reintegration of ex-combatants 
back into communities.   A needed complement to this effort 
is to produce an integrated national Congolese army.  While 
the latter lags behind the DDR framework, conceptual and 
unfortunately competing frameworks for integration have been 
prepared by the Belgian and South African governments. 
Currently there are promising efforts underway in Kinshasa 
and respective capitals seeking to harmonize these plans and 
establish a master unified plan.  Financial resources have 
not yet been identified, although the Europeans in particular 
are implying in conversations that funds may be found at 
least to initiate the effort.   Armed local groups, including 
those in Ituri and potentially some Mai Mai groups, represent 
a related but separate issue, with solutions unlikely pending 
definition and establishment of the overall integration and 
DDR programs.  Finally, armed Rwandan Hutu extremists 
represent a distinct problem, with such groups creating 
security problems within the Kivus as well as representing a 
continuing threat to Rwandan security.  A MONUC-led voluntary 
disarmament and repatriation program (DDRRR) had shown 
promising results, repatriating to Rwanda many thousands of 
combatants and their dependents.  Numbers of new DDRRR 
enrollees dropped to near-zero, however, following the June 
takeover of Bukavu by &dissident8 RCD Tutsi generals Nkunda 
and Mutebusi.  Many of the remaining Hutu extremist elements, 
estimated to number between 8,000 - 15,000, may require 
forcible disarmament.  Prevailing current thinking among CIAT 
members is that this task should be undertaken by a specially 
selected and integrated FARDC &Kivu Brigade8 (pursuant to 
the integration plans discussed above), whose operations 
would be closely coordinated with MONUC-reinforced 
deployments and operations in the east.  Progress in all 
these areas must be realized, and be visible, prior to the 
holding of elections if the volatile eastern region is to 
participate in voting in a meaningful way .  Completion of 
the full integration/demobilization effort, however, will not 
be required prior to elections, and indeed may continue for 
some time into the future. 
 
b) Elections 
The centerpiece of the Sun City Accord is the holding of 
elections, targeted for June 2005.  The accord provides for 
up to two six-month extension periods as necessary. 
Significant delays, however, risk strong if not explosive 
negative public reaction.  Election preparations have 
proceeded laboriously, but at this point there is a general 
election plan in place, a budget reviewed and largely 
endorsed by the international community, and the start of 
needed legislation by the National Assembly and Senate.  An 
Independent Electoral Commission has been formed and is 
starting to operate, thanks in large measure to timely USAID 
intervention.  The election plan is based on as simple a 
model as possible, necessary given the limited time 
available, the size of the country (roughly the size of 
Western Europe), population (approximately 60 million), and 
utter lack of national infrastructure. For example, no census 
is planned, only a voter registration exercise. 
Approximately half of the calculated $285 million elections 
budget has been promised to-date by donors, primarily the EU. 
 Key decisions remain, including the question of the timing 
of local, provincial, and Presidential elections (e.g., 
simultaneous or sequential), and the form of balloting (e.g., 
single-round or runoff elections for President).  Strong 
international and domestic pressure is being maintained on 
political players to complete important legislation, 
including changes or approval of a new draft Constitution, 
which itself requires approval by referendum.  As noted 
above, however, political parties and leaders are already 
beginning what amounts to election campaign activity and 
there is no clear dominating political figure or party with a 
decisive national majority.  A crucial but often overlooked 
aspect to this issue is the immediate post-election period, 
with inevitable unhappiness and challenges by election 
losers, a critical concern in a region burdened by large 
numbers of weapons and combat-experienced fighters. 
Continued strong engagement and support by the international 
community, including MONUC within the limits of that body,s 
mandate, will be required for the successful conduct of 
elections, and transition through the post-election period. 
 
