This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: ANATOMY OF A TAIWANESE LY ELECTION 
 
REF: TAIPEI 02662 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Individual and party strategies for the 
December 11 Legislative Yuan (LY) election will be shaped in 
large part by Taiwan's complex election system, which 
combines direct elections with proportional representation. 
The structures of both the direct and proportional elections 
promote smaller parties and more extremist candidates, and 
facilitate factionalization within the two major parties. 
Furthermore, the multi-member districts used in the direct 
elections encourage parties and candidates to focus on 
tactics over issues.  If the National Assembly confirms the 
constitutional revisions passed in August to reform the LY's 
structure, this will be the last election conducted under the 
system.  End Summary. 
 
The Constituency Seats 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Campaign season is underway for the 6th Legislative 
Yuan, which will start its three year term on February 1, 
¶2005.  All 225 seats in the LY are at stake in the elections 
scheduled for December 11.  Of these, 176 will be directly 
elected from 29 geographical electoral districts, each 
corresponding to a city, a county, or a subdivision of a 
large city or county, and two ethnic districts reserved for 
plains and mountain aborigines, respectively.  Based on 
population, each geographic constituency sends from one to 
thirteen representatives to the LY.  The aboriginal districts 
are fixed at four members each.  However, no matter how many 
members will represent each district, voters everywhere get 
only one vote to use on one candidate each.  Those candidates 
receiving the most votes win the election.  Any surplus votes 
cast for a particular candidate beyond the number required to 
get elected cannot be used to help another candidate from the 
same party who did not get enough votes. 
 
The Single Non-Transferable Vote System 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) This system, known as single non-transferable vote 
(SNTV) balloting, can and often does result in strange 
election outcomes.  In the 2001 LY elections in Nantou County 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took 35.1% of the vote 
and won two seats.  The KMT, despite doing slightly better 
with 37.5% of the vote won only one seat, the same number as 
the People First Party (PFP), which took 11.7% of the vote, 
or less than a third of the KMT's share.  The reason for 
these anomalous results was the overwhelming popularity of 
one KMT candidate, former Kaohsiung mayor Wu Dun-yi.  Wu took 
the lion's share of the KMT vote and left his colleague with 
too few votes to get elected.  Under the SNTV system, 
candidates compete not only against candidates from the 
opposition parties, but also against others from their own 
party. 
 
Nomination Strategy is Key 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Taiwan's SNTV election system requires that parties 
accurately predict how much support they will get in each 
district so that they can nominate the right number of 
candidates.  A party that nominates too many candidates in a 
district risks spreading its votes too thinly and losing 
seats.  Likewise, nominating too few candidates means 
forfeiting seats that might easily have been captured.  Yet 
even a party that perfectly forecasts its support level in a 
district and nominates an appropriate number of candidates 
could have its plans spoiled if the disgruntled candidates it 
did not nominate decide to run anyway as independents, 
cannibalizing their former party's vote.  Such so-called 
"mavericks" rarely get elected, but they often dramatically 
influence the outcome of tight contests. 
 
Vote Distribution Tactics 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Nominating the right number of candidates is only half 
the battle.  A successful campaign also depends on optimally 
sharing votes among the nominees to avoid the type of 
lopsided distribution that was so disastrous for the KMT in 
the 2001 Nantou election.  In rural districts this is often 
accomplished by focusing the campaign on different candidates 
in different areas or having local factions and organizations 
like Farmers Associations rally their respective members 
around specific candidates.  These techniques are less 
effective in urban areas, where voters are harder to 
subdivide geographically and are more influenced by the media 
than by community leaders and social institutions.  In 
response to this, some parties try to implement coordinated 
vote-distribution ("peipiao") schemes where loyal voters are 
asked to support a specific candidate based on things like 
the month of their birth or the last digit of their national 
ID number. 
 
Reserved Seats for Women 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (U) Complicating Taiwan's constituency LY elections 
further, a rule stipulates that at least one of every five 
seats in a district must go to a woman, even if male 
candidates receive more votes.  This adds yet another layer 
of complexity to the tactical considerations that go into a 
campaign in districts with five or more seats at stake. 
Popular DPP incumbent Su Chih-fen's decision not to run for 
reelection in Yunlin County, for example, led some to 
speculate that part of her motivation was to leave the 
reserved female seat for her ally Yin Ling-ying of the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union (TSU). 
 
