This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD PTER PREL IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS OUTLINE CONTINUING 
PROBLEMS IN IRAQ 
 
REF: A. STATE 195610 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 4893 
     ¶C. ANKARA 4529 
     ¶D. ANKARA 4340 
     ¶E. ISTANBUL 1249 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for internet distribution. 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary: Representatives of Turkey's two leading 
transporters associations told us in meetings this week that 
their members perceive a deteriorating security situation in 
Iraq, with problems now reaching as far as Mosul in the 
north.  They also continue to see serious problems with the 
convoy system.  While they are working to explore how 
insurance, secure rest stops, and private security firms can 
ease the difficulties faced by their members, they do not see 
these possibilities providing any short term relief.  Despite 
the problems, they indicated that Turkish companies remain 
committed to supply operations, and that the associations 
continue to explore ways they can help.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) P/E Chief met separately with the leaders of 
Turkey's International Transporters' Association (UND), 
Chairman Cahit Soysal and Vice Chairman Reha Uran, and Ro-Ro 
Transport Association (Roder) Chairman Cumhur Atilgan.  We 
offer a synopsis of their comments in order to provide some 
additional on-the-ground information about this often 
confusing subject. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Convoys:  Both organizations reported that their 
members continue to express concern about the way in which 
convoys for humanitarian and military cargoes are organized. 
Their reports indicate that rarely is the goal of one escort 
per ten vehicles achieved.  Instead, their members complain 
that often one hundred trucks are grouped together with only 
two escorts, causing a "loss of control."  (Note: We believe 
they are referring not to fuel shipments for the coalition-- 
which we understand receive coalition escort on the basis of 
a 1:10 ration-- but to humanitarian fuel shipments for whom 
private security contractors are responsible.  End Note.) 
They stressed that they would like to see smaller (20 vehicle 
convoys) occur in practice.  In addition, members continue to 
report that they "never see return escorts."  Terrorists, 
they added, know this fact, and continue to focus their 
attacks on the return trip.  UND officials conceded that in 
some cases truck drivers may head off on their own to buy 
oil, and so drop out of the convoy system for that reason, 
but they argued that the reports are so unanimous that this 
cannot be the only factor.  A final concern centers on the 
way in which formalities are completed at the convoy's 
destination.  Soysal noted that trucks have to wait on the 
road outside secure areas for the paperwork to be completed, 
leaving all vehicles, but especially those at the end of the 
convoy, vulnerable to attack.  Truckers would prefer that the 
trucks be admitted to the base and that formalities be 
finalized there.  (Note: Turkish contruction company and USG 
contractor Yuksel executive Emin Sazak raised a similar point 
in meetings in Ankara, noting that terrorist surveillance and 
threats often occur at this final stage of the delivery.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Insurance: UND noted ref A's point regarding the 
inclusion of an insurance/security premium in coalition and 
humanitarian delivery contracts.  They responded, however, 
that this is ineffective, as adequate insurance coverage is 
rarely available, and when it is (allegedly only one Turkish 
company will write such coverage) it is prohibitively 
expensive.  The expense, they suggested, far exceeds what is 
provided for this purpose in the contracts, and thereby eats 
into the trucker's profit margin.  If the convoy system were 
more effective, they added, insurance rates might fall. 
(Note: This insurance problem is separate from the at least 
equally difficult insurance issue raised by MFA (and echoed 
by the associations): that truckers are unable to document 
their insurance claims for damage or theft since U.S. 
military and local police do not issue the equivalent of a 
police report.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Secure Rest Areas/Transshipment Centers: RODER chief 
Atilgan noted that progress is being made on a transshipment 
point near Zaho, which will offer Turkish truckers the option 
of transferring their deliveries to local Iraqi drivers. 
This will enhance security for Turkish drivers, though at the 
cost of their income, since it is less lucrative to drop off 
goods in the North than to carry them to their final 
destination.  UND concurred, and stressed that their goal is 
safe transport all the way to Baghdad-- they do not what to 
have to transship their goods, given both the drop in income 
and legal issues that result concerning who retains 
responsibility for the cargo.  Regarding secure rest areas, 
Soysal noted that this is an attractive idea, but that it is 
difficult to move it forward given the lack of authoritative 
interlocutors in Iraq.  "It is unclear who we can deal with 
on this," he stressed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Security: Both organizations reported a 
deteriorating security situation, with problems now reaching 
as far north as Mosul.  If the problems reach the border, 
Atilgan said, "you will no longer see any Turkish truckers in 
Iraq."  UND noted that there is some question about whether 
all of the attacks are the work of insurgents, or whether 
some stem from local operators who would like to see more 
goods be transshipped.  Both concurred that use of private 
security companies is an option for Turkish truckers, and UND 
noted that they put information about available companies on 
their website (without explicit recommendation of particular 
firms).  However, the expense again cuts into operating 
margins, and means that few companies take advantage of this 
possibility. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Other issues: Neither organization saw the Syrian 
route (suggested by some GOT officials last week), as an 
alternative solution.  They noted that it involves additional 
risks, including high charges and further bureaucratic 
difficulties.  (Note: In contrast to MFA officials, senior 
Turkish Customs officials have told the Embassy that the 
Syrian route is impractical for truckers.  End Note.)  RODER 
noted that problems are now extending further north, into the 
Mosul area, which is of serious concern.  UND also complained 
about the activities of Northern Iraqi authorities, who it 
alleged are acting "like they run an independent state."  The 
latest step that has sparked outrage is the requirement that 
Turkish truckers buy fuel from designated stations in Iraq, 
and the levying of fines (240 USD per truck) for vehicles 
that have more than a "minimal amount" of fuel in their tanks 
on entering Iraq. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The RODER and UND comments were a sobering 
indication of what Turkish drivers face in Iraq.  Both 
organizations remain committed to helping their members cope 
with the difficulties that exist (even as UND continues to 
recommend that companies not carry coalition cargo-- a 
recommendation that Soysal said the organization is not yet 
in a position to lift).  They indicated that Turkish 
companies remain committed to supply operations, as reflected 
by the 8000 to 10,000 Turkish trucks that are on the road on 
a daily basis in Iraq, but that the rising risks and expense 
could lessen that commitment.  As a reminder of the threats 
and pressure faced by Turkish drivers, on October 1 Soysal 
faxed a copy of a document distributed to drivers in Iraq 
signed by a Ebi Basir and Ebi Jandel Teams, threatening any 
driver who delivers fuel to Iraq after September 30 with 
death.  End Comment. 
 
Baghdad Minimize Considered. 
ARNETT