This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 BRUSSELS 004844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CA FOR FMOSS AND JJACOBS; EUR/ERA FOR KSHEARER; DOJ FOR 
CRIMINAL DIVISION - BSWARTZ; DHS FOR SBOYLAN, BTS - MCLAYTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2014 
TAGS: CMGT SMIG PTER PREL CPAS CVIS EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: BIOMETRICS: EU ON PARALLEL TRACK WITH U.S. AND 
MOVING FORWARD 
 
REF: (A) 03 BRUSSELS 4747 (NOTAL) (B) BRUSSELS 0928 
     (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR.  REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  In parallel with U.S. efforts to incorporate 
the use of biometric identifiers, the EU is finalizing plans 
to enhance its border controls through the use of biometrics. 
 On October 26, EU Justice and Interior Ministers agreed to 
incorporate two biometrics into national passports, thus 
surpassing the ICAO recommendation and U.S. plans for its own 
passports.  If the three Member States which have expressed a 
reservation about this decision give it the green light, EU 
Member States will have until mid-July 2006 to begin issuing 
passports with digitized photographs and until the end of 
2007 to add digital fingerprints to the chips.  The EU may 
decide to restrict international access to some of the 
biometric data, particularly the passport fingerprints. By 
the end of 2007, the EU hopes that its 3500 consular posts 
and all its international ports of entry will be connected 
through the Visa Information System, and name checks against 
the EU lookout system will be automatic.  Given the 
technological challenges, implementation of these plans may 
slide.  Switzerland has been given the green light to align 
itself with the EU's visa and passport policies.  The EU is 
also considering enhanced consular cooperation abroad as it 
moves to biometric visas.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Overview 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The EU and the U.S. have been working together in a 
variety of international fora (such as ICAO and the G8), as 
well as bilaterally, to combat terrorism and illegal 
immigration through the use of biometrics.  Close cooperation 
between these key players is essential to ensure worldwide 
interoperability.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the U.S. 
and 3/11 in Spain were catalysts for countries on both sides 
of the Atlantic to expedite their plans for securing travel 
documents and strengthening border controls. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On parallel tracks, both the U.S. and EU are 
incorporating biometrics into their consular and border 
management systems to cut down on visa fraud, asylum fraud, 
visa over-stayers and the use of stolen documents by 
imposters.  The European Commission (EC) has proposed using 
biometrics in the following critical areas:  visas and 
residency cards, lookout systems and national passports. 
While the EU is strongly committed to establishing a closer 
link between the applicant and the travel document through 
the use of biometrics, Member States will not fully avail 
themselves of biometrics to check applicants against existing 
EU lookout databases.  Critics have questioned the need for 
biometrics, citing privacy concerns and financial costs. 
Nevertheless, political agreement to go forward with 
biometrics has already been achieved; technical standards 
should be finalized in early 2005. 
 
¶4. (U) Because of "opt-outs", these requirements do not 
automatically extend to the UK, Ireland and Denmark. 
However, the three countries are expected to "opt in" or 
adopt similar provisions in parallel with the rest of the 
union.  EU decisions on biometrics will automatically apply 
to Iceland and Norway because of their participation in the 
Schengen Agreement.  Furthermore, on October 26 the 
Government of Switzerland signed an association agreement on 
to bring the country into the Schengen area.  While 
ratification of the agreement remains pending (possibly by 
referendum), Switzerland "will be involved in all discussion 
taking place in the Council as far as the further development 
of the Schengen acquis is concerned." 
 
------------------------ 
Schengen Visas 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (U) As reported in reftel a, the EU decided to expedite 
the incorporation of biometrics into some of its travel 
documents following the terrorist attacks of 3/11 in Spain. 
The date for including digitized photographs into visas and 
residency permits was moved up to 2005 (from 2007). 
 
¶6. (C) Discussions are still taking place in the EU's "visa 
working group" regarding the technical standards related to 
biometrics in visas.  Most Member States have expressed an 
interest in a flat scan of all ten fingerprints of each visa 
applicant.  According to Silvia Kolligs, the DG Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) policy officer who is drafting the 
biometrics proposals, the EC will only require that the two 
index finger scans be included in the biometric visa.  The 
other eight, if taken, would be stored by the Member States 
and used for national purposes or to mitigate "false hits" at 
ports of entry. 
 
