This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 008350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KISL KMPI ECON JO
SUBJECT: KING ABDALLAH FIVE YEARS ON 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 7619 
     ¶B. AMMAN 6736 
     ¶C. AMMAN 5784 
     ¶D. AMMAN 5109 
     ¶E. 03 AMMAN 2528 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Jordan's King Abdallah continues to enjoy firm 
backing from the Hashemites' traditional pillars of support 
-- the East Bank tribes and the security/military services -- 
as well as the economic elite.  His supporters give him 
credit for navigating Jordan through several regional crises 
during his short tenure.  Others express disappointment that 
this liberal, Western-educated King has not moved more 
quickly to address the core problems slowing Jordan's 
development.  They highlight as key challenges a widening gap 
between the rich and poor, discrimination against the 
majority Palestinian population, restrictions on public 
freedoms, corruption, and a bloated patronage system.  The 
King's support of the Iraq war and his close association with 
other unpopular U.S. policies in the region expose him to 
criticism at home, but do not affect his strategic 
relationship with the U.S. and determination to support 
actively U.S. efforts to stabilize the region.  The security 
environment has grown more tenuous, as Jordan has become an 
increasingly attractive target to extremists, including 
homegrown terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  In the face of 
these challenges, Abdallah has demonstrated 
steadily-improving political judgment, and we do not see a 
threat to the stability of the regime.  End Summary. 
 
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PILLARS OF SUPPORT SOLID 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Five years after ascending the throne, King 
Abdallah's standing with the Hashemites' traditional pillars 
of support -- the East Bank tribes, the military, the 
security services, and the economic elite -- is solid.  The 
King's advisers and supporters credit him with navigating 
Jordan through difficult regional crises, boosting Jordan's 
international image, instituting needed economic and social 
reforms, and defining a "vision" to transform this 
resource-poor, youth-heavy country into a model of prosperity 
and pluralism for the region.  King Abdallah has tried to 
de-emphasize somewhat the symbols of the monarchy in favor of 
building a national identity.  The symbols are there -- 
portraits of father and son adorn nearly every government 
building in Jordan -- but national pride and civic 
responsibility (embodied in the "Jordan First" campaign 
launched two years ago) have been this king's chief public 
themes.  Earlier this summer, Abdallah publicly chastised 
members of Jordan's Olympic team for hoisting his picture 
during the opening ceremony, saying he would have preferred 
they displayed the flag as a symbol of the nation. 
Nonetheless, the team's behavior may have reflected an 
atmosphere that encourages, when in doubt, such displays. 
 
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JORDANIANS GRIPE ABOUT SLOW PACE OF REFORM 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) When asked their primary worry, Jordanians almost 
uniformly point to the economy.  They laud King Abdallah's 
focus on economic development, but despite impressive growth 
under his watch (up to seven percent GDP growth forecast for 
this year), many ordinary people say there has not yet been 
an improvement in living standards.  Some complain the rich 
are living ever more ostentatiously while poverty deepens. 
Fuel price and sales tax increases in April are still a sore 
point.  Dr. Taysir Abdel Jaber, deputy chairman of Jordan's 
Securities Commission, says the government is well aware of 
popular perceptions of increasing inequity and will need to 
do a better job equalizing the playing field, focusing more 
resources on poverty alleviation and job growth. 
 
¶4.  (C) While pocketbook issues may be foremost in Jordanian 
minds, gripes about the slow pace of political and social 
reforms are not far behind.  Some quietly express 
disappointment that this liberal, Western-minded king has not 
made more significant progress in reforming a system built on 
patronage, a bloated bureaucracy, and corruption (ref C). 
Dr. Fares Breizat, director of polling at the University of 
Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), noted that 
frustration over the patronage (wasta) system is particularly 
acute among young Jordanians with few connections seeking to 
break into the professions, start their own businesses, or 
win jobs based on their qualifications.  He offers that these 
long-standing problems have gotten worse under King 
Abdallah's watch, not better.  Many Embassy contacts point to 
the fact that the King surrounds himself with &yes men8 
(mostly security officials and young technocrats), and 
complain most are still chosen for their personal, familial 
or tribal ties, rather than their qualifications. 
Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Ureib al-Rintawi says there 
is no space for "liberal democrats" who could help the King 
sell his reform agenda to the wider population.  Abdallah's 
choice of advisers (whom Breizat terms "liberal autocrats") 
suggests to Rintawi that Abdallah has little real interest in 
making the difficult decisions necessary to realize true 
political and social reform in Jordan.  (COMMENT:  It is 
debatable whether there is as yet a potential popular 
constituency for the liberal democratic politics that 
intellectuals like Rintawi long for.  End Comment.) 
 
