This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 BANGKOK 007313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV AND EAP/CM 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV TH CH ASEAN BURMA
SUBJECT: THAI VIEWS OF A MORE ASSERTIVE CHINA 
 
REF: BANGKOK 4085 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Darryl N. Johnson.  Reasons 1.4 (a and d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  Summary.  When analyzing China's growing influence 
in the region, Thai experts tend to: accept China's growing 
power as inevitable; hope that problems associated with 
China's growing strength will either fix themselves or be 
mitigated by other powers like the United States or India; 
and, keep their fingers crossed that trade deals with China 
lead to growth in Thailand without destroying domestic 
enterprises.  Thai analysts note that China is deftly 
building up good will in the region to assuage any concerns 
about hegemony.  Perhaps naively, they tend to discount 
notions that China will jeopardize its generally good 
relations in the region in the near future by pressuring 
ASEAN nations to support Beijing on political or strategic 
issues. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Thai experts tend to view China's growing role as 
either not affecting the influence of other countries or as 
coming at the expense of Taiwan and Japan rather than the 
United States.  Nonetheless, some warn that China's growing 
role in the region comes at a time when the United States 
appears preoccupied in the Middle East and with the War on 
Terror.  The MFA believes that it will be 15 years before 
China could pose a security threat to the region and expects 
the U.S.-Thai security alliance to counter any future threat. 
 While almost all experts note the generally positive nature 
of Sino-Thai links -- pointing to China's help during 
conflicts with Laos and Cambodia, China's positive role 
during the Asian financial crisis and China's signing with 
ASEAN the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea -- they also 
point to the growing possibility of contention in several 
fields:  trade, Burma, energy, and Chinese development in the 
upper Mekong River region.  Undermining their analysis, Thai 
government analysts notably tend to discount the possibility 
of internal unrest, demographic problems or economic upheaval 
upsetting current growth patterns inside China.  Similarly, 
they tend not to focus on the possibility of conflict between 
Taiwan and the Mainland -- an attitude criticized by some in 
academia and the media as overly optimistic.  Thai Government 
experts would benefit from opportunities to share views on 
China's role in the region with U.S. delegations.  End 
Summary. 
 
PALPABLE INTEREST IN THINGS CHINESE 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  China's cultural influence continues to expand in 
Thailand in obvious ways.  In 2003, according to the Thai 
National Statistical Office, 624,214 PRC citizens visited 
Thailand, making it the 6th largest source of tourists to the 
country (after Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore).  The 15 percent of Thais who are ethnic Chinese 
seem to take a greater pride in their heritage -- notably, 
some now use their Chinese surnames along with their Thai 
ones.  The number of Mandarin language schools is growing at 
the same time Japanese language studies are declining. Thai 
sports fans openly pulled for Chinese athletes in the 
Olympics in ways they've never supported Japanese or other 
Asian competitors in the past.  PRC-owned English-language 
CCTV Channel 9 is very popular in Thailand and Mandarin 
broadcasts on CCTV Channel 4 are readily available.  The 
foreign news editor for the national television network 
Channel 9 reported that his station has signed a cooperative 
agreement with CCTV.  According to the editor, Channel 9 airs 
around four direct feeds from CCTV at the top of its 
international news every morning.  The English-language 
newspaper The China Daily plans to open a publishing 
operation in Bangkok in 2005.  The Xinhua news agency is 
quite active and regularly places stories about "progress" in 
Tibet and Han-Uighur "cooperation" in Xinjiang.  Beijing 
sponsors cultural and educational programs throughout the 
country and has invested heavily in subsidizing Mandarin 
training centers.  Thai journalists are regular beneficiaries 
of Beijing-funded junkets to China.  A recent trip to Tibet 
for ten Thai journalists resulted in a number of glowing 
stories in Thai papers about the benevolence of Chinese rule 
in Lhasa.  Chinese and Thai diplomats express solidarity 
openly. 
 
CHINA'S RISE IS INEVITABLE 
 
¶4.  (C)  Thai military, intelligence and foreign policy 
analysts at the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), National 
Defense Studies Institute (NDSI) and MFA tend to view China's 
growing influence in Southeast Asia as inevitable.  This 
attitude was probably best described by Thongchai Chasiawath, 
Counselor for the MFA's Third Asian Division, who recently 
said "everyone is scared of the China threat, but if you 
can't fight it, you must accept it and become its friend. 
Build ties with that threat so that if they ever do hit you, 
they hit their own interests."  Rudiwan Kateluxana of the NIA 
said "we have no other option but to accept China's offer for 
closer economic links -- the opportunity is too great. 
Nonetheless, we have to be cognizant that China is also a 
competitor.  Our challenge during the next few years as we 
use our Free Trade Agreement with China to export our 
agricultural goods, is to improve our competitiveness in 
other areas."  CAPT Nopadon Suwanapong of the military's 
Strategic Research Institute (SRI), said that "the concept of 
the 'China Threat' in traditional strategic terms is gone, to 
be replaced by the concept of China as trading partner and 
economic engine."  Several contacts hope that risks to 
Thailand posed by a rising China can be offset by continuing 
strong links with the United States and, to a lesser extent, 
with India. 
 
