This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

231431Z Sep 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC HEAD DISMISSES GOZ MOVES; CALLS FOR MORE 
PRESSURE 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND 1.5 (D) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador and DCM met 
September 17 with Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who said that the 
GOZ was making cosmetic changes in the face of 
internal and external pressure but that the 
situation on the ground had yet to change and 
until it did the MDC would hold to its threat to 
boycott the elections.  He added that the government 
remained deeply unpopular, would lose a genuinely 
free and fair election, and faced the prospect of 
continuing and potentially more radical opposition 
should it steal another election.  The Ambassador 
asked what more we could do to help.  Tsvangirai 
said the West needed to keep the pressure on SADC 
in turn to put pressure on Mugabe.  Separately, he 
confirmed that a verdict in his treason trial was 
now due October 15, and speculated that he might 
be found not guilty because the GOZ might seek to 
avoid controversy.  End Summary. 
 
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Election Strategy 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Tsvangirai said the MDC,s approach for the 
coming elections was to hope for the best but plan 
for the worst.  The party faithful supported the 
boycott plan as a way to put pressure on the 
government to make real changes.  The dilemma for 
the MDC remained whether to participate in rigged 
elections, when doing so would allow the government 
to claim the elections were fair.  On the other hand, 
any positive changes that the government made at 
this point would be seen as a win for the MDC, 
regardless of whether in response to pressure from 
the South African Development Council (SADC), and if 
sufficient could lay the ground for MDC participation 
in the elections. 
 
¶3. (C) Tsvangirai acknowledged the government had 
recently made some cosmetic efforts to allow the 
MDC more space, including allowing three campaign 
meetings to be held, but he said the reality on the 
ground was still intimidation and bribery, especially 
in rural areas.  Government militias in the rural areas 
had taken off their uniforms and blended back into the 
populace but were still there, observing, and everyone 
knew who they were )- which was more than enough to 
intimidate the rural populace.  The result was that 
opposition activity remained muted in these areas. 
In addition, the regime was buying off the local chiefs, 
further ensuring that ZANU-PF would sweep the rural 
areas in next spring,s parliamentary elections. 
In addition, the GOZ was busy gerrymandering districts, 
especially in rural areas, to further ensure a ruling 
party victory. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked whether land reform couldn,t 
be turned against Mugabe in rural areas by arguing that 
racial justice aside, it had been botched and had 
devastated the economy.  Without really addressing how 
the MDC might capitalize on this issue, Tsvangari said 
land reform was equated in many Zimbabwean,s minds with 
hunger.  In fact, the litany of woes for most Zimbabweans: 
economic collapse, rising crime, and deteriorating 
education and health systems, ensured that the elections 
would be competitive.  Even if ZANU-PF won, these issues 
would not go away and would fuel continuing opposition. 
 
¶5. (C) Tsvangari said the recent moves by the government 
reflected their growing confidence.  The more confident 
ZANU-PF became the more space they would allow the MDC in 
the run-up to the elections.  However, the government,s 
current confidence was misplaced.  The regime remained 
deeply unpopular and would lose a free and fair election. 
The government might get another rude shock this spring 
as the results rolled in.  The three campaign meetings 
he had attended, in Bulawayo, Gweru, and Harare, had all 
been well attended and the participants enthusiastic. 
 
¶6. (C) Tsvangirai said his deepest concern in the event 
of another stolen election was that the Zimbabwean people 
would lose hope that things would ever change and would 
respond either with massive emigration or rising violence 
or both.  Tsvangirai said he was already having difficulty 
convincing some in his party to continue non-violent 
opposition.  Some day soon, he might find himself pushed 
to the side by more radical elements. 
 
--------- 
SADC Role 
--------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. had a 
difficult line to walk with respect to Zimbabwe. 
If we pushed too hard on the elections, it could be 
counter-productive for the MDC since Mugabe was so adroit 
at turning that support into rhetoric about race and 
colonialism.  He asked what additional steps the U.S. 
and the West in general could take to put pressure on the 
regime.  Tsvangirai agreed that the role of the U.S., UK, 
and other non-African countries was tricky and that our 
approach would have to crafted carefully to avoid playing 
into Mugabe,s hands.  He argued that regional pressure 
from SADC remained key. 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador said we were unsure whether SADC 
would really pressure ZANU-PF as there was little evidence 
to suggest such willingness.  Tsvangirai agreed, noting 
that South African President Mbeki,s preferred outcome 
would be a &fairly8 free election that kept Mugabe 
and ZANU-PF in power, restored their legitimacy, 
and muted Western pressure and criticism.  Tsvangirai 
said an MDC delegation was due to travel to South 
Africa the following week to meet with Mbeki; he 
promised a readout of the meeting (septel).  That said, 
the goal for both the MDC and the West should 
be to put the burden on SADC to enforce the principles 
they agreed to in Mauritius. 
 
------------- 
Trial Verdict 
------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador mentioned to Tsvangirai that we 
had heard from his lawyers (septel) that there would be 
a verdict in his treason trial on October 15 and asked 
what outcome he expected.  Tsvangirai said the timing of 
the decision was curious.  October 15 was a Friday, which 
would not leave any time for the government to find him 
guilty but then grant him clemency before the weekend, 
the outcome he had expected in August.  For that reason, 
he and his lawyers were beginning to think the court might 
find him not guilty.  He speculated that the GOZ might be 
hoping to avoid controversy and present a &nice face8 to 
the outside world. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Tsvangirai confirmed other reports we have heard 
that the GOZ and ZANU-PF, confident that they,ve got 
the election in the bag, may be easing up a bit on the 
MDC.  The motivation is almost certainly to give SADC 
and other regional leaders enough evidence to back the 
election results.  For his part, Tsvangirai appears 
confused and somewhat unrealistic in his own analysis. 
He continues to hope that somehow enough outside 
pressure can be generated to constrain ZANU-PF,s 
electoral antics even as he admits this is highly unlikely. 
Dell