This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC SECRETARY-GENERAL ON PARTY TRAVEL, 
CAMPAIGNING, INTER-PARTY RELATIONS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1787 (B) HARARE 1562 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Movement for Democratic Change 
Secretary-General Welshman Ncube on November 4 updated poloff 
 
SIPDIS 
on the developing itinerary of opposition party leaders, 
including regional travel and a planned trip by him and Party 
President Morgan Tsvangirai to the United States in 
mid-November.  He said the party was finalizing a slate of 
candidates for possible participation in next year's 
parliamentary elections, which were still scheduled for 
March.  He reported positive developments suggesting a 
continuing opening of campaign space for the opposition but 
dismissed South African Government suggestions that the 
ruling party was preparing to re-engage in inter-party talks 
on constitutional change.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Opposition's Hectic Travel Schedule 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ncube reported that Tsvangirai and party 
Vice-President Gibson Sibanda were scheduled to be in South 
Africa November 4, and to meet with heads of state in Nigeria 
November 6, in Ghana November 8, and in Senegal on November 
¶10.  (Note: The delegation also is slated to receive media 
strategy training from IRI while in West Africa.  End note.) 
They hoped to secure meetings with the presidents of 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Burkina Faso during that period as 
well, but scheduling details had yet to be worked out.  Ncube 
indicated that the party was getting the cold shoulder from 
SADC troika member Lesotho, possibly because of the rapport 
between Foreign Minister Mudenge and the Lesotho foreign 
minister, who Ncube said had been classmates. 
 
¶3.  (C) After covering southern and western Africa, the 
delegation would be joined by Ncube for visits to Brussels, 
London, Oslo, and Stockholm before travelling to the United 
States.  During the U.S. leg, dates for which were yet to be 
determined, the delegation hoped to visit the State 
Department, Capitol Hill, the MDC's Washington Office and 
Zimbabwe emigre elements, among other interlocutors.  The 
delegation would then swing by Ethiopia (where they hoped to 
engage the African Union), Kenya, and Tanzania by early 
December before returning to Zimbabwe. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ncube singled out the Obasanjo meeting as 
particularly important.  He said Obasanjo indicated that he 
wanted to remain engaged on Zimbabwe, notwithstanding past 
frustrations.  As the African Union Chair, he could be 
particularly helpful in engineering a meaningful AU election 
observation group.  Moreover, Nigeria could keep Zimbabwe on 
the Commonwealth's agenda, notwithstanding Zimbabwe's 
withdrawal from the organization, and had leverage through a 
bilateral relationship that was important to Zimbabwe. 
 
Campaign Space Opening Up? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ncube reported that he and Deputy Secretary-General 
Gift Chimanikire would be advancing the party's domestic 
agenda while the President was abroad.  They planned to be 
addressing rallies and meeting with party district and ward 
structures in the Midlands in the next few days.  Police were 
becoming notably less obstructive with respect to party 
meetings.  Instead of disapproving applications on specious 
grounds or never responding and then closing meetings down, 
police generally were approving meeting requests around the 
country, with few exceptions.  When applications were 
disapproved, it was usually with some apparent justification 
and without prejudice to reschedule or to relocate. 
(Comment: This appeared to continue a trend first reported by 
Tsvangirai aide Gandhi Mudzingwa in July, ref B. End 
 
SIPDIS 
comment.)  Local organizers still faced intimidation and 
disruptions by local ruling party elements, but not as widely 
as before or with quite the apparent level of official 
impunity. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Secretary-General did not comment on prospects 
for MDC participation in the March election or on the party's 
recent call to delay the election.  Nonetheless, he allowed 
that the party was proceeding with efforts to complete its 
slate of candidates to participate in the election.  The 
party had identified candidates in about 85 of the 120 
parliamentary constituencies.  Most of the remaining 
selections were in the Mashonalands (East, West and Central) 
with a few left in Harare and Manicaland as well. 
 
Bennet Case Implications 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Ncube said the eligibility of recently incarcerated 
MDC MP Roy Bennet to stand for election was murky (ref A). 
The constitution conditioned an MP's ineligibility on a 
criminal sentence exceeding six months being imposed by a 
court, not Parliament (which imposed Bennet's sentence).  Of 
more immediate concern, though, was Bennet's possible 
expulsion from the body and the holding of a by-election 
before the March national elections.  An MP can be expelled 
from the body if he is absent without adequate cause (an 
issue that would be debatable in Bennet's politically charged 
case) for 21 consecutive days that Parliament is in session. 
Under the current parliamentary schedule (assuming he could 
not get a court order freeing him earlier), that would occur 
in mid-December for Bennet.  That would still probably leave 
inadequate time to conduct a by-election before March.  In 
quiet inter-party negotiations, ZANU-PF had proposed to 
release Bennet from jail in return for his expulsion from 
Parliament and a declaration of his seat's vacancy.  Ncube 
indicated that the Parliament didn't have the authority to 
expel him under current law, but that Bennet and the MDC 
would likely accept his suspension for the remainder of the 
current term in return for his release.  Ncube said that the 
ZANU-PF offer underscored its interest in trying to get a 2/3 
majority before the parliamentary election so it could amend 
the constitution to its liking without MDC support.  (Note: 
If ZANU-PF is able to capture Bennet's seat, it would still 
be one seat short of a 2/3 majority.  End note.)  Ncube was 
not optimistic about Bennet's chances for release under a 
high court petition scheduled to be heard on November 9. 
 
