This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 002869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KCOR PREL EC
SUBJECT: "POWER-BLINDED" LFC DRIVES IMPEACHMENT PUSH 
 
REF: GUAYAQUIL 1231 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Leon Febres-Cordero (LFC), the cantankerous 
leader of Ecuador's Social Christian Party (PSC), is 
determined to destroy President Lucio Gutierrez by any means 
possible, according to two thoughtful PSC legislators. 
Brothers Luis Fernando Torres and Carlos Torres, the former 
the head of Congress's Constitutional Affairs committee, 
claim the facts do not support charges of embezzlement, on 
which LFC has based the current impeachment effort (reftel). 
Yet Febres-Cordero has ordered the PSC legislative contingent 
to begin lobbying other blocs in support of the trumped-up 
charges.  In cahoots with newfound ally Vice President 
Alfredo Palacio, LFC is offering lavish gifts to independent 
and small party congressman, whose yes votes are needed to 
remove the sitting president.  Despite dissension in the 
ranks and chafing at Febres-Cordero's "counterproductive" 
instructions, the brothers claimed PSC legislators were 
unlikely to break ranks.  In a same day conversation with 
Ambassador Kenney, however, Minister of Government Raul Baca 
believed PSC "rebels" were ripe for recruitment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Congressmen Swallow Hard and March Forward 
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¶2.  (U) Poloff joined the siblings October 27 for a working 
breakfast, covering upcoming U.S. elections, ongoing 
U.S.-Ecuador free trade talks, and the Colombia-Ecuador 
relationship.  Yet Ecuador's current bout of political 
instability, more specifically Febres-Cordero's attempt to 
impeach Gutierrez, dominated the discussion.  Media had 
reported correctly that PSC legislators had not introduced an 
impeachment motion the previous day, as was widely expected. 
It would be introduced October 27, Luis Fernando revealed, a 
fact that clearly troubled him. 
 
¶3.  (U) The motion was pure Febres-Cordero - he hadn't 
bothered to consult beforehand with fellow party members or 
the PSC Congressional leadership.  In reality, the bloc 
leader, Pascual del Cioppo, was only a figurehead, since LFC 
called all shots.  There was little rank-and-file Social 
Christian support for impeachment, Luis Fernando claimed, but 
legislators, especially first-termers and those running for 
re-election in 2006, feared angering the irascible Leon (not 
ironically, "lion" in English).  There would be no PSC 
dissenters in Congress. 
 
¶4.  (U) LFC wanted Gutierrez imprisoned or exiled, Luis 
Fernando asserted.  The reasons were many, ranging from 
Gutierrez cousin Renan Borbua's insults toward the PSC leader 
to recent GoE efforts to collect seven-figure debts from 
LFC's brother.  Febres-Cordero thus had chosen embezzlement 
as the focus of the impeachment motion.  Were a majority of 
legislators to "admit" the charges (a grand jury-like 
determination of probable cause to investigate), Ecuadorian 
law mandated preventative detention for the accused chief 
executive.  Were this to occur, Gutierrez would have no 
political pulse; his removal from office would be gravy, but 
not imperative. 
 
¶5.  (U) Little proof existed to substantiate LFC's 
accusations, Carlos noted.  There were photos of Gutierrez 
with candidates from his Patriotic Society party (PSP), 
handing out embossed T-shirts and calendars, but little else. 
 His many trips in the run-up to Ecuador's October 17 local 
elections always featured official business, whether 
inaugurating public works or promising others.  Media were 
claiming that fellow large parties ID and Pachakutik too 
supported impeachment, guaranteeing the 51 votes to admit. 
What they were not emphasizing, Luis Fernando explained, was 
that these organizations wanted Gutierrez's head for other 
reasons, including his "neo-liberal" economics and gringo 
"kowtowing."  Pachakutik and ID support for the PSC's motion 
thus was not certain. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Social Christian legislators had impeachment 
marching orders, however, and were following them.  Luis 
Fernando himself had swallowed his personal beliefs and, in 
remarks to Quito daily El Comercio October 26, "sold" LFC's 
arguments and exclaimed that "in the course of the 
proceedings, we hope other parties will join us in seeking 
the president's dismissal."  Worse, Febres-Cordero was 
targeting potential turncoat independent legislators with big 
payoffs.  Gutierrez and the PSP already had sent large sums 
their way; LFC likely would have to pay double to turn them. 
VP Palacio, whom LFC now supported to complete Gutierrez's 
term, had joined the PSC leader in the recruitment effort. 
¶7.  (U) Despite his advanced age, Febres-Cordero sought a 
second presidential term, Luis Fernando argued.  The 
ex-president (1984-88) was bolstered enormously by recent 
press accounts that credited him with the PSC's strong 
showing in the October 17 vote.  LFC's political maneuverings 
to remove Gutierrez had delivered him the spotlight, boding 
well for his comeback attempt.  Regrettably, no PSC luminary 
would challenge Febres-Cordero, Carlos revealed.  Guayaquil 
Mayor Jaime Nebot, who had the charisma and credentials to do 
so, was awaiting a biological solution (LFC's death) before 
seeking the presidency again. 
 
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Political Veteran Sees Chinks in PSC Armor 
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¶8.  (C) More optimistic, Minister of Government Raul Baca 
believes Gutierrez will weather this crisis as he has the 
dozen before it.  In an October 27 meeting with the 
Ambassador, Baca expressed doubts that LFC could enforce 
party discipline during impeachment proceedings.  An obvious 
PSC schism existed, the minister explained.  Over the long 
Ecuadorian weekend (October 30-November 3), he intended to 
wear out his Rolodex, seeking Social Christian and other 
party support for the president's defense.  Baca's talking 
points were two:  Gutierrez had not embezzled public funds, 
and further political instability spelled disaster for 
Ecuador. 
 
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COMMENT: 
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¶9.  (C) Though twenty-five years a democracy, Ecuador suffers 
from political parties rooted firmly in the strongman era. 
The PSC is the perfect example; despite a plethora of able, 
modern politicians, Febres-Cordero remains the iron fist, 
those daring to challenge him rapidly returning to the 
private sector.  Legendary for his "palanca" (connections), 
LFC also enjoys deep pockets, and buying allegiances from 
Ecuador's Congressional Hessians is no Herculean labor.  Nor 
do we question his ability to deliver the PSC legislative 
bloc's impeachment votes en masse, despite Baca's contrary 
opinion.  Yet we join Luis Fernando Torres in doubting blind 
Pachakutik/ID support for the PSC motion.  These are 
left-leaning organizations; right-winger Febres-Cordero, who 
regularly reminisces about his "close" friendship with former 
President Reagan, is even less welcome in their confines than 
political chameleon Gutierrez.  And pragmatically, allowing 
the PSC to shape removal proceedings would give 
Febres-Cordero the upper hand in organizing the successor 
government, anathema to Ecuador's political left.  END COMMENT 
KENNEY