This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001914 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: JOYCE MUJURU SLATED FOR VICE-PRESIDENCY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The ruling ZANU-PF party has probably 
temporarily deferred succession tensions within its ranks by 
tapping Minister of Water Resources and Infrastructural 
Development Joyce Mujuru as its second Vice-President at 
party provincial meetings on November 21.  Provincial 
executives left the party's remaining leadership intact, 
signalling little change in leadership chemistry or in Robert 
Mugabe's unrivalled supremacy as the party heads into its 
upcoming Party Congress in early December.  The party's 
selection processes appeared to function quite 
democratically, with no apparent intervention by Mugabe to 
direct a particular outcome.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Mujuru In, Presidium Otherwise Intact 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Ruling party provincial executives on November 21 
nominated Joyce Mujuru, the wife of retired General Solomon 
Mujuru, to assume ZANU-PF's Vice-Presidential slot vacated on 
the death of Simon Muzenda last year.  Provincial executives 
also nominated three incumbents to round out the ruling 
party's presidium: President and First Secretary Robert 
Mugabe, Vice-President and Second Secretary Joseph Msika, and 
Chairman John Nkomo.  The four candidates are expected to be 
approved when the Fifth Party Congress convenes December 1-5 
in Harare.  Mujuru would then in all likelihood join Msika as 
one of the Government's two Vice-Presidents.  The Constition 
provides that the President can appoint up to two 
Vice-Presidents, which historically have always been the 
ZANU-PF Vice-Presidents. 
 
¶3.  (U) While Mugabe's position was unchallenged, the three 
other senior positions in ZANU-PF were hotly contested. 
Mujuru was the choice of six of ten provincial councils, 
edging out Speaker of the Parliament and Party Secretary for 
Administration Emmerson Mnangagwa.  The octegenarian Msika, 
who was long reported to be under pressure to step down, was 
tipped by seven councils over the party's Women League boss 
Thenjiwe Lesabe, who was the preference of three.  John Nkomo 
beat Minister of Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs 
Patrick Chinamasa, six provinces to four. 
 
Women's Wing Asserts Itself 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Mujuru's star has risen rapidly since September, 
when the party's Women's League resolved to submit a woman 
candidate for the vice-presidency and the popular press 
continued to push the issue.  Advocates cited a 1999 party 
resolution and SADC-related undertakings on gender diversity 
in leadership representation to bolster their case.  Under 
pressure from the Women's League, the politburo on November 
18 reportedly resolved that one of the four presidium 
positions should be held by a woman.  Foremost candidates 
were Mujuru and Thenjiwe Lesabe, the party's senior woman who 
hails from the ZAPU wing of ZANU-PF and whose chances would 
have been enhanced had Msika stepped down.  In a November 20 
interview publicized in the state media, President Mugabe 
publicly endorsed the notion of having a woman 
Vice-President. 
 
Mugabe on Top With No Succession Line 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) As an exercise to tip the balance in the party's sub 
rosa succession struggle, the selection process was 
inconclusive but will probably shelve the issue temporarily. 
Under the Constitution, Mugabe can designate either VP to 
assume the duties of the presidency if Mugabe is unable to 
perform them.  If Mugabe were to die or become permanently 
incapacitated, the designated VP would serve as President 
only until a new presidential election were held within 
ninety days.  Neither Msika nor Mujuru command a wide or 
secure enough standing in the party to be the likely ruling 
party candidate in such an election, thus setting the stage 
for a short-fused and uncertain succession battle should 
Mugabe suddenly depart the stage.  (The Muzenda/Mujuru VP 
slot, ascribed to the ZANU party wing would generally be 
considered to be ahead of the ZAPU-descended Msika slot.)  In 
the meantime, however, Mugabe's position atop the party seems 
as unchallenged as ever.  Indeed, his unwillingness to anoint 
a successor throughout the process contributed to the 
eventual selection of an unthreatening figure -- one who 
emerged after other more powerful candidates had been cut 
down by enemies and rivals with no apparent effort on 
Mugabe's part. 
 
