This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 004235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR PDAS BRADTKE'S SEPTEMBER 27 DISCUSSIONS WITH 
THE EU 
 
 
Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reaso 
ns 1,5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Visiting EUR PDAS Robert Bradtke covered a 
wide range of topics in meetings with the EU Political and 
Security Committee Troika and Director General Robert Cooper 
on September 27.  The US and the EU voiced support for UNSCR 
1564 regarding Darfur, and the EU sought consultations with 
the US on a "division of labor" in Sudan.  On 
Russia/Moldova/Georgia, neither the US nor the EU found 
grounds for optimism regarding December OSCE Ministerials, 
but both insisted that Istanbul Commitments must come before 
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.  The EU shares the US 
view on MONUC and the Great Lakes, that there is a need for a 
stronger mandate and higher force levels. In Afghanistan, the 
US is looking for a way to merge ISAF with OEF, while the EU 
expands its efforts at Democracy support.  On Operation 
Althea in Bosnia, the US desire to vest final Dayton 
authority in DSACEUR met considerable resistance from the EU 
side.  EU battlegroups are moving ahead, with EU assurances 
that they and the NATO Response Force (NRF) will be mutually 
reinforcing.  US underscored concern about lifting of EU arms 
embargoes on Libya and China.  End summary. 
 
Sudan/Darfur 
------------ 
¶2. (C) PDAS Bradtke pointed out the high level of interest 
within the USG over developments in Darfur. He noted that the 
Secretary had characterized the situation as "genocide," 
 
SIPDIS 
giving high profile impetus to our desire to speed the 
deployment of African Union monitors.  Bradtke took note of 
the significant EU contribution, and reiterated the US pledge 
of an additional 20 million dollars. Bradtke lamented the 
apparent hesitance by the AU to accept assistance with their 
military mission on offer, but pointed to hopeful signs of a 
greater willingness to work with experts after meetings last 
week in New York. 
 
¶3. (C) The EU Presidency underlined the EU's full support for 
UNSCR 1564, and called for intensified pressure on the 
parties. The EU continues to look at options, including the 
imposition of sanctions. Dutch Presidency representative 
Ambassador Alphons Hamer noted the urgent need to get peace 
talks back on track in October when discussions resume. The 
EU Commission is looking at ways to mobilize funds for the 
Peace Facility.  Hamer referred to AU requests for planning 
assistance, and said that there was a need for realistic 
cooperation based on the AU's capacities.  He noted a 
North/South linkage to the situation in Darfur, and said it 
was vital that all sides understand that no one can expect to 
gain from the stalemate. 
 
¶4. (C) Deputy Director General for European Defense and 
Security Policy, Peter Feith  -- recently returned from a 
fact-finding mission to the region -- said the AU needs 
assistance in planning, logistics, and funding.  In planning, 
Feith emphasized the need to get the right mix. He urged that 
donors focus on building AU capacity, such as headquarters 
operations in Addis and Khartoum. He argued against a focus 
on protection forces, but called for monitors to reach out to 
remote areas. He said that the UN has shown some flexibility, 
and he urged that we build on -- and phase in -- the Caemmert 
plan. Feith supports a significant police component as part 
of the overall mission in Darfur, believing that a police 
presence might alleviate the need for military protectors. 
 
¶5. (C) With regard to logistics, Feith cited a need for lift 
and transport assets as well as covering accommodation costs 
for the deployed units in Darfur. He suggested continued 
close coordination with a view to arriving at a division of 
labor between the EU and the US. Feith asked for US views on 
where this coordination could best take place.  On funding 
issues, the EU Commission observed that the EU cannot simply 
become the "paymaster" of the African Union. Funding, 
including a tranche of funds for the Peace Facility, must be 
undertaken with reasonable and efficient planning in place, 
and it must contribute to capacity building within the AU. 
There can be no question of releasing additional funds if the 
EU is "uncomfortable" with the AU's strategic approach. In an 
earlier meeting, Director General for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Robert Cooper, told Bradtke that the EU 
envisions a larger role in Addis, but he did not expect 
Europeans to play a major role on the ground in Darfur -- 
other than the small group of observers already there. 
 
