This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005672 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO EUR/SE. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2029 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR OVIP PTER MOPS PARM TU
SUBJECT: DASD BRZEZINSKI'S MEETING WITH TURKISH DEPUTY 
UNDER-SECRETARY ILKIN 
 
REF: ANKARA 5266 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric Edelman, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: DASD Ian Brzezinski held a candid exchange 
with Turkish MFA Deputy Under-Secretary Baki Ilkin during a 
September 22 meeting to discuss ways to elevate the level of 
our bilateral dialogue.  Ilkin confirmed Turkey's interest in 
developing the relationship and understood recent U.S. 
requests for an expanded presence at Incirlik and weapons 
deployment training were examples of the U.S. effort to 
deepen bilateral ties.  Ilkin underscored the MFA's intent to 
respond to all requests and emphasized its role as a 
facilitator.  However, he warned that in the current 
political climate anything requiring parliamentary blessing, 
such as the permanent stationing and unrestricted use of 
F-16s at Incirlik Air Base, was unlikely to receive 
Government of Turkey (GoT) support.  Ilkin thought the 
proposed Cargo Hub at Incirlik could be considered within the 
parameters of a Ministerial Decree, but would require an 
annual renewal, which could prove difficult.  Weapons 
deployment training would not require parliamentary approval 
but some elements of the proposed program were prohibited 
under the Turkish constitution.  Ilkin noted GoT approval of 
the U.S. request to station F-16s at Incirlik between the 
NATO AirMeet and Anatolian Eagle exercise and explained that 
regional sensitivities drove the GoT disapproval of U-2 
flight missions.  On Iraq, Ilkin emphasized Turkish support 
for the U.S. effort there but expressed dismay at the lack of 
early U.S. dialogue with Turkey and urged greater 
communication in advance of the planned January elections. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U)  Additional participants in the meeting included 
Ambassador Eric Edelman, OSD Director for European Affairs 
South Tony Aldwell, OSD Turkey Desk Officer Lisa Heald, 
Embassy Ankara Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor Maggie Nardi, Joint 
Staff J-5 Turkey Desk Officer LTC Eric von Tersch, Turkish 
Ambassador Ahmet Banguoglu, MFA Deputy Director General for 
Middle East Affairs Sefak Gokturk, MFA Deputy Director for 
the Americas Desk Meral Barlas and Pol-Mil Officer Lale 
Agusman. 
 
--------------------- 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) DASD Brzezinksi opened the meeting with a request to 
move the bilateral dialogue beyond the daily issues that have 
dominated our political-military relations over recent years 
and to develop a more mature relationship based on a wider 
view of the war on terrorism, defense transformation, broader 
cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan and a strengthened 
defense procurement strategy.  U/S Ilkin stressed the GoT's 
complete agreement.  In response to Ilkin's request for 
specifics on USG ideas to begin that process, DASD urged more 
momentum in our space and missile defense (MD) cooperation, 
including completion of MD site surveys; a GoT response to 
the USG request for a military transport hub at Incirlik Air 
Base; U.S. assistance to the Turkish-funded NATO Center of 
Excellence for Defense Against Terrorism (CoE-DAT); and 
renewed GoT engagement in the Defense Industrial Cooperation 
(DIC) process, specifically, agreeing to a meeting in early 
2005 to map out a new course of industrial cooperation after 
a six year hiatus since the last meeting. 
 
------------ 
USG REQUESTS 
------------ 
 
¶4. (S) Ilkin welcomed USG interest in a strategic dialogue 
with Turkey, noting that the GoT had received five separate 
requests for assistance in three months but that, in several 
cases, very little detail had been provided.  He specifically 
noted the December 2003 visit of Under-Secretary Grossman and 
PM Assistant-Secretary Bloomfield's June 2004 visit, during 
which the question was raised whether Turkey would consider a 
request to permanently station F-16s, if one were made. 
Ilkin ticked off the status of recent USG requests as 
follows: stationing of F-16s between the NATO AirMeet and 
Anatolian Eagle exercise (approved); U-2 flights over Iran, 
Iraq and Syria (disapproved); permanent stationing of 48 
F-16s at Incirlik Air Base (pending); establishing a military 
cargo hub at Incirlik (pending); and weapons deployment 
training (pending). 
----- 
F-16s 
----- 
 
