This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR PDAS BRADTKE, EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA, AND EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GR TU CY MT
SUBJECT: CYPRUS/MALTA PROBLEM: THE VIEW FROM ANKARA 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 4082 
 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 1974 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey will base its decision on how to break 
the impasse over Cyprus and Malta's participation in NATO-EU 
security cooperation on several factors: EU action to reach 
out to the Turkish Cypriots, EU leaders' Dec. 17 decision on 
beginning accession talks with Turkey, and Turkey's 
evaluation of other concrete elements of NATO-EU cooperation, 
such as Operation Althea and Turkish participation in the 
Battlegroups concept.  In any case, we doubt Turkey will move 
until after, perhaps even well after, Dec. 17.  When they are 
ready, we expect the Turks will insist on breaking the 
impasse on their own, very legalistic, terms.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Embassy Ankara appreciates USEU-USNATO's thoughtful 
and coherent ref a suggestions--as well as Embassy Nicosia's 
equally helpful ref b analysis--for untying the knot of the 
impasse over the participation of Cyprus and Malta in NATO-EU 
strategic cooperation.  From a Turkish perspective, this 
issue is wrapped up in the broad net of Cyprus and Turkey's 
status with the EU.  Thus, we believe that there can be no 
Turkish movement on this problem until after, perhaps well 
after, the EU's leaders decide Dec. 17 on the core question 
of how they will proceed on accession negotiations with 
Turkey. 
 
The Cyprus Problem 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) The Turks believe that the international 
community--and particularly the EU--has done little to reward 
the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) for their vote in the April 
referendum on the island, and that the Greek Cypriots (GCs) 
have avoided any negative consequences.  Specifically, Turkey 
is angry that the GCs have apparently used their EU 
membership to block EU aid and direct trade regulations for 
the TCs.  The GOT believes it has given enough concessions on 
Cyprus, especially given its recent decision to extend its 
Customs Union agreement with the EU to include Cyprus. 
Ankara showed the depth of its displeasure with the GCs and 
the EU in its willingness to cancel the EU-OIC Forum 
scheduled for earlier this month in Istanbul over the GOT's 
insistence on according the TC delegation a higher form of 
recognized representation than the GCs--and thus the 
EU--could live with.  The GOT sees NATO-EU strategic 
cooperation as one of the few cards it holds in this game, 
and it could agree to move only after it is reassured by 
developments on the Cyprus issue. 
 
EU Accession Decision 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) It goes without saying that what decision EU leaders 
take on Dec. 17 will have an impact on the Turks' attitude 
toward the EU.  The Turks will reserve NATO-EU strategic 
cooperation for its menu of policy options to reward--or 
punish--the EU for whatever decision it takes in December. 
The GOT will also monitor very closely in particular the 
GOC's attitude toward Turkey's membership bid as Dec. 17 
approaches. 
 
Other NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation Issues 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Parallel to the accession negotiation decision, Turkey 
is also tracking its satisfaction with other areas in NATO-EU 
strategic cooperation, specifically Operation Althea and the 
EU Battlegroup concept.  So far, this appears to be the only 
unalloyed good news to announce.  The Turks report that they 
are generally pleased with how the EU has worked with them on 
planning for the transition from SFOR to Althea. 
Additionally, we understand that the EU has opened its call 
for Battlegroup contributions to the Turks, and the Turks 
have responded enthusiastically.  Indeed, Turkey is one of 
the few European countries that can offer real capabilities 
to Battlegroups or even make one on its own.  By January the 
Turks will have more data points on both these key areas of 
strategic cooperation, and will enter these into their 
equation. 
 
The U.S. Influence 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Unfortunately, we have less influence with the Turks 
on these EU-NATO issues than we had when we negotiated the 
Istanbul Documents on ESDP.  The Turks believed that if the 
Cyprus referendum failed we would persuade the Europeans to 
move smartly to reward both the Turks and the TCs in tangible 
ways.  Instead, the Turks feel they have almost nothing to 
show for their forward-leaning position on the Annan Plan. 
At the same time, the Turks feel we have failed to deliver on 
a series of other issues related to Iraq, especially the PKK. 
 As a result, our credibility with the Turks is not high at 
the moment. 
 
What Would a Solution Look Like? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Turks are legalistic and would likely be unwilling 
to agree to amend the December 2002 NAC decision which 
requires both PfP membership and signing the NATO security 
agreement for non-NATO EU countries who wish to engage in 
NATO-EU strategic cooperation discussions.  For the Turks, 
this ensures they control the timing (blocking consensus 
until Ankara is ready to move).  For Cyprus and Malta, they 
would have to apply for PfP.  We note Embassy Nicosia's point 
(ref b) that Cypriot PfP membership might not be desirable 
given our efforts to eventually demilitarize the island, but 
we also do not see another alternative acceptable to the 
Turks.  What we and the EU could do is to work on all three 
to ensure the necessary steps are nearly simultaneous, but, 
in our estimation, there is no point in trying with the Turks 
until there is movement on EU measures to reward the TCs for 
their April vote and/and Turkey has a date to begin EU 
accession negotiations. 
EDELMAN