¶7. (C) Last month, the Article 6 subcommittee re-examined the 
EC's proposal to incorporate these two biometrics on a "radio 
frequency identification chip" (RFIC) embedded in the visa 
foil.  According the Head of Unit for Large Scale IT Systems 
at DG JHA Frank Paul, the EC is backing away from this method 
for four reasons.  First, the more chips being sandwiched 
into a passport, the more likely it will be for "collision" 
to occur from the various chips emitting radio signals. 
Second, privacy advocates who favored a system where the 
citizen alone has physical custody of the biometric chip and 
its data (instead of depositing the data into a central 
database) are increasingly concerned about privacy breaches 
caused by chips emitting data.  Third, the U.S. experience 
has shown that the "response time" of querying a centralized 
system is minimal and will not seriously affect the workflow 
(either at consulates or ports of entry).  Fourth, the U.S. 
system of sending biometrics electronically to a central 
database is much cheaper than procuring chips. 
 
¶8. (C) As an alternate to chips being embedded in the visa 
foil, the EC is examining two possibilities.  The first, 
strongly supported by Germany and France, would be an interim 
solution with a separate plastic card containing the 
biometric chip being issued to the applicant at the same time 
the visa foil is placed in the passport.  The second option 
would be to copy the U.S. model and have all the data stored 
in a centralized system.  This, however, would push the 
biometric visa to 2007 when the Visa Information System (VIS) 
is operational (more information below).  Most states arguing 
against the interim solution of a separate card do so for 
financial reasons.  The supporters of the plan, besides being 
eager to move forward with biometrics, point out that the 
separate card format can be used for longer-term residency 
cards.  (Currently, Member States have the option for 
long-term residency documents to be either in foil or card 
format.) 
 
¶9. (C) If the deadline for incorporating biometrics into 
visas is pushed to 2007, the EC will still begin issuing 
Schengen visas in 2005 with scanned photographs on the foils. 
 Although capturing an image from a photograph attached to 
the visa application is good enough to print images on foils, 
Kolligs said that once biometrics are fully implemented with 
the option of running facial recognition checks, live 
photographs will probably have to be taken at the time of the 
visa applications. 
 
¶10. (C) Another technical issue under discussion relates to 
security standards for collecting the biometric fingerprints 
of visa applicants.  Because a decision to require consular 
officers to personally collect each scan would lead to 
serious workflow problems and require applicants to travel 
far distances in many instances, the EC is considering 
alternative methods (like certifying travel agencies). 
Ensuring security without disrupting legitimate travel will 
be key in this decision.  According to Kolligs, she does not 
see any realistic alternative other than copying the U.S. 
model and requiring all visa applicants to apply in person 
for a visa. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The EU will also reconsider the price of its 
Schengen visas, given the cost of incorporating new 
technologies.  Under current policies, the uniform price for 
a Schengen visa is 35 euros.  Member States are free to waive 
fees (for humanitarian or other reasons), but may not charge 
more. 
 
¶12. (C) All of the above changes will be discussed at the 
next visa working group, November 16-17.  Decisions will be 
sent up the chain of command (SCIFA and COREPER) to the JHA 
Ministers for a final decision in early December.  Then, 
Kolligs will revise the various EC proposals and amend the 
Common Consular Instruction to reflect the requirement to 
take fingerprints, etc.  She estimates that final versions 
will be finalized by January 2005. 
------------------------ 
Visa Information System 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) The biometric visa will be the fundamental unit of 
the EU,s Visa Information System (VIS), currently in the 
last phases of discussion.  Once fully operational, the VIS 
will tie together all 3500 visa issuing posts of the 25 
Member States abroad and all the EU's international ports of 
entry, as well as those of the three associated countries. 
The system will be the largest in the world, handling 
approximately 20 million visa applications per year.  The EC 
expects that the central component of the VIS system will be 
operational by the end of 2006 using alphanumeric data and 
that the biometric components will be quickly integrated in 
¶2007.  While the EC develops the central system, Member 
States must build their own national visa systems than can 
support a biometric component.  Each of the national systems 
will connect via an "interface" with the central database 
managed by the EC. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Member States will gradually roll out (at their own 
expense and effort) the equipment to scan fingerprints at 
their consulates and their international ports of entry. 
Among those cited by the EC as potential "first wave" 
participants in the VIS, beginning in 2007, are France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia.  Visa holders will have their fingerprints verified 
at ports of entry by scanning one or two of their prints 
(similar to US VISIT, although without the check against 
criminal databases). 
 
