This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL IZ NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAQ: EU EXPLORATORY MISSION REPORT TO 
FOREIGN MINISTERS AT GYMNICH 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1935 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 2172 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 756 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS ANDREW J. SCHOFER FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The EU exploratory mission to Iraq will 
report its findings and present a long list of "options" for 
supporting Iraqi reconstruction to the September 3-4 Gymnich, 
according to its Dutch chair.  The Dutch hope that the 
mission's report will spur the EU to take a more active role 
in supporting Iraqi reconstruction, especially in the areas 
of "civilian crisis management," which include election 
support, police training, civil administration, rule of law, 
and human rights.  EU involvement on the ground will start 
relatively small and build up gradually, with an emphasis on 
"quality" (i.e., niche value-added) over "quantity."  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) On September 2, DCM received a comprehensive readout 
of the EU's three-day "exploratory mission" to Iraq from 
Herman Schaper, Dutch MFA Deputy Political Director. 
Schaper, who chaired the mission in his EU presidency 
capacity, stressed that the mission had been "exploratory" 
and therefore set out "options" rather than recommendations. 
The mission's report, which would be circulated at the 
September 3-4 Gymnich informal meeting of EU foreign 
ministers, contained a long list of options which could serve 
as the basis for concrete proposals.  Schaper anticipated 
that the September 13 GAERC formal meeting of foreign 
ministers would endorse the findings of the exploratory 
mission and hopefully authorize a second fact-finding 
experts' mission to Iraq to develop a plan of action.  The 
November 5 EU Council meeting -- to which Iraqi Prime 
Minister Allawi has been invited -- could then serve as an 
action-forcer leading the EU to put the plan of action 
quickly into effect. 
 
¶3. (C) Schaper noted (as have other Dutch interlocutors, per 
ref b) that the EU Commission and Council Secretariat had 
earlier been seen as reluctant to engage aggressively on 
Iraq, despite clear guidance that the EU intended to take a 
more active role in reconstruction.  He left no doubt that 
the Dutch presidency had been the driving force behind the 
exploratory mission.  The decision to have FM Bot accompany 
the mission into Iraq, and to staff it at a relatively high 
level, had been deliberately intended to shame the Commission 
and Secretariat into more active participation.  Schaper 
expressed satisfaction that the positive experience of the 
mission would encourage the EU to play a more constructive 
role in Iraq both politically and practically.  In his view, 
the mission succeeded both in bringing all relevant EU 
elements "on board" and in pushing the process of Iraqi 
reconstruction forward significantly.  He added that the 
Dutch were actively pursuing several tracks with regard to 
Iraq, which included strengthening political contacts through 
high-level visits and exchanges and providing 
financial/economic support (including possible debt relief) 
in addition to supporting civilian reconstruction. 
 
¶4. (C) The options contained in the exploratory missions 
report generally fell into the area of "civilian crisis 
management," according to Schaper, which he further divided 
into five sub-categories: 
 
- Police Support (including training) 
- Rule of Law 
- Human Rights 
- Civilian Administration 
- Election Support. 
 
In all these areas, Schaper said, the commission recommended 
that any EU involvement take into account the following 
criteria: 
 
- Does it respond to an actual Iraqi need? 
- Does it provide concrete added value (i.e., no duplication 
of effort)? 
- Is it complementary to what others are already doing and 
part of a coherent program? 
- Does it reflect real EU capacities (esp. since member 
states' participation will be voluntary)? 
- Will the security situation allow it? 
- Is it politically relevant/visible as an EU project? 
- Is it practical in budget terms? 
 
¶5. (C) Schaper stressed that several of the options listed in 
the mission report went beyond the strict mandate of the 
mission but reflected suggestions made by Iraqi and 
international contacts during the visits.  He noted the EU 
was especially interested in finding "niches" where its 
unique capabilities could be most effectively utilized: 
"quality not quantity."  In that context, Schaper cautioned 
that the EU's involvement in Iraq on the ground would 
probably start small and increase gradually; it would not be 
realistic to expect "50 to 100" EU trainers to begin work in 
the next few months, for example, but a few "tens" might be 
possible.  The exploratory mission, he added, had not taken 
up the issue of "reflagging" existing programs (such as the 
training program in Jordan) so the options in the report were 
all new. 
 
¶6. (C) According to Schaper, some of the specific options 
outlined in the mission report include: 
 
- Specialized police training (forensics/crime scene 
investigation, border police, customs, senior-level officer 
capacity building); 
- Human rights/rule of law training support for the Ministry 
of Justice (training of judges, prosecutors, lawyers): 
- Assistance to the Iraqi special tribune (including in the 
area of exhumation of mass graves); 
- Establishment of a center for the promotion of Human Rights 
and Democratization; 
- Election support, including the funding and training of 
observers (NOTE:  Schaper stressed that on this issue, in 
particular, the European Commission would take the lead on 
developing proposals.  End Note) 
 
¶7. (C) Schaper noted that although security/military issues 
were not part of the exploratory mission's mandate, the 
mission had also discussed with U.S. interlocutors in Baghdad 
the possibility of helping Iraq develop effective 
import/export controls and assistance in demobilizing and 
disarming militias.  He stressed that the mission had gone to 
Baghdad without a particular agenda, but had solicited input 
from all sources.  In that context, Schaper said he was 
particularly appreciative of the thoughtful proposals the 
mission had received from U.S. mission personnel in Baghdad. 
Schaper also had an opportunity to discuss the EU mission's 
approach with Dutch Air Force Major General Carel Hilderink, 
who chaired the recent NATO Training Implementation Mission 
in Iraq (ref c) and stressed that every effort would be made 
to ensure that the two missions reports were complementary 
rather than duplicative. 
 
 
 
RUSSEL