This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T  ROME 003985 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD, EUR/RPM AND EUR/WE; 
OSD FOR DASD HOEHN 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - TEXT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR IT NATO FORCES IN ITALY
SUBJECT: GDPR/ITALY: ITALIANS PROPOSE WORKING GROUP TO 
FLESH OUT SIGONELLA SOF DETAILS 
 
REF: A. STATE 207467 
     ¶B. ROME 3933 
     ¶C. ROME 2631 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Tom Countryman. 
Reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (S) Summary. In October 6 discussions with Defense 
Minister Martino, D/CHOD LTG Castagnetti and MFA Director 
General Massolo, A/S Bloomfield and DASD Hoehn explained 
where the Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) process stood 
in the U.S. and heard from the Italians broad agreement with 
the U.S. view of the strategic context and the need for 
rapidly deployable forces to counter emerging threats.  The 
Italian message was that changes underway in Naples/Gaeta and 
Vicenza were not problematic and that outstanding issues 
there could be resolved at a technical level.  The question 
of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) at Sigonella would be 
highly political, would require a top-level Italian political 
blessing, and before seeking that blessing, the Italians 
needed to know more about what the package would contain. 
Massolo proposed the U.S. and Italy form a working group to 
flesh out the details needed for presentation to 
highest-level Italian political powers.  End Summary. 
 
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D/CHOD - Need to Work SOF Top-Down 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) On October 6, PM Assistant Secretary Lincoln 
Bloomfield Jr. and DASD Andrew Hoehn held meetings in Rome on 
the GDPR.  They met first with D/CHOD LTG Castagnetti, who 
said he was confident that Vicenza and Naples/Gaeta issues 
could be solved, but that Sigonella was very sensitive and 
Italy lacked specific information on U.S. thinking about 
basing SOF there.  The Italian decision on that would be "100 
percent political."  The use of SETAF out of Vicenza also had 
a political component to it, but since SETAF was a 
NATO-assigned force, it would be easier to manage. 
Castagnetti said that military-to-military talks could go 
forward to offer recommendations to the politicians for 
decisions on Vicenza and Naples/Gaeta, but for Sigonella, he 
said, a bottom-up approach was not feasible.  Its sensitivity 
required a top-down effort.  A/S Bloomfield assured 
Castagnetti that the U.S. wanted to be together with Italy at 
every step.  He said he was sure that together we could frame 
terms of discussion that would get us to agreement. 
 
¶3. (S) Castagnetti replied that one problem would be 
translating the SOF concept for Sigonella into writing.  If 
something is not strictly connected to NATO, he said, Italy 
must know about and approve it in advance.  SOF operations by 
definition could not be known in advance.  A/S Bloomfield 
countered that SOF was not of a different legal character 
than other forces; but some exigencies required timely action 
that might not wait for formal deliberative processes. The 
U.S. was seeking Italy's advice, as both the U.S. and Italy 
undersood that latitude was needed to deal with crisQs we 
might face.  NATO was certainly a art of the picture, and 
was likely to be involved at some stage in future 
contingencies, even if not at the outset (such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan).  We shouldn't tie our hands in this respect. 
Castagnetti agreed that NATO had a role in new conflicts. 
DASD Hoshn noted that we had a close partnership in all 
dimensions with Italy in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and 
that training and other joint work would allow us both to be 
more effective.  The U.S., he said, understood the need to 
agree on parameters. 
 
¶4. (S) Castagnetti asked what the projected number of SOF was 
for Signoella and was given rough estimates, but was told 
that SOCEUR would be meeting with IDGS on Oct. 7 and would 
have more detail.  He said there was concern that Sicily did 
not have the right facilities for SOF, and especially for SOF 
training as it would be too visible.  When DASD Hoehn 
mentioned the possibility of joint training, Castagnetti was 
intrigued, but said that so far he was unaware of any 
discussion of reciprocity in training.  Castagnetti said "I 
would be the happiest man in the world if you could get my 
Foreign Minister and Defense Minister together with yours on 
this issue."  He said Italy would be very open and 
cooperative in the continuing discussion of SOF at Signoella. 
 
