This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003772 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2014 
TAGS: PREL EAID IZ BM SU SR IR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: GYMNICH RESULTS ON BURMA, SUDAN, MIDDLE EAST AND 
BALKANS HOLD NO SURPRISES 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 3749 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The EU Foreign Ministers' informal "Gymnich" meeting 
in Maastricht on September 3-4 proceeded as expected 
(reftel).  The EU will go ahead with the Asia-EU (ASEM) 
Summit in Hanoi on October 7-9, as long as Burma attends at 
the FM or lower level, but the FMs also announced further 
sanctions they would impose unless Burma's human rights 
record improves by then.  To underline their concerns about 
the situation in Darfur, EU FMs asked the Council Secretariat 
to prepare a draft list of sanctions the EU could consider 
imposing on the Sudanese Government in the future.  The EU 
declared it would be prepared to respond positively if the 
African Union requests an EU Police Mission for Sudan.  On 
Iraq, the general EU mood was positive on member states 
responding to requests for financial support of a UN 
multinational force, although no Community funds can be spent 
on the force.  The EU also underlined the need for the next 
Quartet meeting in New York to propose "concrete steps" 
forward.  There was no agreement that the EU should support 
IAEA referral of Iran to the UNSC in September, but the EU 
still hoped to send a "clear signal" to Teheran.  Regarding 
the Balkans, the Commission got approval to talk separately 
to the Serbian and Montenegrin governments about negotiating 
a Stabilization and Association Agreement, although the EU 
insisted the two republics should remain one country.   The 
EU consensus on developments in Kosovo tracked very closely 
with the recent report of UN envoy Kai Eide.  End Summary. 
 
ASEM/BURMA: TIGHTENING SANCTIONS, WHILE AGREEING TO TALK 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2. (U) EU FMs agreed on a non-paper outlining the EU's 
strategy, which should now be formally endorsed at the 
September 13 GAERC meeting in Brussels (copy faxed to 
EUR/ERA).  In short, EU is going ahead with the ASEM meeting 
(it would be an "affront to the Asians" to cancel it, Bot 
told the Dutch press).  The EU's "expectation" is that, if 
the Burmese don't meet the EU's three demands (release of 
Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, an end to harassment of 
the National League for Democracy, and a "genuine open debate 
in the National Convention) by then, the Burmese participant 
should be "lower than at the the level of Head of 
State/Government" and the summit will be "an opportunity to 
confront Burma" on human rights concerns.  EU would also 
adopt a revised Common Position on Burma that would "tighten 
existing measures" by: an expansion of its visa ban to all 
officers at Brigadier General and above and their families; 
prohibiting EU companies from "making any finance available 
to named state-owned enterprises; EU Members States voting 
against IFI loans to Burma; and consideration of proposals to 
address illegal logging.  The EU would also increase its aid 
to health and education, in consultation with the NLD. 
 
SUDAN/DARFUR:  KEEPING THE SANCTIONS OPTION OPEN 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (U)  FM Bot said the EU remains concerned about the 
situation.  It will continue its humanitarian support, and 
stands ready to provide 
necessary support to the African Union.  Specifically, the EU 
would consider launching an EU Police Mission on an 
initiative from the AU.  (Bot, External Relations 
Commissioner Patten and High Rep Solana were all keen to 
underline the need for the AU, not the EU, to have 
"ownership" of the Sudan problem.)  The EU Council also "does 
not exclude the possibility" that it will in the future need 
to impose sanctions on the GoS, and has tasked the Council 
Secretariat with drafting a list of possible sanctions the EU 
 
SIPDIS 
could impose, including a discussion of their implications. 
Asked about an oil embargo, Bot said FMs did not discuss what 
specific sanctions should be on the list, but expressed 
skepticism an EU oil embargo would be effective. 
 
IRAQ: NO EU MONEY FOR UN FORCE, BUT MAY BE FROM MEMBER STATES 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Bot said he "launched an appeal to colleagues" to 
make further contributions to fund the "1800 troops" in a 
"protection force for the UN".  He said he hoped the UN force 
could be established soon, and that EU members could fund it. 
 Council contacts said that no EU Member States made any firm 
commitments in the Gymnich discussions, but the attitude was 
positive that the money could be found.  Bot said 
"we'll see what happens in the coming days."  The EU is also 
moving ahead on other measures to contribute to Iraq.  The 
Dutch Presidency was given a mandate by the EUFMs to 
elaborate in the coming weeks on recommendations for EU 
actions from the recent exploratory mission to Baghdad and 
earlier Patten/Solana proposals.  The EU's focus is on police 
training (training the trainers, Solana clarified, since he 
said security makes it "practically impossible" to do more 
on-the-ground training), technical assistance to other 
administrative forces such as border or customs forces, and 
support for upcoming elections. 
 
