This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TW
SUBJECT: CHEN 10/10 SPEECH OFFERS CONCILIATORY MESSAGE 
 
 
Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: President Chen Shui-bian used his October 10 
National Day speech to send conciliatory messages to Beijing 
and opposition supporters in Taiwan.  Chen reiterated a 
number of cross-Strait related themes from his May 20 
inaugural address and proposed restarting dialogue with 
Beijing "on the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong." 
Chen's positive overtures on dialogue, enhanced trade 
relations, and a reduction of military tensions were tempered 
by his warning that the "forces of darkness" across the 
Taiwan Strait have aimed more than 600 missiles at Taiwan. 
He then used that warning to call for strengthening 
self-defense.  Chen also made a strong pitch for Taiwan's 
entry into the United Nations and other international fora, 
blaming PRC diplomatic pressure for pushing Taiwan's people 
further away from the Mainland.  On the domestic front, Chen 
appealed for ethnic harmony and political unity.  Chen barely 
mentioned plans for constitutional revision after the 
December Legislative Yuan (LY) elections.  End Summary. 
 
May 20, Part II 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) President Chen Shui-bian's October 10 National Day 
speech mixed conciliatory gestures to Beijing and opposition 
parties with appeals to Taiwan pride and calls for 
international recognition.  Almost a third of the speech 
related to the future of cross-Strait relations.  Chen 
reiterated a number of his May 20 inaugural themes, including 
his commitment not to rule out any form of future political 
relationship between the "ROC and PRC or China and Taiwan." 
He also emphasized that he would not deviate from his May 20 
commitments during his term in office.  Chen announced that 
he would convene his proposed Committee for Cross-Strait 
Peace and Stability after the December LY election and 
include leaders from all political parties.  He also restated 
post-election plans to move forward on the "constitutional 
reform project" and other "national policy issues that are of 
vital importance to the people." 
 
Overtures: The 1992 Formula and Direct Links 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Chen asserted that recent leadership changes in PRC 
offered a new opportunity for progress in cross-Strait 
relations.  Targeting this new leadership, Chen invited the 
PRC to restart dialogue with Taiwan "on the basis of the 1992 
meeting in Hong Kong."  This was the most explicit 
endorsement he has yet given to the formula used to 
facilitate cross-Strait dialogue in 1992, when both sides in 
effect agreed not to challenge the other's definition of "one 
China."  Chen characterized the 1992 arrangement as "not 
necessarily perfect but acceptable" as a framework for future 
dialogue. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Chen's speech also suggested specific areas for 
possible cooperation, including direct cross-Strait passenger 
and cargo charter flights.  Chen put the charter flight 
proposal in the context of an emerging new economic 
relationship between the two sides that will take advantage 
of a "division of labor in the global supply chain."  Chen 
also called on the two sides to reduce military tensions 
across the Strait.  Noting his own decision to cancel 
September "Han-kuang" military exercises, Chen stated that if 
the two sides could exercise self-restraint in the near term, 
it would pave the way for future discussions on terminating 
the current state of hostilities.  Chen said that negotiation 
of a "Code of Conduct across the Taiwan Strait" should be set 
as the long-term goal for both sides. 
 
Warnings: Sha Zukang and other "Forces of Darkness" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Chen's offer for dialogue with the new leadership in 
Beijing was tempered by strong warnings over the threat of 
PRC diplomatic and military intimidation.  Chen disputed the 
PRC's claim to represent Taiwan in the United Nations and 
stated that Beijing's diplomatic pressure was driving the 
people on the two sides of the Strait further apart.  Without 
citing PRC Ambassador to Geneva Sha Zukang by name, Chen 
recited Sha's well-known "nobody cares about you" insult to 
Taiwan reporters after Taipei's failed 2003 bid for World 
Health Organization (WHO) observership to illustrate the 
Beijing's "flagrant attitude." 
 
¶6. (SBU) To reinforce the need for upgrading Taiwan's 
self-defense capabilities, Chen also warned his people about 
the dangers posed by the "forces of darkness" across the 
Strait.  Chen said the 600 ballistic missiles pointed at 
Taiwan represented a "shadow of terror" that neither Taiwan 
nor the international community could afford to ignore.  Chen 
added that these "forces of darkness" and "shadows of terror" 
threatened both the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait 
and the security of the region and the world. 
 
Domestic Appeal: "The Republic of China Is Taiwan" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Chen declared that the "Republic of China is Taiwan, 
and Taiwan is the Republic of China" in the context of a 
domestic appeal for unity.  Chen told the audience that it 
did not matter whether an individual identifies with "Taiwan 
or the Republic of China, per se, any such professed 
expression of national identity is a testament to one's 
loyalty to this country."  Chen promised that he and his 
party would make a candid self-reflection on the issue of 
identity and ethnicity.  At the same time, he urged others 
not to dwell upon the "victory or defeat of each election" 
and instead seize new opportunities for rebuilding solidarity. 
 
Comment: Something for Everybody 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Chen's speech addressed a wide range of often 
contradictory themes and audiences.  His references to the 
"1992 Hong Kong" formula and reducing military tensions were 
clearly meant to be the headliners for Beijing.  At the same 
time, Chen's warning about the growing PRC military threat 
was calibrated to strengthen the government's case for early 
LY action on the USD 18 billion special defense procurement 
budget.  Similarly, Chen's appeals to Taiwan pride and 
greater international recognition likely targeted his own 
base, while his focus on the "ROC" and ethnic unity aimed at 
opposition supporters.  Rhetoric about the "forces of 
darkness" notwithstanding, Chen's 1992 formula should offer 
Beijing some  opening to respond positively, if and when it 
chooses to do so.  Officials in Taipei tell us they will wait 
for Beijing's response before deciding on further possible 
concessions to get around the "one China" deadlock. 
PAAL