This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 002025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG KBEM
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF INTERIOR ON ELECTIONS, SECURITY 
 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
 ¶1. (C)  Summary:  Minister of Interior, and PPRD co-founder, 
Theofile Mbemba expressed concern that the newly launched 
pre-election campaigns will further divide the transitional 
components and throw up new obstacles to military 
integration.  He outlined a PPRD strategy to dominate all the 
southern provinces except western Kasai, as well as South 
Kivu and Katanga in the East, thereby ensuring Joseph 
Kabila's victory.  The majority of seats in Parliament likely 
will go to the MLC, according to the Minister, making Bemba 
Prime Minister.  Mbemba insisted that Kabila has decided to 
be the PPRD candidate but will postpone announcing this until 
early December. The PPRD is exploring alliances with the MLC 
and Etienne Tshisekedi's UDPS with an eye to improving the 
PPRD position in Province Orientale and western Kasai, 
respectively.  When pressed, he admitted that Katanga could 
be not only an electoral battleground but the stumbling block 
for the transition as a whole. With face-offs between police 
and military on the rise and social tension increasing, 
Mbemba said, the country could "implode" before elections in 
any event.  End Summary. 
 
The PPRD Elections Map -- Color It PPRD 
 
¶2. (C)  Over dinner October 29 at PolCoun's house, Minister 
of Interior and PPRD co-founder Theofile Mbemba waxed 
enthusiastic over his party's likely success in next year's 
elections.  Simply put, party strategists believe the PPRD 
will control Kinshasa (itself a province), Bas-Congo, 
Bandundu and East Kasai, as well as South Kivu and Katanga. 
West Kasai is solidly with Etienne Tshisekedi's UDPS so 
unless PPRD can forge an alliance they will not do well there 
-- and do not intend to waste time, money or effort in trying 
to do so.  The Eastern Province probably will go to 
Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC, according to Mbemba, but 
surprisingly, Bemba could lose his home province of Equateur 
to either the UDPS (which, according to Mbemba, is well 
organized and working hard there) or to the PPRD.  The RCD is 
too weak to control anything, and therefore the entire East 
is up for grabs -- which, he said, explains why everyone has 
launched their campaigns in Bukavu (or, in the President's 
case, Kisangani).  A clearly disgruntled Mbemba acknowledged 
that President Kabila will now be the last politician to 
visit South Kivu, since Bemba, VP Z'Ahidi Ngoma and now VP 
Yarodia have all made initial visits.  Nonetheless, Mbemba 
was confident that Kabila will capture South Kivu, in part 
because of his mother's origins.  (Note:  Presidential 
friends and loyalists say that Kabila's mother is a South 
Kivutian -- his enemies say that she is a Rwandan.  In any 
event, she likely is from South Kivu, at least 
geographically. End Note.)  North Kivu will be an enigma 
until the day after elections, Mbemba predicted, but 
acknowledged that Bemba clearly is courting Governor 
Serufuli, who is unquestionably well-positioned to "deliver" 
his province to the candidate of his choice.  (Septel reports 
further details of Bemba's visit to the two Kivus.)  Even 
without North Kivu, however, Mbemba said Kabila will garner 
the majority of the popular vote, guaranteeing his election 
as president. 
 
Useful But Not Necessary Alliances 
 
¶3. (C)  Mbemba said that the PPRD is exploring a possible 
alliance with the MLC, primarily with the aim of improving 
its effective presence in Parliament, i.e., the MLC likely 
will win a majority of Parliamentary seats, putting it in a 
position to block key government legislation.  Bemba likely 
would "settle" for being Prime Minister, a position which 
would ensure his continued access to wealth, and he and 
Kabila normally have a good working relationship, Mbemba 
said, making this a natural partnership.  (Note:  Mbemba said 
that both PPRD and MLC have already decided to support a 
President-Prime Minister-Parliament scheme for the future 
government, implying there is therefore little left to do but 
produce the appropriate paragraphs in the consitution 
enshrining this arrangement.  End Note.)  PPRD also is 
talking to Tshisekedi's UDPS but so far the negotiations 
haven't advanced much beyond the early stages, in large part 
because PPRD has more to offer UDPS than vice versa -- 
although PPRD would, Mbemba admitted, like to add West Kasai 
to its group of "captive" provinces.  (Comment:  It could be 
hard for the elder statesman Tshisekedi to swallow being 
second fiddle to a young upstart like Kabila.  End Comment.) 
Mbemba insisted that UDPS will not renew its old ties to the 
RCD (despite recent confident assertions PolCouns heard from 
RCD leaders), since the RCD "has nothing to offer anyone." 
When PolCouns asked about courting Z'Ahidi Ngoma or Yarodia 
(for the support of the unarmed political opposition and 
civil society, respectively) Mbemba somewhat contemptuously 
dismissed both, noting that neither faction is united nor 
does either benefit from strong leadership -- meaning that 
all the diverse elements are up for grabs.  (Comment:  Given 
the historical animosity between Yarodia and Kabila it would 
be hard in any event to image Yarodia throwing his support 
behind Kabila, even were he in a position to do so.  End 
Comment.)  He added, almost in passing, that President Kabila 
is currently "on the outs" with Z'Ahidi over the latter's 
visit to Bukavu the same weekend as the President's trip to 
Kisangani -- a move clearly designed to upstage the President 
in one of his "home provinces."  After a quick pause, Mbemba 
said that of the major religious groups (a key element of 
civil society) the Kimbanguists definitely will support 
Kabila, and possibly the Catholics as well, but that the 
evangalists probably will go for Tshisekedi while the 
protestants will throw their support to Bemba. 
 
