This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 003782 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR DAS LAURA KENNEDY, EUR/CACEN, EUR/ERA TOM 
LERSTEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV EAID GG AM AJ KZ KG TI TX UZ EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA 
(COEST) 
 
REF: USEU TODAY 09/02/04 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On September 1 EUR DAS Laura Kennedy held 
semi-annual consultations with the EU on Caucasus and Central 
Asia (COEST).  Caucasus discussions concentrated on 
establishing a political process to resolve the South Ossetia 
conflict (Kennedy met separately on South Ossetia with Heikki 
Talvitie, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, 
who had just returned from the region -- see ref), and on 
reviewing the issues in play in Nagorno-Karabakh with an eye 
toward developing a comprehensive plan to move forward. 
Regarding both conflicts, interlocutors focused on getting 
the Russians to play a positive role and work with, rather 
than seek to exclude, the OSCE.  COEST participants 
consistently emphasized the need for promoting regional 
cooperation in both the Caucasus and Central Asia.  On 
Central Asia, both sides agreed on the importance of building 
civil society and coordinating U.S. and EU promotion of 
democratic reform and development assistance.  Noting this 
summer's terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan, the EU said the 
Uzbeks had asked them to designate Hizb-ut Tahrir as a 
terrorist group (the U.S. has not designated Hizb-ut Tahrir). 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
SOUTH OSSETIA: STARTING A POLITICAL PROCESS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Jan Lucas Van Hoorn, Director of the Southeast and 
Eastern Europe Department in the Dutch MFA (the Netherlands 
is the current EU president), said the key in South Ossetia 
was to keep hostilities from flaring up and introduce 
confidence-building measures.  He supported Tbilisi OSCE HOM 
Roy Reeve's idea of setting up confidence-building working 
groups focused on key issues.  After those groups had made 
progress, added van Hoorn, then a higher-level process could 
begin, either via the Joint Control Commission (JCC) or by 
reviving the Baden process, as proposed by the U.S.  Van 
Hoorn noted that the EU would have its Cooperation Council 
meetings with all three Caucasus countries on September 14. 
On September 13, Dutch FM Bot and EU HighRep Solana would 
have dinner with the three FM's from Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.  Van Hoorn implied that the EU intended to raise 
and endorse Reeve's CBM proposal at these meetings. 
 
------------------------------------- 
MEANING OF SOUTH OSSETIAN "AUTONOMY?" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Van Hoorn lamented the lack of clarity on how the 
Georgians planned to flesh out the concept of autonomy for 
South Ossetia.  He said Georgia should be encouraged to make 
progress on defining the autonomy for Ajara; that would send 
an important, positive signal to the South Ossetians and the 
Russians.  Kennedy noted the difference between the 
situations but agreed that the definition of autonomy was a 
crucial element for the future of South Ossetia.  She 
underlined the role of positive public signals; she said, for 
example, that supportive statements such as Georgia had made 
to the Russians regarding the recent hostage-taking in North 
Ossetia could go a long way toward defusing the tensions with 
Russia that were complicating the search for a solution in 
South Ossetia.  We had consistently urged Saakashvili to 
cease inflammatory rhetoric.  Now that he had disengaged 
militarily, we need to push the Russians to engage 
politically. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ABKHAZIA: PROGRESS AFTER ELECTIONS? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) On Abkhazia, Kennedy suggested that the U.S. and the 
EU explore the possibilities for new movement after the 
October Abkhaz elections, perhaps by revitalizing the 
"Friends of Georgia" process.  Van Hoorn agreed, but said the 
Dutch experience as 2003 OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) had 
been that Abkhazia is "the hardest nut to crack" of all of 
the conflicts in the region.  He suggested that Georgian 
public acceptance of the concept of dual Georgian/Russian 
nationality for South Ossetians and Abkhazians could lead to 
progress in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Kennedy 
cautioned that such a move would reward the Russian policy of 
liberally granting Russian citizenship in those regions, and 
could be unacceptable to the Georgians. 
 