WINNING GOODWILL BY GOOD BEHAVIOR 
 
¶5.  (C)  Most Thai experts acknowledge the deft diplomacy 
China recently has used to help reassure ASEAN countries in 
general and Thailand in particular that China is a peaceful 
neighbor.  They cite China signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea, China's leadership role in the Six-Party Talks on 
Korea, the China-ASEAN Strategic partnership and the 
China-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Non-Traditional Threats as 
evidence of China's growing trustworthiness.  Thongchai at 
MFA believes that Hu Jintao and the other fourth generation 
leaders in the PRC are much more adept at building regional 
ties than Jiang Zemin was.  "Hu is building bridges to the EU 
and to ASEAN in a way Jiang never did; Jiang was much more 
concerned with having strong ties with the United States," he 
said.  CAPT Arna Charanyananda, J-2 staff officer at the 
Joint Staff College, sees China's signing the Code of Conduct 
in the South China Sea as an example of Beijing putting its 
desire to win influence in the region ahead of its short-term 
national interest -- a view echoed by Rudiwan at the NIA. 
"Ten years ago, China repeatedly threatened to use force over 
the Spratleys," Rudiwan explained; "today, it has renounced 
the use of force."  SRI's Nopadon thinks that, by tying China 
to regional security protocols, ASEAN is helping to ensure 
that China will act more responsibly. 
 
ECONOMIC LINKS ARE SEDUCTIVE 
 
¶6.  (C)  In addition to China making effective diplomatic 
moves, all of the Thai China watchers interviewed for this 
message agree that the desire to have access to China's 
market is the major driving factor in Thailand's growing 
links with the PRC.  According to the Customs Department of 
Thailand, in 2003 Thailand exported 235 billion baht (5.73 
billion dollars) of goods to China, a 54 percent increase 
over 2002.  Also in 2003, Thailand imported 203 billion baht 
(4.95 billion dollars) worth of goods from the PRC, a decline 
of 4 percent from 2002.  The October 2003 Sino-Thai Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) and the 2002 Sino-ASEAN FTA have many 
Thai companies eager to sell their wares in China.  Rudiwan 
believes that growing economic competition between China and 
the United States is good for medium-sized economies like 
Thailand's.  Suvapan Tamyuwattana, Director of NIA's Division 
One, noted that many ASEAN leaders, including some in 
Thailand, now subscribe to the Chinese maxim, "what is good 
for China is good for the rest of Asia."  MFA's Thongchai 
pointed out that PM Thaksin agrees with the maxim that "a 
rich China will lead to a prosperous Asia" and claims that 
Chinese leaders who promote economic links with Thailand are 
"knocking on an open door."  Thongchai sees Thailand as 
uniquely situated to serve as a bridge between China and the 
rest of ASEAN.  He is optimistic that China will expand road 
links to Thailand, passing through Laos and Burma, linking 
the two countries. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Public perceptions of the impact of the FTA 
affecting agricultural goods are quite different than the 
optimistic view Thai analysts tend to hold.  87 percent of 
the items covered by the Sino-Thai FTA are fruits and 
vegetables.  According to the Customs Department of Thailand, 
from October 2003 until September 2004 the value of Thai 
fruit exported to China under the FTA was 3.43 billion baht 
(83 million dollars), a 37 percent increase from the previous 
12 months.  For the same period, however, Chinese exports of 
fruit to Thailand were worth 1.28 billion baht (31 million 
dollars) an increase of 125 percent over the previous 12 
months.  For the same period, the value of Thai vegetables 
exported to China was 8.13 billion baht (198 million dollars) 
a 73 percent increase over the previous year while Chinese 
exports of vegetables to Thailand were worth 3.06 billion 
baht (76 million dollars) a 120 percent increase.  Press 
reports and public comments on the FTA Early Harvest pact 
have focused on its impact on Thai farmers in the north of 
the country who have reportedly been overwhelmed by cheaper 
and better Chinese agricultural products such as garlic and 
onions.  Experts complain that the RTG, which was urged to 
quickly conclude the agreement by PM Thaksin, did not 
seriously study the impact of the agreement nor draw up plans 
to help those negatively affected by it.  In addition, 
critics complain that Thai negotiators did not understand or 
anticipate the difficulties faced by intra-provincial trade 
in China, or the effect that excise taxes, documentation 
requirements and other non-tariff barrier would have on Thai 
products going into China.  Ministry of Commerce officials 
admit this lapse and say that it has been a good learning 
experience.  Interestingly, the Thai public seems to blame 
the RTG for rushing into the agreement rather than the 
Chinese for benefiting from it. 
 
