This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 011205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2014 
TAGS: PINR PTER SNAR PHUM KJUS CO AUC
SUBJECT: RESTREPO OUTLINES AUC DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS TO 
THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS 
 
REF: A) BOGOTA 10728 B) BOGOTA 10687 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On October 26, Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos 
Restrepo presented the government's demobilization plan for 
the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) to the 
diplomatic corps.  Seven AUC groups will demobilize between 
November 3 and December 18 and the GOC continues to insist 
that the AUC groups operating in the eastern plains follow 
suit.  Demobilization will last up to 48 days: 15 to 30 days 
to prepare the demobilization zone, two to ten days for the 
paramilitaries to disarm, and eight days to leave the zone 
and report to government reinsertion centers.  During this 
time, the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) will 
determine which of the demobilized are guilty of major 
crimes.  Those guilty will be required to remain in 
government-controlled areas until the Law for Justice and 
Reparation passes.  According to Restrepo, paramilitary 
murders have gone down 67 percent and massacres 83 percent 
since the cease-fire began.  Diplomatic corps reaction was 
subdued; no one present was openly critical but most want 
more details.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On October 26, Restrepo presented a detailed 
demobilization plan to the diplomatic corps.  He prefaced his 
power-point presentation by reiterating the pre-condition for 
negotiating with the AUC and guerrilla groups: a public 
demonstration of will to abandon violence, to which only the 
AUC had so far agreed.  He emphasized that there was no 
distinction in bringing these groups to justice, and that 
there would be no mass pardons.  He described the process not 
as a political negotiation, but as a negotiation that, if 
turned out right, would lead to a real political negotiation 
that could bring these groups into the democratic mainstream 
of the country. 
 
¶3. (C) Restrepo then described how the demobilization would 
proceed on a day-to-day basis and which groups would 
demobilize.  Between November 3 and December 18 the following 
AUC groups will concentrate and demobilize: 
 
- Self Defense Forces of Catatumbo (eastern Norte de 
Santander) 
- Lower and Upper Sinu Self Defense Forces (western Cordoba) 
- The Bananero Front (northwestern Antioquia) 
- The Southeastern Antioquia Front 
- The Pacific Front (coastal Cauca and Valle del Cauca) 
- The Self Defense Forces of Cundinamarca (northern 
Cundinamarca) 
- The Calima Bloc (Cauca and Valle del Cauca) 
 
¶4. (C) Restrepo noted that the government continues to insist 
that the AUC groups operating in the eastern plains -- the 
Centauros Bloc, the Vanquishers of Arauca, and the Self 
Defense Forces of Meta and Vichada -- demobilize before the 
end of this year.  (He did not mention the independent Self 
Defense Forces of Casanare, which have suffered heavy 
military blows). 
 
¶5. (C) Stressing the need for flexibility, Restrepo gave the 
following time line: 
 
-- Preparation: 15 to 30 days (GOC provides security for the 
demobilization zone and formerly occupied areas, conducts 
community outreach, and transports paramilitaries to the 
zone.  The paramilitaries submit a list of who is 
demobilizing). 
 
-- Concentration, demobilization, and identification: two to 
ten days (disarmament, minors turned over to the Family 
Welfare Institute, OAS verifies list, and GOC conducts survey 
of paramilitaries and provides basic humanitarian assistance). 
 
-- Exiting demobilization zone: eight days (demobilized 
return home and report to local reinsertion centers.  These 
centers will be in urban areas where the demobilized live). 
 
¶6. (C) According to Restrepo, the Fiscalia would begin 
investigating each demobilizing individual once the list is 
submitted.  However, because the paramilitaries will remain 
in the demobilization zone for only two to ten days, the 
Fiscalia will not finish the investigations until after they 
leave.  Investigations are still underway in Medellin, more 
than a year after the demobilization of the Cacique Nutibara 
Bloc.  Once the Fiscalia determines who is guilty of an 
unpardonable crime (serious violations of human rights or 
narcotics trafficking), those individuals will be required to 
remain in government-controlled areas until they are given an 
alternative sentence under the "Law of Justice and 
Reparations."  Restrepo noted that time spent in these 
controlled areas could reduce the alternative sentence. 
 
¶7. (C) As outlined in ref A, the government is offering 
economic incentives, including preferential credit, to 
private companies which provide jobs to the demobilized. 
 
¶8. (C) Restrepo acknowledged that the cease-fire has not been 
perfectly observed.  He reported, however, that between 
February 2001 to November 2002 and December 2002 to September 
2004 paramilitaries murders dropped 67 percent (1,172 versus 
390 murders).  During the same time frames 
paramilitary-perpetrated massacres dropped 83 percent (100 
versus 17 massacres).  According to Restrepo, between June 
2000 to July 2002 and August 2002 to September 2004, the 
military has captured 300 percent more paramilitaries, killed 
229 percent more, and seized 286 percent more paramilitary 
weapons.  He said that this process should result in the 
demobilization of approximately 30 to 35 percent of the AUC 
before the end of 2004. 
 
¶9. (C) The reaction of the diplomatic corps was subdued but 
not openly critical.  Following the meeting, some Europeans 
expressed concern about the lack of specifics in the 
concentration and monitoring phase, the short period of time 
the paramilitaries would remain in the demobilized zone (two 
to ten days), and the slow movement in the Congress of the 
"Law of Justice and Reparations."  The law will be critical 
in dealing with fighters wanted for serious human rights 
violations or narcotrafficking and senior leaders remaining 
in the special concentration zone at Santa Fe de Ralito. 
WOOD