 
 A/S Bloomfieldthanked him for his advice and for his 
positive outlook regarding U.S.-Italian cooperation on this 
matter. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
DefMin - Work etails and We'll Support You 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (S) The Deegation was joined by Ambassador Sembler for 
heir call on Defense Minister Martino.  Martino noted that 
Italy had its most pro-U.S. government since World War II. 
It approved of U.S. goals in the GDPR and would do what it 
could, but operated under strict constitutional and political 
constraints.  He promised to "analyze with sympathy" U.S. 
proposals and see how he could help.  He stated that any 
approach that required modifying existing agreements risked 
resulting in less than is available now.  A/S Bloomfield said 
the U.S. agreed and would not seek to re-open the existing 
agreements. 
 
¶6. (S) Martino directly stated that the only problem is 
Sigonella, due to political sensitivity and a shortage of 
training facilities in Sicily.  DASD Hoehn pointed out that 
there were other training sites in the region that could be 
used by SOF stationed at Sigonella.  Ambassador Sembler added 
that there could be great opportunities for joint training 
with U.S. SOF there.  Martino agreed that other training 
locations could be worked out and said joint training would 
be excellent as it would develop feelings of friendship and 
understanding of procedures, and would be a "great investment 
of goodwill."  DASD Hoehn told him that the U.S. wanted 
Allies to be inside of the transformation envisioned in the 
GDPR, a position with strong Congressional support. 
 
¶7. (S) A/S Bloomfield asked about LTG Castagnetti's advice in 
seeking a top-down approach on the SOF discussion.  Martino 
replied that the SOF at Sigonella issue was not insoluble but 
needed to be worked carefully.  Italy, he stressed, does not 
want there to be too much visibility.  If the numbers were 
not large, it would not be a problem.  He said that once the 
military technical issues related to SOF at Sigonella were 
worked out, the U.S would have his full support and that of 
the GOI.  He underscored that this would be represented by a 
strong and cohesive GOI and parliamentary majority. 
 
¶8. (S) Martino said Italy recognized that we faced a common 
global threat and that we were all involved.  One could not 
step back and say "let others take care of it."  A/S 
Bloomfield added that 9/11 and developments since 
demonstrated the need to react quickly, sometimes without the 
luxury of time for extensive debates back in capitals.  The 
new environment included unpredictable dangers that required 
speed, and decisive operations before threats could grow 
worse.  Martino replied that speed of deployability was a 
political, not a technical issue, and a system was needed to 
allow for rapid decision making.  However, there was a 
trade-off between possibilities for quick action and 
democratic control.  We all want both.  "Everyone," he said, 
"is interested in increased usability of forces."  He pointed 
out that Italy has been a leader in a transformation of 
usability, with total number of forces going down 
significantly while increasing the number available for 
deployment outside Italy four-fold.  DASD Hoehn noted that it 
was no accident that we sought to work most closely with 
countries like Italy who take the threat and the need to 
change to meet it seriously.  Martino added that Italy, like 
the rest of NATO, had a free ride on the shoulders of the 
U.S. taxpayer in terms of defense for 50 years, and saved 
over USD 750 billion in defense spending because of US and 
NATO protection since the founding of the Alliance.  Now, 
however, the answer is not defense as such, it is security 
against terrorism threats.  Martino said that once the 
military-to-military work is done, we could talk about how to 
support the U.S. plans politically. 
------------------------------------ 
MFA's Massolo Proposes Working Group 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (S) MFA Director General for Multilateral and Political 
Affairs Giampiero Massolo told A/S Bloomfield and DASD Hoehn 
that Italy was pleased to hear the President's speech on GDPR 
 
 
in August (which he said was well-received by the Italian 
public) and to have the delegation in Rome to follow up. 
DASD Hoehn asked Massolo for his sense of the way forward 
with Italy, asking at what level the discussion should take 
place and in what terms.  A/S Bloomfield noted that mil-mil 
discussion on Sigonella was ongoing, but that it was not yet 
ready to provide detailed planning information for the 
consideration of the top political level.  We would, he said, 
be able to be more specific soon. 
 
