This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 001499 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USNATO FOR AMB BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2014 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL FI EUN NATO
SUBJECT: NATO AMBASSADOR NICHOLAS BURNS' VISIT TO FINLAND, 
NOV. 29-30 
 
REF: HELSINKI 1472 
 
Classified By: PolOff David Allen Schlaefer, reasons 1.4(B) and (D) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Of all the open questions in Finnish foreign policy, 
the issue of whether to join NATO is the biggest.  It is 
debated endlessly in the editorial and op-ed pages, but that 
debate has yet to affect public opinion.  Polls continue to 
show strong opposition to membership, in part because of 
Finland's tradition of nonalignment, in part because of Iraq, 
and in part because a mistrustful public still thinks of NATO 
in Cold War terms and does not have a clear sense of where 
NATO transformation is taking the Alliance.  At the same 
time, Finland's leaders make no bones about the importance of 
the NATO to trans-Atlantic security.  Finland retains a close 
relationship with the Alliance: it is an active member of 
PfP, and is committed to NATO interoperability.  This close 
relationship reflects practical calculations about Finland's 
neighbor to the east -- the latest White Paper on national 
security policy, released in September, retains territorial 
defense as the primary mission of the Finnish Defense Forces. 
 The Finns also understand the importance of crisis 
management, however: the Finns work closely with NATO 
partners in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the GoF has 
committed to joining two EU battle groups -- one with the 
Swedes and Norwegians, and one with the Germans and Dutch -- 
with the stipulation that this effort must be consistent with 
Berlin Plus.  In your conversations in Helsinki, the Finns 
are likely to ask for your assessment of the direction in 
which the Alliance is moving, and the role that they can play 
in it, short of actual membership, and the future of NATO's 
relations with the EU.  End Summary. 
 
The White Paper 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Your visit to Finland takes place shortly after the 
GoF's much anticipated White Paper on national security 
policy was completed and sent to Parliament for its review in 
September.  Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja told EUR 
Assistant Secretary Beth Jones on Nov. 8 (see reftel) that he 
expected the Parliament to approve the report's main outline 
with only minor revisions.  The White Paper reaffirms 
Finland's nonalignment, although "applying for membership in 
the (NATO) Alliance will remain a possibility...in the 
future."  The White Paper has since been criticized by some 
of the country's most committed trans-Atlanticists for being 
too timid in its treatment of Finland's need for allies.  One 
commentator said that the White Paper was "born old" in 
failing to note the modern realities in Russia.  MP Liisa 
Jaakonsaari, the Social Democratic Party's chair of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, has said that Finland's foreign 
policy lacks direction. 
 
¶3.  (C)  This criticism seems to have gained some traction: 
at a Nov. 8 dinner in honor of A/S Jones, LGEN Ahola, 
second-ranking MoD official, told the Ambassador that some 
consideration is being given to changing "a possibility" to 
"a real option," more in line with the last White Paper, 
issued in 2001. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Public opinion, however, remains strongly against 
NATO membership.  By early 2003, support for joining the 
Alliance had struggled up to 20%, or even higher in some 
polls, but it plummeted to near zero after the onset of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  A recent poll found over 80% of 
respondents still opposed the idea, although most wanted the 
door to NATO left open.  If Finland's political leadership 
were to recommend that Finns walk through that door, the 
nation probably would do so, but there is no indication this 
will happen in the foreseeable future.  In fact, Foreign 
Minister Tuomioja told us last year that he did not expect 
the NATO question to arise during this Parliamentary term 
(2003-2007).  Despite this, Finland clearly sees NATO as the 
foundation for trans-Atlantic security, and Finland has made 
NATO interoperability one of the guiding principles of its 
military.  The Finns are among the most active participants 
in the PfP, and welcomed the Baltic States' entry into the 
Alliance.  The White Paper states that "Finland considers a 
strong trans-Atlantic relationship to be important for the 
security of Europe."  Finland can be expected to foster that 
relationship on a bilateral basis with the U.S., as well as 
through the EU and the PfP. 
 
Russia 
------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Russia obviously figures prominently in Finnish 
foreign policy.  The stability of political and commercial 
relations with Russia -- and therefore the stability of 
Russia itself -- will always be of vital importance to the 
Finns.  In recent conversations, they have said that while 
day-to-day interactions with the Russians continue on track, 
Finns are concerned about long-term trends.  Foreign Minister 
Tuomioja told the Ambassador in September, in the wake of the 
changes made by Putin after the Beslan tragedy, that he was 
worried that Putin seemed to be relying more and more on 
people who are not by inclination natural democrats. 
Tuomioja also told A/S Jones on November 8 that Russia was 
trying to drive wedges between EU members on certain issues, 
and clearly did not understand how the EU worked or that 
Finland was now an integral EU member and not a "bridge" 
between Russia and the Union. 
 
Territorial Defense 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The White Paper also reaffirmed Finland's 
long-standing policy that territorial defense is the primary 
mission of Finland's armed forces.  Finnish defense strategy 
is based on maintaining the capability to muster a credible 
deterrent force of approximately 350,000 troops to counter 
any Russian threat.  To that end, a system of universal male 
conscription is in place.  Concerns about the compatibility 
of Finland's territorial defense strategy with the demands of 
NATO membership and/or participation in collective EU defense 
structures are frequently raised by detractors of both 
concepts.  NATO and the envisaged EU force are looking more 
at an enhanced ability to rapidly project military force 
abroad, requiring members to reconfigure their armed forces 
accordingly.  Some Finns fear that overhauling the Finnish 
military along these lines could jeopardize Finland's ability 
to credibly field a conventional territorial defense of the 
country vis-a-vis Russia.  In addition, PolDir Lyra worries 
that NATO planners are pressing the three Baltic nations too 
hard to shift capabilities away from territorial defense, 
leaving the possibility of "a security vacuum in the Baltic." 
 