Mnangagwa's Waterloo? 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The process' big loser was Mnangagwa, long assumed by 
many to be Mugabe's preferred successor.  The Speaker had 
withstood repeated investigations of financial scandal, 
sometimes reportedly with the President's intervention on his 
behalf.  Despite both having positioned many of his 
supporters in the party's provincial restructuring over the 
past year and knowing where everybody's skeletons were, 
Mnangagwa's troops failed to back him decisively at this 
critical moment.  Whether they did not trust him or thought 
him too "unelectable" to head the party (or both), key 
supporters defected once Mugabe endorsed the party's gender 
resolution.  Mnangagwa no doubt was hurt by the unprecedented 
assertiveness of the party's women's wing, but may have been 
done in even more by machinations of rivals.  Reputed 
"kingmaker" Solomon Mujuru (Joyce's spouse, although the two 
reportedly do not live together), for example, reportedly 
told Mnangagwa in front of other party leaders that Mnangagwa 
would never be the party's leader as long as he was alive. 
Having previously staged comebacks with Mugabe's help from 
defeats in his race for Party Chairman (against John Nkomo) 
in 2000 and in his parliamentary race against the MDC the 
same year, Mnangagwa's star may have been eclipsed for the 
last time. 
 
Other Losers 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) No provinces backed announced VP candidate Didymus 
Mutasa, the mercurial ethnic Manyika and Party Secretary for 
External Affairs, or Vitalis Zvinavashe, the retired General 
who had had held himself out as a candidate for unspecified 
national office.  The unsuccessful Lesabe may have been 
pushed by Mnanagagwa forces to meet the gender resolution's 
requirement at Msika's expense (in the ZAPU-wing slot) 
instead of Mnangagwa's.    Chinamasa's stealth run for the 
Party chairmanship (it was unreported in the popular press) 
is interesting.  Often viewed as a hard-liner technocrat with 
little constituency and totally reliant on the Mugabe's 
favor, he managed to take four provinces.  He and Lesabe may 
have been on some kind of ticket with Mnangagwa; the three of 
them took three provinces (Matabeleland South, Masvingo, and 
Midlands), with Chinamasa also picking up his home province 
of Manicaland and Mnangagwa surprisingly taking Bulawayo. 
(Curiously, Bulawayo alone defied the party's gender 
resolution by not choosing a woman for any slot.)  Party 
Chairman John Nkomo, oft-cited as a candidate to succeed 
Mugabe, was rumored to have had the inside track on the Msika 
slot had Msika stepped down. 
 
Some Disgruntled, Likely Quiet 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Some party constituencies are likely left grumbling 
by the Veepstakes' resolution.   Many in the country's 
Karanga ethnic group - Zimbabwe's most numerous - had long 
argued that it was "their turn," and that one of their ranks 
should be the next in line to run the country after Mugabe, a 
Zezuru.  The elevation of Mujuru, also a Zezuru, leaves the 
party's two highest ranking ZANU-wing figures both from the 
same clan.  (Msika is an ethnic Manyika from the ZAPU wing of 
the party.)  Also disappointed will be some of the party's 
young Turks, who hoped the naming of the Vice-President would 
more decisively signal the party's succession course.  Their 
frustrations will likely simmer along quietly for now but may 
heat up as the end of Mugabe's term approaches in 2008. 
 
Party Processes Functioning 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The party showed itself capable of following its 
processes in an orderly (and yes, even somewhat democratic) 
manner in conducting what was a fractious contest for an 
important position.  Different factions and figures all 
participated in a remarkably inclusive process.  We are 
unaware of evidence that President Mugabe stepped in to exert 
decisive influence; quite the contrary, several insider 
reports indicated that Msika resisted Mugabe's (and others') 
efforts to get him to relinquish his VP seat and that Mugabe 
otherwise kept above the fray.  Alas, the party still seems 
unprepared to show as much equanimity in its inter-party 
relations as it has in its intra-party processes.  Indeed, 
the dichotomy between relative democracy within ZANU-PF and 
the party's/government's repressive practices nationally only 
underscores Mugabe's continuing vision of "democratic" 
one-party state.  Finally, it remains to be seen whether, 
with succession tensions subdued somewhat for now, a 
healthier policy-making dynamic can take shape among the 
inward-looking leadership. 
DELL