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GAP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) On top of these frustrations, analysts say there is a 
growing disconnect between the leadership and ordinary 
Jordanians.  King Abdallah has focused less than his father 
did on cultivating the personal connection with average 
people.  While Hussein was known for taking meals regularly 
with tribal sheikhs and mingling with the common folk, 
Abdallah has concentrated on building his statesman's image. 
He delivers few public speeches (although his Arabic has 
improved notably over the last few years, his accent remains 
undeniably foreign).  He also spends significantly more time 
abroad than his father did, leading some to joke that the 
King lives abroad and vacations in Jordan.  Contacts close to 
the King justify his frequent international jaunts as 
necessary to attract foreign aid and investment.  To some, 
however, the lack of interaction with locals shows that the 
King considers them too backward to be worth consulting. 
According to political scientist Dr. Muhammad Kheir Mustafa, 
many Jordanians are losing respect for leaders perceived as 
aloof and not honestly working for the greater good, which in 
turn makes it difficult to sell the King's liberalizing 
program to the common people. 
 
¶6.  (C) Loath to criticize the King publicly, the regime's 
detractors focus on the King's men.  Critiquing the cabinet 
is the staple of conversation in private homes and 
coffeehouses, and considered safe in a country where rumor 
has it that one in three Jordanians is an informer.  However, 
Abdallah's tendency to associate himself personally with the 
government's goals, as well as policy implementation, makes 
him accountable for the cabinet's failures as well as its 
successes -- stripping away a firewall his father had always 
carefully maintained.  More in keeping with Hussein's 
experience, gossip about Abdallah's personal life is 
widespread.  Resentment is voiced about the King and Queen's 
perceived lavish spending and jet-setting lifestyle, and 
there is talk about his roving eye.  Popular perceptions 
about Hashemite high living are a running theme through 
Jordan's modern history, and only at times of acute economic 
crisis, such as in the late 1980s, did they become 
politically meaningful.  The same is largely true today, but 
a new element is the charge that top regime figures are 
taking larger and more visible slices of contracts for 
personal gain.  Although this behavior is consistent with 
regional norms, it contrasts with the reformist stance of 
King and cabinet -- and hands a (pick)pocketbook issue to the 
populists. 
 
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REGIONAL CRISES PRESENT MAJOR CHALLENGE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Impatience over the slow pace of change at home is 
exacerbated by regional turmoil.  Inheriting the throne in 
February 1999, Abdallah took power at a time of relative calm 
in the region.  He commented to an interviewer in early 2000 
that he intended to focus on the only challenge he foresaw 
for Jordan: economic development.  Barely six months later, 
the Palestinian intifada erupted to the west.  Protests in 
Jordan against the Israeli incursions in Jenin and the 
assassination of HAMAS leaders resulted in clashes between 
police and Jordanian demonstrators, leading to tighter 
restrictions on public gathering.  The professional 
associations and the Islamic movement revived 
"name-and-shame" campaigns against alleged advocates of 
normalization with Israel.  Meanwhile, Abdallah carefully 
guided Jordan through the aftermath of September 11 and the 
war in Afghanistan.  He proved himself a faithful partner in 
USG efforts to combat Al-Qaeda -- cementing his already close 
relationship with the U.S. 
 
¶8.  (C) The war in Iraq, however, proved even more 
challenging.  Anti-war demonstrators in southern towns 
carried signs and chanted slogans critical of Abdallah and 
his perceived support of the American campaign.  Anti-regime 
pamphlets appeared in several cities, prompting the security 
services to tighten their control over demonstrations.  These 
direct attacks on the King were unprecedented (ref E); people 
were convinced that the King and senior GOJ officials were 
not telling them the truth about the extent of Jordan's 
support for the war.  Some contacts say the King's reputation 
still suffers.  Since the Iraq war, public criticism of GOJ 
policies, including those linked to the King, has continued 
if not increased.  Even figures such as former PM Taher 
al-Masri have offered critical statements.  Outside of 
Jordan, the King has come under fire from Palestinian 
officials for his perceived criticism of the Palestinian 
National Authority leadership.  U.S. success in stabilizing 
the region is critical, in the King's mind, to maintaining 
Jordan's stability, so his active support will continue.  The 
King's strategic alignment with the U.S. exposes him to 
domestic and regional critics, and his instinct is to silence 
rather than accommodate them in any meaningful way. 
Unfortunately, critical popular attitudes toward his stance 
have made it all the harder to advance political reforms 
which could empower those forces which oppose the King's 
association with the U.S. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
REALISTIC REGIONAL POSTURE BRINGS PAYOFFS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Abdallah wisely dropped the pretensions to regional 
leadership that his father could never shed.  Long-expired 
Hashemite claims to the throne of the Hijaz, Iraq, or even 
leadership of the Arab nation may, by 1999, have seemed 
comical to Western observers.  But the Saudis rightly 
suspected there was a gleam of irredentist ambition in 
Hussein's eye to the very end.  By contrast, Abdallah made it 
known his aim was to keep the one throne his family still 
held, enabling him to cultivate good relations with most of 
the Gulf states.  This more modest posture paid off when 
Saddam's oil largesse was abruptly ended in 2003 but quickly 
replaced by Saudi and Kuwaiti donations.  Continuing Gulf 
petro-charity staves off a collapse of Jordan's economy. 
 