MILITARY TO MILITARY LINKS WITH CHINA 
 
¶8.  (C)  Thailand continues to have good relations with the 
Chinese military.  The Chinese military attache in Bangkok is 
a Brigadier General.  Chinese defense sales delegations visit 
Bangkok frequently.  Many Thai military officers are 
appreciative of China's assistance in supplying small arms, 
tanks and artillery shells during conflicts involving Laos 
and Cambodia and every year a number of Thai officers receive 
military training in China.  Nonetheless, Thai officers 
acknowledge a vast disparity between Thailand's military 
links with the United States and links with the PRC.  "Most 
of the equipment we received from China was not of good 
quality when we received it and it is all outdated now," 
General Ronachuck Swasdikiat, former Commanding General of 
the National Defense Studies Institute,  said.  NIA's Suvapan 
notes the growing number of security seminars and dialogues 
Thailand and ASEAN countries have with China and expects 
these to continue to increase.  However, a number of Thai 
military officers are quick to emphasize that China's 
influence on the Thai military is minuscule compared to that 
of the United States.  "For every one officer we send to 
Beijing for training, we send 400 to the United States," one 
explained. 
 
DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN BANGKOK 
 
¶9.  (C)   PRC diplomats in Bangkok have told U.S. Embassy 
officials that they view the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok as 
Beijing's leading diplomatic presence in ASEAN.  Chinese 
Ambassador Zhang Jiuhuan is a polished professional -- a 
veteran of two previous tours to Bangkok and one in Singapore 
-- who speaks excellent Thai and English.  Mid-level Chinese 
Embassy staff tend to be much more professional than their 
predecessors.  The PRC Embassy in Bangkok has done a 
masterful job of reaching out to Sino-Thais.  While attending 
a large PRC-hosted function that included several hundred 
ethnic-Chinese Thai nationals, one senior Chinese official 
proudly claimed that "ten years ago this would have been 
Taiwan's crowd."  Thai military and government officials 
attended PRC National Day on October 1 in large numbers and 
at senior levels. 
 
 
CHINA AND THAKSIN 
 
¶10.  (C)  Allegations that Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
is under Beijing's spell are rife in Bangkok.  Outspoken 
Thaksin critic Kavi Chongkittavorn of the Nation calls 
Thaksin "China's deputy sheriff."  Professor Thitinan 
Pongsudhirak of Chulalongkorn University claims that 
Thaksin's decision to single out and expel Falun Gong 
adherents from Bangkok in preparation for 2003's APEC Leaders 
Summit was directly due to pressure from Chinese leaders 
(NOTE:  Falun Gong adherents also were not tolerated under 
the previous Thai administration).  Thitinan and Kavi both 
claim Thaksin has been receptive to overtures from Beijing in 
order to win contracts for Thaksin's family multinational 
company, Shin Corporation.  They point to a recent telecom 
license deal involving Shin's IPStar broadband satellite 
system and the China Satellite Communications Corporation 
(Chinasat) as an example of how China has rewarded Thaksin 
for his support of closer business links. 
 
CHINA'S RISE COMING AT WHOSE EXPENSE? 
 
¶11.  (C)  Many Thai analysts believe that both Japan and 
Taiwan are losing influence to a rising China.  Rudiwan notes 
that China's growing influence in the region comes at a time 
when Japan is declining in power and the United States is 
preoccupied in the Middle East and with the War on Terror. 
She suggests that ASEAN countries are improving ties with 
China to take into account China's rise and to hedge bets in 
case the United States remains occupied elsewhere.  Rudiwan 
also points out that China's effective use of Free Trade 
Agreements with ASEAN countries make those countries more 
linked to China and cut Taiwan out.  In 2003, according to 
the Customs Department of Thailand, Thai exports to Taiwan 
were worth 108 billion baht (2.63 billion dollars), or 46 
percent of exports to the PRC.  In 2001, Thai exports to 
Taiwan were worth 85 billion baht (2.07 billion dollars) or 
67 percent of the value of exports to the Mainland.  In 2001, 
more Taiwanese than mainland tourists visited Thailand but 
those numbers have reversed since then.  Nopadon sees 
participation in regional meetings as an effective bellwether 
of influence. He notes the growing number of Chinese scholars 
at conferences outlining the future of Southeast Asia and 
sees fewer and fewer Japanese scholars attending. Kavi 
Chonkittavorn claims that contacts between senior Thai and 
Chinese leaders are much more frequent than they were in the 
past and seem to be coming at the expense of meetings between 
Thai and Japanese leaders. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Political Minister Hasegawa Susumu and First 
Secretary Hajime Kishimori of the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok 
 