¶10. (S) Massolo said he could give a positive reaction and 
feedback, including on behalf of the Foreign Minister.  Italy 
understands the general U.S. perspective and considerations 
and interprets them in a positive way.  He urged the U.S. to 
continue on the same public diplomacy path opened by the 
President's August speech.  That, he said, would help secure 
support in the Italian Parliament.  We would soon need to 
pass from the general to the specific and explain some 
details of U.S. thinking.  Vicenza and Naples/Gaeta were 
"certainly not problems," the issues there could be handled 
on a technical level, and public reaction would not be 
problematic.  Plans for SOF at Sigonella would have to be 
better understood by the Italian side.  Decisions about 
Sigonella would be political ones, but first, Massolo said, 
it must be very clear what will be said to the political 
level players.  What is the aim?  What does the U.S. mean by 
flexibility?  What will Sigonella look like in 5 or 10 years? 
 These questions, he said, needed to be answered before the 
matter goes to the political level. 
 
¶11. (S) Massolo then suggested establishing a U.S.-Italy 
working group, without publicity, to clarify from a military 
and MFA perspective the content of the "SOF package" that the 
Italians would eventually move forward for top-level 
political blessing.  He asked for the USG to send a group for 
informal and direct talks.  "We must explain that there will 
be forces hosted in Italy that will have to leave for 
missions from Italy and that it is known and understood that 
there is a procedure of informed consent for them."  He asked 
to what extent the new security situation would require new 
elements in this context.  He added that his presentation was 
a result of MFA/MOD/IDGS consultation.  A/S Bloomfield 
replied that the U.S. was ready to support establishing a 
working group.  SOF numbers would be made clear in mil-mil 
discussions.  Post-9/11 the U.S. changed our conceptual view 
of national security, as we were attacked asymmetrically by 
non-state actors.  He paraphrased Australian PM Howard,s 
remarks soon after the Bali bombing, saying that any leader 
would be derelict if he knew a terrorist attack was coming 
and did not act to stop it, even outside the nation,s 
territory.  This notion needed to be incorporated in our 
national security concepts.  It explains the need to act 
quickly.  And such action must be viewed as legal and 
legitimate.  We may not have time to go to the NAC or 
Parliaments for a vote.  Recognizing this was sensible 
preparation for the future. 
 
¶12. (S) Massolo closed by saying Italy broadly shared the 
U.S. view of the new strategic context and the necessity for 
rapid strategic action.  However, he needed a procedural hook 
on which to hang it.  We cannot, he said, allow a just and 
shared cause be made to sound illegal.  Once we figure out 
how to do that, the rest will be relatively simple  "Not all 
of the machinery needs to be exposed to the public, but the 
explanation must be waterproof."  He also noted that Italy 
needed to do some public diplomacy work with Italians talking 
to Italians about the coming changes.  He said that bases are 
seen as a contribution to stability, but asked that U.S. 
commanders on the bases refrain from discussing the changes 
publicly for the time being.  A/S Bloomfield responded that 
here the U.S. would follow Italy's lead on the process and 
thanked Massolo for his advice.  DASD Hoehn cautioned that 
there may be public discussion in the U.S. of some details 
and that we would keep Italy informed about our thinking in 
this regard.  Massolo said he would inform the GOI's public 
affairs officers to sharpen their antennae.  A/S Bloomfield 
closed the session by saying the USG would let the GOI know 
what goes up to Congress, would provide more detail on SOF 
Sigonella issues via mil-mil channels, and would form a U.S. 
team for the working group. 
 
¶13. (U) A/S Bloomfield has cleared thQs message. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2004ROME03985 - Classification: SECRET