This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 012938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2014 
TAGS: PTER PHUM KJUS PINR CO AUC
SUBJECT: DAS SHAPIRO DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS WITH PEACE 
COMMISSIONER 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) December 14, 2004, 7:30-8:30 p.m., Ambassador's 
residence, Bogota 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
 
DAS Charles Shapiro 
Ambassador William B. Wood 
Jeff DeLaurentis, POLCOUNS 
David Henifin, Deputy Director for Andean Affairs 
Sarah LaGier, notetaker 
 
Colombia 
-------- 
 
Luis Carlos Restrepo, Peace Commissioner 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶3. (C) Restrepo told DAS Shapiro that the peace process with 
the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was going 
well and that the Calima Bloc in Valle Department was next to 
demobilize.  AUC strongmen Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente 
Castano, and Hernan Hernandez have become allies of the peace 
process.  Restrepo agreed that it was important to have a 
legal framework for the process but said the GOC would wait 
until February to present its version of the Law for Justice 
and Reparations.  It is trying to avoid a long, drawn-out 
national debate on the law.  Restrepo also said the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) would not 
negotiate until they suffer a serious military defeat.  The 
GOC authorized Mexican facilitator Ambassador Valencia to 
invite the National Liberation Army (ELN) Central Command 
(COCE) to meet with him in Mexico without GOC participation 
provided they halt all violence during the meeting.  Valencia 
expects the COCE to agree. 
 
------------------------------ 
AUC Demobilizations Going Well 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Restrepo told DAS Shapiro that the recent 
demobilization of the Catatumbo Bloc in Norte de Santander 
Department was a success.  The group turned in over 1,000 
weapons, 150 farms, and 57 houses and commercial outlets. 
However, the threat of a FARC resurgence in the area remains 
real.  In order to guarantee state control of the Catatumbo 
region, Restrepo said the government needs: 
 
- Aerial eradication in the mountainous, FARC controlled 
coca-growing region in Catatumbo.  The GOC estimates there 
are 3,800 hectares of coca including 800 in the Bari national 
park.  Eradication in the formerly AUC-controlled plains of 
Catatumbo has been successful.  (Embassy is reviewing our 
coca estimates and spray plans for the region.) 
 
- At least four Navy patrol boats on the Catatumbo River; 
 
- One to two helicopters for aerial coverage; and 
 
- 42 kilometers of paved roads and about 50 kilometers of 
secondary dirt roads 
 
¶5. (C) The Calima Bloc in Valle del Cauca Department has 
begun concentrating and is scheduled to formally demobilize 
on December 19.  This would bring the total demobilized in 
2004 to approximately 2,500. 
 
¶6. (C) AUC strongmen Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente Castano, and 
Hernan Hernandez have become government allies in the peace 
process.  Castano, who is the behind-the-scenes powerbroker 
of the AUC, called Restrepo to tell him personally that he 
had decided to support the peace process.  Mancuso and 
Hernandez are demobilizing the blocs they command.  However, 
AUC "narcoparas" Diego Murillo and Jorge Tovar Pupo are 
trying to stall demobilization and view Mancuso as a traitor. 
 Restrepo has tried to take advantage of internal AUC 
dissention since the onset of the process.  He explained 
that, although the AUC has talented advisers, they are poor 
negotiators when left alone at the negotiating table.  This 
allowed Restrepo to convince the AUC to sign the July 15, 
2003 agreement to demobilize all their troops by the end of 
¶2005.  In response to Shapiro's question about local support 
for the AUC, Restrepo explained that the rural elites in 
areas such as Cordoba, Magdalena, and Uraba believe the AUC 
are necessary for their safety.  Local elites fear the 
government does not have the capacity to prevent the FARC 
from returning after the AUC demobilizes.  These are areas 
plagued by FARC violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
------------------------------ 
Law of Justice and Reparations 
------------------------------ 
¶7. (C) Restrepo agreed that it was important to have a legal 
framework to deal with demobilized paramiltaries who are 
charged with major crimes.  The GOC plans to present its 
version of the Law of Justice and Reparations in February, 
possibly during the G-24 London conference follow-on in 
Cartagena.  Senator Rafael Pardo wrote his own draft of the 
law to counter the GOC's version.  Restrepo explained that 
the GOC had four main concerns about Senator Pardo's version: 
 
