This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 003989 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA; PRM/AFR; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS 
USAID FOR AFR,DCHA AND PPC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV EAID PHUM XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA: EU AND U.S. 
LARGELY AGREE ON SUDAN, GREAT LAKES 
 
REF: (A) BRUSSELS 3556 (B) BRUSSELS 3813 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR.  REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  The September 8 transatlantic consultations 
on Africa (COAFR) addressed priorities in the Great Lakes 
(strengthening MONUC, protecting refugees, supporting 
internal and regional dialogues), Sudan (calibrating pressure 
on the government, strengthening the AU role, meeting 
humanitarian and security needs and responding to the Pronk 
Plan); Zimbabwe (preparing for elections); and other issues 
in the Horn and West Africa.  In opening the discussions Van 
de Geer noted that "Africa has boomed on the European/EU 
agenda."  He emphasized EU interest in intensifying already 
good cooperation with the U.S. and said that the EU wants to 
be able to present a positive agenda on Africa to the 
European public.  The EU, he stated, has a positive view of 
U.S. policy in Africa. End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Participants 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) EU participants included: Roeland van de Geer, 
Director for Sub-Saharan Affairs (MFA), Norbert Braakhuis, 
Deputy Director, Sub-Saharan Affairs (MFA), Hein Knegt, 
Senior Policy Advisor for Sub-Saharan Affairs (MFA), Gerda 
Vrielink, Senior Policy Advisor for Sub-Saharan Affairs 
(MFA), and Guusje Korthals Altes, Senior Policy Advisor 
(Dutch Embassy/Washington), for the Dutch Presidency; 
Ambassador Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes; 
Peter Clausen, Jesper Tvevad and Genoveva Hernandez, Africa 
Desk Officers for the EU Council Secretariat; Anders 
Henriksson, Director for the Horn, East and Southern Africa 
(DG DEV), Sipke Brouwer, Director for Central  and West 
Africa (DG DEV), and Marc van Bellinghen , Deputy Head of 
Unit for ACP Issues (DG RELEX) for the European Commission 
(EC); and Alain de Muyser, Director for African Affairs (MFA) 
and Nadia Ernzer, Senior Advisor for Africa and CIS Affairs 
(MFA) for the incoming Luxembourg Presidency.  USDEL 
consisted of Ambassador Michael Ranneberger (Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, AF), John Nay (Director, AF/Regional and 
Security Affairs), Patricia Lerner (Development Counselor, 
USEU/USAID), and Marc Meznar (Political Officer, USEU/PRM). 
 
-------------------------------- 
Great Lakes 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In his initial overview of the Great Lakes region, 
Ajello said that he is not encouraged by recent developments. 
 The peace processes in both DRC and Burundi remain fragile, 
as does the democratization process in Rwanda.  Regarding the 
DRC, Ajello said that the existence of parallel structures in 
both the government and military -- one official and the 
other where real power rests -- is at the root of 
instability.  DRC's government of national unity is unable to 
withstand the "negative forces" emanating from the 
President's cabinet and the "maison militaire" which control 
the country.  Ajello singled out security sector reforms as 
the number one priority to stabilize DRC.  He said that the 
international community has put forth an array of plans to 
reorganize the army, but that they should work together to 
move this needed objective forward.  He expressed optimism 
that South Africa and Angola have agreed to cooperate in this 
area.  Ajello was not optimistic about the World Bank's 
program to disarm and demobilize soldiers; he also emphasized 
the need to disarm non-Congolese forces in the country. 
 
