This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004881 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL KNNP PHUM EAID PINR IR KN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU/DPRK: SE DETRANI DISCUSSES 6PT, KEDO, 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND MISSILES 
 
REF: A. USEU TODAY 11/10/04 
     ¶B. USEU BRUSSELS 4756 
     ¶C. USEU BRUSSELS 1119 
     ¶D. USEU BRUSSELS 1081 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During consultations November 9 with Special 
Envoy Joseph DeTrani and EAP/K Director Jim Foster, EU 
officials underscored the EU's firm support for the Six-Party 
Process and willingness to play a constructive role when the 
time comes.  They urged the US to consult early if the EU is 
ever expected to provide assistance as part of any resolution 
of the nuclear issue.  DeTrani and Foster urged the EU not to 
agree to anything with Iran that the DPRK could cite as 
precedent for demanding something short of full disarmament 
itself.  Commission interlocutors said the EU is grappling 
with what to do about KEDO, and hopes for a signal from the 
US about its 2005 funding plans.  On humanitarian assistance, 
the EU is disappointed with North Korea's lack of cooperation 
and decision to quit participating in the UN Common Appeals 
Process, but will look for other ways to coordinate 
international assistance.  DeTrani and Foster, accompanied by 
INR Analyst Anthony Ruggiero, also delivered a briefing on 
the DPRK's ballistic missiles program.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) Special Envoy for North Korea Joseph DeTrani and EAP/K 
Director Jim Foster met on November 9 with EU Council, 
Commission and Member State officials to discuss the 
Six-Party Process and other DPRK issues in advance of a visit 
to North Korea by the EU's Regional Director-level Troika 
(ref. B).  DeTrani and Foster also met with the EU Political 
and Security Committee and, accompanied by INR Anthony 
Ruggiero, briefed cleared EU officers on North Korea's 
ballistic missiles program. 
 
SIX-PARTY TALKS 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (C) DeTrani briefed his interlocutors on US thinking about 
the Six-Party Talks and thanked them for the EU's consistent 
support.  He expressed US hope that China will be able to 
bring North Korea back to the negotiating table in late 
November or early December, and asked the EU to urge China to 
increase its pressure on North Korea.  Council DG Robert 
Cooper said he thought we were entering a critical phase 
because, with President Bush now re-elected, Pyongyang had to 
decide whether to return to the table or wait out another 
four years in the unrealistic hope that something might 
change.  DeTrani agreed, and said he was guardedly optimistic 
that North Korea would make a strategic decision to 
re-engage. 
 
¶4. (C) Several interlocutors, including Cooper, wanted to 
know if the US had a "Plan B" for if the Six-Party Talks 
failed to resolve the nuclear issue.  DeTrani and Foster 
explained that the US saw the Six-Party Process -- a 
multilateral mechanism involving all major regional parties 
-- as the only viable way to ensure North Korea's complete, 
verifiable and irreversible disarmament.  The ultimate prize 
for North Korea was full normalization with the international 
community.  The DPRK needs to make a fundamental decision 
about what kind of state it wants to be.  Until then, there 
was little the international community could do except keep 
the pressure on and the Six-Party avenue open.  While not 
ruling out options as a matter of principle, the US was not 
contemplating any kind of unilateral or military solutions to 
the problem. 
 
EU WILLING TO HELP, WILL NEED EARLY CONSULTATION 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (C) DeTrani's interlocutors were grateful for the timely 
US briefing on the Six-Party Process.  They reiterated the 
EU's willingness to play a supportive role when the time is 
right (refs. C, D).  Council Secretariat North America and 
Human Rights Director Jim Cloos said the EU was ready to help 
in any way it could, while "recognizing our secondary role." 
Commission External Relations Director Richard Wright pointed 
out that even though the EU is not part of the Six-Party 
Talks, the EU would expect to contribute if the talks result 
in a long-term plan, and therefore should be kept in the loop 
along the way. 
 
¶6. (C) In separate meetings, Council DG Cooper and HiRep 
Solana Policy Advisor Chris Holtby urged the US to consult 
early if it wanted the EU to provide incentives and 
assistance to the DPRK as part of an eventual resolution of 
the nuclear issue.  The EU will need time and will want input 
from the US if it is ever expected to play a role, Holtby 
said.  Cooper said the EU would need to know early if the US 
wanted it to play a bigger role.  "It will be easier for us 
to help you," he said, "if we feel consulted early, rather 
than just handed a bill."  DeTrani and Foster thanked the EU 
for its willingness to help and said they would bear in mind 
the EU request for early consultation when the time comes. 
 
EU LOOKING FOR SIGN ABOUT FUTURE OF KEDO 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) During a meeting with Commission Director Richard 
Wright and members of his staff, Wright asked about US 
intentions toward the Korean Energy Development Organization 
(KEDO).  The KEDO issue is becoming time-sensitive for the 
EU, since they must decide whether to fund KEDO next year. 
Wright said the EU is inclined to continue support for KEDO's 
administrative costs (Euros 1 million per year), but to 
discontinue the Euros 4 million they provided for suspension 
costs last year.  The fact that the US is not contributing 
this year "is not helping," Wright said.  He asked for some 
sort of signal from Washington to indicate whether the US 
will fund KEDO next year, so the EU can make an informed 
decision on whether to continue funding.  He also pointed out 
that the legal basis for EU contributions to KEDO runs out at 
the end of 2005.  If KEDO is terminated, Wright said, there 
will be "contingent liabilities," and "we do not consider 
ourselves at risk for these." 
 