c) State Authority, and General Development 
As previously noted, a large part of the current problems in 
the DRC can be attributed to the political vacuum at the 
center - the lack of viable government institutions and 
operations to govern generally, much less to manage a large 
and diverse country such as the Congo.   This will require 
sustained effort over a long time, extending far beyond 
elections, essentially building a new structure from a base 
near zero.  There has already been significant progress, 
however, seen in areas as diverse as macro-economic indices 
(as cited above); the gradual establishment of minimal 
government services (e.g., police operations, schools), 
albeit in limited areas; and even the recent appointment of 
an Ituri District Commissioner, the first sign in years of 
Kinshasa government authority in that troubled district. 
Despite good gains in the government,s revenue base in the 
past two years, domestic-generated resources are still 
extremely limited with a current GDRC domestic revenue budget 
base of roughly $450 million dollars for an area equivalent 
to the U.S. east of the Mississippi.  Clearly, sustained and 
significant international support will be required for an 
extended period in this area.  As well, accompanying a 
gradual replacement of military operations by peacetime 
government, major reconciliation efforts are needed at the 
local grassroots level and some are needed at the national 
level, particularly in the volatile eastern areas.  Without 
the success of such reconciliation efforts, accompanied by 
activities bringing the promise of economic improvement, 
sustainable stability in the eastern region will be hard to 
achieve.  Related, the DRC,s largely dysfunctional judicial 
system requires rebuilding.  Finally, visible economic and 
social development progress must be seen for nascent 
government institutions to have credibility, and to address 
the urgent basic needs of Congolese citizens.  Macroeconomic 
achievements need to translate into new investment and 
employment, and improvements to the disastrous state of DRC 
basic education, health, and other services must be evidenced. 
 
d) Regional Relations 
Obviously stability in the DRC and indeed the region requires 
that regional governments refrain from unilateral 
cross-border military operations or other activities intended 
to undermine neighboring states.  The DRC is particularly 
vulnerable given the precarious and divided nature of its 
current transition government.  For long-term stability, 
however, we need to go further and work to build 
intergovernmental relations in which governments are capable 
of dealing with each other, and resolving conflicts through 
dialogue rather than confrontation.  Such is not currently 
the case, and the respective governments, especially those in 
Kigali and Kinshasa, are unlikely to normalize their 
relations if left to themselves.  There are numerous efforts 
to promote regional dialogue, including initiatives sponsored 
by the U.N., Belgium, South Africa, and other African states 
as well as the U.S.  A basis for improved relations exists in 
the form of commercial and economic potential, and a presumed 
shared interest in peace and stability.  Ultimately, however, 
deep-seated mistrust and personal animosity arising from 
years of conflict, exacerbated by events such as the recent 
massacre of Congolese refugees in a camp in Burundi, must be 
overcome by a realization that each country can best serve 
its own interests through peaceful dialogue.  At minimum, 
clear and consistent international pressure must be 
maintained, rejecting as unacceptable cross-border 
interference.  Ultimately, the countries in the region 
themselves must renounce ambitions to work against 
neighboring states, although realization of this goal is 
unlikely until a more durable and coherent government can be 
established in Kinshasa following elections.  More broadly, 
success in this area will require sustained international 
engagement to promote concrete cooperation measures (e.g., 
Uganda/DRC and Rwanda Joint Verification Mechanisms), improve 
border controls, and regularize ongoing contacts and dialogue. 
 
¶12. (C)  Progress in the inter-related four areas identified 
above will be self-reinforcing, i.e., progress in any area is 
helpful to efforts in the other three.  Conversely, at least 
some degree of success in all four areas is needed to achieve 
overall objectives.  A lack of progress in any of the four 
will necessarily retard overall progress, and the overall 
objective of a stable region requires at least partial 
forward movement in all four categories. 
 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
¶13. (C) The sectors cited above do not constitute a 
comprehensive listing of important outstanding issues.  For 
example, improper exploitation of the DRC,s natural 
resources by foreign and Congolese interests continues as a 
major problem.  It is unlikely, however, that satisfactory 
resolution of this issue can be found prior to progress in 
establishing Kinshasa government authority and at least some 
improvement in working relations with neighboring countries. 
Likewise, sexual violence directed against women is a 
horrifying past and present reality, with some armed groups 
practicing systematic sexual predation as a weapon.  While 
there are numerous activities underway to address this 
problem, including significant USAID operations, definitive 
resolution is unlikely in the east absent progress in 
military demobilization and integration, as well as 
establishment of coherent DRC government authority. 
Impunity also remains a major problem requiring resolution, 
with a long-term answer certainly requiring at least minimal 
improvements in the DRC,s barely functioning legal system. 
All of these and other issues are important.  The four areas 
cited above, however, remain the central focus areas that 
will in turn permit progress to be realized to address a 
variety of other issues. 
 
