This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ROME 003979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA GOTTLIEB, AFR/FO LAVELLE 
STATE FOR IO/EDA, AF, AF/W, AF/EPS, NEA/MAG, OES/ENV 
USDA/FAS FOR REICH, HUGHES AND CHAMBLISS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH; BRUSSELS FOR LERNER 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR AORC MASS SENV XI XY FAO
SUBJECT: LOCUST EMERGENCY: DONORS' MEETING AT FAO, 
13 OCTOBER 2004 
 
REF:  (A) ROME 3681 (NOTAL),  (B) ROME 3669 (NOTAL) 
 
¶1.  Summary:  At FAO Headquarters on 13 October, Director 
General Jacques Diouf and FAO Secretariat staff briefed 
representatives of donor governments and affected states 
on progress in bringing the locust emergency under 
control.  FAO reported that the locust plague is "the 
worst in fifteen years."  After a slow start, control 
efforts stepped up dramatically during September, when 
745,000 hectares were sprayed.  Diouf stated that, due to 
the sluggish donor response, what was a $9 million 
problem eleven months ago has now become a $100 million 
emergency.  Thus far, FAO has received $20 million in 
contributions, with another $9.5 million pledged.  U.S. 
representative and other donors, while mindful of the lag 
in donor contributions, pointed also to deficiencies in 
FAO's response, but they also recognized recent progress 
made.  U.S. representative highlighted USAID's 
commitments to help address the emergency.  In a private 
meeting with Diouf later in the day, the Ambassador 
stressed that USG criticisms of FAO were aimed at 
improving the organization's ability to respond to the 
present and future emergencies.  Separately, U.S. Mission 
has tentatively discussed with EUCOM possible use of U.S. 
military assets in this emergency.  At present we do not 
see an immediate need for such USG support, but we will 
remain in contact with FAO as it works to overcome 
initial glitches in the response effort and becomes 
better able to plan for future logistical needs.  End 
summary. 
 
LOCUST SITUATION 
 
¶2.  The FAO Secretariat characterized the current locust 
situation in the Sahel as "the worst in 15 years," and 
particularly severe in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and 
Niger.  There has been significant damage to crops and 
pastureland.  A significant number of new swarms are 
forming in the above four countries, as well as Burkina 
Faso and Chad.  These swarms are spreading to the north 
and west into Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, and could possibly move southward into the Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau and Guinea.  Some 3-4 million hectares are 
infested.  Further details are available at www.fao.org. 
 
CONTROL ACTIVITIES 
 
¶3.  According to the FAO briefing, control activities 
have stepped up dramatically. Since the summer, a 
cumulative 875,000 ha have been sprayed.  Of this, 
745,000 ha were sprayed in September alone.  The 
immediate objective is to protect crops, while reducing 
the number of locust.  Currently 28 spraying aircraft are 
operating in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Chad. 
Another 10 aircraft will be available in the next few 
days. 
 
DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
¶4.  Diouf said that donor contributions have been slow to 
come in; donors are putting severe restrictions on how 
their funds can be used; and donors are not providing FAO 
 
 
with information on their contributions (including 
bilateral aid).  All this has hampered FAO's efforts, 
according to Diouf, and the result is that a $9 million 
problem eleven months ago has become a $100 million 
problem today.  Thus far, FAO has received $20 million, 
and it is using $6 million of its own funds, and donors 
have promised another $9.5 million.  The organization has 
$38 million in approved projects ready to go, and much 
more needs to be done.  (Note: these numbers, spoken by 
Diouf, do not correspond exactly with the figures U.S. 
Mission obtained from the FAO Secretariat shortly 
afterwards, and should be taken only as a rough 
indication of the current situation.)  Additional 
constraints, according to Diouf, are: (1) the shortage of 
airlift capacity due to competing demands in Darfur and 
the Caribbean, (2) the time it takes to gear up pesticide 
production, (3) the fact that some pesticides have not 
been approved in all affected countries. 
 