¶6. (C) USEU Charge called for realistic engagement, noting 
that there are three provincial capitals within Darfur, and 
that the AU has been unable to develop acceptable accounting 
mechanisms.  He also said there was a need for planning cells 
in Addis Ababa and Khartoum. 
 
¶7. (C) Observers, and Police training. PDAS Bradtke outlined 
the US hope to see a force of 1500 observers deployed by the 
end of October as part of an eventual total of 3500. He said 
that meetings in New York had been used to accelerate the 
deployment process. Bradtke noted that the AU has no policing 
capability and asked who the EU would plan to work with if it 
undertook a police training mission, given that the Sudanese 
security forces are part of the problem. 
 
¶8. (C) Feith outlined three options for a police mission to 
Darfur. The first would be an EU-only operation, which he 
said was unlikely to find consensus among EU member states. 
The second option would be an ESDP mission with 50 senior 
police advisors in an EU chain of Command to mentor, monitor, 
advise, and train local police under an AU or UN umbrella. 
The third option would be an AU Police Mission with EU 
trainers within a Sudanese chain of command. The trainers 
would serve to steer the Sudanese command away from embarking 
on harmful or undesirable missions. 
 
¶9. (C) USEU PolMinCouns asked whether the deployment of 
unarmed monitors did not risk creating a situation where 
international observers might witness atrocities taking 
place, but could do nothing to stop them.  Feith responded by 
saying that this would not be the case if the mandate and key 
supporting tasks for the protectors called for protection of 
civilian populations.  He also said that the presence of 
unarmed observers had been shown to have a deterrent effect 
against attacks against civilians. 
 
¶10. (C) NAC-PSC Consultations.  Bradtke pointed out that 
UNSYG Annan had approached both the EU and NATO seeking 
support in Darfur. Under these circumstances, it was a 
particular disadvantage that the issue could not be raised in 
NAC-PSC sessions because of the ongoing political question 
over participation by Cyprus and Malta in NATO-EU 
discussions.  This made consultations difficult in an area 
that could be appropriately covered under the provisions of 
the Berlin Plus Agreements.  The EU Presidency replied by 
acknowledging that this was a strange situation, but that the 
issue could only be dealt with by all 25 EU member states. He 
urged greater contacts between the NATO International Staff 
and the EUMS as one way around the blockage. Bradtke said 
that NATO could become involved under the right 
circumstances, but it would depend upon a specific requestfor assistance. EU 
representatives observed that there is a 
"siege mentality" within the AU, and that additional 
"non-african faces" as part of the mission would be a 
sensitive matter. In the earlier meeting, Robert Cooper, 
suggested that coordination could best be carried out via 
talks between Peter Feith and NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary 
General for Crisis Management and Operations, Robert Serry. 
Cooper recommended against holding the discussions at the 
senior political level (Solana- De Hoop Scheffer) and the 
NAC-PSC is not feasible because of the Cyprus-Malta problem. 
Cooper also suggested that it would be difficult for the AU 
to accept a NATO role. He pointed out that even with all the 
EU's money, they have found it difficult to gain entrance to 
the AU HQ in Addis. "Everything is political with the AU," 
Cooper concluded. 
 
Georgia/Moldova: Istanbul Commitments 
-------------------------------------- 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Hamer opened the discussion by observing 
that the EU continued to insist upon fulfillment of Russia's 
Instanbul commitments.However, Hamer warned against holding 
any high expectations for the December OSCE Ministerials. On 
Moldova, Hamer noted that only a single ammunition 
repatriation train has left Moldova this year.  He said that 
the EU tries to work with Moscow within the OSCE, but there 
is a need for the US to push the Russians in the right 
direction. The prospect is not promising for regional 
declarations at Sofia, since they are not likely to find 
agreement in Moscow. 
 