The U.S. Role 
------------- 
 
A - Central Focus 
 
¶14. (C)  As indicated above, the central problem is the 
political void at the center, i.e., the lack of government 
institutions and authority in the DRC.  U.S. engagement 
therefore needs to be focused primarily on support for the 
transition process, its successful conclusion through the 
conduct of free and fair elections, and follow-through for a 
successful post-election period.  This activity needs to be 
complemented by continuing attention to ensure observance of 
non-interference across borders among the Great Lakes 
countries, and normalization of relations among all Great 
Lake states. 
 
¶B. - International Cooperation 
 
¶15. (C) The DRC is a huge country with accumulated immense 
problems.  Certainly no single country alone has the 
resources to assist in finding the necessary solutions. 
Instead, we must focus use of our available resources, 
coordinating closely with other bilateral and multilateral 
countries and agencies to achieve the desired results. 
Fortunately, widely shared common objectives and much of the 
framework to enable such cooperation already exist, a 
beneficial product of the work done in recent years to bring 
an end to the DRC conflict.  The principal national players 
involved are Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, South 
Africa, and Angola as well as the U.S.  All are heavily 
involved already with assistance and/or political support for 
the DRC,s transition.  These efforts are complemented by 
substantial involvement of the European Union, World Bank, 
IMF, ADF, and United Nations as multilateral partners. 
 
¶16. (C)  A general framework for coordination exists in the 
17 member CIAT, whose membership includes all the main 
bilateral engaged countries (e.g., Belgium, France, U.K., 
South Africa, Angola and U.S.) as well as the European Union, 
the African Union, and MONUC.  We should stay strongly 
engaged in CIAT activities to ensure a maximum degree of 
harmonized policies and activities.  Complementary 
senior-level consultations between capitals should ensure a 
close degree of coordination between discussions being 
conducted at the level of the CIAT, and topics being 
discussed during bilateral/multilateral consultations. 
 
¶17. (C)  The MONUC peacekeeping operation represents another 
element vital to the success of the transition process. 
MONUC has a unique capability to help ensure adequate 
security conditions in the DRC necessary for progress, and 
this should therefore be its central and overriding focus. 
MONUC, however, also has a variety of other capabilities and, 
in accordance with the existing UNSC resolution, 
responsibilities.  Within the constraints of available 
resources, the U.S. should continue to be as supportive as 
possible of the MONUC mission, while continuing to press to 
maintain a MONUC focus on key priorities to preclude mission 
creep, and enlargement of an already existing 
mission/resource gap. 
 
¶18. (C) Ongoing discussions being conducted in New York at 
the U.N., and in particular the Security Council, as well as 
Bank and Fund sessions also provide an opportunity for 
improved coordination with multilateral coordination through 
the CIAT.  To-date, internal USG coordination regarding these 
fora has been less than ideal, and efforts are needed to 
ensure better communication and coordination regarding 
proposed discussions, initiatives, and activities.  The U.S. 
has considerable influence in each of the multilateral 
bodies, and we need to do a better job to ensure that such 
influence is being used effectively in terms of our bilateral 
agenda, as well as being coordinated with our positions in 
the CIAT multilateral context. 
 
C - Bilateral Activities 
 
¶19. (C)  Within the general context of overall support for 
the transition process, current U.S. government programs and 
activities should be focused on four major areas: 1) 
governance issues, including election preparations, 2) 
military and security issues, 3) development and institution 
building, and 4) regional relations. 
 
