This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014 
TAGS: PREL BR MARR MOPS UNSC POL MIL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL-HAITI: READOUT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY'S 
ASSESSMENTS, 22 NOVEMBER 2004 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 2799 AND 2764 
 
     ¶B. PORT AU PRINCE 2325 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS W. HEARNE. REASONS: 
1.4 (B)(D 
) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary. Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marcos 
Aurelio Garcia and his deputy, Marcel Biato, returned from a 
mid-November fact-finding mission to Haiti with the strong 
view that Aristide must not be allowed back into Haitian 
politics under any circumstances, Biato told PolCouns in a 19 
November meeting at the presidency.  The dominant impression 
gathered over several days meeting with multiple sources is 
that Aristide is a criminal who should be prosecuted, but 
still a powerful "shadow" over Haiti that inspires both 
terror and ill-founded hopes among many.  Hence Garcia and 
Biato brought back to the GOB the key assessment that the 
"grand strategic question" now is how to quickly create hope 
for the future among Haitians that is decoupled from 
Aristide, and specific GOB views outlined below on 
requirements for stability, assistance programs and political 
dialogue flow from that question, according to Biato. The 
highly negative assessment of Aristide by this influential 
advisor to President Lula da Silva will likely inform GOB 
policies and actions henceforth.  End summary. 
 
Aristide: 
-------- 
 
¶2. (C) Garcia and Biato returned from their mid-November 
fact-finding mission to Haiti with a strong view that 
Aristide must not be allowed back into Haitian politics under 
any circumstances, that he is "a shadow over the country" and 
should be "exorcised," if possible by some form of trial in 
Haiti, Biatio told PolCoun.  Biato allowed that Garcia had 
traveled to Haiti believing that Aristide was a political 
reality that might have to be considered as a factor in 
political dialogues.  However, after 27 meetings with 
government officials, diplomats, UN officials, church 
leaders, military sources, and moderate Lavalas figures (who 
would only meet with Garcia after he publicly denounced 
Aristide in Port au Prince), Garcia came away from Haiti 
viewing Aristide as a completely unacceptable actor, "a 
mobster" involved in a range of illegal activity who "orders 
assassinations by cell phone," Biato said. 
 
¶3. (C) Biato (strictly protect on this) said Garcia's highly 
negative assessment of Aristide is being heard by Lula and 
the senior GOB leadership, and will be factored into any 
consideration of sending an unofficial Brazilian emissary to 
meet with Aristide (a possibility reported previously in ref 
a).  Instead, Biato opined that the GOB may communicate to 
South African President Mbeki its concerns about the apparent 
freedom Aristide enjoys in inciting violence and provocations 
from his South African enclave. 
 
¶4. (C) The "exorcism" of Aristide is essential because he 
inspires both terror and "what passes for hope" among so many 
in Haiti's masses, Biato said.  The "grand strategic question 
is how to create hope for the future among Haitians that is 
not linked to Aristide." Biato said.  From that question flow 
several of the specific policy and practical assessments that 
Garcia brought back from his trip, which also tend to 
reinforce the GOB view that progress must move simultaneously 
in establishing stability and order, starting real political 
engagement, amd most importantly, bringing to bear assistance 
projects that have an immediate and positive effect on the 
population.  Progress on all fronts needs to move ahead 
quickly, "because time is on Aristide's side," Biato said. 
 
Stability and Public Order: 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The GOB assessed that the threat to general stability 
appears to have diminished after "Operation Baghdad" 
dissipated, although crime and disturbances continue. 
MINUSTAH's commander indicated to Garcia that force levels 
expected on the ground by the end of the year should be 
sufficient for maintaining general control, Biato said. 
Biato noted that Brazil deployed a plus-up of 250 marines and 
support personnel, 44 vehicles (including armored personnel 
carriers) and provisions on 18 November from Rio. He said the 
GOB is also planning to send an army engineering battalion 
for civil works projects as part of its scheduled December 
rotation.  However, he stressed that the GOB does not plan a 
substantial increase in its MINUSTAH contingent, in part 
owing to domestic political sensitivities about the mission 
in Haiti. 
 