¶15. (U) The EC proposal includes the following advantages of 
an EU-wide visa system: 
-- boost anti-fraud efforts by improving exchanges of 
information between Member States regarding information 
contained in visa applications; 
-- prevent "visa shopping"; 
-- facilitate communications between consular posts and 
European ports of entry, as well as between consulates abroad 
and consular headquarters in European capitals; 
-- verify the identity of visa holders at external borders, 
immigration posts or police checkpoints; 
-- verify the identity of visa over-stayers and assist in 
their removal if undocumented; 
-- help determine the state responsible for adjudicating an 
asylum application (if the asylum seeker had been issued a 
visa); and, 
-- contribute toward improving the administration of a common 
visa policy to improve internal security and combat terrorism. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Once the VIS is operational, a person who is caught 
illegally in the Schengen area and claims to have no 
identification can have his or her biometric fingerprint run 
against the VIS to establish identity and nationality.  If 
the individual makes an asylum claim, a check against the VIS 
can also be made to determine responsibility for adjudicating 
the claim (i.e., the country that issued the visa).  The VIS 
cannot, however, be used for investigative or law enforcement 
purposes.  (Example.  A fingerprint found at the scene of a 
crime could not be run against the VIS to see if by chance 
there were a match.)  Approximately 25 percent of EU visa 
requests are refused. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Under EU data retention rules, information in the 
VIS will be kept five years after the expiration of the visa. 
 In exceptional circumstances, the information can be kept up 
to ten years.  If an alien becomes a citizen, personal data 
must be removed from the VIS.  After the data is removed, it 
is kept for an additional year in a "locked file" that can 
only be accessed if fraud is suspected.  Given these 
parameters, the EC estimates that at once fully operational, 
the VIS will have data on over 70 million applicants in the 
system.  Electronic files would include a digitized 
photograph, fingerprints and scanned documents to support the 
visa application. 
 
------------------------ 
Name Checks at the European Level 
------------------------ 
¶18. (SBU) The VIS will share a common structural platform 
with the EU's lookout database, the upgraded Schengen 
Information System (SIS2), but will retain separate 
operational controls.  Visa applications will be 
automatically checked against the SIS2 to determine whether 
the individual is prohibited from entering the Schengen area 
(the so-called Article 96 list).  Under the current system, 
visa posts must perform manual checks against the SIS.  Most 
countries use compact discs sent through diplomatic pouches 
for the mandatory name check.  Under this system, the lookout 
information is dated, and there is no certainty that a name 
check has actually been run.  In contrast, the VIS check 
against the SIS2 will be automatic, instantaneous and an 
integral part of the visa issuance process. 
 
¶19. (SBU) According to standard EU procedures, if there is a 
hit against an individual in the SIS, the visa is usually 
denied without further questioning.  The adjudicating officer 
has the ability to ask the country that entered the name onto 
the Article 96 list for additional information.  (Language 
difficulties and time lapses frequently discourage requests 
for additional information by the interviewing officer.)  A 
consular officer has the option to issue a 
geographically-limited visa to an applicant placed on the 
Article 96 list by another EU Member State.  A geographically 
limited visa, in theory, does not permit free circulation to 
other Member States (although lack of internal border 
controls means there is no physical barrier to prevent 
circulation). 
 