¶4. (C) Regarding MONUC, Ajello said he favored reworking its 
mandate to remove some responsibilities (such as its 
humanitarian mission).  Ranneberger said that while the U.S. 
favored reviewing MONUC's mission, it did not favor a large 
expansion of personnel.  The EU side called for increased 
attention to the quality of troops being brought in.  Van de 
Geer commented that while endless numbers of Bangladeshis and 
Uruguayans could swell the ranks, troops that cannot speak 
the language, don,t know the terrain, and operate in a 
"bubble" might only succeed in ruining the reputations of the 
UN and MONUC.  Ajello contrasted MONUC to the EU's (mainly 
French-speaking) Operation Artemis where the perceived and 
real readiness to respond to challenges and disturbances was 
highly effective.  Ajello conceded that although in certain 
situations size could compensate for lack of quality, MONUC 
should not become "an aggregation of banana republics." He 
advocated targeting MONUC forces in Kinshasa, Ituri, and the 
Kivus, as well as having a reserve force that can quickly 
deploy to areas where a need arises, and training Congolese 
forces to deploy with MONUC.  When Lerner asked about the 
possibility of another EU peacekeeping operation in the Great 
Lakes, van de Geer denied there were plans and said it would 
not be needed if MONUC could be fixed. Ranneberger said that 
the U.S. would not support a massive expansion of MONUC.  Van 
de Geer said that the EU was preparing a paper with options 
for MONUC and would share this.  Van de Geer and Ajello said 
that one option being considered is to "bring up to speed" 
two Congolese brigades to help with disarmament.  The South 
Africans have indicated that they might be willing to help 
with this.  Van de Geer and Ajello raised the possibility of 
a collaborative U.S./EU/African effort. 
 
¶5. (C) Regarding Burundi, Ajello said that both sides were 
not only pushing for ethnic balance, but also concerned with 
the political persuasions of those representing their ethnic 
communities.  Van de Geer referred to the work of the Dutch 
government in mediating between the FNL and the government. 
He said that the FNL remains a problem because of the lack of 
political progress among the parties in the government of 
national unity.  Braakhuis noted that while the international 
community deplored the massacre of refugees by rebels, no one 
said a word when a week later the Government was complicit in 
the killing of 200 people.  He sketched out a "worst case 
scenario" in Burundi as follows:  general spread of chaos and 
insecurity followed by a 1993-type incident with a military 
takeover of power -- one where they would go "all the way" 
because power sharing had not worked -- and consequent 
destabilization of the neighboring countries. 
 
¶6. (C) Ajello characterized the Gatumba massacre of refugees 
from the DRC as "one of the most horrible things I've seen." 
He lamented the fact that, by chance, UNHCR had housed the 
Tutsis in green tents and the others in white ones (the 
Tutsis had arrived later, after the white tents were all in 
use), which made the ethnic-based slaughter easier to carry 
out.  He also noted that while the GoB had granted permission 
to move the camps away from the border, the refugees 
themselves seemed determined to return home and thus did not 
wish to move further from the border.  Van de Geer said that 
the attack on DRC refugees in Burundi threatened to undermine 
the whole region.  Meznar noted that the desire to return 
probably stemmed from the lack of security.  He noted UNHCR 
had put forth an appeal for its work in Burundi and that 
funding would help the agency further ensure the safety of 
refugees.  Meznar also referred to the successful joint 
U.S.-EC mission in April which assessed the return of 
Burundian refugees from Tanzania. 
 
¶7. (C) With reference to Rwanda, Ajello said he felt the EU 
needed to be more active and frank in dealing with the 
government.  Despite the historical context and the GOR,s 
concerns, "there are limits" beyond which the GOR should not 
go, he noted.  Ajello asked for increased coordination with 
the U.S. in this regard.  Van de Geer agreed and said that 
the GoR was too "heavy handed." 
 
¶8. (C) Van de Geer praised the work of the USG in bringing 
together foreign ministers from the region on August 24 in 
Kampala. U.S. efforts, he said, helped prevent the crisis in 
the Congo from spilling over into the region.  He warned that 
President Kabila is trying to reopen some elements of the 
agreed Kampala text. Ranneberger briefed on U.S. plans to 
host a signing ceremony on the margins of the UNGA to 
formally constitute the Tripartite Commission.  Van de Geer 
and Ajello expressed strong support. He said that the Great 
Lakes Conference scheduled for this November would be another 
opportunity for the leaders of the region to interact. 
Ranneberger noted the U.S.,s skepticism about the 
conference; he asked what the specific agenda would be and 
what the EU hoped the conference would accomplish.  Van de 
Geer said that the EU was also was skeptical, and 
"exceedingly frustrated" over the lack of progress in this 
regard.  Braakhuis noted that on September 13 the "group of 
friends" would meet and hopefully move the agenda forward. 
He invited the U.S. to participate.  (The U.S. delegation 
alerted Embassy The Hague.)   Ajello said that he would be in 
New York on Sept 20 for the UNGA, and expressed interest in 
meeting with U.S. officials.  Ranneberger said that we would 
try to arrange that and be in touch with him directly in New 
York. 
 