Battle-Groups 
------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Finnish defense officials are formulating a plan for 
Finnish participation in EU battle-groups.  The White Paper 
commits the nation for the first time to providing combat 
troops to EU rapid reaction forces.  Tentative plans call for 
between 300-400 Finnish troops to be divided between a 
"Nordic" battle-group led by Sweden and including Norway, and 
a German-Dutch group.  The Finns tell us they were able to 
win Greek agreement to including Norway in the battle-group 
only after Finnish and Swedish officials went to Athens last 
week to appeal directly to the Greek Government. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Finnish troops in the "Nordic" group would be 
primarily ancillary and support types, while those in the 
German-Dutch group would be special forces.  However, Finland 
maintains only a small standing military of about 8,000 
professionals, plus about 15,000 conscripts in training for 
six months.  The bulk of Finland's military strength lies in 
reserves.  Finnish politicians want to have a force of 
several hundred troops ready to deploy with an EU 
battle-group on five-days notice, without increasing the size 
of the "standing army."  One possible solution might be to 
maintain a core of soldiers who would remain de facto 
reserves for one year after conscript service. 
 
NATO Interoperability 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Finland is committed to being interoperable with 
NATO, and already is to a remarkable extent.  For example, in 
the last 18 months, Finland  has held the role, for two 
six-month periods, as the Framework Nation for the 
Multi-National Brigade Center in Kosovo.  However, there are 
other areas where Finland has a ways to go as regards 
interoperability.  One in particular is with its Air Force. 
The FiAF's 63 F-18 Hornets are superb air defense fighters; 
however, their datalink systems not compatible with NATO. 
The Finns have decided to cease further development of their 
unique datalink and spend scarce defense dollars on a 
"dumbed-down," less capable system that is NATO compatible. 
It is not yet clear whether this system will be operational 
by 2008, when the White Paper states Finland will be prepared 
to offer its F-18s for international crisis 
management/peacekeeping operations. 
 
Landmines 
--------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  The White Paper commits Finland to signing the 
Ottawa Convention by 2012, and destroying its anti-personnel 
landmines (APLs) by 2016.  This has been one of the most 
controversial decisions in the White Paper, and in the 
subsequent Parliamentary review has been criticized from the 
left and the right.  Finland's Left Alliance (which includes 
the Communists, as well as a range of more moderate political 
figures) argued that the nation should stay with the original 
compromise of the 2001 White Paper, in which the government 
committed to joining Ottawa in 2006 -- if doing so would not 
harm national security -- while Conservative MPs argued that 
Finland should not give up APLs at all.  Ministry officials 
tell us that the White Paper decision was a hard-fought 
compromise among MFA, MoD, and the Ministry of Finance (which 
must find the necessary millions of Euros to purchase 
replacement systems), and is unlikely to change. 
 
Your Meeting at the MFA 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Jaakko Laajava will leave Helsinki next month to become 
Finland's Ambassador to the United Kingdom.  The current 
Director General for Political Affairs, Markus Lyra, will 
move up to replace him at the MFA.  You may wish to 
congratulate both on their new appointments.  Laajava has 
been Finland's ambassador to the U.S., and is regarded as the 
MFA's premier Americanist.  He is known to be close to former 
PM Paavo Lipponen, whose support for NATO membership is a 
poorly-kept secret in Finnish politics.  Laajava himself 
supports NATO accession, although, given the Foreign 
Minister's position and prevailing public opinion, he is 
usually measured in his comments.  He will probably provide 
an overview of Finland's White Paper (stressing NATO 
interoperability), and discuss plans for Finnish 
participation in the EU battle-groups.  The Under Secretary 
may be interested in hearing about ongoing NATO operations in 
Afghanistan, and about the recent decision concerning NATO 
and troop training in Iraq.  (NOTE:  Finland has pledged 1 
million Euros to help fund a UN Protection Force in Iraq, but 
bureaucratic problems in New York over the creation of a UN 
trust fund to manage the money has held up the project, and 
no funds have been disbursed.) 
 
Your Meeting at the Ministry for Defense 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Your one hour meeting at the MoD will be split 
between a roundtable discussion with MoD policy makers, and a 
meeting with the Defense Minister, Seppo Kaariainen.  The 
roundtable discussion will be led by MoD Policy Director Dr. 
Pauli Jarvenpaa.  Jarvenpaa knows you from previous 
encounters, and he is a strong advocate of the trans-Atlantic 
link.  Kaariainen has been Defense Minister for a little over 
a year, and during that time he has significantly softened 
the overtly isolationist agenda he brought to the office. 
However, he is a politician who focuses on domestic issues. 
Our best hope with him is for incremental gains.  You might 
take the opportunity to thank Finland for its work in 
Afghanistan (18 members in a PRT; 6 military firefighters at 
Kabul airport; approximately 46 CIMIC specialists in Kabul); 
and its work in Kosovo and in helping to coordinate the EU 
takeover from NATO in Bosnia.  He would probably also 
appreciate hearing about NATO cooperation with the EU, and 
with Russia. 
MACK