- Pardo's draft requires that all demobilizing members of an 
illegal armed group (IAG), including those not accused of any 
crime beyond membership in an IAG, go through a complete 
legal investigation before being pardoned.  The GOC's version 
only applies to IAG members who are accused of major crimes. 
The rest are pardoned for membership in an IAG and related 
non-violent crimes under current Colombian law.  Restrepo is 
concerned that a prior full investigation for each IAG member 
is counterproductive and too time consuming. 
 
- Pardo's draft requires that a judge decide if a potential 
beneficiary can be pardoned only after he has completed the 
punishment imposed by the Tribunal for Truth, Justice, and 
Reparations.  The GOC version states that the Tribunal both 
imposes the punishment and pardons the beneficiary for the 
remainder of the original sentence at the same time (the 
pardon could be revoked).  Restrepo explained that this would 
streamline the process. 
 
- Pardo's version requires that the IAG submit a list of all 
crimes before demobilizing.  The GOC requires that each 
demobilizing IAG member confess all crimes to the Prosecutor 
General's Office and have dental identification records and 
fingerprints taken for purposes of investigation, but only 
after he demobilizes.  Restrepo fears that requiring a full 
confession before demobilization would prevent groups from 
even considering demobilizing.  He asserted that the GOC 
sequence allows better control over former IAG members 
because they would first be identified and put under state 
supervision and then required to cooperate with authorities. 
 
- Pardo's version allows the Supreme Council of the Judiciary 
to choose the Tribunal members.  The GOC version allows the 
President to nominate them.  (This distinction between a 
"legal" versus "political" leadership could be central to 
future negotiations with the ELN and FARC.) 
 
¶8. (C) Shapiro urged the GOC to share its approach with the 
international community and human rights organizations. 
Pardo was skilled at lobbying for his draft and had framed 
the terms of the debate, but little was known about the GOC 
draft.  Restrepo explained that the GOC had been 
intentionally silent on the issue to avoid starting a 
national debate but he believed the GOC had little choice but 
to challenge Pardo's version.  The Ambassador urged the GOC 
to work for early consensus with Congress behind the scenes 
instead of debating in public. 
 
----------------------- 
FARC: Military Pressure 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) When asked if the FARC was willing to negotiate, 
Restrepo said not until the group suffered a serious military 
defeat.  Restrepo asserted that the GOC needed to disprove 
the myth that the FARC Secretariat was untouchable by killing 
or capturing several of its senior commanders.  In contrast 
to the AUC, Restrepo said the FARC was hierarchical with a 
united leadership and provincial mindset.  For example, 
two-thirds of the 35 imprisoned guerrillas whom the GOC 
pardoned and released in November were illiterate or just 
barely able to read. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ELN: Possible COCE Meeting in Mexico 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Restrepo said the GOC had authorized Mexican 
facilitator Ambassador Andres Valencia to hold a meeting with 
the COCE in Mexico provided the ELN ceased all violent 
activity during the meeting.  The proposal was presented to 
the COCE as an invitation from Valencia with no involvement 
from the GOC as a way to get around the ELN's refusal to 
declare a cessation of hostilities to the government.  The 
ELN has responded positively, and Valencia told Restrepo that 
he expects the COCE to agree to the meeting.  Restrepo 
asserted that COCE member Antonio Garcia's recent interview 
in which he said the group would agree to a bilateral 
cease-fire was nothing new and remained unacceptable for the 
GOC because (1) the ELN has refused to include a cessation of 
kidnapping in the cease-fire, and (2) the GOC wants a 
unilateral cease-fire. 
 
¶11. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Shapiro. 
WOOD