------------------------ 
Sudan 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Ranneberger presented a sober analysis on Sudan noting 
the north/south negotiations are stalled and that the GoS is 
trying to use Darfur as leverage, arguing that it cannot 
proceed in the north/south talks while it is under so much 
pressure on Darfur.  He emphasized the U.S. view that the 
north/south talks and resolution of the crisis in Darfur must 
move forward in parallel.  The two situations are linked in 
practical terms.  Progress toward a comprehensive north/south 
agreement will increase pressure for progress on Darfur, and 
both sides know that a north/south agreement cannot be 
implemented unless violence is ended in Darfur.  Ranneberger 
noted that John Garang was currently in Washington and that 
the USG was urging him to be helpful in resolving the Darfur 
crisis; unfortunately, there are indications that he is 
urging the rebels to maintain maximalist positions.  The USG 
has also warned Garang that time is running out on the peace 
process (and its subsequent peace dividend).  Garang, 
mistakenly in the U.S. view, believes that delay works in his 
favor by building pressure on the GOS.  Van de Geer said the 
EU shares the approach of pushing resolution of both Darfur 
and the north/south negotiations in parallel.  He noted the 
same resistance from Garang to assist in Darfur, despite his 
one-day appearance at the Abuja talks.  "We can't wait for 
him to become Vice President," was van de Geer's message. 
 
¶10. (C) Ranneberger presented the U.S. assessment of the 
situation in Darfur. While there has been significant removal 
of some obstacles to humanitarian assistance, the GoS had 
taken no credible actions to improve security. The plan of 
action developed by SRSG Pronk with the GOS is problematic in 
several respects, particularly in creating so-called "safe 
areas."  The GOS is using the concept to develop "safe areas" 
that include rebel-held territory as a pretext to mount 
operations against rebel forces in those areas.  Recent GOS 
attacks involving the use of helicopter gunships, verified by 
the AU, highlights GOS failure to respect the ceasefire. 
Ranneberger emphasized the need to press the GOS and the 
Darfur rebels to move ahead quickly to resolve political and 
security issues. The talks thus far have made some progress 
in reaching a protocol on humanitarian access to rebel-held 
areas, but the rebels will not agree to sign the protocol 
until agreement is also reached on a protocol on security 
issues.  The AU has tabled a compromise security proposal. 
Ranneberger reported the U.S. will soon issue a report, based 
on interviews with almost 1200 refugees in camps along the 
Chad border, which will document the close links between the 
GoS and the janjaweid. Van de Geer said the EU is considering 
a second fact-finding mission.  Regarding public statements 
by the head of the first mission (reftel a), Van de Geer said 
he regretted the statements allowed the GoS to get the 
misimpression that the EU was less concerned than the U.S. 
about the situation.  He believed that misunderstanding has 
since been clarified, however. 
 
¶11. (C) From the Commission's point of view, Henriksson 
questioned whether too much external pressure could provoke 
the government to collapse and destabilize the region.  He 
also wondered whether the GoS was still in control of the 
events in Darfur and to what extent a chain of command still 
existed in the government.  Ranneberger responded that there 
is no alternative to maintaining and intensifying pressure. 
Pressure could conceivably lead to a shake-up in the 
government, but the resulting situation would be no worse 
than the current situation. While the GoS has unleashed a 
monster in the janjaweid, the GOS is still in a position to 
take the necessary political and security steps to stop the 
violence. Braakhuis expressed concern over a split within the 
government -- "The GoS can control the monster, but can it 
control the monster within?" 
¶12. (C) Regarding the Pronk plan, Ranneberger said the USG 
had not been consulted and believes that the plan is 
seriously flawed.  Rather, however, than oppose the Pronk 
plan, the U.S. has made clear that its 14-point list of 
required steps given to the GOS is still on the table.  The 
U.S. has indicated that the steps it intends to take, 
including in the UNSC, will in part be determined by the U.S. 
assessment of GOS actions with respect to the 14 points.  Van 
de Geer appealed for a united stand on the Pronk plan, noting 
he was aware the USG was unhappy that Pronk had underplayed 
the negative aspects of the current situation during his UN 
presentation.  He stated there were also parts of the plan 
the EU was unhappy with, and that the EU too would keep its 
Council Conclusions of the 12th and the 26th as road maps for 
Sudan.  "Meeting the Pronk Plan will not get them off the 
hook, neither for the EU nor the U.S.," Van de Geer 
concluded.  There was a brief discussion of the new 
U.S.-drafted UNGA resolution (reftel b). 
 