ZANU-PF Temporizing on Talks 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) According to Ncube, ZANU-PF was still dragging its 
feet on long-standing discussions about a package of 
constitutional amendments.  Since the MDC publicly announced 
in July its conditional suspension of participation in 
elections, the ruling party had backed off from the package 
tentatively agreed between Ncube and Minister for Justice, 
Parliamentary and Legal Affairs Patrich Chinamasa.  Ncube 
said that Chinamasa told him that Mugabe himself had scotched 
further ZANU-PF efforts on the matter.  According to 
Chinamasa, Mugabe had said that the MDC was "taking them for 
a ride" and would end up reneging on any agreed amendments or 
demanding more at the last minute. 
 
¶9.  (C) Ncube maintained that the MDC remained interested in 
rekindling talks but had little faith in the ruling party's 
sincerity.  The opposition privately had made it clear to 
ZANU-PF counterparts that the constitutional talks were not 
linked to the issue of election participation; they would 
vote for the agreed constitutional changes even before making 
a decision to participate in the election.  Ncube said that 
Tsvangirai had conveyed that message to Mugabe in a letter. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶10.  (C) Ncube said that SAG interlocutors told the MDC that 
Mugabe had undertaken to Mbeki on the margins of the UNGA in 
September that inter-party talks on the constitution would be 
revived soon.  SAG sources later said that the politburo was 
scheduled to meet on November 3, when Mugabe would bless the 
recommencement of talks.  However, Chinamasa has been unable 
to confirm any of this to Ncube.  When they last spoke 
earlier in the week, Chinamasa told Ncube to talk to Minister 
for Security Nicholas Goche, who has since been unavailable. 
 Ncube concluded that these developments were consistent with 
the ruling party's long-term strategy of using "talks on 
talks" to string out the SAG and the MDC, appearing to be 
willing to talk without ever talking meaningfully. 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The ruling party's overarching priority remains to 
win the March elections and win big - big enough to amend the 
constitution on its own.  Nonetheless, the party is stepping 
up efforts to market its election internationally, at least 
to the region and its developing world "friends."  The MFA 
convened diplomats from Non-Aligned Movement embassies on 
November 1 to brief them on election-related developments. 
At the briefing, Foreign Minister Mudenge rejected MDC 
demands that the election be delayed and casitigated the EU 
for planning to condemn Zimbabwe with an UNGA resolution 
"based on stale reports from three years ago," a move he 
alleged indicated that they had prejudged the election.  He 
maintained that Zimbabwe had the region's strongest 
opposition party and was ahead of most of SADC in 
implementing SADC's electoral principles - proof of the 
Government's commitment to multiparty democracy.  The 
reportedly meek response from the audience and muted reaction 
from regional counterparts will fortify ruling party 
confidence in its strategy. 
 
¶12.  (C) The GOZ can be expected to make additional marginal 
(but not decisive) improvements in the electoral environment, 
as the gradual opening of campaign space indicates.  The 
electoral bill's modest reforms received their second reading 
in the Parliament and elicited little outcry in a recent 
sparesly attended public hearing conducted on the bill by the 
parliamentary committee; they will likely pass in the coming 
weeks, in time to be implemented for the March election.  The 
GOZ reportedly is working on election-related media access 
rules, but ministers have proclaimed publicly that they will 
apply only to parties contending in elections - an implicit 
(and mostly disingenuous) enticement for the MDC to 
participate.  The MDC will be challenged to take advantage of 
these openings to rekindle hope and energy among an 
electorate that appears increasingly resigned to a ruling 
party victory. 
 
¶13.  (C) The MDC leadership hopes that its ambitious travel 
agenda will burnish its image at home and abroad, will 
generate more regional pressure on the GOZ, and will 
stimulate party fund-raising efforts, particularly with the 
growing Zimbabwean diaspora.  The strategy is not without 
costs, however.  The party will be without much of its 
leadership at home for a lengthy and potentially important 
period in the run-up to elections, potentially handicapping 
its ability to exploit the small openings being afforded it 
as the ruling party dresses up its election administration. 
Moreover, the public posturing with Western governments is a 
double-edged sword -- it may bolster flagging morale among 
party faithful but it plays into the hands of the GOZ 
propagandists, who exaggerate the party's western orientation 
in playing to unaligned domestic and regional audiences. 
Finally, few things raise the hackles of travel sanctioned 
ruling party officials more than high profile opposition 
globe-trotting.  Tsvangirai's publicized meetings abroad 
could provoke a backlash, including an effort to go after 
Tsvangirai's passport again in connection with purported 
 
SIPDIS 
treason charges.  We do not discount the possibility that a 
backlash could touch us as well; a ZANU-PF official once 
indicated privately to us that reports he had received from 
the ANC that the USG was funding MDC travel, if true, could 
adversely affect bilateral relations. 
DELL