This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BLCTV, S/CT, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: WILL THE SOUTH AFFECT THAKSIN'S 
REELECTION? 
 
REF: A. INR OPINION ANALYSIS 11/04/04 
     ¶B. INR OPINION ANALYSIS 11/16/04 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 7677 
     ¶D. BANGKOK 7171 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DARRYL N. JOHNSON. REASON 1.4(D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary/Comment:  As Thailand moves towards general 
elections in February 2005, Post believes, along with many 
local political observers, that barring a dramatic attack 
outside the southernmost Muslim provinces, the current level 
of violence in the south -- and the Royal Thai Government's 
(RTG) handling of it -- will not affect Prime Minister 
Thaksin's likely reelection.  First, most Thais remain either 
indifferent to the south or even supportive of the 
government's hard-line position, so Thaksin's posture will 
not lose him votes nationwide.  Thaksin can use the success 
and popularity of his economic policies plus nationalistic 
feelings in order to rally his non-South base for victory. 
Second, Thaksin won handily last time without much support in 
the Muslim southern provinces, and failure to make hoped-for 
inroads into the Democrat Party (DP) electoral southern 
stronghold this time will not significantly harm his overall 
reelection chances.  Post will report separately on speeches 
made by the King and Queen on the southern situation in 
recent days and their increasingly high-profile role in 
publicly calling for peace and unity.  End Summary/Comment 
 
THE SOUTH WON'T HURT THAKSIN IN THE ELECTION 
 
¶2.  (C)  To date the South does not appear to be a central 
issue that will significantly lessen Thaksin's electoral 
prospects or threaten his grip on power, despite the fact 
that political observers and the media generally agree that 
southern violence is the most high profile domestic issue. 
Despite daily criticism directed at Thaksin and his southern 
policies by some of the major Bangkok media outlets, the 
impression of many observers is that the majority of Thai 
voters will still support Thaksin when it comes time to vote 
in the February 2005 national elections. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Academic Amat Sombun, who lives in the southern 
province of Pattani, told the Embassy that he believes that 
the current violence has not greatly affected Thaksin's 
overall support in Thailand, and would likely have little 
impact on the prospects of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) 
party even in the south.  Amat noted that in the southernmost 
Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, 5 
incumbent MPs (all Muslim members of the "Vadha" -- which 
means "unity" in Arabic -- faction) will  run again under the 
banner of TRT.  He feels that TRT has a good chance of at 
least maintaining those seats. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Thirapat Serirangsan, the Dean of the Political 
Science school at Sukhothai University, agreed with this 
analysis.  He told the Embassy that while the situation in 
the south will prevent TRT gains at the expense of the DP in 
the Muslim majority provinces, TRT will win comfortably on a 
nationwide basis. 
 
¶5.  (C) Among the large number of Thai voters in the north 
and northeast regions, the problems of the south remain 
distant, both literally and figuratively.  Much closer to 
home for northeastern voters are Thaksin's many populist 
economic measures targeted towards rural voters, such as debt 
restructuring for farmers, which remain extremely popular. 
And for many other Thais increasing prosperity, reflected by 
Thailand's quickly growing economy (6.8 percent in 2003 and 
an estimated rate of 5.5 - 6 percent this year), is the most 
important factor in the election. 
 
POLITICS REMAIN LOCAL 
 
¶6.  (C)  Science Minister Korn Dabbaransi told Poloff on 
November 10 that outside of the three affected southern 
provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, most Thais in the 
other 73 provinces were "indifferent" about the situation in 
that region.  Korn opined that for most Thai voters, the 
issues of jobs, medical care and housing would supersede the 
very real security concerns of their counterparts in the 
southern provinces. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Even among prominent Muslim-Thai politicians there 
is an understanding that events in the south are unlikely to 
stop Thaksin from being reelected in an overwhelming fashion. 
 Muslim Senator Den Tomina, an opposition politician whose 
late father is regarded as a martyr and icon of the Pattani 
independence movement -- and who himself has been accused of 
being sympathetic to today's militant Muslim separatists -- 
told Poloffs that Thaksin had told him confidently and 
personally that the southern situation "will not impact 
voters in other regions."  Den said he agreed with Thaksin's 
analysis.  Den noted that for the majority of voters across 
Thailand, especially those in northern rural areas, Thaksin's 
"populist" economic policies were much more important than 
his southern strategy. 
 
