This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR BELL 
INR FOR JNOYON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KMDR PINS NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: INFO MINISTER MOHSIN ON THE PEACE PROCESS, 
BLOCKADE 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1745 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 1698 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 1688 
     ¶D. KATHMANDU 1667 
     ¶E. KATHMANDU 1658 
     ¶F. KATHMANDU 1644 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty; Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Minister of Information and Communication Mohammad 
Mohsin outlined for the Ambassador on August 31 the structure 
of the newly-announced Peace Secretariat.  Mohsin hoped the 
new body would help prepare the government for any eventual 
peace process with the Maoists, as well as build trust 
between and among the parties, the palace and civil society. 
Mohsin was flabbergasted by the international reporting of 
the "blockade" of Kathmandu (reftels). END SUMMARY. 
 
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PEACE SECRETARIAT AND PROSPECTS 
=============================== 
 
¶2. (C) Just after briefing the press on the structure of 
Nepal's new Peace Secretariat on August 31, Minister for 
Information and Communication Mohammad Mohsin told the 
Ambassador that he was hopeful that the new body would help 
rebuild trust in Nepal's political landscape.  Lamenting the 
state of the relationship between the palace, parties and 
civil society, Mohsin emphasized the need for the political 
forces to unify, to trust each other, and to solve the 
country's most important issue, the insurgency.  The new 
peace structure would have a political committee (to include 
the Prime Minister, Mohsin and the heads of the other three 
parties in the coalition -- M.K. Nepal, Pashupati Rana, Badri 
Prasad Mandal), but the secretariat itself would be led by 
Nepal's Chief Secretary (the country's most senior civil 
servant).  The four political parties would also give policy 
advice to the political committee through a separate channel. 
 Sub-committees of the Peace Secretariat would include 
constitutional law experts, security and conflict management 
experts and civil society members, along with a policy 
analysis division, a conflict victims' relief and 
rehabilitation division and a peace talks assistance 
division. 
 
¶3. (C) Prospects for successful peace talks with the Maoists 
were less clear, Mohsin believed.  It seemed as if the 
political wing of the Maoists might be ready to talk, but it 
was unclear if the Maoist military commanders would accept 
compromise.  After all, the Maoists wanted to create a 
one-party state, and the government was unwilling to give up 
on democracy.  Moreover, Mohsin added, while the ultimate 
role of the monarchy might be less than clear, at this point 
in its history, Nepal needed the King as a symbol and force 
for unity.  Musing on possible paths to peace, Mohsin 
mentioned that the GON might be willing to accept UN 
mediation, but not until the Maoists demonstrated that they 
were serious about peace, by forswearing violence and giving 
up their arms. 
 
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BLOCKADE??  WHERE'S THE BEEF? 
============================= 
 
¶4. (C) Mohsin expressed his surprise at the exaggeration by 
the foreign media of the Maoist "blockade" of Kathmandu. 
Explaining that he had done everything he could to convince 
the journalists of the reality in Kathmandu over the period 
(that there were no physical roadblocks, that the army had 
given convoy protection for trucks and buses), the Minister 
mentioned that he had even taken a call from the New York 
Times and invited them to send a team to Kathmandu to verify 
his information.  Still, he explained, despite his best 
efforts, the foreign media, including the Indian media, had 
misread reality.  Actually, Mohsin argued, the "blockade" and 
the exaggeration by the foreign media created two significant 
benefits for the GON: first, the Nepali media reported the 
story accurately, which had built trust between them and the 
GON; and, secondly, the blockade, the over-reporting and the 
killing of journalist Dekendra Raj Thapa (murdered after 
several months in Maoist detention) had built a sense of 
solidarity between the GON and the local media against the 
Maoists.  In any case, Mohsin added, if American media 
visited Nepal, he would gladly meet with them. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶5. (C) Mohsin, the senior of two palace appointees in the 
cabinet (and only Muslim), is an important and influential 
figure, representing the King within the government.  At 
first blush, the Peace Secretariat appears to contain the 
necessary elements to provide the government technical and 
policy information to prevent repeats of past mistakes. 
There was, perhaps, no way to avoid heavy involvement of the 
parties in the peace process.  Fortunately, it appears that a 
structural wall will separate the political and technical 
sides. 
 
¶6. (C) It is hard to disagree with the Minister's take on the 
foreign press coverage of the blockade.  While the foreign 
media was discussing airlift operations or even foreign 
military intervention to "break the blockade," the Nepali 
media did a credible job of reporting the situation on the 
ground.  As one Embassy interlocutor shrugged and explained, 
"It's hard to blame them (the foreign press).  The last real 
siege they could report on was Stalingrad."  END COMMENT. 
MORIARTY