----------------------------- 
IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
----------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Both sides agreed that continued pursuit of economic 
reform was a key factor in increasing political stability in 
Georgia and the Caucasus in general.  Aid channelled through 
the Millenium Challenge Corporation -- with its emphasis on 
reform -- was key in Georgia.  Also, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline would be vital to the future of Georgia 
not only as an energy corridor, but also as an example to 
other investors of the attractiveness of doing business 
there.  Kurt Juul, Head of Unit for South Caucasus and 
Central Asia in the External Affairs Directorate of the 
European Commission, said Commission President Romano Prodi 
planned to underscore the importance of economic reform when 
he visits the region on September 16.  Both sides agreed on 
the importance of sending a clear message to Georgian 
President Saakashvili that he must not divert his focus from 
the need to follow through on his economic reform 
initiatives. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH: STATE OF PLAY AND RUSSIA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Van Hoorn noted that the September 14 EU Cooperation 
Council meeting with the three Caucasus countries would take 
place just before the CIS Summit in Astana.  Now that 
Azerbaijan's President Aliyev has been in office for a year, 
the EU hopes to see a clear indication that he will make 
progress, van Hoorn asserted.  He added that Armenia was 
concerned, with good reason, about being excluded from the 
development of infrastructure in the region. 
 
¶7. (C) Kennedy noted that the Azeri and Armenian foreign 
ministers had met in Prague earlier in the week.  U.S. Minsk 
Group Co-Chair Steve Mann had reported on a positive meeting; 
its focus on technical matters  -- access issues, for example 
-- was useful. Perhaps after another similar session, the 
parties could consider an overall plan.   The Azeri foreign 
minister seemed to be growing into his role.  Kennedy agreed 
that the Astana meeting between the leaders was the next key 
step. 
 
¶8. (C) COEST participants discussed the need to watch 
carefully Russian President Putin's upcoming meeting with his 
Armenian and Azeri counterparts in Astana.  Putin had 
essentially invited himself, possibly intending to cut the 
OSCE and the Minsk Group out of future negotiations.  Michael 
Swann, South Caucasus and Central Asia Desk Officer in the EU 
Council Secretariat, remarked that some -- especially in 
Azerbaijan -- had "had it" with the Minsk Group, and might 
thus be receptive to Putin's efforts to sideline it.  Van 
Hoorn underscored that the EU would have to provide 
Azerbaijan and Armenia with a clear message in support of the 
Minsk Group at the upcoming Cooperation Council.  Kennedy 
added that we also needed to urge the Russians at all levels 
to endorse the OSCE and the Minsk Group -- of which Russia is 
one of the co-chairs.  Van Hoorn said he expected the EU 
would take this up at the November 11 EU-Russia Summit in The 
Hague. 
 
----------------------------- 
CAUCASUS: A REGIONAL APPROACH 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) COEST participants consistently emphasized the need 
for a regional -- vice country-by-country -- approach to both 
the Caucasus and Central Asia.  As Juul portrayed the 
Commission point of view, the U.S. and the EU have regional 
assistance programs, but interactions with the recipients 
tend to focus on individual countries -- this provided each 
with the opportunity to blame its problems and failings on 
its neighbors.  Taking a collective approach and working with 
recipient countries as a unit could help break this pattern, 
he suggested.  On the Caucasus specifically, he commented 
that Commission President Prodi's September 16 meetings with 
all three leaders (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) would 
provide the best near-term opportunity to reinforce messages. 
 He pointed to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as an 
example of the EU -- or at least Commission -- interest in 
addressing the region more broadly.  Energy would be a 
particularly important agenda item in EU discussions with 
these three countries, he said.  Armenia's nuclear power 
plant -- now run by Russians -- was unsafe; the EU had been 
trying for years to get it closed.  According to Juul, the 
Commission was prepared to convene a donors' conference to 
raise funds for alternate energy sources; he had hoped the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) would be a source of 
contributions, but it appeared that the MCA was focused on 
poverty reduction instead. 
------------------------------------ 
CENTRAL ASIA: BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) On Central Asia, both sides agreed on the difficulty 
and importance of helping to build civil society.  Swann 
commented that the EU had to deal with "substandard 
governments and substandard civil society" -- the governments 
were suspicious of efforts to reach out to NGOs and other 
groups, while NGOs and the press tended to take irresponsible 
actions that aroused further government suspicion.  The U.S. 
and EU, suggested van Hoorn, needed to call all parties on 
their behavior -- and to encourage further contact between 
government and civil society representatives. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
CENTRAL ASIA:  PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, COORDINATING AID 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶11. (C) Kennedy solicited EU support for several assistance 
projects in Central Asia.  Money was still needed to complete 
the bridge from Tajikistan into Afghanistan and the road 
leading up to the bridge, she said, and an EU contribution 
would be appreciated.  The EU declined to respond directly, 
but noted that the EU would sign its Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan in October.  Juul 
pointed out that again, the key was a regional approach; and 
Afghanistan is also a part of the region.  He said the 
Commission was trying to get the Central Asian countries to 
work together wherever possible on poverty reduction, 
fighting drugs and crime, and governance. 
 
