This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO DELAURENTIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014 
TAGS: EFIN PTER ETTC PREL SNAR FARC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT COMPLETES FARC FINANCE STUDY 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker for 
reaons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) The GOC recently completed an unprecedented 
interagency analysis of FARC finances.  The study concluded 
that FARC profits in 2003 were between 1.35 and 3.25 trillion 
pesos (approximately USD 520 million to 1.25 billion) in 
¶2003.  According to the study, the FARC spent about 40 
percent of its earnings on precursor chemicals and 35 percent 
on terrorist attacks.  Almost half of the FARC's income was 
from drug trafficking and approximately 40 percent from 
extortion.  However, the GOC study's methodology was flawed 
and its conclusions were based on incomplete, sometimes 
questionable data.  Now that the Government has formed an 
interagency team to study terrorist finances, future studies 
will be more reliable as analysts build expertise and acquire 
better information.  The GOC has asked the Embassy for input 
on the study's reliability and how to improve its 
methodology. 
 
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A First-Time, Comprehensive Look at FARC Finances 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) On May 13, 2004, the GOC completed an unprecedented 
interagency analysis of the finances of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2003 (sent to WHA/AND and 
SOUTHCOM).  Under the auspices of the Colombian military's 
(COLMIL) Joint Intelligence Unit (JIC), the GOC's Financial 
Intelligence Unit (UIAF) formed an interagency team of 
analysts who used input from Police, Army, Air Force, and 
Naval Intelligence, the Department of Administrative Security 
(DAS, a rough equivalent to the FBI), the Technical 
Investigative Unit (CTI) of the Prosecutor General's Office 
("Fiscalia"), and the Interagency Committee Against 
Subversive Finances.  On August 31, the JIC presented its 
findings to Emboffs. 
 
¶3. (C) Based on 25,000 data entries from a variety of 
sources, the study concluded that in 2003 the FARC: 
 
Earned: between 2.1 and 3.8 trillion pesos (approximately USD 
810 million to 1.45 billion) 
Spent: between 550 and 790 billion pesos (approximately USD 
210 million to 300 million) 
Profited: between 1.35 and 3.25 trillion pesos 
(approximately USD 520 million to 1.25 billion, as calculated 
from earnings and expenses) 
 
Breakdown of Expenses: 
 
Precursor Chemicals: 304 billion pesos (38.6%) 
Terrorist Actions: 280 billion pesos (35.5%) 
Armaments: 41.3 billion pesos (5.23%) 
Bribes and Infiltration: 34.1 billion pesos (4.32%) 
Food: 32.2 billion pesos (4.07%) 
Losses from Seized Weapons: 20.1 billion pesos (2.54%) 
Administrative Costs: 14.4 billion pesos (1.82%) 
Gasoline for Drug Labs: 12.5 billion pesos (1.59%) 
Losses from Deserters: 10.9 billion pesos (1.38%) 
Communications: 8.3 billion pesos (1.05%) 
Assistance to Imprisoned Guerrillas: 7.1 billion pesos (0.90%) 
Training: 5.1 billion pesos (0.65%) 
Explosives: 4.3 billion pesos (0.54%) 
Gasoline not for Drug Labs: 3.4 billion pesos (0.43%) 
Expense Accounts: 2.5 billion pesos (0.32%) 
Food for Hostages: 2.4 billion pesos (0.30%) 
Support to Guerrilla Family Members: 1.8 billion pesos (0.22%) 
Transportation: 1.5 billion pesos (0.19%) 
Health Care: 1.5 billion pesos (0.18%) 
Political Outreach: 803 million pesos (0.10%) 
International Front: 477 million pesos (0.06%) 
Radio Stations: 431 million pesos (0.05%) 
Losses from Seized Logistical Products: 186 million pesos 
(0.02%) 
Web Pages: 20.2 million pesos (0%) 
Miscellaneous Supplies: Negligible 
Intelligence: Negligible 
 
Breakdown of Earnings: 
 
Coca Cultivation and Sales: 1.73 trillion pesos (45.5%) 
Extortion: 1.57 trillion pesos (41.3%) 
Kidnapping: 256 billion pesos (6.75%) 
Investments: 115 billion pesos (3.04%) 
Cattle Theft: 52.7 billion pesos (1.39%) 
Hydrocarbon Theft: 42 billion pesos (1.11%) 
Taxing Coca Labs: 20.3 billion pesos (0.53%) 
Charge for Use of Illegal Airstrips: 7.2 billion pesos (0.19%) 
Bank Robberies/Embezzling: 2.8 billion pesos (0.07%) 
Middleman for HCL Labs: 2.6 billion pesos (0.07) 
Middleman for Coca Leaf Transportation: 953 million pesos 
(0.03%) 
Middleman for Base Labs: 886 million pesos (0.02%) 
Middleman for Coca Cultivation: 542 million pesos (0.01%) 
Discarded Military Equipment: 152 million pesos (0%) 
Support from Sympathizers: Negligible 
Extorting Border Security: Negligible 
Contraband: Negligible 
 
¶4. (C) To put such profits in context, the study notes that 
"Almacenes Exito," a Colombian chain of discount superstores, 
had sales of 3.15 trillion pesos (approximately 1.2 billion 
USD) in 2003, which falls near the high end of the FARC's 
estimated 2003 earnings.  Exito's 19,303 employees are 
organized in a national structure that can be compared in 
size and complexity to the FARC's drug trafficking/extortion 
industry. 
 
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Key Assumptions 
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¶5. (C) The GOC analysts assumed that in 2003 the FARC had 
between 14,576 and 16,672 members and 136 units (blocs, 
fronts, mobile columns, and urban militia networks).  They 
also assumed there were 68,365 hectares of coca and 1,342 
hectares of poppy in the country. (The GOC uses UN numbers, 
which are consistently lower than USG estimates of illicit 
cultivation.) 
 
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Methodology: A Work in Progress 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The study was a useful first-time effort and 
demonstrated the GOC's ability to conduct a comprehensive 
interagency study.  However, the study has several weaknesses 
that call into question the reliability of its conclusions: 
 
-- Limited Information: The analysts acknowledged that their 
conclusions were based on rough estimates and incomplete 
data.  For example, when estimating earnings from drug 
trafficking, they averaged disparate data on drug prices, 
suspected FARC drug production, and production costs from 
several different agencies and tried to determine the most 
likely range.  The 25,000 data entries are a relatively small 
number given the FARC's size and complexity. 
 
-- Lack of Information Sharing: The analysts lamented that 
many intelligence agencies were reluctant to share 
information or skewed information for political reasons. 
 
-- Technological Limitations: The analysts' computer software 
limited the sophistication and depth of the analysis. 
 
¶7. (C) By forming an interagency team of analysts devoted to 
terrorist finances, the GOC has developed an important tool 
to identify key vulnerabilities of illegal armed groups.  As 
the analysts develop expertise and acquire more detailed and 
reliable information, subsequent studies should be more 
useful.  They are planning a follow-on analysis of 2004 FARC 
finances and studies on paramilitary and National Liberation 
Army (ELN) finances.  The GOC has asked for Embassy feedback 
on the study's conclusions and how to improve future 
analyses. 
DRUCKER