¶8. (C) DeTrani told Wright that the U.S. continues to see 
KEDO as a viable entity, but that the KEDO light-water 
reactor project is not viable.  Wright responded that as part 
of an international settlement, "I don't think we'd object" 
to termination of the light-water reactor project. 
 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Commission Director Richard Wright said that a major 
goal of the EU's November 13-16 Troika visit to North Korea 
(ref. B) was to assess recent changes in the climate for 
humanitarian aid and development projects.  Wright said the 
EU was disappointed by North Korea's recent decision to 
terminate the UN's Common Appeals Process (CAP), but said the 
EU would find other ways to coordinate aid to the DPRK.  He 
underscored, however, that monitoring was "non-negotiable" 
for the EU. 
 
¶10. (SBU) During its November 13-16 trip, the EU Troika also 
plans to conduct monitoring visits to ongoing development 
projects, Wright said.  The EU was trying to develop a better 
sense of the economic situation, and hoped to see a deepening 
of the economic improvements observed in recent Troika trips 
to North Korea, including an influx of Chinese electronics 
and revitalization surrounding the Kaesong industrial zone. 
¶11. (C) Over dinner with other EU and third-country 
officials, Wright also mentioned that the EU had two pilot 
development projects on the books that "could be launched in 
just a few weeks if North Korea did the right things."  But, 
as we have seen with regard to humanitarian assistance, the 
DPRK seems to be "going backward rather than forward," he 
said.  Japanese Mission DCM Yoshihisa Kuroda cautioned the EU 
not to invest too much of itself in planning for possible 
development projects.  He underlined that the first priority 
of Japan, the US, and others in the region was security, not 
the development of North Korea.  The EU does not have to live 
in North Korea's neighborhood, he said, and should be very 
careful not to say or do things that undermine the security 
interests of those who do.  EU interlocutors reassured 
Yoshihisa that the EU fully supported the Six-Party Process 
and saw North Korea as a grave global threat.  The EU would 
take its cue from Six-Party partners about the timing and 
design of any future increase in economic engagement. 
 
BRIEFING THE PSC: DPRK-IRAN PARALLELS? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In a meeting with the twenty-five Member State 
Ambassadors to the EU Political Security Committee (PSC), 
DeTrani provided an overview of the Six-Party Talks, then 
opened to the floor to a range of questions from the 
audience.  Ambassadors asked about the future of KEDO, the 
possible impact of a nuclear agreement with Iran on the 
Six-Party Talks, a possible "Plan B" if the Six-Party Talks 
remain at an impasse, and the climate for humanitarian aid to 
North Korea. 
 
¶13. (C) DeTrani noted that the EU should be very careful 
about any potential agreement with Tehran over its nuclear 
activities, because North Korea could use any relatively weak 
deal with Iran to try to leverage concessions in the 
Six-Party Talks.  As with North Korea, the international 
community should accept nothing less from Tehran than the 
complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all 
nuclear-related programs.  DeTrani and Foster also made this 
point in their other meetings throughout the day.  EU 
interlocutors were in listening mode, but several observed in 
very general terms that the multilateral track the US was 
pursuing with the DPRK was similar in many ways to the EU's 
approach to Iran.  Only Council DG Cooper underscored the 
differences, arguing that geography and regional political 
dynamics made Iran the more dangerous -- if also more 
potentially democratic -- of the two.  At the same time, both 
had a history of "lying and cheating" which made them equally 
hard to trust, he said (ref. A). 
 
BRIEFING THE EU ON DPRK MISSILES PROGRAMS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) INR Analyst Anthony Ruggiero, who accompanied DeTrani 
and Foster, delivered a briefing to cleared EU officials on 
recent developments in North Korea's ballistic missiles 
program and indications that the DPRK might be preparing for 
a new test launch.  The EU officials thanked the US for the 
briefing -- which went smoothly despite incompatible US and 
EU security guidelines that prevented the use of visual aids 
-- and expressed hope that North Korea's missiles 
proliferation activities could be addressed once the nuclear 
issue was resolved.  Several officials asked about DPRK links 
to outside technology suppliers (especially Russia) and 
missile customers (Pakistan, Iran, private groups and 
terrorists).  DeTrani and Ruggiero said that the DPRK's 
willingness to sell complete systems to any country able to 
pay was alarming, but noted that Pyongyang did not seem 
interested in selling to non-state entities, probably because 
of the risks involved.  The real danger was that corruption 
and established DPRK links to organized crime could result in 
unauthorized technology transfers.  Commission 
representatives said that the EU has raised missiles concerns 
in its (low-level) political dialogue with North Korea, and 
said the EU would discuss the problem with China during the 
December 8 EU-China Summit. 
 
(U) This cable has been cleared by SE DeTrani and EAP/K 
Foster. 
 
Schnabel