¶20. (SBU) Although both the VIS and SIS2 will both contain 
biometrics, the EU is not currently considering biometric 
checks against any SIS2 files such as law enforcement 
databases (fugitives from justice, suspected criminals, etc.) 
or judicial databases (those wanted for extradition or to 
appear in court as witnesses).  At the European level, the 
SIS2 biometric function will only be used to confirm identity 
in the case of an alphanumeric hit on the system,s Article 
96 list and used for border management purposes. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The SIS2 is programmed to be operational by March 
¶2007.  This is a key date, not only for the VIS, but also for 
the new EU Member States.  Border controls between the old 
and the new Member States cannot be removed until the new EU 
countries have access to the SIS2.  (The EC must also certify 
that external borders and other technical standards are up to 
Schengen requirements before internal borders fall.) 
 
------------------------ 
Additional Name Checks at the National Level 
------------------------ 
 
¶22. (SBU) In addition to the EU-wide SIS checks, Member 
States can -- and often do -- run name checks against their 
own national lookout systems.  These systems frequently 
contain derogatory information not entered into the SIS, 
including intelligence and other sensitive information 
countries are not willing to share with other Member States. 
Any fingerprints collected as part of the visa application 
could also be run against a Member State's criminal database. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Another method to restrict visa issuance apart from 
the Article 96 list relates to the so-called "VISION" 
consultation network.  VISION lists nationalities (not 
specific names) which require prior notification to certain 
interested countries before Schengen visas can be issued by 
consular officers of other EU Member States.  Although the 
list is classified, VISION lists generally follow colonial 
patterns.  For instance, before any Member State issues a 
visa to an Algerian citizen, France must be given the name of 
the applicant.  Even though the applicant might not be on the 
Article 96 list, France can refuse to allow the partner 
Member State to issue the visa.  Because of magnet 
communities and language ties, citizens of former colonies 
are thought to be more likely to eventually end up in the 
territory of the former colonial power.  The VISION list can 
also help to combat both the movement of suspected 
terrorists. 
 
------------------------ 
Tenders and Contracts 
------------------------ 
¶24. (SBU) On October 26, the EC signed its first contract for 
the VIS and SIS2, awarding the 40 million euro project to a 
multinational team of IT companies led by STERIA-France and 
HP-Belgium.  This project will allow a preliminary version of 
both systems to go forward with capabilities for alphanumeric 
data and digitized photographs.  Tenders for a much larger 
contract (up to 400 million euros) will be issued in 2005. 
The second phase will permit the two systems to incorporate 
digital fingerprints, as well as scans of documents that 
support the visa applications. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Note.  Frank Paul plans to travel to the U.S. on 
his IVP program in early 2005 to consult with policymakers 
and technical specialists as the EC begins implementing the 
decisions made regarding biometrics.  While there, he also 
hopes to meet with U.S. companies that supply biometric 
technologies.  The EC has been very happy with the products 
supplied by U.S. firm Cogent to EURODAC, the EU,s 
biometric-based system for asylum seekers.  End note. 
 
------------------------ 
Passports 
------------------------ 
 
¶26. (C) On October 26, JHA Ministers decided to require two 
biometrics in national passports:  a digitized photograph and 
digital fingerprints.  Their decision significantly altered 
the original EC proposal, which called for just digitized 
photographs.  Among those countries pressing hardest for the 
double biometric were France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain.  Those most 
skeptical were Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Sweden, while 
those expressing reservations over the cost were Denmark and 
Portugal.  At the JHA meeting, both Finland and Austria 
placed "scrutiny reservations" on the decision, meaning they 
wish to examine the issue more closely.  (Note.  During a 
meeting on November 4 in Vienna with an Austrian official in 
charge of biometrics, he told PRMOff that Austria was 
concerned over the price of this endeavor.  According to 
Kolligs, Austria also questions the need for fingerprints in 
passports.  End Note.)  The Netherlands also has a 
reservation until its national parliament can review the 
decision.  Any of these countries could render a negative 
decision and scuttle the process, although the likelihood of 
this is very small. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Another change from the original proposal allows 
for a longer implementation phase:  18 months (instead of 12) 
for the digital photographs and 36 months for the digital 
fingerprints.  The 18-month implementation phase would give 
EU countries until mid-2006 to issue biometric passports (far 
past the USG's current October 26, 2005 deadline for visa 
waiver countries).  Passports in circulation at the time the 
deadlines kick in will remain valid.  Several smaller EU 
Member States -- such as Belgium, Austria and Slovenia -- 
should be able to meet the USG deadline.  During a 
ministerial meeting on June 8, Germany and Denmark publicly 
stated they planned to begin issuing biometric passports with 
digitized photographs before the end of 2005 partly because 
of the U.S. visa waiver legislation.  At a CIREFI meeting on 
October 29, Italy committed itself to the same implementation 
timeline. 
 