MEPP 
---- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  The EU said the Israeli government's decision to 
expand 
settlements "ignores the road map" and "cannot be accepted." 
FM Bot also insisted the EU could play a "middle man role" in 
making the Gaza withdrawal a "two-sided process."  Bot argued 
the GoI was becoming more inclined to see a positive EU role 
in helping to reduce risk of "chaos" in Gaza after a 
withdrawal.  Both Solana and Bot said they looked forward to 
a Quartet meeting during UNGA week in New York, provided it 
can agree on "concrete steps" forward.  (Bot: "meeting just 
for the sake of meeting doesn't make any sense."  Solana: 
"If we can't give the meeting content, it may not be 
necessary to have it at this point.")  (COMMENT:  These 
latter comments were aimed at the U.S., according to Council 
and Commisison sources, although the press seems to have 
missed them entirely.  While the EU thinks Quartet agreement 
on how to address the Gaza withdrawal is possible, the EU is 
concerned that US-EU "divergences" over issues such as the 
settlements and the fence could make it hard to agree on a 
Quartet statement worth making.  Our sources said by the end 
of the Gymnich session that it looked like planning for the 
Quartet meeting was progressing, and were more upbeat on the 
value of the upcoming meeting. Nonetheless, there remain 
lingering concerns in the EU that the U.S. uses the Quartet 
process to -- as one Council contact told us today -- "keep 
the Europeans quiet and prevent us from stirring up trouble." 
 END COMMENT.) 
 
IRAN: A "CLEAR SIGNAL" TO TEHERAN, BUT NOT TO THE UNSC YET 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Bot, Patten, Solana, Fischer all repeatedly talked 
about the need for the EU to "send a strong  signal" to Iran 
on nuke concerns, and that Teheran should "make no mistake 
about our message."  But they had nothing concrete to add and 
did not mention the IAEA BoG meeting in front of the press. 
Council and Dutch Presidency contacts tell us there is little 
or no EU sentiment in favor of sending it to the UNSC in 
September; "maybe in November, depending on that report." 
 
BALKANS: SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO, AND KOSOVO 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (U) The EU (especially Solana) endorsed the EU's policy 
supporting the State Union.  Solana stressed that SaM's 
progress toward the EU "will be much, much faster in the 
context of the State Union."  But FMs 
also endorsed Patten's proposed "twin-track" approach to 
handling "technical" issues "of an economic and commercial 
nature", such as negotiating the economic sections of a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).  Patten said 
the aim would be to have one SAA for SaM, 
but with some sections where Serbia and Montenegro might be 
treated separately.  As the AP accurately summarized it: "The 
EU agrees to treat the two states separately, while insisting 
they should remain one country."  Solana argued emphatically 
that EU policy toward SaM "has not changed, and will not 
change", arguing this shift is just a technical 
adaptation of the EU's dealing with the governments in 
question.  Senior EU officials (Lehne and Priebe) will go to 
both Belgrade and Podgorica next week to explain the change, 
followed by Solana and Patten in a joint trip by the end of 
the month. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On Kosovo, the Gymnich discussion strongly supported 
all of the messages of the recent report by UN envoy Kai 
Eide.  The EU urged Kosovar Serbs to participate in 
elections.  It agreed UNMIK should look at transferring more 
powers to PISG, as long as the UNMIK SRSG's "control 
functions" are also strenghtened (a Solana staffer said 
Solana favors a "Bosnia model" where the local authorities 
would make the decisions, but could be overruled by the High 
Rep).  The UN standards process needs to be prioritized (with 
protection of minorities and 
refugee returns right at the top); and Serb concerns need to 
be addressed, with decentralization "absolutely fundamental" 
to the whole process.  Only Austrian FM (and incoming 
External Relations Commissioner) Ferrero-Waldner made any 
comment on the status issue, and that was to say it should 
only be discussed later. 
 
¶9. (C) Dutch and Council Secretariat sources confirmed that 
EU FMs had no serious discussion of the status question.  But 
there was a general consensus in favor of Eide's arguments 
that further postponement of the status issue would be a 
problem, and that it was important there be a positive 
standards review in 2005.  Solana noted to the Gymnich that 
the Contact Group would have to play a leading role in the 
process leading to status discussions, and there were no 
objections.  At the same time, there was little support for 
"early" (i.e., in 2004) appointment of an envoy to initiate 
discussions on status.  In a discussion on Sept. 7, a Solana 
staffer elaborated further, noting that as long as the EU 
does not discuss the status issue, then Member State 
positions will be "all over the map."  But the status issue 
is far too sensitive an issue to discuss at 25, since it 
would surely leak.  That is why Solana has been pushing 
Member States to accept that the Quint needs to take the lead. 
 
¶10. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
MCKINLEY