This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 001486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EU TU FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND:  NOVEMBER GAERC STRATEGY 
 
REF: STATE 244333 
 
Classified By: POLOFF DAVID ALLEN SCHLAEFER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Poloffs delivered reftel demarche to officials at the 
MFA and to Jonna Partanen, Special Advisor on EU Affairs to 
Prime Minister Vanhanen.  On November 19, Poloff received 
feedback from Leena Aalto, Counselor in the MFA's EU Affairs 
Division.  Aalto's remarks were keyed to the issues covered 
in reftel. 
 
Middle-East Peace Process 
------------------------- 
¶2.  (C)  Aalto said that the top priority for Finland was 
securing strong EU support for a new electoral process aimed 
at electing a new generation of post-Arafat Palestinian 
leaders.  She said that Arafat's death provided a "window of 
opportunity" in which to promote a substantive peace 
settlement in Palestine, and that the EU and U.S. needed to 
closely cooperate to take advantage of this opportunity. 
(Note:  Aalto's remarks about the "window" were almost 
identical to those made by Foreign Minister Tuomioja on Nov. 
8 during a meeting with EUR A/S Jones in Helsinki). 
 
China Arms Embargo 
------------------ 
¶3.  (C)  Aalto opined that she did not believe the EU would 
produce a statement suggesting to China that the arms embargo 
would be lifted in the near future.  She said that certain EU 
countries would push hard for this, but that so many 
differences remained about how to revise the Code of Conduct 
and how to pursue the EU's human rights dialogue with 
Beijing, that it would be very difficult to draft any 
consensus statement.  She said that the fact the discussion 
was back on the agenda for November was already a concession 
to EU members that wished to lift the embargo.  Finland's 
official position would be that it was too early to produce 
such a statement. 
 
Belarus 
------- 
¶4.  (C)  Finland shares American concerns over Belarus, and 
agrees that U.S.-EU coordination is important.  Finland will 
support whatever consensus emerges at the GAERC as regards 
possible measures against the Belarusian leadership. 
 
Cyprus 
------ 
¶5.  (C)  Aalto said that she understood Cyprus was no longer 
on the November GAERC agenda. 
 
Turkey 
------ 
¶6.  (C)  Finland supports Turkish EU accession and will try 
to build consensus for setting a concrete date for talks to 
begin.  Aalto said that it was possible certain EU countries 
might support setting a date, but propose language suggesting 
that an arrangement short of full membership might still be a 
"positive" outcome to accession talks.  Finland was opposed 
to this since it would send a negative signal to Turkey at 
the outset of negotiations.  However, Aalto said that the 
question of timing (when the actual date is) was less 
important than the establishment of a concrete date itself. 
She said that Finland would prefer an early date, but would 
support whatever consensus emerged so long as it was "clear 
and concrete." 
 
Iran 
---- 
¶7.  (C)  Aalto also said that Finland was interested in the 
anticipated GAERC discussion about Iran's nuclear program. 
She said that both Tehran's positive response to the European 
proposal and Secretary Powell's comments about Iranian 
attempts to obscure efforts to produce a warhead and delivery 
vehicle would likely be discussed at the GAERC. 
MACK