This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002303 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS MARR BR POL MIL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON DEFENSE MINISTER VIEGAS, 8 
SEPTEMBER 2004 
 
REF: BRASILIA 2293 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4(B)(D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. In a courtesy call on 8 September with 
Ambassador, Defense Minister Jose Viegas expressed 
enthusiastic satisfaction with Department responses to GOB 
suggestions for revisions in the stalled 2000 bilateral 
Technology Safeguards Agreement on possible U.S. 
participation in commercial space launches at Brazil's 
Alcantara facility.  Viegas believes the governments are 
close to consensus on a revised text. Viegas was also 
grateful and optimistic regarding successful conclusion of a 
bilateral understanding on Brazil's lethal force air bridge 
denial program.  Viegas opined that it could take Brazil 
"some years" to work through issues and sign onto the IAEA 
Additional Protocol on non-proliferation safeguards (a view 
not/not reinforced by FM Amorim in later conversation with 
the Ambassador, per reftel; Department please see also action 
request on this issue in para 8).  Viegas also said he 
expects President Lula da Silva to announce a decision in 
Brazil's  new fighter acquisition program in a few weeks' 
time.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Viegas greeted Ambassador warmly in a small meeting in 
the minister's office (Viegas was accompanied by one senior 
advisor, Ambassador by POL Counselor) and directly embarked 
on a review of the following issues: 
 
Alcantara Technology Safeguards Agreement: 
 
¶3. (C) Viegas said that he is "delighted" with the content of 
a USG nonpaper providing the Department's reactions to 
GOB-proposed revisions in the Alcantara TSA (signed by both 
governments in 2000 to facilitate U.S. firms' participation 
in commercial space launches from Brazil's Alcantara facility 
but stalled in ratification in Brazil's congress owing to 
concerns the accord impinges on Brazilian "sovereignty"). 
Viegas said the two remaining areas of difference between the 
governments as reflected in the nonpaper -- relating to 
access for USG personnel to accident sites and the need for 
conclusion of TSA's by Brazil with other users of the 
facility -- appear to him to be easily resolvable.  Viegas 
said he would the USG nonpaper to Brazilian experts and 
informally approach contacts in congress to assure a 
favorable environment when a revised text is resubmitted for 
ratification.  Viegas expressed his deep appreciation for USG 
willingness to revisit the Alcantara issue, calling it an 
"important symbol" of good will toward Brazil on the USG's 
part.  Viegas also reiterated that the GOB will join the 
International Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles (ICOC), 
which has been the main USG request to the GOB in the context 
of re-opening the TSA text for revisions. 
 
"Shootdown" Issue 
 
¶4. (C) Viegas said his staff would provide the USG asap with 
its final input to the draft texts for diplomatic notes and 
addenda that will serve as the basis for memorializing the 
governments' mutual understanding of Brazil's lethal force 
interdiction program for aerial narcotrafficking, scheduled 
for implementation in October. Viegas implied that the MOD 
was prepared to accept virtually all of the USG's recommended 
final revisions to the texts. (Note: Viegas' staff provided 
the comments to Pol Counselor on 10 September, which were 
forwarded to Department WHA/BSC via email on the same date. 
End note.)  Ambassador and Pol Counselor noted that the 
Department is preparing the Memorandum of Justification (MOJ) 
 recommending a Presidential Determination waiving liability 
under U.S. law as related to Brazil's program.  The formal 
exchange of the diplomatic notes will be the final bilateral 
step before the MOJ is sent to the President for decision, 
they added. 
 
Additional Protocol 
 
¶5. (C) The minister then raised the question of Brazil's 
adhering to the Additional Protocol to the NPT.  Viegas said 
that the GOB would likely sign on to the AP, but that the 
process of deliberation could require "some years." 
Ambassador voiced surprise that a decision could take so 
long.  Viegas elaborated that Brazil occupies a unique 
"niche" among suppliers in terms of its technological 
development, which it wants to protect while still finding 
ways to cooperate with inspection.  He also said that any 
suggestion that Brazil belongs in the same company as North 
Korea and Iran is anathema for the GOB, given Brazil's strong 
non-proliferation credential.  Ambassador rejoined that it is 
just those exemplary credentials which make Brazil an 
important  model for others.  Viegas replied that Brazil 
deserves to be granted patience and consideration as it works 
through decisions on the AP.  (Comment:  Viegas' assertion 
that it could require years for Brazil to sign the AP was 
not/not echoed in a subsequent meeting between Ambassador and 
Foreign Minister Amorim, per reftel.  Amorim said Brazil 
needed to work through a number of issues regarding the AP, 
but he seemed surprised when Ambassador noted Viegas's 
comment, and did not affirm it as a GOB position. End 
comment.) 
 
FX Program 
 
¶6. (C) Responding to a query from Ambassador on the status of 
Brazil's F-X new fighter selection competition, Viegas said 
that the MOD has completed its technical evaluation and 
referred the decision to the President.  Viegas said that 
Presidency Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu had told Viegas to 
expect a decision "soon,"  and Viegas opined the decision 
could be announced "in a few weeks."  Viegas did not offer 
further comment, except to note that the Lockheed Martin 
offer for the F-16 Block 50 was regarded by some in the 
Brazilian Air Force as "lacking" in its offset proposals, and 
also there remained a question of "the weapons not following 
the plane"  -- an apparent allusion to continuing questions 
in the BRAF about the availability of the AMRAAM BVR missile 
system.  When POL Counselor noted to Viegas that the USG had 
fully cleared sale of the AMRAAM to Brazil two years ago, 
Viegas seemed puzzled and asked that POL Counselor contact 
the Brazilian air force to discuss the issue. 
 
South America 
 
¶7.  (C) In closing, Viegas noted that the GOB's guiding 
strategic interest in South America is "stability." He 
assured Ambassador that all GOB regional military policies -- 
whether bilateral information sharing initiatives with 
neighboring countries or possible defense-industrial 
cooperation projects -- were intended to promote stability, 
and this should be seen as complementary of, not competitive 
with, USG policies.  Ambassador replied that Brazilian 
leadership in regional security initiatives is welcomed and 
encouraged in Washington. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment. Viegas was upbeat, speaking gratefully and 
enthusiastically about bilateral progress on both the 
Alcantara agreement and the shootdown issue.  Clearly he 
views both of these as close to successful resolutions -- 
welcome developments for the GOB and feathers in Viegas' own 
cap.  His remarks on the Additional Protocol and the FX 
program are, on the other hand, puzzling.  On the AP, the 
impression is that Viegas does not entirely master the issue 
(e.g., he seems to mix in his mind the questions of AP 
adherence and Brazil's ongoing negotiations with the IAEA for 
inspections at Brazil's Rezende facility which, while 
thematically related, are technically separate questions). 
Hence we would be cautious about taking his comments as 
definitive GOB positions, and are inclined to believe that FM 
Amorim's views, as  expressed in reftel, are more 
authoritative.  Action request: Given the current lack of 
precision and clarity on Brazil's official position on the AP 
issue, we will continue to query senior GOB officials about 
the evolution of their views at every opportunity.  We also 
ask that Department engage with Ambassador Abdenur regarding 
Brazil's position. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment continued.  On the FX and AMRAAM, it is 
bewildering to us that, at this late stage, the minister of 
defense does not understand from his air force that the 
AMRAAM system has been approved for Brazil for some time.  We 
intend to explore this quietly with air force contacts. 
 
Danilovich