¶13. (C) Both sides were positive about the involvement of the 
AU in Darfur.  Ranneberger noted that the AU has moved 
quickly and effectively to set up its mission in Darfur.  The 
AU realizes that its handling of Darfur could be a "make or 
break" test case for the organization.  Ranneberger 
emphasized that continuing EU and U.S. technical, logistical, 
and financial support for the AU to ramp up its mission is 
essential. Ranneberger reported that the U.S. is publicly 
calling for an expansion of the AU mission, and will announce 
an additional 21 million dollars for the mission; putting 
money on the table will make it harder for both the AU and 
the GoS not to move ahead quickly. 
 
¶14. (C) The U.S. and EU teams agreed that Egyptian 
involvement to press the GOS on Darfur is helpful.  Efforts 
should be made to persuade the Arab League to do more.  Van 
de Geer expressed concerns about Eritrea's involvement in the 
Sudan conflict. Ranneberger described U.S. efforts to press 
Eritrea not to exacerbate the situation in Sudan, 
particularly in the east. 
 
¶15. (C) Ranneberger said that, while there is some progress 
on the humanitarian front, about 50 percent of the population 
cannot be reached on a regular basis, largely due to the 
continuing environment of insecurity. Ranneberger reviewed 
U.S. efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. Lerner 
requested EU help in convincing donor countries to increase 
food assistance to Darfur. She noted the U.S. has been very 
generous, but will be unable to make further commitments 
until and unless the GoS revises its GMO restrictions.  Van 
de Geer said the Dutch Presidency would take the request to 
the Member States, noting that the combined EU total of 
assistance so far was about 285 million euros and that the EU 
was prepared to give more for the humanitarian response. 
 
------------------------ 
Horn of Africa 
------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) Both sides expressed concern at the lack of tangible 
success in dealing with problems that affect Eritrea. 
Ranneberger pointed out that President Isaias has a general 
disregard for outside pressure.  Isaias still has not 
accepted the credentials of the new U.S. Ambassador in 
Asmara, nor is the U.S. able to influence him on the 
detention of two Department foreign service nationals.  Nay 
said that some tension also was caused by the most recent 
U.S. international religious freedom report on Eritrea.  The 
only glimmer of hope was a commitment to not move 
belligerently on the boundary situation "for the time being." 
 Van de Geer expressed similar frustration with Isaias, but 
noted that in a recent meeting the Dutch Development Minister 
gave him "a cookie of his own making" (i.e., a hard time). 
Van de Geer said that the EU was supporting Axworthy and 
standing by the boundary commission, but asked what this 
would amount to in the end.  The EU is encouraging Axworthy 
to convene a meeting in Algiers to brainstorm, perhaps to 
have the IMF and World Bank work out a peace dividend plan. 
Regarding UNMEE, Nay said that the U.S. is looking at the 
numbers carefully.  Although perhaps UNMEE,s numbers should 
be reduced, rather than pushing for the pullout of a specific 
unit, it likely would be better to spread any reduction out 
over UNMEE and thus reduce the risk of sending a damaging 
signal about the commitment to peace on the border. 
 