SIPDIS 
are also convinced that China's growing role in Southeast 
Asia is coming at Japan's expense.  They privately lament 
that Tokyo does not seem to have a coherent strategy to 
reengage with the region.  MFA's Thongchai also believes 
China's growing role is coming at a time when Japan's 
influence is declining.  He thinks that it would be good for 
U.S. interests if Washington were to urge Japan to take a 
more active leadership role in fora affecting Thailand. 
 
CHINA TAKING OVER ASEAN? 
 
¶13.  (C)  Many analysts suspect China's participation in the 
ASEAN region is an attempt to further expand its influence, 
perhaps at the expense of the United States.  Arna of the 
Joint Staff College describes China's "partnership strategy" 
as the means by which China hopes to emerge as a long-term 
counterweight to the United States in the region.  Under this 
"partnership strategy" China stresses the need for 
multilateral approaches in ASEAN and ARF as the best means to 
solve regional problems. China is also not hesitant to play 
up its role as a member of the UNSC P-5.  While Arna believes 
China wishes to use only economic influence in the near-term, 
he is convinced that China's ultimate aim is to replace the 
United States as the strongest power in the region.  Rudiwan 
at NIA claims that every country in ASEAN remains quietly 
suspicious of China's real agenda in the region and is 
concerned about its influence in ASEAN.  Nonetheless, she 
notes, so far the attractiveness of the China market coupled 
with China's good behavior in North Korea and the Spratleys 
has more than offset that suspicion.  MFA's Thongchai also 
believes that China wants ASEAN to be "China-centric" and is 
convinced of China's long-term goal to supplant the United 
States in the region.  However, he discounts concerns that 
China will be able to exercise power on a par with the United 
States for decades.  On the other hand, Nopadon believes that 
China's growing role in ASEAN will not allow the organization 
to act contrary to China's wishes ten years from now. 
 
UNITED STATES REMAINS THE PREEMINENT POWER 
 
¶14.  (C)  General Ronachuck observed that Thailand is not 
about to replace the United States with China as its 
strategic partner; "we are cordial with China, we are allies 
with the United States, and that's not about to change" he 
said.  NIA's Suvapan goes further by saying "We recognize 
that China is trying to use growing economic ties to create 
an atmosphere of political and security dependence, but this 
issue is quite sensitive among Thai senior officials who 
intend to rely on the United States as the prime guarantor of 
security in the region for the foreseeable future."  MFA's 
Thongchai thinks that, to counter the risk of a rising China, 
Thailand will need to rely more strongly on the bilateral 
relationship with the United States.  He does not see this as 
a zero sum game, however, noting that if China and the United 
States can continue to improve relations with each other, 
they could work jointly in the region to promote stability. 
 
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE -- ARE THAIS NAIVE? 
 
¶15.  (C)  Most of the analysts interviewed seem convinced 
that China's impressive economic growth will continue for the 
next several years uninterrupted.  None seem willing to 
seriously entertain the notion that China's huge unemployment 
figure, overheated financial sector, insolvent banks, aging 
population or underdeveloped interior might upset the 
economic juggernaut.  As a result, Thai analysts seem unable 
to consider moves a struggling China might make that could 
jeopardize regional security.  COL Thavin Akaramathayut, J-3 
Staff officer at the Joint Staff College, realizes that China 
must continue to maintain a high level of economic growth in 
order to modernize and believes that China will be unwilling 
to jeopardize Southeast Asia's peaceful environment for the 
foreseeable future.  Nopadon is also generally optimistic 
about China's emerging role in Southeast Asia and seemed 
unwilling to consider alternative scenarios where internal 
problems cause China to act aggressively to divert domestic 
attention.  Thongchai at MFA is convinced that Chinese 
leaders will not make any aggressive moves in the region for 
the foreseeable future; "their number one concern is to 
maintain Party control and they will do nothing to jeopardize 
the economic growth that allows the Party to remain in 
power."  He added, "China can't afford a war over Taiwan, it 
would kill economic growth."  Rudiwan agreed by saying, "We 
are not sure that China would use force against Taiwan; in 
the near term we think China wishes not to jeopardize its 
economic development.  In the future, however, we are not 
sure what China's long range strategy is."  She added, "We 
believe the United States will continue to successfully use 
influence over Taiwan to prevent Taipei from declaring 
independence." 
 