¶12. (C) Key to the regional approach, Kennedy pointed out, 
was the OSCE.  Kazakhstan's desire for 2009 OSCE Chairmanship 
offered the U.S. and EU the opportunity to press for 
political reform and better respect for human rights.  An 
important near-term indicator would be how Kazakhstan 
conducted its September elections.  Van Hoorn agreed, saying 
Kazakhstan today was a poor candidate, but the decision 
doesn't need to be made until 2008.  In the meantime, the EU 
has not reached a "common position" on Kazakhstan's bid but 
will wait and see how it evolves.  Given Russia's concerns 
with the OSCE, he said, it would be "interesting" to have a 
CIS country as chairman.  However, he noted that Kazakhstan 
had signed the CIS statement critical of the OSCE; he added 
that the EU had pointed out to the Kazakhs that this was 
inconsistent with seeking the OSCE chairmanship.  Van Hoorn 
said Commissioner Patten had leaned heavily on Kazakhstan 
during his March visit on issues such as the proposed media 
law and elections.  The media law has since been withdrawn, 
and Van Hoorn concluded that U.S. and EU efforts can lead to 
changes in Kazakhstan. 
 
¶13. (C) It was also important that Turkmenistan, despite its 
autocratic dictatorship, not be isolated.  A central factor 
in keeping engaged with Turkmenistan would be to find a 
successor for the OSCE HOM in Ashgabat, Paraschiva Badescu, 
who could be equally effective in pressing for human rights 
and civil society.  Kennedy urged U.S.-EU cooperation in the 
search for the right successor; the worst signal that could 
be sent to Ashgabat would be if no qualified candidate could 
be found. 
 
¶14. (C) Returning to the topic of civil society and 
coordinating assistance, Kennedy urged the EU to support 
independent media in Kyrgyzstan by funding the Freedom House 
printing press there.  Juul noted that the Commission's TACIS 
program was not structured for this type of assistance, but 
Van Hoorn and the Council Secretariat were receptive to using 
the EU's COEST Working Group to identify possible EU member 
states who could provide bilateral assistance.  (USEU 
subsequently provided the EU Council with a non-paper 
outlining the need for donors to support independent media in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and with details on the road spur 
between the Afghan border and the Tajik town of Dusti.) 
 
------------------------ 
UZBEKISTAN AND TERRORISM 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (C) EU representatives were very interested in how 
Tashkent had reacted to the U.S. decision earlier this year 
not to certify Uzbekistan, and sought U.S. views on the 
likelihood of instability in a post-Karimov era.  Kennedy 
noted our hopes to continue to engage Uzbekistan on the 
reform front; we hoped to send a senior official to discuss 
economic reform.  Noting this summer's terrorist attacks on 
US and Israeli embassies, Van Hoorn asked whether we had 
added a group called Hizb-ut Tahrir to our list of terrorist 
groups; he said that the EU would consider this soon but he 
was not himself convinced that the group should be so 
designated.  Van der Togt opined that there are no legal 
grounds for banning them in most other EU countries, 
especially given the group's vague message -- it is hard, he 
said, to determine exactly what the organization stands for 
or intends to do.  Van der Togt added that the Uzbeks raise 
this group with the Dutch "all the time" in meetings.  (NOTE: 
 Uzbekistan has also approached the U.S. repeatedly with the 
same request, but the USG has not designated the group as a 
terrorist organization.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶16. (C) COMMENT:  In the course of discussions, Kennedy 
suggested that the agenda for the next COEST meeting include 
a more detailed discussion of coordination of development 
assistance and offered to include a representative from 
EUR/ACE on the U.S. delegation for that purpose.  The EU 
welcomed the proposal.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by EUR DAS Laura 
Kennedy. 
 
SCHNABEL