¶28. (C) The EC is now working to spell out the technical 
standards for the biometric passports.  Important questions 
related to data protection and data privacy include:  1) what 
information is stored; 2) how can it be used; and, 3) who has 
access to it.  According to Kolligs, the EU will probably 
determine two levels when restricting access to the chip. 
For the biographic data and photograph, the EU is considering 
"basic access" control, requiring that the passport's 
machine-readable zone be swiped before the chip can be read. 
This procedure would reduce concerns of privacy advocates who 
fear that a chip which continually emits data could be read 
by a curious bystander using basic equipment.  For the 
sensitive fingerprint data, which will not be displayed on 
the passport's photo page, the EU is considering "extended 
access" or "key code" controls.  Once the passport is swiped, 
the reader will recognize the user's authority to view the 
fingerprint and the user will be asked to enter a key code to 
view the fingerprint. 
 
¶29.  (C)  It will be up to the Member States to decide on a 
broader range of technical issues related to passports, 
including how many fingerprints to scan.  The EC envisions 
requiring two index fingers (with a descending priority of 
other fingers if those two are missing).  However, Member 
States could require their citizens to have all ten 
fingerprints scanned.  They will also be responsible for 
determining where and how the prints are taken and to which 
other national authorities (including the U.S.) they might 
grant "extended access" to view the fingerprints inscribed on 
the chips.  It will also be up to Member States to decide 
whether to run the fingerprints of applicants against lookout 
databases before issuing the passport.  According to Kolligs, 
Germany is the driving force behind fingerprints in 
passports; she said that other countries such as Spain and 
Portugal, which have routinely fingerprinted their nationals, 
are also supportive. 
 
------------------------ 
Towards an EU Consular Service? 
------------------------ 
 
¶30. (U) Given the developments related to passports and 
visas, some Europeans question whether it remains practical 
for each Member State to maintain a fully operating consular 
section in major cities.  Already, EU citizens abroad can go 
into other EU Member State consulates for assistance if their 
own government is not represented locally.  Consular officers 
can issue temporary EU travel documents to citizens of other 
EU countries for emergency onward travel. 
 
¶31. (SBU) With the development of the VIS, further 
cooperation or consolidation may occur.  Two scenarios have 
been proposed to streamline visa issuance procedures.  The 
basic version envisions a visa processing center jointly 
shared by the Member States represented in that city. 
Employees would do all the pre-processing (i.e., collection 
of the fingerprints and fees, name checks, etc.) and then 
send the applications to the appropriate consulate for 
adjudication.  An enhanced variation provides for the visa 
officers of the various countries being co-located in these 
centers and adjudicating there as well.  This would 
undoubtedly result in closer cooperation and further reduce 
visa shopping.  However, it might restrict access to national 
lookout databases. 
 
¶32. (U) In its proposal for JHA goals over the next five 
years (known as "Tampere II" or "The Hague Program"), the 
Dutch Presidency states the need for "further harmonization 
of national legislation and handling practices at local 
consular missions.  Common visa offices should be established 
in the long term, taking into account discussions on the 
establishment of a European External Action Service."  The 
Dutch Presidency also welcomed some initiatives by individual 
Member States, on a voluntary basis, in pooling their staffs 
and resources to issue visas. 
 
------------------------ 
EU Time Line:  Next Steps 
------------------------ 
 
¶33. (SBU) Important dates in the EU decision-making and 
implementation process are as follows: 
 
-- February 18, 2004:  The EC put forth its proposal for 
biometrics in EU passports.  Commissioner Vitorino briefed 
the JHA Council and said the proposal was not intended to 
harmonize passports: "We are just dealing with basic security 
features." Though the introduction of fingerprints should be 
considered optional for the time being, it could become 
mandatory in the future," he said. 
 
