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Viewing cable 04RANGOON1402, BUSINESS AS USUAL: THE SPDC SHOWS LITTLE CONCERN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04RANGOON1402 2004-10-26 11:14 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rangoon
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL, G/TIP, STATE PASS LABOR/ILAB, 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY, TREASURY FOR OASIA, USPACOM 
FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: ELAB PGOV PHUM BM ASSK
SUBJECT: BUSINESS AS USUAL: THE SPDC SHOWS LITTLE CONCERN 
ABOUT UP-COMING ILO REVIEW, RELEASE OF ASSK, OR RETURN OF 
UN SPECIAL ENVOY 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1370 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. RANGOON 1365 
     C. STATE 223852 
     D. STATE 214607 
     E. RANGOON 1224 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Minister of Labor U Tin Winn told COM on 
October 25 that his government would "reassess the utility of 
the ILO" if the ILO's Governing Body decided to implement the 
measures outlined in Article 33 of the International Labor 
Conference's resolution of 2000. In response to our statement 
of concern about the safety and the continued detention of 
ASSK, the Minister responded that it "was only temporary." 
The Minister was dismissive of the need for the return of the 
Special Envoy or the Special Rapporteur, saying the SE has 
visited 12 times since he was appointed to his position and 
less than one year has passed since the SR was here.  End 
Summary 
 
2.  (SBU)  The COM, accompanied by Poloff (notetaker), called 
on Minister of Labor U Tin Winn on October 25 to review the 
USG's views on actions the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) will likely take when Burma comes up for discussion by 
the ILO's Governing Body in Geneva on November 18.  Other 
subjects discussed during the contentious, but nevertheless 
cordial, 45-minute meeting were the USG's continuing deep 
concern about the SPDC's detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and U 
Tin Oo; the failure of the SPDC to allow the National League 
for Democracy (NLD) to function throughout the country and to 
participate in the National Convention (NC); the failure of 
the Government to allow United Nations Envoy Razali and 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Sergio 
Pinheiro to continue their work here; the ramifications for 
the Embassy's physical security of the GOB's publicly 
announced decision on October 22 to dissolve its National 
Intelligence Board--of which the Minister was a member--and 
the multiple official roles the Minister has played on behalf 
of the SPDC during the past few weeks in New York, Hanoi, and 
Rangoon. 
 
The GOB Will Close Local ILO Office if Labor Organization 
Invokes Article 33 Measures 
 
3.  (SBU)  The COM opened the discussion by saying the 
Embassy understands the Burmese Supreme Court's Special 
Appellate Branch had clearly stated on October 14 that 
contact with the ILO, and other international organizations, 
are not against the law.  She added that the USG further 
understands the Special Appellate Branch has reduced the 
sentences of the three individuals who had been sentenced to 
jail for, among other things, carrying business cards of the 
ILO representative in Burma at the time they were taken into 
custody.  The COM added that the Government has the authority 
to release the individuals on grounds of good behavior, and 
urged the GOB to do so. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Nevertheless, stressed the COM, we do not believe 
the ILO Governing Body is prepared to consider--nor would we 
support--reactivating the 2003 Plan of Action to combat 
forced labor until the Burmese Government releases the three 
individuals imprisoned for contact with the ILO; improves 
cooperation with the Rangoon ILO representative in 
investigating forced labor allegations; and ensures that 
Burmese citizens clearly understand their government does not 
condone reprisals against those who report incidents of 
forced labor. 
 
5.  (SBU)  In the latter connection, the COM mentioned the 
case in Toungup (southern Rakhine State), where there have 
been allegations of action being taken by local authorities 
against those who have informed the ILO of forced labor 
abuses.  A credible response from the authorities to this 
case is important, said the COM.  If the Government does not 
respond to such cases, it gives the impression that national 
authorities condone--even encourage--such action. 
 
6,  (SBU)  Minister U Tin Winn responded by saying the 
problems in Toungup had been caused by "lower level" 
officials.  He went on to say the Ministry of Labor has tried 
to investigate some cases, but had found it difficult to do 
so because of the need for "transparency" in notifying local 
officials that they were being investigated and the inability 
of the Labor Ministry to conduct undercover operations. 
(Note: The ILO has confirmed that the GOB has investigated 18 
of the 38 cases brought to its attention, but has yet to find 
anyone involved guilty.)  The COM responded by saying the GOB 
has considerable expertise and capacities in gathering 
intelligence that could be applied in cases of forced labor - 
she had previously seen successful undercover actions against 
such abuses in other countries, and is confident that the GOB 
could do the same if it has the political will to do so. 
 