¶17. (C) Due to the press of time, there was only a very short 
discussion on Ethiopia.  Lerner asked the EU views on the 
GoE's resettlement plans.  Braakhuis said there were Member 
State concerns, but did not elaborate.  Henriksson noted 
U.S.-EU cooperation under the G8 Famine Initiative and said 
the Commission is engaged in a policy dialogue on food 
security with Ethiopia, but that the government is not 
behaving rationally.  He said that Ethiopia is "facing real 
choices" regarding its resettlement and agricultural 
policies.  On another note, Henriksson said that Ethiopia's 
engagement with Somalia has been positive. 
 
¶18. (C) Regarding the peace process in Somalia, Van de Geer 
said that many Member States are hopeful about recent 
developments and that the EU maintains "very guarded 
optimism."  He said most of the Member States will be 
represented at the inauguration of the transitional national 
government, although some still had legal and political 
questions (including about Somaliland) to be resolved. 
Braakhuis expressed concern that General Morgan and other 
rebels might try to challenge the new government; on a more 
optimistic note he said that for the first time neighboring 
countries did not seem to be supporting the spoilers. 
Henriksson asked whether the international community would 
respond with targeted sanctions.  The EU urged the U.S. to at 
least be perceived to engage with Somalia.  Ranneberger noted 
that the U.S. had contributed 1 million dollars to IGAD to 
support the Somalia process, and that another 900,000 dollars 
would be made available for engagement with civil society and 
efforts to promote reconciliation.  Nay said that the U.S. 
has issued a public statement welcoming developments in 
Somalia. 
 
------------------------ 
Uganda 
------------------------ 
 
¶19. (C) Van de Geer said that the war in the north of Uganda 
threatens to destroy the country.  Not only does it drain the 
budget, but it is destroying President Museveni's image.  He 
said that Museveni might win a few battles, but that he 
cannot win the war.  Van de Geer also noted that although 
this is currently a "forgotten war," once the press discovers 
it Museveni's image will truly suffer.  (Van de Geer reported 
that Museveni has told the EU that he gets support for the 
war from the U.S. and that the U.S. will capture LRA leader 
Joseph Kony for him.)  Henriksson said that the GoU has 
proposals for a big reconstruction program for the north, 
which the Commission rejects as an extremely premature 
discussion. 
 
¶20. (C) Van de Geer said the EU had thought of suggesting a 
mediation effort between the LRA and GOU, but that when 
Museveni went to the International Criminal Court over Kony 
and other leaders the EU felt the need to back away from the 
proposal.  The Netherlands, however, will remain in contact 
with lower echelons in the LRA to maintain options to help 
facilitate an end to the conflict. 
 
¶21. (C) Ranneberger said that 52 percent of the GoU's budget 
comes from the international community.  He expressed concern 
that the GoU is using much of this to acquire weapons beyond 
the type and amount legitimately needed, and asked whether 
the EU conditions any of its aid, particularly in light of 
inappropriate arms purchases.  Van de Geer reported that only 
the Netherlands has suspended budget support to the GOU 
because of arms purchases.  Henriksson said that continued 
military expenses would serve to undermine public support for 
the Commission's assistance to the GoU.  Braakhuis noted that 
spending on social programs is down, yet overall spending is 
up because of costs associated with the Presidency and the 
war; he added that Uganda is slipping vis-a-vis IMF criteria 
across the board.  Both sides agree that the U.S. and EU 
should coordinate closely to discourage a third term by 
Museveni. 
--------------------------------- 
Zimbabwe 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) Both sides indicated that they were in the midst of 
internal reviews regarding their Zimbabwe policy, and agreed 
to exchange papers (once the reviews have progressed further) 
on how to address the deteriorating political and 
socio-economic situations in Zimbabwe.  Ranneberger expressed 
concern that no concrete results have come from South 
Africa's engagement with President Mugabe and said that South 
Africa should be more forceful.  Van de Geer said that the EU 
raised the issue with South Africa at a troika meeting in May 
and it seemed as if South Africa had made a genuine -- albeit 
unsuccessful -- attempt to influence Mugabe.  The EU also 
made demarches in all SADC countries, but most have 
disengaged in the last few months.  Only Angola's response 
was surprisingly positive.  He said that the UK has a "large, 
but guarded" role in addressing the situation in Zimbabwe. 
Van de Geer emphasized that the EU will not reverse its tough 
approach. 
 