The At-Large Seats 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The 49 remaining seats in the LY are considered "at 
large" and are filled according to proportional 
representation.  Votes for candidates in all of the SNTV 
districts are tallied according to party, and parties that 
receive at least 5% of the total popular vote divide the 
at-large seats according to their share of the vote.  Because 
eight of the at-large seats are reserved for the "overseas 
Chinese" community, parties actually nominate candidates for 
the proportional seats on two separate lists.  Predictably, 
the definition of "overseas Chinese" is often stretched by 
candidates hoping to get nominated to that list.  It is not 
unheard of for politicians to have family members in the US 
petition for their immigration shortly before an election so 
they can move overseas and be eligible for nomination.  After 
winning election, they move back to Taiwan to serve their 
term.  In an even more peculiar twist, an overseas candidate, 
if elected, must renounce any foreign citizenship in order to 
be seated.  If they wish to run for reelection as an overseas 
candidate, they must then renew their overseas status, for 
example by obtaining a new immigrant visa.  However, in the 
end, no party renominated an incumbent "overseas Chinese" 
legislator, obviating the need for a ruling by the Central 
Election Committee on what constitutes an "expatriate." 
 
Ramifications : Tactics Over Issues 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Taiwan's complicated electoral system for the LY has a 
number of important political ramifications.  At the party 
level, the peculiar requirements of the SNTV system cause 
parties to expend much of their focus and energy on voting 
mechanics.  The main strategic concern is nominating the 
right number of candidates in each district, and the campaign 
is then dominated by tactical concerns like mobilizing voters 
and distributing them equally among candidates.  Policies and 
issues tend to take a back seat.  Issue-based campaigns, in 
particular, are to be avoided because they can easily lead to 
a situation where one candidate becomes too popular and 
thereby squeezes out other allied candidates. 
 
Intra-Party Factionalism 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) Furthermore, because candidates compete with members 
of their own party as much as (if not more than) with members 
of opposition parties, SNTV encourages intra-party 
factionalism and an emphasis on local connections and 
personalities.  Those in danger of losing an election, 
particularly, tend to focus their attacks on members of their 
own party rather than the opposition, because it is far 
easier to steal votes from an ideologically similar opponent. 
 A breakdown in discipline is especially likely if a party 
has overnominated, or there are too many mavericks.  In such 
situations, candidates decide it is "every candidate for 
himself," peipiao schemes are abandoned, and a better 
disciplined party usually claims an extra seat or two. 
 
¶10. (U) Factionalism rears its ugly head in the at-large 
elections as well.  The at-large seats added in 1991, 
ostensibly to represent the mainland and overseas Chinese 
communities, were unofficially intended as a means of 
increasing party cohesion and bringing more professionals and 
minorities into the LY.  In reality, positions on the 
nomination list for these "safe" seats are often treated as a 
currency for party leaders to buy the loyalty of various 
party factions. 
 
Independents, Gangsters and Vote-Buying 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) Additionally, the low election threshold in 
multi-member districts makes it possible for independents, 
single-issue candidates, gangster bosses, or anybody else 
with strong personal connections and deep pockets to win and 
hold onto an LY seat.  In Taoyuan county's thirteen member 
district, for example, a reliable 4-5% of the vote is all 
that is necessary to take a seat.  The margin of victory 
between the last-place winner and the first runner-up in the 
larger districts also tends to be extremely small (often just 
a few hundred votes) increasing the temptation for, and 
effectiveness of, vote-buying and voter intimidation. 
 
Changes Likely for Next Election 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) A proposed constitutional amendment passed by the LY 
in August (reftel) will halve the number of seats in the LY 
to 113, lengthen the term to four years (to match that of the 
Presidency), eliminate the "overseas Chinese" seats and 
replace SNTV with a single member district "first past the 
post" system.  This will help address the many obvious flaws 
in the existing system and weed out extremist and nuisance 
legislators from the LY.  However the amendment has not yet 
been approved by the National Assembly and any changes would 
not take effect until 2008.  The current election will be 
held under the old rules and all the complications arising 
out of that system will be a prominent part of the campaign, 
as they have been in past elections. 
PAAL