¶5. (S) According to Ilkin, the MFA doesn't have the final say 
on the F-16s, cargo hub or weapons deployment training but 
was pushing for a political decision from the government and 
the Prime Minister.  In Ilkin's view, anything requiring 
parliamentary blessing was a non-starter within the current 
political climate, given the difficult situation in Iraq and 
the internal political dynamics in Turkey, particularly since 
the U.S. was asking for unrestricted flights, similar to 
those allowed by Germany.  Article 92 of the Turkish 
constitution does not permit a foreign military to exercise 
greater operational flexibility than that granted to Turkish 
forces.  He said he saw no way for the government to take the 
F-16 basing request to Parliament for decision now.  In his 
estimation, Parliament's decision would be a repeat of the 
March 1, 2003 decision against allowing U.S. troops to use 
Turkey to open a northern front in Iraq. 
 
¶6. (S) When asked by the Ambassador whether such a basing 
request could be viewed within the parameters of the 
strategic relationship both parties are striving for, Ilkin 
responded that in theory it could, but the reality of the 
current political situation proscribed action on the request 
at this time. He added that Turkey had serious issues with 
the current state of events in Iraq and that "nothing much 
tangible" had been done to resolve them.  Ilkin said he 
wanted to get an answer for the U.S., adding that not 
responding was the worst thing Turkey could do.  He promised 
to pursue the issue after the European Commission issued its 
Oct. 6 progress report on Turkey.  He emphasized that there 
was a great deal to discuss regarding the overall development 
of our relationship and urged discussion on the broader 
strategic issues and other ways to enhance our position. 
 
--------- 
CARGO HUB 
--------- 
 
¶7. (S)  Ilkin confirmed that the government has not made a 
final decision on the U.S. request for a military cargo hub 
but indicated that such an arrangement may be workable 
without parliamentary approval, depending on the USG 
responses to three questions: 1) Duration of activities; 2) 
Area of Operation (i.e. flight destinations); 3) Flight 
permissions (i.e. blanket clearances).  If the GoT approved 
the request, the agreement would need to be written into the 
Ministerial Decree governing the USG tanker re-fueling 
operation at Incirlik.  However, Ilkin continued that the 
current Ministerial Decree clearly states that the USG can 
only support efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The problem 
lay with the USG request to supply the entire CENTCOM AoR. 
Any destination other than Afghanistan or Iraq would likely 
require parliamentary approval.  While there was some 
flexibility in the decree, according to Ilkin, it was not 
endless.  In addition, the GoT was not inclined to grant 
blanket clearances for all U.S. flights.  If it approved the 
request, we would need to work through issues of the duration 
of the request and the destination of the supply flights. 
Again, he promised to pursue the issue after the European 
Commission's Oct. 6 report. 
 
¶8. (S) Ambassador noted that the current Ministerial Decree 
operates on the basis of the UN resolution in Afghanistan and 
the NATO resolution on Iraq.  He asked if the absence of UN 
resolutions on other countries was the basis for GoT 
disapproval to fly elsewhere, and whether UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1546 might provide a possible rubric. 
Ilkin simply reiterated that the limit would be Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  He noted the potential pitfalls of adding the 
cargo hub into the Ministerial Decree, including the need to 
wait until the current decree expires in June 2005 and the 
need for annual renewal, which could be difficult. 
 
¶9. (S) Ilkin underscored that taking the request to the 
Turkish Parliament in order to expand the parameters of the 
Ministerial Decree would "open Pandora's box."  The situation 
would become politicized and everything already agreed to 
would be put back on the table.  Ilkin expressed his 
frustration at having heard twice that the Turkish General 
Staff (TGS) had approved the cargo hub and the MFA was the 
stumbling block.  In his view the problem was that the 
parameters of the request hadn't been finalized up front, 
before the request was taken to the GoT, slowing the process. 
 Ilkin stated that he had wanted to give the U.S. a response 
two months ago and was doing his best to get an answer from 
the government. 
 
--------------------------- 
WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT TRAINING 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) In Ilkin's perspective the weapons deployment 
training request could be worked out.  The MFA did not see a 
requirement for parliamentary approval.  However, some of the 
dimensions of the request, such as night flying, didn't fit 
within GoT parameters.  The Turkish Air Force (TUAF) does not 
undertake the type of night flying requested by the USAF 
fighter aircraft.  Since the constitution does not permit 
foreign militaries to exercise greater freedom of operation 
than that granted to Turkish forces, U.S. forces would need 
to observe the rules followed by the TUAF. 
 