¶23. (C) Van de Geer characterized the SADC election 
principles as "the best show in town" and said that the 
GoZ,s reported acceptance of the principles is a potentially 
positive development that must be followed up vigorously. He 
expressed concern, however, that the opposition MDC is still 
threatening to boycott the elections and is diminishing as a 
viable alternative to the regime.  He also said that if the 
EU concluded the elections were not "credible and democratic" 
it would not feel compelled to rubberstamp a SADC positive 
assessment of the elections.  The EU will meet with six SADC 
members in the Netherlands on October 20 to further discuss 
the situation in Zimbabwe.  Lerner inquired whether there are 
ways the U.S. and EU can work to build capacity for the 
elections.  Henriksson indicated assent.  Nay said that the 
U.S. is contributing 400,000 dollars for electoral support 
(not channeled through the government, but for programs like 
voter education).  Van de Geer expressed concern that the new 
Zimbabwean government bill on NGOs could effectively kill 
civil society in the country.  He reported the EU will 
maintain its sanctions through the elections. 
 
------------------------ 
West Africa 
------------------------ 
 
¶24. (C) Due to time limitations, other issues on the agenda 
were not dealt with in as much depth. 
 
-- ECOWAS:  The EU had a "frank exchange" at the recent 
EU-ECOWAS summit on Charles Taylor, with a difference about 
timing.  Both the U.S. and EU have a positive assessment of 
ECOWAS as contributing to regional stability. 
 
-- Cote d'Ivoire:  The EU has engaged in Article 96 
consultations. 
 
-- Nigeria:  The U.S. remains concerned about corruption and 
religious/regional conflict. 
 
-- Oil:  In response to an EU question, the U.S. noted that 
although a growing percentage of US petroleum imports comes 
from Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea area, this follows the 
market and is not part of a specific strategic plan to lessen 
dependence on Middle East sources. 
 
-- Liberia:  Lerner noted concerns over donor coordination in 
Monrovia which may have led to duplication of efforts in some 
reconstruction work.  Nay said a follow-up meeting on Liberia 
reconstruction will take place on September 24. 
 
-- Guinea:  Van Bellinghen said the EU opened Article 96 
consultations in July and the GoG has agreed to have 
elections in 2007.  The EU will receive a plan of action by 
the end of this month.  Until a viable program is in place, 
the Commission will not sign the 9th European Development 
Fund agreement with Guinea.  At the EU-AU Troika meeting on 
May 18, Nigeria asked for EU help in getting through to 
President Conte, who seems to remain upset with ECOWAS for 
not helping Guinea when it was attacked by forces supported 
by Charles Taylor.  Meznar briefed on plans for a joint 
PRM-ECHO monitoring trip to Guinea in early 2005 to assess 
the humanitarian situation and GoG relations with UNHCR. 
 
 
-- Africa Peace Facility:  Responding to a U.S. inquiry, 
Henriksson explained that there is a black list of items 
which cannot be funded with this money.  However, he noted 
that the Member States have more flexibility with regard to 
items such as weapons, ammunition and salaries for soldiers. 
 
-- Other issues briefly discussed included HIV/AIDS and 
counter-terrorism. 
Comment 
------------------------ 
 
¶25. Unlike previous troika discussions, the Presidency 
monopolized the EU side of the discussion.  Following the 
meeting, Council Secretariat staff confided that about 60 
percent of what was said by van de Geer reflected Dutch -- 
not EU -- points for view.  Luxembourg was totally silent, 
which may mark the tone for the upcoming presidency. Since 
Luxembourg has almost no presence in Africa, it is expected 
to rely heavily on the Dutch. The EU agreed to Ranneberger's 
suggestion that a short list of concrete measures to improve 
transatlantic efforts and coordination be drawn up and 
reviewed at the next meeting (tentatively scheduled for March 
11, 2005).  The Council Secretariat will draft the list in 
coordination with USEU. 
 
(Ambassador Ranneberger has cleared this message.) 
 
Minimize considered. 
 
SCHNABEL