¶12. (C) PDAS Bradtke expressed US appreciation for the close 
cooperation of the EU on this issue. Although we did not 
succeed in Maastricht on obtaining a ministerial declaration 
on regional issues, the Russians did not divide us. The joint 
US-EU visa ban on members of the Transnistrian regime was an 
example of our positive cooperation.  While the US shares the 
EU's pessimism concerning the OSCE Ministerial, we must stick 
to our bedrock principle that the Istanbul commitments must 
come before ratification of the amended CFE.  Bradtke 
wondered if there were other possibilities to make progress 
on OSCE issues at the December Ministerial, noting that 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had recently taken a less 
threatening posture toward the OSCE. He warned, however, that 
the Russians hold an extremely negative view of Georgian 
President Saakashvili. In his earlier meeting with Robert 
Cooper, Bradtke said that Russian FM Lavrov had expressed 
critical views of the Georgian PM in meetings with the 
Secretary.  The PSC Troika participants agreed that the US 
 
SIPDIS 
and the EU must stay in close touch in the run-up to the OSCE 
Ministerials in Sofia. 
 
¶13. (C) Ambassador Hamer suggested that Moscow has shown more 
openness to an EU role in the Caucasus.  He said that EU 
envoy Talvitie believed it would be possible to bring about 
the withdrawal of 3000 Russian military personnel by 
negotiation. Both the EU and the US expressed concern over 
recent moves by Russian President Putin that bring into 
question the direction of democratic development in Russia. 
PDAS Bradtke cited a need to stay engaged with Moscow on 
Counter-Terrorism, but said the US is keeping a close eye on 
internal developments. 
 
¶14. (C) Robert Cooper told Bradtke that the EU had noted a 
change in atmosphere recently, with some "real Soviet stuff" 
coming from FM Lavrov. He cited continuing Russian 
assertiveness vis-a-vis the Baltics, which has now become 
more pronounced also with regard to Lithuania (regarding 
Kaliningrad transit).  Cooper also reported that the Russians 
have told the EU that they are not ready to discuss Moldova 
since it is "a former part of the USSR." According to Cooper, 
the Russians are relatively pleased with the functioning of 
the NATO-Russia Council and point to it as the "gold 
standard" they would like to emulate in their contacts with 
the EU. Cooper said that this kind of 25 plus 1 mechanism 
would not work with the EU, and they were not prepared to 
pursue it. 
 
MONUC/Great Lakes 
---------------- 
¶15. (C) The Presidency said the EU is supportive of a more 
robust and focused MONUC. They call for strong international 
monitoring, with a strengthened mandate and access to 
information -- including satellite imagery. There is also a 
need for better coordination in Kinshasa.  The EU has taken 
concrete steps toward a December launch of a civilian ESDP 
mission to conduct fact-finding and to help reinforce 
internal security within the DRC. This would be the first 
civilian ESDP mission outside Europe. Per Bradtke, the US 
shares the EU's support for stronger MONUC mandate and force 
levels.  USEU Charge pointed out the need to consider the 
Rules of Engagement for an expanded MONUC. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
¶16. (C) PDAS Bradtke noted the very high US priority attached 
to elections in Afghanistan. On the positive side, there have 
been 10 million people registered to vote, of whom 40 percent 
are women. Three million refugees returned to the country. 
Bradtke credited Eurocorps with a smooth takeover of command 
of ISAF and commended the stage one expansion of ISAF. He 
said that challenges remain, including finding the 
appropriate relationship between ISAF and Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Problems with warlords and narcotics traffic must be 
resolved. Bradtke said that the end-state should be a merger 
of ISAF and OEF. It remains to identify the right timeline. 
 
¶17. (C) For the EU, narcotics remain a significant threat, 
and there is still great concern over the security situation. 
Democracy, development, and reconstruction remain at the 
heart of EU policy in Afghanistan. The EU Election Monitoring 
Mission in Afghanistan will mobilize teams to visit Islamabad 
and Teheran to examine registration programs for 
out-of-country refugees.  Bradtke commended the OSCE 
monitoring mission under Ambassador Barry. 
 
Operation Althea 
---------------- 
¶18. (C)  Ambassador Hamer referred to what he characterized 
as an "unhelpful" interpretation of a NAC decision sheet that 
prevented discussions of non-Berlin Plus issues such as Sudan 
and Afghanistan in broader NATO-EU fora. On the transfer of 
SFOR to Operation Althea, Hamer cited the need for intel 
sharing, since EUFOR would be intelligence driven, based on a 
robust situational awareness.  He said there would be three 
EUFOR sectors as currently exist under SFOR: Tuzla, Mostar 
and Banja Luka. He recognized that the US wants a December 2 
Transfer of Authority in Tuzla, but said that NATO must so 
advise the EU.  While the issue of reserves was dealt with at 
the earlier NAC-PSC (see septel), Hamer confirmed that all 
nations currently in SFOR would be invited to participate in 
the force generation process for EUFOR. 
 