----------- 
U-2 FLIGHTS 
----------- 
 
¶11. (S) In response to Ilkin's raising GoT disapproval of the 
U.S. request for U-2 flights along Turkey's borders with 
Syria and Iran, the Ambassador pointed out that this request 
was a USG response to assist the GoT to fill a gap TGS had 
identified in Turkey's surveillance coverage.  Ilkin said 
that GoT sensitivities about Turkey's need to maintain good 
relations with its neighbors prohibited approval of this 
request. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶12. (C) Turning to Iraq, MFA Deputy Director General for 
Middle East Affairs Gokturk said Turkey's concerns with and 
vision for Iraq mirrored that of the U.S. but developments on 
the ground, particularly after the end of hostilities, were a 
concern.  In his view, the U.S. misconstrued Turkey as being 
preoccupied with the Kurds in the north, but that was only 
part of the picture.  According to Gokturk, the GoT believed 
the initial blueprint for Iraq was incorrect and that 
realities on the ground were not adequately considered; 
ethnic and religious lines were overemphasized.  Now there 
was a huge task to reconcile all ethnic and religious groups 
toward a common agenda.  Turkey saw Iraq as regionalizing 
itself, and neighborhood involvement increasing.  In 
Gokturk's opinion, each successful insurgency action against 
the U.S. military emboldened other groups.  Gokturk stated 
his belief that, working from a common understanding, we 
could fix the problems in Iraq.  The GoT wanted the elections 
process to proceed as scheduled.  Turkey had good relations 
with almost every segment of Iraqi society.  Working in 
concert, drawing the Sunni Arabs into the process, the 
international community could put things back on track. 
Gokturk registered the GoT's concerns with the Iraqi 
Governing Council, which Turkey had not viewed as a 
decision-making body.  These concerns had been partially 
alleviated with the establishment of the Iraqi Interim 
Government, which, he noted, had only eight members of 
Turkmen origin.  According to Gokturk, Turkey had pressed the 
Turkmen and Arabs to integrate into the new structure in the 
way they best saw fit.  If all groups receive a sufficient 
outlet to achieve their goals, he thought there would be 
sufficient ethnic balance. 
 
¶13. (C) Gokturk continued that, despite being the only U.S. 
ally bordering Iraq, the GoT had felt in the past year as if 
it was being treated like Syria or Iran.  As an example, 
Gokturk noted that during the development of UNSCR 1546, the 
USG had approached, Syria, Egypt, and others, but not Turkey. 
 This isolation was magnified on the ground.  While 
expressing concern that Turkey had felt isolated, and 
agreeing that we should have spent more time talking with 
Turkey about Iraq early on, DASD emphasized that the U.S. 
held Turkey in a very different category than Iran.  He 
agreed that the U.S. and Turkey shared the same vision for 
Iraq but emphatically disagreed that the initial plan had 
been wrong, saying such a view underestimates the progress 
made, including the high level of interest among Iraqis in 
creating a new Iraq and the large numbers of Iraqis risking 
their lives to sign up for the Iraqi Security Service.  This 
incredible turnout had the terrorists worried. 
 
¶14. (C) Ambassador Edelman noted U.S.-Turkish agreement on 
the need for a politically unified Iraq, with territorial 
integrity, whose citizens think of themselves first as 
Iraqis.  He reminded Gokturk of the USG effort to organize a 
meeting in New York on the margins of UNGA between Deputy NSC 
Advisor Blackwill, Turkish Senior Advisor on Iraq Koraturk, 
and Turkish Director General for Middle East Affairs 
Burcuoglu to discuss the way ahead. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶15. (S) Given Ilkin's emphasis on the difficulty of getting 
GoT/parliamentary approval of the U.S. requests for F-16 
basing in the current political climate, the Ambassador asked 
whether removing the F-16 request from the table might 
facilitate a positive GoT decision on the cargo hub and 
weapons training.  While Ilkin did not directly acknowledge 
that the F-16 request was the crux of the problem, he gave 
the impression that this might be the case.  End Comment. 
 
¶16. (U) This cable was approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Ian Brzezinski. 
 
EDELMAN