This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU AR MOLINA
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE KIRCHNER VISIT TO CUBA STILL UNDER REVIEW 
 
REF: BUENOS AIRES 02682 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: At a luncheon on October 6, Under Secretary 
for Foreign Policy Garcia Moritan told the Ambassador that 
Cuba was lobbying hard for an official visit from either 
President Nestor Kirchner or the first lady but that no visit 
would be contemplated until Cuban scientist Hilda Molina was 
allowed to visit her family in Argentina.  The Ambassador 
told Garcia Moritan a visit by Kirchner, regardless of the 
circumstances, was a bad idea and would simply play into the 
hands of the Cuban government.  We made it clear that we 
would prefer that no visit to Cuba by GoA officials take 
place.  However, if one did, the Ambassador stressed it was 
absolutely essential that Kirchner also meet with dissidents 
and opposition activists.  In a separate meeting the same day 
with the DCM, the Foreign Minister's Chief of Cabinet, 
Ambassador Eduardo Valdes, also raised the possibility of a 
Kirchner visit to Cuba.  The DCM underscored that a Kirchner 
visit would send the wrong message and undermine the strong 
commitment to human rights and democracy the president had 
demonstrated here in Argentina and in his dealings with other 
countries in the region.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  At a luncheon on October 6, the number three MFA 
official, Under Secretary for Foreign Policy Roberto Garcia 
Moritan, told the Ambassador that Cuba was lobbying hard for 
an official visit by either Kirchner or the first lady (and 
senator) Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner.  Garcia Moritan 
noted that any consideration of a visit was dependent on 
resolving the long-standing issue of granting travel permits 
to Cuban scientist Hilda Molina and her mother to visit her 
son and his family in Argentina.  The Ambassador told Garcia 
Moritan a visit by Kirchner, regardless of the circumstances, 
was a bad idea and would simply play into the hands of the 
Cuban government.  However, if a visit did take place, he 
stressed to Garcia Moritan that it was absolutely essential 
that Kirchner also meet with dissidents and opposition 
activists. 
 
¶3. (C)  The same day the DCM, accompanied by the ECON and POL 
counselors, met with the Foreign Ministry Chief of Cabinet, 
Amb. Eduardo Valdes, to provide a briefing on a separate 
issue.  (MFA Director for North American Affairs Amb. Vicente 
Espeche Gil was also present.)  Following the briefing, 
Valdes quickly raised the issue of a possible Kirchner trip 
to Cuba.  He noted he was aware of the meeting DCM had with 
Under Secretary for Latin American Affairs Dario Alessandro 
last month on the Cuban visit issue. (reftel)  Valdes said 
the possibility of a Kirchner visit to Cuba had been 
misinterpreted and played up by the media.  As did Garcia 
Moritan with the Ambassador, he added that a presidential 
visit would not take place before a resolution of the Molina 
issue. 
 
¶4. (C)  Repeating the points delivered to Alessandro, the DCM 
emphasized that a Kirchner visit to Cuba (regardless of 
whether Molina was issued a travel permit) would send the 
wrong message in light of the systematic repression and 
crackdown by Cuba on opposition activists.  He pointed out 
that Kirchner had worked diligently to establish strong 
credentials as a supporter of human rights and constitutional 
democracy, noting his support for the constitutional 
government of President Mesa in Bolivia and for the recall 
referendum in Venezuela and that a Cuba visit would undermine 
these accomplishments.  The DCM told Valdes that if Kirchner 
ultimately did decide to visit Cuba, meetings with opposition 
and dissident figures would be critical.  Valdes responded 
with a replay of Kirchner's efforts in support of democratic 
institutions in Venezuela and Bolivia and then ended the 
meeting, stating that for the present "we're not going" (to 
Cuba). 
 
¶5. (C)  Comment:  The Ambassador and Country Team members 
will continue to raise the issue of human rights in Cuba  and 
to discourage GoA actions that can be manipulated by the 
Cuban government in Castro's favor.  End Comment. 
GUTIERREZ