¶19. (C) Bradtke pointed out that a number of allies find the 
costs being allocated by the EU to be exorbitant and 
disproportionate.  He reaffirmed the US commitment to Bosnia 
stability, pointing out that the US will fill 44 of 150 
billets in the NATO HQ and provide a number of support 
personnel to General Schook. 
 
¶20. (C) Bradtke concluded that the smooth transition process 
has shown that Berlin Plus can work, proving the naysayers 
wrong.  Cooper agreed, telling Bradtke that Berlin Plus 
mechanisms were functioning, but it would be up to the new 
DASCEUR to make it work smoothly. Cooper noted that Turkey 
was not helping the process with its restricted 
interpretation of strategic cooperation. (The Greek Cypriots, 
Cooper acknowledged, have also behaved "unspeakably.") 
 
¶21. (C)  Dayton Final Authority.  Bradtke identified one 
remaining point that should be resolved before debate begins 
on a new UNSCR in October.  Bradtke said that the US had 
concluded there was a need to further clarify the issue of 
the successor to COMIFOR/SFOR as the final authority on 
military matters under the Dayton GFAP. Once SFOR ceased to 
exist, there is a need to vest that final authority in 
someone. The US position is that this authority should be 
vested in DSACEUR as the operational commander in both the 
NATO and EUFOR chains of command. DSACEUR could then delegate 
that authority to the EUFOR commander and the NATO HQ 
commander as necessary in conjunction with delineated tasks. 
The US would not accept that the final authority be vested in 
COMEUFOR. 
 
¶22. (C)  Peter Feith expressed concern about designating 
DSACEUR as the final authority. He wondered whether the US 
was trying to move the goalposts at this late date, or if the 
issue were even necessary.  Feith said it was important -- 
both politically and psychologically -- that COMEUFOR not be 
seen as having any less authority than was held by COMSFOR. 
All parties have agreed that COMEUFOR will have full 
authority in addressing and assessing issues of 
non-compliance under Dayton, and that authority cannot be 
qualified or delegated as suggested by the US position. 
Bradtke assured Feith that there is no ambiguity concerningCOMEUFOR's "full 
Dayton authority" in his areas of 
responsibility, but that we did not accept that COMEUFOR 
would be vested with the "final" authority.  Ambassador Hamer 
argued that this issue must be raised within NATO, where "we 
will deal with it. Bradtke reiterated that this was not a 
question of moving the goalposts, but a legal issue raised by 
lawyers. The US would prefer to resolve the issue before it 
becomes an issue for negotiation within the UNSC, where we 
want to avoid non-participating UNSC members causing 
mischief.  He argued that DSACEUR could delegate final 
authority to the commanders, leaving COMEUFOR's credibility 
unchallenged.  It was agreed that further discussions of this 
issue are needed. 
 
¶23. (C) Exchange of letters on Reserves. PDAS Bradtke 
responded to a question from Feith about an exchange of 
letters on reserves by saying that the US has not proposed 
such an exchange but supports the idea within NATO that such 
an exchange could specify how the parallel decisionmaking 
processes in NATO and the EU would work. Robert Cooper noted 
the importance of arriving at an agreement that avoided 
language on "joint decisions" but allows for parallel 
decision-making" in both NATO and the EU. 
 
¶24. (C) Kosovo. In earlier discussions, Robert Cooper voiced 
the EU's support for the ideas contained in the Eide Report 
and noted that doing nothing was clearly not an option. 
Bradtke said the US generally agrees with the EU's assessment 
of the report, and that we are committed to staying in KFOR. 
 
 
EU Battlegroups 
--------------- 
25, (C)  Ambassador Hamer told the US delegation that the EU 
plans for Initial Operational Capability of high-readiness 
battlegroups by 2005, with Full Operational Capability by 
¶2007.  The EU ambition is to be able to launch a mission 
within 5 days in response to a request from the UNSYG. The 
most probable mission would be to act as a bridging operation 
by intervening quickly in a crisis situation, thereby giving 
time to the UN to organize its own intervention force. Hammer 
assured Bradtke that the EU battlegroups and the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) would be mutually reinforcing, both in 
terms of capabilities and timelines for deployment. 
 