MANY THAIS SUPPORT A TOUGH APPROACH TOWARDS THE SOUTH 
 
¶8.  (C)  Thais in Bangkok often express indifference to, or 
even approval of tough government tactics in the south. 
While some are sensitive to a backlash effect from blundering 
by Thai authorities (such as at Kru Se Mosque and Tak Bai), 
many Thais actually want the government to take a harder line 
towards "troublemakers" in the south who have assassinated 
state authorities and innocent Buddhist victims.  We don't 
have an empirical measure on how widespread these feelings 
really are, but anecdotal evidence suggests that many Thais 
are supportive of a tough policy; on the street, Bangkok 
Thais have been heard using derogatory terms when speaking 
about "ungrateful" southern Muslims; taxi drivers talk about 
the need for a "tough leader to take care of these problems 
in South;" even an MFA official, who spoke in confidence, 
said "the feeling even here among many of my colleagues is 
that if the southerners don't want to be Thais, well...screw 
them." 
 
¶9.  (U)  Recent polling data by INR (reftels A, B) seems to 
support this anecdotal evidence.  Sample surveys taken before 
the October 25 incident at Tak Bai show that the majority of 
urban Thais approve of the way the government is handling the 
situation in the south, and the way the government approaches 
terrorism.  This data tracks with surveys conducted after the 
Krue Se mosque incident in late April of this year by 
Rajabhat Suan Dusit University where most respondents said 
they supported a strong policy towards the South. 
 
¶10. (C)  Prominent Muslim-Thai observers have noticed similar 
trends.  Dr. Charan Malulim, a prominent Muslim academic and 
member of the official investigation commission into the 
October 25 Tak Bai incident, told the Embassy that he is 
frightened by strong negative sentiment and growing anger 
among Buddhist Thais towards southern Muslims.  He believes 
that the effect of the attacks by southern militants on 
symbols of Thai authority has been to bring out strong 
nationalistic feelings among the Buddhist majority.  He 
suggested that the tabloid media is encouraging this 
sentiment. 
 
¶11. (C) While we have no hard evidence that the Prime 
Minister is cynically manipulating reaction to the southern 
situation this way, Thaksin can use this apparent growing 
resentment among some Thai Buddhists, which increases with 
each attack against symbols of Thai authority or Buddhist 
civilians, to play on strong Thai nationalist sentiment and 
rally voters around him and TRT because they look like 
attacks on "Thailand."  This may be why he refuses to 
officially "apologize" for Tak Bai and the unnecessary deaths 
that took place when detainees were transported from there on 
October 25.  Of concern, however, is that this refusal to 
apologize -- which undermines his credibility with Muslims -- 
plays into the hands of the ill-defined group of Muslim 
militant "separatists" who are bent on increasing general 
support among the populations of the Muslim majority 
provinces of the south. 
 
COMMENT:  DESPITE THE SOUTH...LOOKS LIKE FOUR MORE YEARS 
 
¶12.  (C)  Comment:  Thaksin has faced serious criticism 
internationally and domestically over his handling of the 
violence in southern Thailand.  This criticism, along with 
the growing public concern -- mainly that it will spread 
North -- about the problem, makes the south one important 
domestic issue with the potential to erode his general 
popularity.  That said, it doesn't appear that the crisis has 
undermined Thaksin's administration sufficiently to threaten 
his broader dominance of Thai politics.  As noted above, the 
general voting public, beyond the Bangkok chattering classes 
and media, continues to support Thaksin and his southern 
policy.  That support, coupled with the apparent desire by 
many Thais for Thaksin to take a security-weighted line in 
the south, means that Thaksin can probably continue the 
government's ineffective (and, in the longer term, possibly 
counter-productive) policies vis-a-vis the south without 
serious national political consequences. 
 
¶13.  (C)  The wild card factor would be a dramatic attack on 
a major metropolitan or tourist area before the election.  In 
such a situation, voters could turn on Thaksin, blaming him 
for failing to "protect us."  However, given the public's 
mood and Thaksin's ability to play on nationalist sentiment, 
the public might just as likely rally around the prime 
minister, and support even stronger and one-sided government 
countermeasures following such an attack. 
¶14.  (C)  Few would deny that political problems stemming 
from the deteriorating situation in the deep South have 
embarrassed Thaksin's administration at a certain level: 
policy approaches appear ineffective and insincere; the 
Bangkok press and opposition Democrats highlight his failures 
to curb violence; and there is growing negative international 
attention to the situation in the South, highlighted by 
recoil from the handling of the events of April 28 and 
October 25.  For most Thais, however, these factors will not 
be as important as popular economic programs and nationalist 
sentiment when it comes time to vote in the national 
elections.  The deep South's travails will not likely derail 
Thaksin's reelection.  End Comment 
JOHNSON