This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2014 
TAGS: PGOV CG
SUBJECT: RCD: SOME STILL SEARCHING FOR REASONS TO ABANDON 
THE TRANSITION 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1311 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1. (C)  Summary:  Bizima Karaha, one of the RCD-G's most 
well-known extremists, told Ambassador September 23 that the 
transition has failed, implying that another mechanism should 
be found.  Ambassador reiterated strongly our message that 
the transition, while flawed, remains the sole available 
vehicle through which peace can be maintained and the 
Congolese people's interests advanced.  Karaha also repeated 
the oft-heard RCD demand that Congolese military elements 
deployed in the Kivus must be withdrawn and the government 
cease supporting the Interahamwe. Ambassador also raised the 
importance of ending the climate of impunity which has partly 
enabled the cycle of violence plaguing the DRC.  End Summary. 
 
An Extremist Flexing His Muscles 
 
¶2. (C)  As recently as late-May of this year, Bizima Karaha 
was on the outs with RCD-G president Azarias Ruberwa, and 
indeed, had retreated, together with seven like-minded party 
colleagues, to a sort of exile in Goma.  (Note:  Karaha and 
the "group of seven" had disregarded Ruberwa's instructions 
on key votes, had publicly misspoken themselves in the 
Parliament, and as a consequence, Ruberwa had sent a letter 
to National Assembly President Kamitatu removing the eight 
from their RCD-appointed seats, a decision which prompted 
their disgruntled move east (ref).  End Note.)  In the wake 
of the Gatumba massacre, however, Karaha and others have 
recast themselves as among Ruberwa's close advisors -- 
although other party members have characterized Bizima more 
as a thorn in Ruberwa's side, or even as his "Rwandan 
jailor."  In any event, his star within the party seems on 
the rise, and many of his previously disregarded statements 
have emerged as policy demands underpinning the RCD's return 
to the transitional government.  During his September 23 
meeting with Ambassador (a meeting which Karaha requested), 
he struck some familiar chords, including: 
 
-- the RCD is afraid that the transition will end with many 
promises unmet; it is seriously behind schedule and little is 
being done to put things right; these current negative trends 
have serious implications for the future; 
 
-- there has been no progress on military integration, which 
is key to progress on improving social services, installing 
democracy and holding elections; worse, there is no interest 
by the Congolese participants in making progress on these 
issues; 
 
-- President Kabila doesn't act like a national leader, but 
instead tolerates hate media and makes promises that aren't 
kept; 
 
-- therefore, given all the hidden agendas, the lack of 
Congolese ownership of the processes and general bad faith, 
the transition has failed. 
 
¶3. (C)  Karaha went on to reiterate another well-known RCD 
complaint, namely that the current deployment of government 
and MLC troops to the East is promoting uncontrolled 
fighting, exacerbating general instability, prohibiting the 
return of refugees, and generally making more difficult any 
move toward "real" military integration, since the current 
brassage ("mixing") of troop elements as seen in the East is 
forced and unnatural, and will lead different elements to 
turn on each other.  He concluded by accusing the government 
of continuing to support the Interahamwe, and indeed of 
having integrated some elements into the military, including 
in the personal bodyguard of South Kivu regional military 
commander Mabe. 
 
Transition Flawed, But Necessary 
 
¶4. (C)  In response, the Ambassador noted that no one had 
expected the transition to function perfectly; it is an 
ungainly conglomeration but the only means by which the 
ex-combatants can be brought to work together.  Undeniably, 
progress has been slower than we and the international 
community had hoped, and much remains to be done.  Flawed 
though it is, however, the transition remains the best and 
only means by which to reach the shared goal of free, fair 
and democratic elections, and to protect and advance the 
rights and interests of all the Congolese people.  We must 
all work with what we have available, and that is the 
transition.  Military integration and the related issues of 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants are 
complicated issues in which the international community 
perhaps could usefully play a better coordinated role. 
Nonetheless, in this area there also is positive movement, 
seen in meetings of the Supreme Military Council and renewed 
activity by the international community.  The Ambassador 
reminded Karaha that the mere existence of the CIAT (the 
International Committee to Accompany the Transition) is an 
unprecedented example of international interest in,and 
coordination with, the DRC. 
 
¶5. (C)  The Ambassador said that another complicated but 
important priority is addressing the climate of impunity 
which has enabled the cyle of violence plaguing the Congo. 
While the GDRC's request to the ICC may be a part of the 
answer, there are other avenues as well to address 
allegations that date back a number of years.  The Ambassador 
went on to note that, as for the problem of the Interahamwe 
presence, the actions of (RCD) renegade commander Nkunda and 
the presence of his troops have essentially stymied very 
promising voluntary repatriation of Interahamwe elements 
facilitated by Monuc which, pre-Nkunda, had successfully 
moved over 14,000 FDLR and their families back to Rwanda. 
Post-Nkunda, the number of voluntary repatriations has fallen 
to practically zero.  He concluded by noting that clearly it 
is in the interest of both the DRC and its neighbors, 
particularly Rwanda, to put an end to the menace of the 
Interahamwe, and to support disarmament and relocation 
programs. 
 
Comment 
 
¶6. (C)  On the way out of the building, out of earshot of 
others, Karaha noted to the Ambassador that he had applied 
for a visa but had been told he needed to wait for some time 
before receiving and answer (note: e.g., a security advisory 
opinion).  He asked if there is a problem.  The Ambassador 
replied that he did not track individual visa cases, but 
underscored that in all cases, procedures standardized at all 
U.S. Embassies needed to be followed. 
 
¶7. (C)  Karaha may, in part, have come to hear for himself 
the U.S. reaction to his "the transition is dead" line.  Or 
he may simply have been fishing to see if his failure to 
obtain a visa immeidately signaled bigger problems with the 
U.S.  Alternatively, Ruberwa may have encouraged Karaha to 
hear for himself that the U.S. doesn't accept that the 
transition is dead, in hopes that he will modify his stance. 
The latter, however, would be a vain hope, since by all 
accounts Karaha is the embodiment of RCD-G hard-core 
positions, and widely perceived to be a close Kigali ally. 
Karaha's comments, however, make painfully clear how very 
little manuevering room Ruberwa has, particularly since, 
having chosen to retreat to Goma in the wake of Gatumba, he 
has made himself more susceptible, at least in the 
short-term, to Karaha's and other hard-line factional 
influences. 
MEECE