DONORS' QUESTIONS 
 
¶5.  Canada wanted to know if FAO could really use 
$60 million if it arrived tomorrow, and stressed the 
importance of coordination throughout the UN system.  A 
WFP rep said the UN agencies were "pulling together" in 
this crisis.  Diouf pointed to the establishment of a 
coordination center in Dakar. 
 
¶6.  France said that in the short term there should be 
crisis procedures in place that, for instance, permit 
rapid transfers of credits.  In the medium term, we need 
to make sure that the Emergency Prevention System for 
Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases 
(EMPRES) is effective.  And we need to ensure effective 
coordination among all the players.  Diouf agreed there 
are lessons to be learned from this crisis, and the 
Secretariat will provide suggestions as to how to assess 
 
SIPDIS 
this.  He said that EMPRES worked last year when there 
was a similar outbreak in Sudan; the problem was 
contained and there were no headlines. 
 
¶7.  Sweden said it was about to donate SKr 5 million, but 
FAO has not provided any project documents that would 
allow Sweden to use that money.  Diouf responded that 
"there is a limit to what we can do."  All donors want 
project documents at the same time, he said; it takes 
time to negotiate agreements with major donors. 
 
¶8.  The US commended FAO staff for their hard work and 
praised the organization for providing timely warning of 
the crisis, but reiterated our disappointment with FAO's 
response thus far: (1) insufficient transparency and 
delays in use of donated funds, (2) delays in 
establishing a coordination structure/process, (3) 
inadequate staffing in the field, (4) lack of quick 
response mechanisms, (5) absence of a comprehensive 
information system.  (See reftels.)  We also mentioned 
FAO's failure to use its own Emergency Trust Fund for the 
locust crisis, and the Emergency Operations Division's 
apparent inability to give us specifics of what kinds of 
aid was needed, and precisely where and when, in response 
to our queries.  We did note that there had been progress 
 
in recent weeks/months, but said that an after-action 
review would be important to extract lessons learned.  We 
also reviewed USAID's $11.3 million commitment thus far 
for FY 2004-2005, and USAID/FFP's readiness to contribute 
short-term emergency food aid, if needed. 
 
¶9.  Japan mentioned its $3 million contribution, 
stressing the need for more efficient procedures, more 
information, and more accountability so that the 
expenditures could be justified to taxpayers back home. 
 
DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REACTION 
 
¶10.  Diouf reacted defensively and emotionally to some 
comments made during the meeting, using inflections and 
rhetorical flourishes that seemed to take some dnors 
aback.  He reiterated that the lag in doQor response was 
largely to blame for the cQrrent situation.  He said the 
Emergency Trust Fund was only $2 million, and that had 
alreadybeen allocated to other emergencies.  He said hQ 
did not understand how FAO could be more trasparent 
about funds received.  He said it 7as impossible to plan 
during a crisis, and difficult to give much advance 
notice of anticipaed logistical needs.  He conceded 
donors' poiQt about the need for strict accountability, 
aconciliatory tone, so n a less contentious nNG WITH DIOUF 
 
¶11.  e Ambassador met privatelQl Diouf.  The locust eme2mary topic of conversatversation the AmbassadQtions 
in criticizingst outbreak were 
cons4improve FAO's ability to 
o future emergencies. 
 
 
¶12.  We have taken thQ`rtp@ 
r rack. 
 
¶13.  In Septembehe possibility of 
iQ`Q&0LQQollowed up.  We have appreciated EUCOM's willingness to 
assist in this effort within DOD operational, budgetary 
and policy constraints.  In view of the currently fluid 
situation on the ground and the apparent mismatch between 
U.S. capabilities and current needs of the international 
effort being coordinated by FAO, we do not at present 
 
 
foresee an immediate need for U.S. military involvement 
in this crisis in the near term.  We will remain in 
contact with FAO as it works to overcome initial glitches 
in the response effort and becomes better able to plan 
for future logistical needs. 
 
¶13.  Minimize considered. 
 
HALL 
 
 
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	2004ROME03979 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED