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Viewing cable 04BRUSSELS4161, SEPTEMBER 3 U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRUSSELS4161 2004-09-29 10:16 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brussels
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 004161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL UNGA CDG EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 3 U.S.-EU TROIKA CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS 
CONTROL AND GLOBAL DISARMAMENT (CODUN) 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please Protect Accordingly. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The U.S. and the Dutch EU presidency on 
September 3 conducted semi-annual CODUN consultations in 
Brussels on UN disarmament issues.  Subjects covered included 
U.S./EU priorities, UNFC, UNDC, CD, FMCT, landmines, CWB, 
BWC, CCW, CTBT, Libya, Luxembourg,s upcoming EU presidency, 
and potential changes in Dutch representation at the CD. 
Participants are listed in para 23 below. 
 
Action items: 
 
-- Para 13:  The Dutch asked whether it would be useful for 
the EU to mediate U.S.-Russian differences over Aberdeen and 
other CW facilities.  The EU was serious about wanting to be 
of assistance in breaking the deadlock.  The U.S. side 
undertook to report the EU,s offer to Washington and 
communicate any U.S. reaction through USEU. 
 
-- Para 20:  On the U.S.-EU Summit declaration, the U.S. 
promised fuller comment during September 28 CONOP 
consultations. 
 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
U.S. and EU Priorities 
---------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) U.S. and EU delegations met in Brussels on September 
3 for semi-annual consultations on UN disarmament issues. 
Reviewing EU priorities, which focused on advancing the EU's 
WMD strategy paper, the EU side highlighted revitalization of 
the UNGA First Committee (UNFC); promotion of multilateral 
agreements, including the Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT); adoption of a work program for the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD); improving control of man-portable air 
defense systems (MANPADS), which was more important than 
ever, due to potential use by terrorists; and encouragement 
of universal acceptance of the Ottawa Convention on 
anti-personnel mines.  The U.S. side remarked on the improved 
political atmosphere in arms control discussions in New York 
and Geneva, which it hoped would prove sustainable. 
Delegation members pointed to reform of the UNFC as an issue 
that remained a U.S. priority, and expressed optimism about 
continued cooperation to this end with the EU. 
 
-------------------- 
UNGA First Committee 
-------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The U.S. welcomed the EU's response to last year's 
First Committee resolution on improvement, noting that we 
plan to follow up this year with a draft resolution 
recommending specific measures to enhance the Committee's 
working methods.  The U.S. hoped to be able to share this 
with the EU soon.  The U.S. also is exploring with Russia the 
possibility of introducing a joint draft resolution on 
bilateral nuclear arms reductions; the Russians seem 
interested, but we are still considering specific resolution 
language.  Elaborating on reform, the U.S. noted that changes 
can take place only gradually, with leadership from key 
countries on measures such as reducing the number of agenda 
items.  It was for this reason that the U.S. response to the 
UN had cited the work of specific governments as proof that 
other countries had provided contributions of merit. 
 
4. (SBU) The EU side replied that the EU would look at the 
U.S. draft resolution with great interest, and predicted that 
it would be in line with EU thinking.  The willingness of 
national governments to merge resolutions was not something 
that the EU Presidency could prescribe -- the Presidency 
could encourage them to do so, but could not actually make 
them.  The EU presidency noted its strong interest in 
coordinating in New York "at 25, " which it was finding 
"quite a challenge."  On some topics, EU member states would 
have to work things out on their own rather than through the 
EU.  The EU was working toward common positions on 
resolutions where there used to be split votes, although only 
it was likely that the EU would only be able to agree on one 
common position.  The bad news was that a new resolution on 
The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) was in the work; this would 
be another draft resolution to add to the UNFC,s agenda, 
despite our common efforts at reduction. 
 
5. (SBU) The EU then sought U.S. views on the Argentine draft 
resolution on Confidence and Security Building Measures 
(CSBMs) and on the draft MANPADS resolution.  Regarding the 
Argentine CSBM draft, the U.S. side explained that the U.S. 
had encouraged Argentina to table its resolution to preserve 
the work on conventional CBMs that the UNDC had conducted 
during 2001-03.  The U.S. might co-sponsor that resolution 
and the draft MANPADS resolution. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The U.S. side was not optimistic about the prospects 
for the UNDC.  U.S. representatives expressed their 
disappointment that the EU -- despite productive discussions 
with the Irish EU Presidency in January -- did not consult 
with the U.S. before tabling a draft agenda last April.  The 
U.S. side recalled that the Non-Aligned refused to consider 
the EU proposals, preferring to negotiate on the basis of the 
U.S. proposals for the UNDC agenda, and that the EU had to 
seek U.S. support to participate in those negotiations.  The 
Dutch EU presidency seemed uninformed about those events, but 
accepted that U.S.-EU communications on the UNDC had broken 
down at some point.  The EU sought clarification of the U.S. 
assertion that the future of the UNDC needed to be 
reconsidered.  The U.S. replied that the U.S. will propose to 
the UNDC chair (Georgia) devoting one year to examining UNDC 
institutional reform.  If the impasse over the UNDC agenda is 
not resolved during the first week of the First Committee, 
the U.S. might table an alternate draft resolution.  The EU 
side reiterated that it continued to view the UNDC as an 
important forum for allowing non-CD countries to express 
their opinions, but that EU member states agreed that the 
UNDC could be improved. 
 
------------------------------ 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) The EU underscored concerns about the lack of a CD 
work program for the eighth straight year.  How long can a 
body that does not do anything be kept alive?  The U.S. 
commented that the history of the "Five Ambassadors" (A-5) 
proposal for a CD work program has led the U.S. to conclude 
that it is unlikely to command consensus in the future. 
Realistically, it also is highly unlikely that a 
long-inactive CD currently could take on more than one or two 
negotiations at the same time; as a result, the U.S. has been 
urging the CD to agree to begin work on the U.S. proposals on 
FMCT and persistent landmines -- it is an opportunity for a 
fresh start.  Though this year,s CD session would end on 
September 10, the debate generated by the two U.S. proposals 
has served as a useful platform from which the U.S. and the 
EU should work in tandem to develop a consensus on a program 
of work early next year.  The U.S. hoped that EU governments 
will instruct their delegations in Geneva to support the U.S. 
proposals without linkage to other issues or within a 
balancing formula. 
 
8. (SBU) The Dutch EU Presidency noted an evolution in EU 
thinking, and suggested that "packaging" might be the only 
way toward establishing a program of work.  Delinking, from 
the EU,s perspective, would unravel the possibility of 
getting anything done.  The U.S. side reiterated that each 
prospective CD agenda item should be considered on its own 
merits, and that efforts to link them constitute a formula 
for continued stalemate at the CD. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) 
------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The EU side welcomed the conclusion of the U.S. 
review on the FMCT, and asked for a brief readout of U.S. 
briefings in Geneva earlier that week, which had focused on 
verification.  The U.S. side reported that consultations had 
gone well and had included contacts with a broad range of 
delegations, but were only the start of a long process.  The 
U.S. would seek early action in January at the CD for a 
negotiating mandate, but would maintain that the FMCT, unlike 
the NPT or other agreements, was not verifiable.  If Canada 
reintroduced its traditional verification resolution in the 
UNFC, the U.S. would not be able to support it if its text 
were similar to that of past years.  The Dutch EU Presidency 
then asked how the GON and/or the EU could pose FMCT 
questions to the USG.  The U.S. side invited the EU 
Presidency to forward any questions regarding an FMCT through 
either USEU or State/AC/ISN. 
 
-------------------- 
Persistent Landmines 
-------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) The EU side stated that the EU was studying the 
U.S. proposal at the CD for an international agreement to ban 
the sale or export of all persistent landmines, but cautioned 
that most EU countries give priority to existing instruments, 
especially the Ottawa Convention.  The U.S. side reiterated 
its hope that EU governments at the CD will be able to 
support negotiations on this subject early next year, 
pointing out that the U.S. had chosen the CD as the venue in 
order to avoid confusion with the Ottawa Convention or other 
demining issues. 
--------------------------------- 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
--------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) The U.S. side stated that this fall's Conference of 
CWC States Parties would mark the mid-point of the Article II 
Action Plan on national implementation of the Convention.  It 
is an ideal opportunity to assess progress to date and to set 
the agenda for the coming year, and the U.S. sees meaningful 
progress in a number of capitals on implementing measures. 
The past year also has been an exercise in gathering data 
about the status of implementation in various countries and 
the obstacles that they face.  One frequent problem is that 
many countries indicate that they are having difficulty and 
would welcome assistance, but appear to have only vague ideas 
concerning the sort of assistance needed.  Giving this issue 
a high profile at the Conference will maintain pressure; it 
also will let us "fine tune" the second year of the Action 
Plan. 
 
12. (SBU) The EU side replied that CWC was a successful 
treaty and a successful organization; under its new 
leadership, it was well under way to fulfilling its mandate. 
EU policies dovetailed with U.S. remarks about some countries 
not having implemented all the provisions, and the EU hoped 
that financial contributions would help those countries along 
the way.  The European Commission (EC) representative noted 
that this was part of the EU's WMD strategy, and that the EU 
representative for WMD nonproliferation efforts, Annalisa 
Giannella, has discussed this issue with the OPCW.  They were 
considering three areas of effort:  supporting OPCW action on 
CWC universalization (conferences, etc); supporting national 
implementation with technical or other assistance; and 
chemical sector cooperation programs.  The EC rep noted other 
EC programs:  with the Russians on the construction of CW 
destruction facilities at Gorny; with the U.S. and the UK on 
CW facilities at Shchuch,ye and Kambarka; and with the 
Germans, as well as preliminary talks with Sweden.  The EU's 
proposed budget for 2007-2013 dedicated additional funding to 
disarmament and non-proliferation, and could support chemical 
weapons destruction, especially in Russia. 
 
13. (SBU) Looking at the OPCW,s draft budget for 2005, the 
U.S. side pointed to the proposed 4.8 percent increase, 
remarking that, although the U.S. has not finalized its 
position on this proposal, it is inconsistent with overall 
U.S. budget policy in favor of zero-nominal-growth budgets in 
international organizations.  The U.S. and EU members should 
work hard for a budget agreement at the October Executive 
Council session; budget negotiations at the Conference 
usually are an opportunity for Non-Aligned "crisis" tactics 
to increase funding.  The EU side replied that the EU had 
discussed the 4.8 percent funding increase the previous day. 
Some member states felt that the increase would be hard to 
agree to, but saw value in extra funding for OPCW for 
additional inspections.  The EU would review this again in 
The Hague on September 9.  On challenge inspections, the EU 
now was developing a draft OPCW action plan that it hoped to 
discuss with key WEOG partners, including the U.S.  The EU 
side also asked about Aberdeen, inquiring whether it would be 
useful for U.S.-Russian discussions to be opened to others. 
The U.S. side undertook to report the EU interest to 
Washington. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
----------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Reviewing the July experts' meeting on disease 
surveillance, suspicious outbreaks, and alleged use of BW, 
the U.S. side described the gathering as very successful, 
providing a useful opportunity to exchange information and 
enhance international contacts.  The U.S. believed that this 
and other meetings encourage BWC States Parties to implement 
the BWC, and hoped that all States Parties would be able to 
report by 2006 that they have fully implemented the 
Convention -- an imperative reinforced by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540.  This year's meetings already have made 
progress, but an Annual Meeting document drafted by Chairman 
Goosen would need to highlight strengthening public health 
networks and mechanisms for disease surveillance; increasing 
support for the World Health Organization and other 
international bodies; agreement for prompt notification of an 
outbreak; and improved coordination and assistance among 
States Parties on public health and disease surveillance. 
The EU side agreed with the overall positive assessment of 
the experts' meeting in Geneva, particularly the constructive 
participation, including by NAM countries, and little 
politicization, other than Iranian efforts.  The EU side 
added that both sides needed to collaborate on keeping 
politicization out and enforcing discipline on the NAM in 
steering the agenda for the Meeting of States Parties in 
December.  The EU will coordinate with the U.S. on this in 
Geneva. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
15. (SBU) The EU side affirmed that, regarding mines other 
than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM), it was too early to find 
a common denominator between a total ban and unconstrained 
use.  The EU wished to integrate the Irish proposal with 
other parameters for mine use.  On Explosive Remnants of War 
(ERW), the EU highlighted the successful adoption of Protocol 
V and said that it would push for rapid entry into force. 
The EU envisioned a two-stage approach to compliance, 
beginning with a consultation process, followed by the 
subscription by States Parties to more stringent regulations. 
 These would include the referral of violations to a 
committee of experts, followed by a fact-finding mission. 
(COMMENT:  The latter stage is one that the EU would like to 
add to current procedure.  END COMMENT)  This would require 
either creating a new protocol, or amending/adding on a less 
formal agreement that would be faster, yet politically (vice 
legally) binding.  The EU may call for consultations on this 
subject under Article 13. 
 
16. (SBU) The U.S. side stated that Washington was prepared 
to continue the discussions of measures to prevent munitions 
from becoming ERW.  The U.S. supported calls by several 
states, including The Netherlands, to focus on implementation 
of existing best practices and safeguards, including the 
implementation of the new ERW protocol by states in a 
position to do so.  The international community should 
evaluate the implementation of the ERW protocol that was just 
negotiated before any consideration is given to starting a 
new negotiation on this subject.  The U.S. Administration 
currently is reviewing the protocol to determine whether to 
submit it to the Senate to seek its advice and consent to 
ratification.  In any case, the U.S. could not support a 
moratorium or ban on the use of cluster munitions, as some 
NGOs are advocating.  Such munitions have a legitimate role 
in military operations, and do not necessarily create greater 
humanitarian problems than other munitions. 
 
17. (SBU) The U.S. side observed that the U.S. and the EU are 
generally on the same track regarding MOTAPM.  The U.S, which 
plans to get rid of all its persistent landmines, could 
support the Irish proposal.  We are urging fellow co-sponsors 
of the 30-nation proposal to take it on board, and have found 
encouraging the apparent movement of India towards the 
approach set forth in this proposal.  However, China, Russia, 
and Pakistan still reject the need for a MOTAPM protocol, 
arguing that the detectability and 
self-destruct/self-deactivate requirements could create 
military problems or be too expensive to implement.  The U.S. 
intended to approach those governments bilaterally during the 
intersessional period to demonstrate that reasonable 
restraints on MOTAPM can be agreed without prejudicing 
legitimate security concerns, and encouraged similar efforts 
by EU countries.  The U.S. also is urging NGOs to make clear 
that anti-vehicle mines are indeed a humanitarian problem, 
and plans to work with Germany to fund a study on this issue 
through the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD).  The U.S. plans to meet with the Russians 
in early October to review their technical concerns; their 
willingness to engage in this way gives us some hope that we 
can bring them around.  The U.S. does not believe that 
another mandate for the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 
is necessary for the group to negotiate on a MOTAPM protocol. 
 The current mandate provides sufficient authority, and those 
who want to obstruct progress will use a debate on revising 
the GGE mandate to prevent action. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
18. (SBU) The EU noted the great importance that it attaches 
to the treaty's entry into force, which is one of the 13 
Steps agreed to at the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Review Conference and slated to be reviewed at next year,s 
RevCon.  The U.S. reaffirmed its opposition to the CTBT and 
its intention not to ratify the CTBT.  That said, the U.S. 
funds and participate in 95 percent of Preparatory Commission 
activities, and continues to observe a nuclear testing 
moratorium.  The two sides then discussed potential 
leadership changes at the IAEA and the Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (PTS).  The U.S. asserted that succession in 
 
SIPDIS 
these organizations should be considered in the context of 
turnover in other UN agencies over the next year, but hoped 
that the process for seeking a new PTS Executive-Secretary 
would move ahead in order to ensure a smooth transition next 
year.  Asked for EU views on succession issues, EU 
participants offered little on the PTS, but said that IAEA 
Director-General el-Baradei could, under the two-term/12-year 
rule, have a third term, as he has been in office for less 
than twelve years.  The U.S. side also mentioned that the 
unfavorable exchange rate between the dollar and the euro, 
among other issues, have placed serious constraints on the 
availability of funds for the U.S. assessment for 2005, and 
could shape our response to possible G-77 calls for budget 
cuts at the November meeting. 
 
19. (SBU) FYI:  AC/ISN Director Robert Luaces was laying out 
the U.S. case against the CTBT when his wristwatch alarm 
unexpectedly went off.  After a momentary silence captured 
the meeting room, Luaces quipped, &Sorry:  that was 
Washington alerting me that I,m saying too many positive 
things about the CTBT.  I,d better stop now, before my watch 
explodes and takes my wrist with it!8  A brief bout of 
laughter ensued.  END FYI 
 
------------------------ 
US-EU Summit Declaration 
------------------------ 
 
20. (SBU) The EU side reviewed the statement, noting that the 
EU continues to promote the universalization of disarmament 
and non-proliferation treaties.  Many of the follow-up issues 
were more appropriate for CONOP.  The EU supported UNSCR 
1540, which lists steps that states should take to counter 
proliferation of WMD and its delivery systems, and planned to 
report as early as possible ) hopefully, by the October 28 
deadline -- on the status of European efforts.  As the 
relevant competences within the EU usually were national, 
rather than European, there would be separate EU and national 
reporting to reflect these differences.  Regarding the IAEA 
Additional Protocol, the EU had undertaken a round of 
demarches, and found that non-adherence in most countries was 
a matter of institutional delays, rather than of policy.  On 
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the EU Presidency had 
done a quick survey and determined that member states planned 
to attend at the senior policymaking (vice political) level. 
On the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials, there were some difficulties within the EU, 
including admittedly tepid support from The Netherlands. 
Regarding the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against ballistic 
missile proliferation, the EU supported universal adherence, 
and had sent out a round of demarches aimed at increasing 
support for the Chilean resolution in the First Committee and 
asking non-adherents to become parties.  The U.S. side 
thanked the EU side for this review, and promised to provide 
responses on these issues during the September 28 U.S.-EU 
CONOP meeting. 
 
----- 
Libya 
----- 
 
21. (SBU) The EU side asked for an update on WMD 
dismantlement efforts in Iraq and Libya, and was particularly 
interested in what the U.S. was doing to assist unemployed 
WMD scientists.  The U.S. side explained that Washington was 
looking at expanding our current program with the Russians 
and trying similar work with Libya, which was made various 
proposals regarding conversion of its CW production facility 
at Rabta.  The EU Presidency described a "complete meeting of 
minds" within the EU on conversion, although the details 
still needed to be worked out.  Both sides agreed on the 
importance of ensuring that Libya not see its WMD 
renunciation as an opportunity to seek "rewards" for good 
behavior. 
 
---------------------- 
Luxembourg/Netherlands 
---------------------- 
 
22. (SBU) The Luxembourgeois informed the U.S. side on the 
margins of the meeting that the GOL has asked The Netherlands 
to continue to represent the EU presidency on CODUN and CONOP 
issues during Luxembourg,s EU presidency during the first 
half of 2005.  The Dutch confirmed this arrangement.  The 
Dutch also stated privately that, if the CD failed to adopt a 
program of work by the end of the extended Dutch EU 
presidency in June 2005, The Hague would &have8 to consider 
closing its separate diplomatic representation at the CD. 
Were this to happen, The Netherlands UN Mission in Geneva 
would represent the GON at the CD.  (COMMENT:  Of 65 CD 
member states, only twelve (including the U.S.) have separate 
delegations in Geneva accredited to the CD.  END COMMENT) 
 
------------ 
Participants 
------------ 
 
23. (U) AC/ISN Director Robert Luaces led the U.S. 
delegation, which included U.S. CD Deputy Representative 
Thomas Cynkin and USEU PolOff Maren Smith (notetaker).  The 
Dutch EU Presidency was represented by MFA Nonproliferation 
and Nuclear Affairs Director Paul Wilke, Deputy Director of 
the Arms Control and Arms Export Policy Division Freek 
Keppels, Policy Officer Elke Merks-Schaapveld, and CD Deputy 
Representative Daniel Prins.  Robert Lauer and Tim Kesseler 
attended for the upcoming Luxembourgeois EU Presidency. 
Council Secretariat participants were Andreas Strub, Tomas 
Reyes-Ortega, and Jean-Claude Brunet from the Office of the 
Personal Representative of the High Representative for 
Non-Proliferation of WMD.  Commission attendees were Marc 
Deffrennes, Head of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Unit; Laura Ligouri, from the Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament Unit; and U.S. Desk Officer Andrew Denison.  This 
meeting marked the broadest EU representation at U.S.-EU 
CODUN consultations in recent memory. 
 
24. (U) AC/ISN Director Luaces has cleared this cable. 
 
McKinley