¶26. (C) Bradtke welcomed EU initiatives to improve 
capabilities, and cited the positive discussions within the 
EU-NATO capabilities working group to ensure common 
standards.  He reiterated the need to harmonize the 
battlegroups and the NRF, asking about the creation of the 
NATO liaison cell within the EU. He urged further discussions 
within the Capabilities Working Group on standards and 
certification processes. 
 
¶27. (C) Hamer said that the EU envisioned a "large number" -- 
from 8 to 9 -- battlegroups to be eventually available to 
meet the EU ambition. He argued that the battlegroup concept 
had to be dealt with by all 25 member states under the 
principle of inclusiveness.  He said that excluding Cyprus 
and Malta from discussions or participation was neither 
acceptable nor desirable.  Battlegroups are seen as a 
"welcome lever" on capabilities development. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
¶28. (C)  Per Bradtke, the US priorities in Iraq revolve 
around supporting the electoral process, including support 
for a UN protection force. The assessed requirement is for 
three 600-man battalions at an estimated cost of USD 24 
million for six months.  Potential troop contributors include 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Romania and Georgia, though there are 
unresolved problems.  Such a force is critical to the UN 
presence.  EU funds are needed to support these deployments. 
Bradtke asked that any planned EU police mission be closely 
coordinated with existing programs underway in Jordan. 
 
¶29. (C) Peter Feith explained that he will lead an EU 
civilian crisis management fact-finding mission to Iraq in 
mid-October to assess the possibilities for an EU police 
training mission. He foresaw a positive EU role in the areas 
of Rule of Law, Police Training, and Civil administration. 
The fact-finding mission was tasked by the Council and will 
travel to Basra and Baghdad, where he asked US assistance in 
making broad contacts. One part of the mission will visit 
Amman.  Ambassador Hamer said that the EU will be as generous 
as possible on election support via the UN Iraq Stabilization 
Fund.  He wondered about the cost of the protection force -- 
projected by the UN at usd 26 million -- asking what the 
funds would be for and how they would be dispersed. 
 
¶30. (C) Bradtke offered that the bulk of the cost would be 
for salaries, and said he would check to see if there would 
be costs for insurance associated with the force.  The US 
will provide lift and sustainment resources, but cannot pay 
salaries. He asked if there were legal restrictions on the 
Commission's ability to provide funds for such a protection 
force.  Michel Caillouet, Deputy Political Director, replied 
that he "could not say it was impossible" for the Commission 
to provide funding for the inner protective circle.  Both the 
US and the EU were in agreement that the 13 percent overhead 
charges proposed by the UN to act as 
administrator/disbursement agent was too high. Bradtke 
wondered whether one of the contributing nations might be 
able to perform the function by distributing money from a 
fund into which other contributors could pay. 
 
China/Libya Arms Embargoes 
-------------------------- 
¶31. (C)  In an addition to the agreed agenda, PDAS Bradtke 
raised the issue of existing arms embargoes on China and 
Libya.  He urged that the EU not lift these embargoes.  On 
Libya, although Qaddaffi has come a long way, he still had 
not received a "clean bill of health."  There are questions 
related to an attempt on Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's life, 
and lingering human rights concerns. The treatment of the 
Bulgarian medics held in Libya is especially troubling. 
Ambassador Hamer agreed that the treatment of the medics is 
disgraceful. He took note of the US views, stating only that 
the issue of the Libyan embargo will come before the Council 
at the October 12-13 General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC). 
 
¶32. (C) Bradtke also expressed strong concern that weapons 
sold to China might be used against US forces, especially in 
the Taiwan Straits. He also said that lifting the embargo 
would send the wrong message on human rights. Hamer said the 
US views were well known, and being taken into consideration 
by the EU as it weighs its decision.  He replied that even if 
the embargo were lifted, no one anticipates a flood of 
weapons sales to China. He posited that, while there may 
remain some human rights concerns, China does not belong in 
the same category as Zimbabwe or Sudan. 
 
¶33. (U) PDAS Bradtke has cleared this message. 
 
McKinley