7.  (C)  The Minister concluded this part of the discussion 
by muttering that he would pass the COM's concerns to the 
judiciary.  He also said--in much stronger tones--that the 
GOB would  "reassess the utility of the ILO" in the country 
in the event of a decision by the ILO's Governing Body to 
implement the measures outlined in Article 33 of the 
International Labor Conference's resolution of 2000.  When 
the COM pressed for a clarification of "reassess" he said 
that would mean closing ILO operations in country. 
 
Concern about Aung San Suu Kyi and National League for 
Democracy 
 
8.  (SBU)  The continuing detention of Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK) and U Tin Oo raises serious doubt about the Burmese 
Government's commitment to a free, open society and to its 
own "road map to democracy," said the COM.  The USG is very 
concerned about the safety of ASSK, she stressed, and the 
SPDC bears responsibility both for her release and for her 
safety.  ASSK's continued house arrest when she has neither 
committed, nor been charged with any crime, belies the 
government's stated commitment to national reconciliation and 
destroys its credibility.  The Minister responded by saying 
that the detention "was only temporary" and avoided 
responding to COM's request to define "temporary." 
 
9.  (SBU)  The Government had invited NLD Chairman U Aung 
Shwe and other NLD Members-elect of Parliament to participate 
earlier this year (May 17, 2004) in the National Convention, 
responded the Minister, but they had refused.  There is 
nothing more the Government can do in this regard: "If the 
NLD wants to live in a cocoon," so be it, said the Minister. 
As for the May 2003 incident in Depayin, that was a political 
matter, not an issue of forced labor or human rights, he 
added.  The Minister said he had told UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan that such things require time to sort out: "the 
Burmese Government is trying as hard as possible to resolve 
the matter." 
 
National Convention to Resume in December-January 
 
10.  (SBU)  The National Convention (NC) will resume in 
December or January, said the Minister. The determining 
factors "will be the weather, not politics." Questions of the 
harvest and road conditions must be taken in to account in 
order to ensure full participation by all members of the NC. 
 
Khin Nyunt Was "Covered with Rust," Had To Be Replaced 
 
11. (SBU)   The Minister responded to COM's question as to 
his opinion on the recent changes of senior government 
officials by saying that deposed Prime Minister Khin Nyunt 
had to be replaced because he was "covered with rust" and 
needed to "have it scraped."  He should have been replaced 
"6-12 months before" (the announcement of his retirement on 
October 19, ref A), said the Minister, a former MI officer 
himself and a close collaborator with the fallen Prime 
Minister while both were serving in MI. 
 
Why Razali and Pinheiro Can't Come Back to Burma 
 
12.  (SBU)  The COM told the Minister that his government's 
refusal to permit visits by the Special Envoy Razali or 
Special Rapporteur Pinheiro showed a lack of commitment to UN 
efforts to assist in addressing the issues of human rights 
and national reconciliation.  The Minister was dismissive, 
responding that the Special Envoy had been here "12 times in 
four years" and less than one year has passed since the 
Special Representative last visited the country. 
 
Dissolution of the Burmese National Intelligence Board 
 
13.  (SBU)  The Minister was a member of the Burmese 
Intelligence Board prior to its dissolution by the Government 
on October 22 (septel).  The COM inquired about the 
implications of this move, particularly for the physical 
security of the Embassy.  The Minister assured her that the 
Director of Police and the Minister of Home Affairs would 
continue to arrange for the American Embassy to be guarded 
diligently.  He was confident that the USG remained "very 
strong" and "secure" in Burma. 
 
The Minister's Many Hats 
 
14.  (SBU)  In addition to his portfolio in Labor, the 
Minister serves concurrently as Minister in the Prime 
Minister's office.  In the latter capacity, he headed the 
Burmese delegations to the recent opening of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and to the ASEAN-European 
Ministerial Meeting (ASEM) in Hanoi earlier this month. The 
Minister said the Chairman of the SPDC, Senior General Than 
Shwe, had asked him to join the Burmese delegation to the 
opening of a trade exhibit in China in the Minister's 
capacity as a member of the Myanmar Economic Cooperation 
Committee.  (Note: There has not been a public announcement 
of the trip, the dates of which are unknown.) 
 
15.  (C)  Comment: A former Ambassador to the United States 
and earlier to Thailand, U Tin Winn is a highly experienced 
operator who clearly has the Senior General's confidence.  He 
has held several ministerial portfolios since his return to 
Rangoon from Washington in 2001.  While serving earlier in 
Military Intelligence, he was the government's chief 
negotiator with the Wa and Kokang cease-fire groups.  We are 
not sure whether the Minister's statement about closing the 
ILO's office in Rangoon would hold if the Governing Body 
invokes Article 33 measures against it in the November 
meeting in Geneva.  However, his will be a highly influential 
voice in any related discussions.  Absolutely nothing the 
government has done during the past few months suggests that 
it would hesitate to thumb its nose once again at the 
international community. End Comment 
Martinez