¶6. (C) Garcia returned concerned about the overall law 
enforcement situation and the dysfunctionality of the 
national police, Biato said, and the GOB will be trying to 
work with others on police training and related initiatives. 
 
Assistance: 
---------- 
 
¶7. (C) Of the more than one billion dollars in assistance 
potentially available for Haiti, little has started to flow, 
and at the current rate, the GOB fears there will not be 
appreciable progress visible to the public before the 
elections, Biato said.  A main challenge continues to be a 
lack of reliable interlocutors and institutions for turning 
assistance funds into viable projects, so donors are standing 
off, Biato said.  Specific steps the GOB will pursue include: 
 
--The GOB will pressure the EU, U.S. and others to accelerate 
release of funds (e.g., the GOB met with other donors on the 
margins of the Ibero-American summit, FM Amorim spoke to the 
visiting German foreign minister, Garcia spoke recently to 
French officials and Lula will soon call EU Commission 
President Durao Baroso, Biato said). 
 
--Coupled with this, the GOB will urge the UN to place 
competent aid technicians on the ground asap, headed by a 
senior UN official experienced both in large-scale program 
management and dealing with the New York bureaucracy, Biato 
said. 
 
--Biato said the GOB is also planning to approach the World 
Bank regarding a USD 70 million dollar loan that is available 
for Haiti, but not released yet owing to Haiti's 50 million 
debt to the Bank.  The GOB, in coordination with Canada, 
plans to loan the IGOH the required 50 million to pay the 
debt off and trigger release of the World Bank loan.  Once 
the GOB is repaid and other adjustments are made, the GOB 
estimates 25 to 30 million would be immediately deployable 
for assistance efforts. 
 
--The GOB is working with Canada and hopes to approach others 
about quickly designing and implementing joint projects in 
health, sanitation and utilization of such resources as Haiti 
has, Biato said.  Biato indicated he will approach the 
Mission about possible U.S.- Brazil joint projects when the 
GOB has developed more specific plans, but opined that the 
single most dramatic U.S. contribution would be an immediate 
adjustment of textile quotas to benefit Haitian producers. 
 
--The GOB alone plans to send Brazilian technicians to assist 
Haitians in enhancing their production of manioc and cashews 
(the island's main export).  Brazil will also build a garbage 
recycling facility and plans to invite other donors to 
support it in exporting to Haiti a successful Brazilian 
program for building affordable housing (approximately USD 
1,000 per house). 
 
Political Engagement: 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Following Garcia's visit the GOB has the view that 
elements of the sprawling Lavalas are willing to be part of a 
national dialogue, if Aristide's intimidation efforts can be 
diminished and if what many Lavalas members view as IGOH 
repression is curtailed, Biato said.  Opponents of Lavalas 
also indicated to Garcia that there are "moderate" and 
"intellectual" elements in Lavalas with whom they would be 
willing to engage.  The UN should expand on this baseline for 
dialogue with a series of conferences on political, economic, 
social and reconciliation topics, Biato said. 
 
¶9. (C) Biato indicated that the GOB also plans to invite a 
number of political figures from Haiti to a December OAS 
conference in Brasilia on political party development, to 
provide exposure of isolated Haitian political leaders to 
international concepts of democracy and party politics. 
 
¶10. (C) Garcia left Haiti convinced of the importance of 
concentrating now on election mechanics, Biato said.  The GOB 
will work with others on efforts to make Haiti's election 
commission functional and will send to Haiti over 10,000 of 
Brazil's highly reliable computer voting machines.  Political 
efforts of all kinds will "fall into a vacuum," however, if 
there is not apparent progress on aid projects, Biato opined. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment: Garcia is an influential advisor to the 
president and Garcia's fact-finding mission to Haiti produced 
a realistic and negative assessment of Aristide that, we 
believe, will inform Lula's approach to this issue and GOB 
actions henceforth.  We will be attentive to the possibility 
that the GOB may reach out to Mbeki to underscore their 
concerns about Aristide, and we will also be ready to discuss 
with the GOB any specific assistance proposals they present 
to us for possible bilateral collaboration. 
 
Chicola