OVERLY ROSY PICTURE? 
 
¶16.  (C)  General (ret.) Teerawat Putamanonda, an influential 
thinker on a number of security issues, is concerned that 
Thai leaders have too rosy an opinion of future relations 
with China.  "I think they are not considering our potential 
points of conflict carefully enough," he cautioned.  Teerawat 
is especially concerned that China's growing influence in 
Burma will undermine Thailand's interests there and hurt 
efforts to stop the drug trade between Thailand and Burma. 
Doctor Panitan Wattanayagorn of Chulalongkorn University said 
that, while Thailand should not overlook the possible 
benefits of closer ties with the PRC, it is in Thailand's 
best interests to think about less sanguine possibilities. 
Panitan thinks that Thai analysts covering China could gain 
much by having more regular meetings with U.S. counterparts. 
 
 
SOME AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT STARTING TO APPEAR 
¶17.  (C)  While noting the generally good relationship 
between China and ASEAN countries, some analysts predict that 
the number of contentious issues will grow as China becomes 
stronger.  Thongchai noted how forcefully Beijing responded 
to Singapore PM Lee Hsian Loong's recent trip to Taipei and 
expressed concern over how abjectly Singapore apologized and 
made amends for the "offense."  Kavi of the Nation finds it 
significant that ASEAN resisted Chinese overtures to accede 
to the protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone but is skeptical that the effort may have served as a 
wake up call to ASEAN leaders that they need to stand up to 
Beijing more frequently.  Joe Horn, an Anglo-Thai businessman 
with offices in Bangkok and Beijing believes that trade 
friction between Thailand and China will only increase. 
"It's fairly easy to avoid the political hotbuttons with 
Beijing -- Tibet, Falun Gong, Taiwan -- but as more and more 
Thai consumer companies are undercut by cheap Chinese 
imports, there will be a growing call to protect Thai 
industry," he predicted.  Thongchai at MFA and General 
Teerawat believe that Burma will become an increasingly large 
irritant between China and Thailand.  Thongchai believes that 
Chinese efforts to reach the Andaman Sea through Burma are at 
odds with Thailand's interests in having Chinese goods bound 
for ASEAN pass through Thailand. 
 
¶18.  (C)  General Ronachuck believes that China's planned 
dams along the upper Mekong River will give it a great deal 
of influence over countries downriver.  SRI's Nopadon 
foresees Mekong subregional development and the drive to find 
new sources of fossil fuels as the two issues most likely to 
cause bilateral problems between China and Thailand.  He sees 
energy security as second only to Taiwan as a potential cause 
for China to use force in the region.  Nopadon described 
Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan as "irrational" and, 
looking at Chinese spectators' behavior during the recent 
Asian Games, expressed concern about rising nationalism in 
the PRC.  LTG Tanongsuk Tuvinun, Superintendent of the 
National Defense College, is also skeptical that Thailand can 
avoid economic disagreements with China; "China says it does 
not want to be a superpower, but it seems to be moving in 
that way by acquiring better defense technology, improving 
its space program and modernizing its military.  Every 
country looks at China as a potential export market, yet look 
around at how many companies import far more from China than 
they export there." 
 
WHEN COULD CHINA POSE A SECURITY THREAT? 
 
¶19.  (C)  NIA's Rudiwan concludes that China will continue to 
try to use its economic clout to influence ASEAN countries in 
the political and security fields.  Nonetheless, she doesn't 
see China as an outright security threat for several years. 
Thongchai predicts it will be 2020 at the earliest before 
China will have the potential to pose a military threat to 
Thailand.  If present economic trends continue and China can 
maintain 7 percent annual growth, Thongchai believes China 
could have the means to possess three or four aircraft 
carriers by 2020. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶20.  (C)  While Thailand's desire to see China emerge in the 
future as a responsible member of the international community 
are in line with our objectives, Thai analysis of the 
ramifications of China's growing influence seems inadequate 
and overly optimistic.  RTG economic officials seem unable to 
gauge the impact of many of Thailand's recent trade deals 
with China, and Thai strategic thinkers seem overly sanguine 
about the effect China's rise will have on the security 
situation in the region.  Thailand's close ties with the PRC 
give Thai sinologists some insights that might be beneficial 
to American experts.  A regular exchange of views between 
Thai and U.S. sinologists could improve our insights into 
Chinese policies and practices in this region while helping 
the Thais to improve their analysis.  End Comment. 
JOHNSON