This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

id: 22386
date: 11/2/2004 18:31
refid: 04BOGOTA13139
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 013139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2014 
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINR PREL PGOV CO ELN
SUBJECT: DAS SHAPIRO MEETS WITH FATHER DARIO ECHEVERRI 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) December 15, 2004, 11:15-12:15 a.m., Espicopal 
Conference, Bogota 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
DAS Charles Shapiro 
Ambassador William B. Wood 
Jeff DeLaurentis, POLCOUNS 
David Henifin, Deputy Director for Andean Affairs 
Sarah LaGier, POL (notetaker) 
 
Colombia 
-------- 
 
Father Dario Echeverri, Secretary General of the National 
Conciliation Commission (CCN) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶3. (C) Father Echeverri was optimistic that a meeting between 
the ELN and Mexican Government would create the right 
conditions for the launching of a formal peace process 
between the ELN and the GOC.  However, he said two major 
obstacles remained: (1) the FARC's control over the ELN; and 
(2) the ELN's belief that the Uribe administration was not 
committed to social and political reform.  Echeverri believed 
that the FARC was not serious about a peace process with the 
Uribe government, but said the Catholic Church would keep 
pressing for a humanitarian exchange and eventually a peace 
process.  He asserted that the best way to weaken the illegal 
armed groups was to have an effective reinsertion program, 
but expressed concern that the GOC's program was weak and 
poorly funded.  Echeverri acknowledged that the FARC and the 
Chavez administration have long-standing ties.  End Summary. 
 
¶4. (C) As Secretary General of National Conciliation 
Commission (CNN), Father Echeverri is authorized by the GOC 
to reach out to the illegal armed groups, particularly the 
FARC, to try start formal peace talks. 
 
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ELN: Possible Meeting in Mexico 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Echeverri was hopeful that the proposed meeting 
between the ELN Central Command (COCE) and Mexican 
facilitator Ambassador Andres Valencia would help set 
conditions for a formal peace process.  He praised Valencia's 
efforts and said the ELN was likely to accept the conditions 
of the proposal, including suspending all violent activity 
while the meeting took place.  He said the ELN was seeking to 
gain political recognition.  However, two obstacles to formal 
negotiations remain: 
 
- The ELN is dependent on the FARC financially and 
militarily.  The FARC would control any ELN peace process 
with the Uribe administration.  The COCE does not have 
sufficient power over the group's combatant fronts to 
implement a peace process. 
 
- The ELN does not view the Uribe Administration as serious 
about meeting its demands for social reform.  Although Uribe 
has said he is not opposed to holding a national assembly, 
the ELN would not be satisfied with a one-time forum but 
rather wants concrete political concessions.  Echeverri said 
that he believed the Uribe administration should allocate as 
many resources to social programs as it does to the armed 
forces. 
 
¶6. (C) Echeverri agreed that the ELN is no longer a military 
threat but warned against discounting it altogether.  The 
December 13 capture of an ELN field commander powerful in 
Valle del Cauca Department was a serious blow to the group. 
He asserted that the ELN, nonetheless, has a significant 
social base in parts of Arauca, Narino, Santander, and Valle 
del Cauca Departments.  He noted that the group is not as 
deeply involved in drug trafficking as the FARC or the 
paramilitaries.  He hoped the group would eventually be held 
accountable for numerous kidnappings, including the 2002 
kidnapping of a 12 year-old boy whom they continue to hold 
for ransom.  He also expressed concern that ELN units could 
be absorbed into either the FARC or paramilitary groups. 
--------------------------------- 
FARC: Not Yet Serious About Peace 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In October, Echeverri met with the Swiss government to 
coordinate efforts to facilitate a humanitarian exchange. 
The Swiss have been authorized by the Uribe administration to 
reach out to the FARC to orchestrate an exchange.  Echeverri 
hoped that an exchange would be a first step toward an 
eventual peace process.  He pulled Shapiro aside at the end 
of the meeting to assure him that he is putting exactly the 
same priority on the three U.S. hostages as on the Colombian 
hostages.  He stressed that the FARC was not serious about 
holding negotiations with the Uribe administration in part 
because the country's widespread poverty provides the FARC 
with easy recruits, and Plan Patriota, in Echeverri's view, 
was not hurting the FARC.  For example, Echeverri claimed 
that FARC Secretariat member Mono Jojoy recently met with 
journalists in the middle of a Plan Patriota area of 
operations with minimal security. 
 
¶8. (C) Echeverri noted that the FARC was undergoing a 
leadership change, which he does not fully understand yet. 
He believes Secretariat member Raul Reyes may be sick and 
losing influence, while Secretariat member Alfonso Cano and 
subordinate Pablo Catatumbo are gaining power.  Echeverri has 
received invitations from both Reyes and Catatumbo to meet to 
discuss conditions for the humanitarian exchange.  He implied 
that there were some divergences among the FARC leaders that 
could possibly be exploited. 
 
------------------------ 
Reinsertion Program Weak 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Echeverri asserted that the best way to weaken the 
illegal armed groups was to offer the rank and file a better 
life as civilians.  He expressed concern that the 
government's reinsertion program for deserters and the 
demobilizing paramilitaries was not effective.  Without 
adequate funding to train and employ the deserters, they 
would return to a life of crime and violence. 
 
----------------------- 
Venezuelan Ties to FARC 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Echeverri acknowledged that the FARC have 
long-standing ties to Venezuela and President Chavez.  He is 
aware of at least one meeting between FARC Secretariat member 
Raul Reyes on December 26, 2003 in the Petare municipality in 
Caracas with GOV officials.  Echeverri noted that when 
Venezuela hosted meetings between the GOC and the FARC in the 
1990s, the FARC negotiators clearly were on friendly terms 
with the GOV officials.  Colombian Ambassador to Venezuela 
Enrique Vargas Ramirez is a member of the CCN, and Echeverri 
hopes Vargas can take advantage of GOV-FARC ties to reach out 
to the FARC through Venezuelan channels. 
 
¶11.  (U) DAS Shapiro cleared on this cable. 
WOOD 

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