-     Governance and elections:  The U.S., primarily through 
State and USAID activities, has been very much engaged in 
this area, and continued major involvement will be important 
to a range of governance issues.  In terms of elections, 
USAID was instrumental in quick intervention, for example to 
get the Independent Electoral Commission in operation.  It 
will be important for us to continue to be very active to 
encourage further progress and ensure acceptable procedures. 
Our support, however, is constrained by limited USAID 
Democracy and Government Funding.  Specifically, at this 
point, we have very little available or committed to direct 
election support, a dramatic contrast to the EU,s total 
committed to-date of over $100m. 
 
-     Military and security:  The U.S. has already committed 
resources to the DDR program, both through its support of the 
World Bank and in bilateral terms through USAID.  As 
previously noted, there are promising initiatives underway 
for harmonizing competing models from South Africa and 
Belgium of the equally critical military integration program. 
 Pending results of that effort, we should be prepared to 
look at $3.4 million in available leftover prior-year FMF 
funds for potential support to the integration and military 
reform program as may be appropriate.  We should also be 
attentive to child soldier demobilization activities, and 
general reintegration programs for additional intervention 
with any new resources made available. 
 
-     Development and institution building:  The U.S. is 
involved in these efforts, primarily through USAID.  This is 
a long-term process, however, and sustained engagement will 
be required to show satisfactory results both pre- and 
post-election to help create conditions conducive to 
long-term stability.  Lists of economic, education, and 
health needs are very long, and the government structures and 
policies needed to support progress are largely yet to be 
created.  One major area that is currently underfunded by all 
donors is national and regional reconciliation programs. 
Progress in achieving reconciliation, particularly in the 
troubled east, is essential for long-term peace in the DRC 
and the region.  We should be attentive to the possibility of 
any new resources that may be made available for these kinds 
of activities, as well as seek to tap into expertise in 
Africa or elsewhere that has proven effective to achieve 
results.  Clearly, general development activities should also 
be identified for target regions that could complement any 
reconciliation programs that are implemented. 
 
-     Regional relations:  The U.S. is already engaged in 
promoting &tripartite8 talks involving key players.  As it 
progresses to a more concrete form, the tripartite process 
should be tailored to mesh as effectively as possible with 
other ongoing initiatives, including established Joint 
Verification Mechanisms, regional efforts promoted by South 
Africa, the African Union, and other African countries, as 
well as those of the U.N.  This too represents a long-term 
investment likely destined to pay full dividends only 
following the establishment of a post-transition, more 
effective Kinshasa government.  In the short to medium term, 
it is of critical importance to maintain a consistent and 
strong message rejecting as unacceptable cross-border 
unilateral activities designed to undermine the security or 
influence of neighboring governments within their own 
territories. 
 
U.S. and Mission Constraints 
---------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) At the current time, there are two major resource 
constraints limiting, or threatening to limit, U.S. influence 
in key areas. 
 
a) First, available funds to support democracy and governance 
activities are extremely limited.  At this point, for 
example, the U.S. has committed a total of approximately $5 
million over two years in indirect support of the election 
process, and has no funds identified now for direct support 
of scheduled elections.  While USAID has leveraged its 
funding to be particularly visible in early election 
planning, lack of further funding will likely mean declining 
U.S. visibility and influence as the transition process moves 
forward to active preparation and conduct of the DRC 
elections.  Likewise, there are few USG funds available or 
foreseen at this point to assist with improving critically 
important judicial/legal systems, including anti-corruption 
efforts, nor for larger-scale reconciliation efforts which 
are particularly required in the troubled eastern region of 
the DRC. 
 
b) The Embassy is currently slated to lose two of its four 
Political Officer positions in calendar year 05, necessarily 
implying a substantial cutback in Embassy political reporting 
and activities.  This severe reduction in political section 
staffing will mean a major reduction in reporting from the 
troubled eastern region, a general reduction in the frequency 
and depth of contacts among the many and diverse political 
parties and groups as well as within the government, and a 
general loss of USG visibility and activity.  Worse, this 
cutback will likely be occurring over the precise period when 
DRC political activity will be particularly intense, 
associated with the elections. 
 
¶21. (U)  Bujumbura minimize considered. 
MEECE