This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 002912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA AND INL 
NSC FOR TOM SHANNON AND MIKE DEMPSEY 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AR PROTESTS
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA CRACKS DOWN ON PIQUETEROS IN SANTA CRUZ 
 
REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1104 
     ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 1029 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  Early in the morning of Saturday October 2, 
85 members of an elite Gendarmeria riot control unit, 
assisted by provincial police, broke up a roadblock and 
forcibly ended the piquetero occupation of an oil depot in 
the town of Caleta Olivia in President Nestor Kirchner,s 
home province of Santa Cruz.  Thirty-six piqueteros were 
arrested and three remain in detention at present.  A 
reliable source indicates that those close to the President, 
and possibly the President himself, ordered the Gendarmeria 
operation.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C)  In a decisive operation, an elite Gendarmeria riot 
control unit broke up a roadblock and ended the piquetero 
occupation of an oil depot in the Santa Cruz town of Caleta 
Olivia on October 2 (see reftels).  While press reports 
indicate that the swift GOA response was a local action 
undertaken by the Gendarmeria and Provincial Police, POLOFF 
has been informed that it was the work of an elite 
Gendarmeria unit ordered into action by the Casa Rosada. 
During an October 3 meeting with POLOFF, General Roberto 
Nieva Malaver, Chief of Operations for the Gendarmeria 
(number four in the organization), outlined the details of 
the operation. 
 
¶3. (C)  Malaver stated that at approximately 1000 hours on 
October 1 his office received instructions "from the Casa 
Rosada" to immediately take action to end the oil depot 
takeover.  He stated that the original instructions demanded 
action by 1700 hours that day, but that he informed his 
Interior Ministry contact that normal deployment procedures 
would necessitate a few days to transport the nearest riot 
control unit to Santa Cruz.  He reported that the Interior 
Ministry then contacted the Argentine Air Force to provide 
needed airlift capability.  Malaver ordered the riot control 
unit stationed in La Pampa to immediately mobilize for 
deployment, and the 85-man unit was airborne with all 
equipment, including attack dogs, by 1600 hours.  While the 
unit was airborne, a federal prosecutor issued a warrant 
authorizing them to disband the protesters.  He reported that 
by 2200 hours the unit had established a command base in 
Caleta Olivia and after coordination with local police and 
medical units, moved on the Piqueteros at or around 0200 
hours.  Malaver relayed that the action "took less then 15 
minutes" once it started.  According to Malaver, the riot 
control unit was supported by a large contingent of 
provincial police, and three ambulances, in case of injury. 
He stressed that the unit went into action fully armored but 
without the use of billy-clubs, water hoses or teargas.  He 
stated the decision not to use billy-clubs was made to limit 
possible injury to the Piqueteros; weather conditions 
prevented the use of teargas.  He reported that the 
Gendarmeria suffered two minor casualties.  A Molotov 
cocktail burned one soldier and another was stabbed by the 
sharpened point of a piquetero,s stick.  Malaver also 
reported that the protesters suffered no serious injuries. 
(NOTE: A Vintage Oil executive confirmed to ECONCOUNs that 
the Gendarmeria had cleared the piquetero roadblock on the 
highway in Caleta Olivia, but asserted that the provincial 
police removed the 35 piqueteros that were occupying the top 
of one of the oil tanks in the depot, thereby suggesting two 
separate actions carried out by two distinct groups). 
 
¶4. (C)  Thirty-six piqueteros were detained and three remain 
in custody at present.  There have been press reports and 
subsequent protests claiming human rights abuses occurred to 
detained piqueteros, but Malaver was quick to point out that 
the alleged abuse reportedly took place after the Gendarmeria 
had handed the detainees over to the Provincial Police. 
Santa Cruz Governor Sergio Acevedo told DCM that he 
suppported the law enforcement action, which he claimed was 
conducted at his request.  He also said that he had agreed to 
look into the allegations of police abuse. 
 
¶5. (C)  Malaver was clearly proud of his unit's success, and 
talked at great length about the difference between the five 
Gendarmeria riot control units and those available to other 
forces.  He stated that, as opposed to federal and provincial 
police forces consisting of regular duty officers that engage 
protesters individually, often resulting in a general melee, 
his forces "move in like the Roman Legion; they don't fight 
as individuals they are trained to stay together and move as 
one unit."  He also pointed out that these five units, 
located in strategic areas including Buenos Aires Province 
and La Pampa, train year round solely for this sort of 
mission.  He opined that the Gendarmeria was the only force 
that had units trained and equipped to break up protesters 
with a minimum risk of injury posed to either the soldiers or 
the protesters.  The meeting with POLOFF ended abruptly when 
an aide to Malaver entered the room to remind him he had to 
leave for the airport.  Malaver confided in POLOFF that he 
had been ordered to travel to Santa Cruz to start the process 
of establishing a sixth elite riot control unit to be 
permanently based in the President's home province "as soon 
as possible." 
 
¶6. (C)  After Malaver,s departure, POLOFF continued the 
meeting with Hector Schenone, the Gendarmeria General in 
charge of narcotics control, who explained that the Interior 
Ministry had recently approved the recruitment of 8,000 more 
Gendarmeria over the next four years.  He stated this was at 
least partially in recognition of the increased public 
security role that the force was playing, especially in the 
Province of Buenos Aires.  He intimated that a major obstacle 
facing the force was that its training facility was overtaxed 
with both Gendarmeria recruits and almost 400 recruits for 
the new Buenos Aires Police Force.  He stated that at the 
present time only 1,000 of the 2,000 recruits authorized for 
this year were in training, and it was clear he did not like 
the idea of provincial police recruits taking training slots 
from his force. 
 
¶7. (C)  COMMENT: Although reaction to piquetero activities 
are historically much harsher in the provinces than the 
potentially-explosive Buenos Aires, this had not been the 
case in Caleta Olivia, the site of repeated labor strife.  It 
is clear that this rapid deployment ordered from the 
President's office marks a much more proactive approach by 
Kirchner to protests that affect his traditional center of 
power.  It is of course possible that Kirchner authorized the 
use of force because he has a higher degree of trust in the 
Gendarmeria to intervene without bloodshed than the Federal 
and Provincial Police in the Buenos Aires area.  His order to 
establish a Gendarmeria riot control unit in Santa Cruz seems 
to indicate that he will not brook future piquetero protest 
in the province. END COMMENT. 
 
 
GUTIERREZ