-- June 8, 2004:  The JHA Council agreed to include one 
biometric in EU passports (digitized photographs). 
 
-- October 26, 2004:  The JHA Council agreed to include a 
mandatory second biometric in EU passports (digitized 
fingerprints).  Switzerland signed an agreement with the EU 
to accede to the Schengen agreement and was allowed to begin 
participating in policy discussions on visas and passports. 
 
-- by December 2004: The JHA Council should makes its 
decision of October 26 final.  Agreement on the technical 
standards for biometric passports should also be finalized. 
 
-- by January 2005:  Biometrics proposals and the Common 
Consular Instruction are re-written and approved;  the clock 
will begin ticking for the 18-month and 36-month 
implementation deadlines for the two biometrics to be 
included in passports. 
 
-- February 2005:  IVP nominee Frank Paul should begin a 
three-week visit in the U.S. to coordinate on biometrics with 
governmental and industry representatives. 
 
-- May 1, 2005:  The EU Border Management Agency should 
become operational and help the Member States coordinate on 
risk analyses and training, joint border control operations, 
and purchasing of equipment.  The agency will be located in 
either Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Malta or Slovenia. 
 
-- December 2005:  The Schengen visa foils should include 
digitized photographs.  Most EU legal permanent residency 
cards should also contain digitized photographs. 
 
-- July 2006:  All EU Member States should be issuing 
biometric passports compliant with the ICAO standard. 
 
-- October 2006:  The central component of the VIS should be 
operational with one biometric identifier (digitized 
photographs) and alphanumerical data. 
 
-- March 2007:  The upgraded SIS2 should come online.  Member 
States will begin the process of linking their national visa 
systems to the combined VIS/SIS2.  The VIS should support the 
biometric fingerprint function with search capabilities and 
scanned supporting documents should be added to the VIS. 
 
-- December 2007:  All countries should be issuing visas, 
residency cards and passports bearing two biometric 
identifiers.  Internal borders between old and new EU Member 
States should be abolished.  Preliminary decisions about 
expanded use of the SIS2 and biometric-based searches in the 
system should be taken. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Because of the serious technological challenges and 
the political/public debate that frequently surrounds the 
issue of biometrics, some of these projected dates may slide. 
 The European Parliament (EP), which has questioned the need 
for biometrics (reftel b) is expected to gain a stronger 
voice on these matters in the coming years.  Like some Member 
States, the EP questions the costs of biometrics, both in 
financial terms and in threats to civil liberties. 
Furthermore, many of the costs associated with biometrics 
will be born by the Member States. 
Although the EC sets policy, it has very few teeth available 
to force implementation.  This could also adversely affect 
speedy implementation of these measures. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment 
------------------------ 
¶34. (SBU) Given its extensive effort with regard to 
biometrics, the EU is now on a parallel track with the US in 
incorporating biometrics into travel documents.  They have 
demonstrated that they are equally interested in combating 
terrorism and illegal immigration through the use of 
biometrics, but the practical realities are extremely complex 
since it involves 28 different countries, each with its own 
policy reservations and resource limitations.  Despite all 
the progress the EU has made (even exceeding US standards by 
moving to include two biometric indicators), they are 
unlikely to meet our 10/26/2005 biometrics deadline, and are 
sure to press for its extension or for individual waivers to 
countries who are working hard but unable to meet the 
deadline.  Since standard-setting is an EU forte, it is also 
possible we may see a future EU effort in multilateral fora 
to incorporate two biometrics into all travel documents to 
further bolster border controls. 
 
¶35. (SBU) We should attempt to build on the progress the EU 
has made to press harder to reach an agreement with the EU on 
sharing lookout information on suspected terrorists and those 
ineligible to receive visas to enter the EU -- in accordance 
with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6.  During 
consultations with CA/VO/BIP on October 27 in Brussels, the 
EC stated that once the new systems are in place, information 
sharing will be technically feasible.  To bring the EU to 
yes, however, we will have to come to some understanding with 
them on the data privacy concerns which have formed a basic 
stumbling block -- and to which the EU must also respond in 
its efforts to strengthening its border control mechanisms. 
 
SCHNABEL