Katanga The Battleground, Maybe In More Ways Than One 
 
¶4. (C)  When pressed, Mbemba reluctantly acknowledged that 
PPRD might have trouble in Katanga -- in more ways than one. 
From both an electoral and security standpoint, he said, the 
province is increasingly problematic and indeed, could be the 
trigger which explodes the transition.  Pointing to outside 
influence, Mbemba said that Congolese security forces have, 
in the last several weeks, "escorted" over thirty Zambians to 
the border and warned them not to return.  These were people, 
he said, who have been posing as businessmen but who actually 
have been fomenting unrest and political divisiveness; 
likewise Tanzania is increasingly active in the province, 
particularly in the northern zones, and its influence is 
becoming worrisome, while South Africa is a "giant" in the 
provincial landscape.  All this plus, he noted, a resurgence 
of traditional tribal-based tensions between north-south 
Katanga and between southern Katanga and West Kasai, 
represents a heady and potentially explosive brew.  Finally, 
he noted cautiously, there are some Presidential advisors, 
Katangans, who don't necessarily want elections and who have 
been working against the President's interests in the 
province.  (Comment:  Mbemba wouldn't name names, but most 
likely he was referring to both Air Force General Numbi and 
Augustin Katumba, whose name increasingly is being linked to 
a variety of troubling developments.  PolCouns also has heard 
from various people that Katumba is trying to marginalize 
Mbemba or drive him from office, because he, Katumba, would 
like Mbemba's job, so there also could be an element of 
personal bias involved in Mbemba's hints.  End Comment.) 
 
Finger On The Trigger - Social Unrest Rising 
 
¶5. (C)  During dinner Mbemba took several calls (including 
one from Kabila) about a security incident in the Kinshasa 
neighborhood of Binza, where unpaid soldiers had tried to rob 
moneychangers, only to be attacked by enraged citizens, 
assisted by police.  Using this incident as an example, 
Mbemba said that he is increasingly concerned that face-offs 
between military and police, or between citizens and 
army/police, represent a disturbing societal shift.  People 
are angry and restless, he said, and more and more they are 
inclined to fight back, sometimes striking out without 
thinking.  This "social trigger," he said, could implode the 
country before the transition can get to elections.  Along 
these lines, he added that he regrets the early launch of 
pre-campaigning, which he feels will further divide the 
transition and virtually eliminate the possibility of 
military integration (he predicted that the RCD, especially, 
will now dig in its heels on integration since its only 
political card is the threat of renewed fighting in the 
East).  He welcomed the latest EU initiative to provide 
police training, hoping that it will augment, in some ways, 
the French-trained riot police.  (Comment:  When Mbemba left 
he was on his way to Binza, together with a military 
official, to try to calm the situation without utilizing the 
riot police against the military, and indeed, the situation 
was resolved without recourse to violent means. End Comment.) 
 
Comment 
 
¶6. (C)  We agree that social issues and/or the swirling 
dynamic of Katanga are two potential flashpoints to future 
progress, but it is unclear what the government, or Kabila 
specifically, can do to defuse them. The former is difficult 
due to lack of means, the latter intransigent because of 
Kabila's reliance on Katangans as a key support base. 
Mbemba's vision of PPRD dominance and MLC quiessence seems 
simplistic and, indeed, cocky, although we could wish it 
would indeed be this easy. More troubling are his admissions 
-- confirming our suspicions -- of possible external 
manipulation in Katanga. 
MEECE