----------------------------------- 
THE WESTERN SALES PITCH vs. REALITY 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) King Abdallah has also done an effective job of 
selling a modernizing vision of Jordan to the West.  His 
articulate appearances on U.S. talk shows have boosted 
Jordan's international reputation.  The King's adept handling 
of relations with U.S. congressmen and foreign dignitaries 
has further enhanced his international stature to the point 
that some Jordanians grouse that he is more popular abroad 
than at home.  Behind the smooth delivery, however, there are 
aspects of everyday Jordan that the regime would prefer that 
the West overlook.  The country's Palestinian-origin majority 
suffers from disproportionately low representation in a 
gerrymandered Parliament, as well as in the military and 
security services ranks (refs B and D).  The option of true 
political participation for most Jordanians is still far off. 
 The only viable political party remains the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF) -- the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood 
-- which has emerged as the leading voice of popular 
discontent.  Relations between the Hashemites and the Islamic 
movement have vacillated through the years.  The monarchy at 
times used Islamists to offset the influence of Arab 
nationalists and socialists.  However, Islamist leaders have 
become assertive in their criticism of the regime for its 
alleged acquiescence in Western "anti-Arab" foreign policies, 
as well as for tolerating corruption and punishing public 
expressions of opposition.  In an October 4 press interview, 
for example, Hamzah Mansour, IAF Secretary General, accused 
the GOJ of pursuing policies "that harmed Jordan's interests" 
and denounced alleged government attempts to silence its 
critics (ref A). 
 
¶11.  (C) Some public freedoms have been curtailed under King 
Abdallah, although Jordan remains one of the more open Arab 
societies.  A Baathist weekly newspaper has been temporarily 
shut down twice in the past year for criticizing the Saudi 
regime.  Jordanians complain that the intelligence apparatus 
can exercise a veto over every aspect of life -- whether the 
media, regulating public gatherings, or getting a job.  This 
perception reinforces a strong tendency among Jordanians 
today toward political passivity.  CSS polls show that 
people's sense of justice is low, and that Jordanians are 
more fearful of criticizing officials since Abdallah came to 
power.  For example, 83 percent of respondents in a 2003 
study reported that they did not feel free to openly 
criticize the government and/or disagree with its opinion 
without experiencing repercussions from the security 
services.  In 1999, 70 percent of respondents reported such 
concerns.  Dr. Mustafa argues that Jordan's international 
image masks a fragile society with key problems that need to 
be addressed if stability is to be maintained. 
 
---------------------------- 
WHO ELSE BUT THE HASHEMITES? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) It is very difficult for many Jordanians to separate 
their national identity from the Hashemite family.  The 
thought of Jordan without a Hashemite leader is almost 
inconceivable to some, both because Jordan and the Hashemites 
have been inextricably linked sine the state's foundation, 
and because there is no realistic alternative to the 
monarchy.  In a country divided between East and West Bankers 
and with little appetite for a religious theocracy, no other 
family or institution acceptable to a broad majority of 
Jordanians could play the Hashemites' unifying role.  King 
Abdallah and his advisors reinforce this situation by 
ensuring that no figure, group or ideology emerges that could 
challenge the royal family's legitimacy.  Even if King 
Abdallah were to suddenly depart the scene, the leadership of 
Jordan would almost certainly remain in Hashemite hands.  No 
potential successor to the throne, however, appears to have 
the same reforming zeal as Abdallah. 
 
¶13.  (C) Despite domestic and regional challenges, we do not 
see a threat to the regime's stability in the near term. 
However, as evidenced by the terrorist plots disrupted in 
Jordan since 1999 (primarily instigated by homegrown 
extremist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his ilk), the regime has 
its share of dangerous enemies.  The King's public standing 
over the next year will depend on his success in further 
promoting the economy and closing income gaps, pushing reform 
and weathering regional crises.  Ironically, it is the 
traditional pillars of the regime's stability -- the East 
Bank tribes, the military and security services, and the 
entrenched economic elite -- that are the most significant 
barriers to economic and political reform.  It is the 
Hashemites' traditional allies who stand to lose the most if 
political participation is increased, public freedoms are 
enhanced, and corruption contained.  Because the King has 
aligned himself so closely with the reform agenda, a lack of 
progress will increase the perception that the King is not 
serious about broadening political participation.  Faced with 
the concerns of his loyalists, and the certainty that opening 
up politically will embolden opponents of those regional 
security policies that the King views as critical for 
Jordanian stability -- including peace with Israel and 
alignment with the U.S. -- the King is likely to take a 
cautious approach to genuine political reform. 
 
¶14. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE