This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 001493 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL ECON ETRD EIND EINV ENRG ETTC MASS PARM PHUM SENV
SUBJECT: EU/IRELAND: AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE BRUTON DISCUSSES 
GOALS 
 
REF: DUBLIN 1331 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In an October 4 meeting with Ambassador 
Kenny, EU Ambassador-designate to the United States John 
Bruton noted his plans to work with Congress and through 
public diplomacy to strengthen U.S.-EU relations.  Bruton 
said he would aim to underscore the policy objectives that 
both sides shared and to reduce the focus on trans-Atlantic 
differences.  Ambassador Kenny encouraged this approach and 
urged him to reach out to the U.S. business community and USG 
agencies.  Regarding key U.S.-EU issues, Bruton: 
 
-- avoided predictions on the decision that the EU would take 
on the China arms embargo; 
 
-- related that Brussels was "desperately worried" about a 
possible trade war over subsidies to aircraft manufacturers; 
 
-- said that the EU had instructed him to make the resolution 
of the FSC issue a priority in his dealings with Congress; 
 
-- expressed concern that DHS would not be ready by next 
autumn to implement biometric passport requirements; and 
 
-- expressed EU hopes to engage the USG on efforts to curtail 
international trade in small arms.  End summary. 
 
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Bruton's Planned Approach to His Office 
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¶2.  (C) In an October 4 meeting with the Ambassador, EU 
Ambassador-designate to the United States John Bruton (bio 
reftel) said that he would focus on Congress in his efforts 
to strengthen U.S.-EU relations.  He noted his intention to 
foster exchanges between Congress and the European 
Parliament, with a view to preempting controversies that 
might arise through unilateral legislative action by either 
side.  Bruton mentioned that he was sensitive to the 
influence that interaction between Congress and the 
Administration had on the USG approach to Europe, having seen 
the occasionally contentious interplay among the European 
Commission, Council, and Parliament on U.S. policy.  He 
anticipated that Irish ethnic U.S. Representatives and 
Senators would provide entre for his dealings with Congress. 
He expressed concern, however, about the degree to which 
partisanship would hamper such outreach, noting that the 
bipartisan spirit that he had seen during his visits to 
Washington in the early 1970s had disappeared. 
 
¶3.  (C) Bruton also planned substantial public diplomacy 
during his tenure.  He envisioned speaking engagements to 
address possibilities for U.S.-EU cooperation on issues like 
democratization, which the European public had inaccurately 
associated with U.S. neo-conservatism.  He would also try to 
give his listeners a better sense of the way that EU 
authorities interacted with the EU Member States -- a subject 
that even most Europeans did not understand, he observed. 
Quoting Freud, Bruton said that the overall goal of his 
efforts would be to redress "the narcissism of small 
differences" in U.S.-EU relations and to highlight the 
abundance of shared objectives. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Ambassador encouraged Bruton's outreach to 
Congress and urged him to work with the U.S. business 
community and with USG agencies, including the State 
Department.  The Ambassador suggested, in particular, that 
Bruton meet with USTR Zoellick to review U.S.-EU trade 
issues, noting that trans-Atlantic trade relations were the 
foundation upon which cooperation in all other fields was 
built.  The Ambassador observed that segments of Congress 
were unfamiliar with the European Union and that Bruton could 
play a valuable role in filling in those information gaps. 
He added that Bruton could play a similar role with U.S. 
business groups and industry associations, many of whom had 
substantial investments in Europe and were hungry for input 
on U.S.-EU economic issues.  When Bruton asked what most 
annoyed Americans about the EU, the Ambassador cited the 
perception, fueled by the Microsoft case, that EU authorities 
hassled U.S. firms in Europe. 
 
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Key Points on U.S.-EU Issues 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Bruton made the following points on key issues in 
U.S.-EU relations: 
 
¶A.  China arms embargo.  There would be no European arms 
exports to China even if the embargo were lifted, given the 
strictures of the Code of Conduct.  The Code of Conduct would 
thus have the same effect as the embargo, while appearing 
less hostile to China.  Bruton said he understood U.S. 
concerns, adding that he could not predict the final decision 
that the EU would take on the embargo. 
 
¶B.  Boeing-Airbus.  Brussels is "desperately worried" about a 
possible trade war over subsidies to aircraft manufacturers 
Airbus and Boeing.  A complicating factor is that some Member 
States, particularly France, have substantial interests at 
stake, while others have no interests at all. 
¶C.  FSC.  The EU had instructed Bruton to make the resolution 
of the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) case (in which the WTO 
has authorized the EU to impose retaliatory fines for U.S. 
tax breaks to exporters) a priority in his dealings with 
Congress.  Bruton hoped that the matter could be finalized in 
this session of Congress. 
 
¶D.  Homeland Security.  The EU wants to be helpful on U.S. 
homeland security measures and has accepted the biometric 
passport requirements to be implemented in 2005.  As EU 
Member States move to put the necessary passport technology 
in place, however, they have concerns that DHS may not be 
ready by next autumn to bring its own requirements into 
effect. 
 
¶E.  The Middle East.  The Commission has not been clear with 
Bruton as to the role he could play regarding efforts by the 
Quartet in the Middle East.  He related the EU impression 
that Israeli Prime Minister Sharon wished to keep the U.S. 
from establishing a negotiating partner among the 
Palestinians. 
 
¶F.  Kyoto Protocol.  The EU is unsure whether the Bush 
Administration has remained outside the Kyoto Protocol 
because of the economic impact that adherence would have on 
U.S. industry, or because the Administration is simply not 
convinced of the science of climate change.  The EU believes 
that the Administration has overemphasized the potential of 
technology in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
¶G.  Small arms trade.  The Commission hopes to engage the USG 
on efforts to curtail international trade in small arms and 
light weapons, notwithstanding opposition to gun control in 
the United States.  In the EU view, easy access to small arms 
is a principal reason for the failure of poor states. 
 
¶H.  Africa.  Bruton agreed with the Ambassador that U.S.-EU 
cooperation on African issues, particularly the fight against 
HIV/AIDS, could be a positive experience upon which to build 
in mounting joint efforts on other difficult issues, like the 
Middle East. 
KENNY