This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/;BCLTV, S/CT 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO), JICPAC AND J2 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PTER KPAO TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: IMPRESSIONS FROM THE SOUTH 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 6619 
 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 6554 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 6477 
 
Classified By: DCM ALEXANDER A. ARVIZU.  REASON 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY/COMMENT:  In an effort to gage the current 
situation in Thailand's south, Bangkok PolOffs recently 
completed an extended trip through Narathiwat, Pattani, and 
Yala provinces, meeting with a cross-section of interlocutors 
including local Islamic groups, security officials, 
academics, journalists, and businessmen.  The visit focused 
on three main themes: security; education; and local 
sentiments.  On security, we heard a wide range of 
assessments of the situation in southern Thailand, from Thai 
security officials who claimed it was improving, to local 
businessmen who predicted worse to come.  Education was a 
major theme in all our meetings.  Many locals are upset over 
Royal Thai Government interference in Islamic "pondok" 
schools and the general lack of educational opportunities; 
the government remains concerned over the pondoks' role in 
the violence.  Local Muslims uniformly expressed frustration 
and anger over perceived historical "injustices" that 
continue, in their minds, to be perpetrated by the police and 
military.  Local anger continues to be directed at symbols of 
the Thai central government, especially the police.  We did 
not detect strong or overt anti-U.S. sentiment.  END 
SUMMARY/COMMENT. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Bangkok PolOffs traveled to Thailand's southernmost, 
Muslim majority provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala 
from September 7th - 9th.  In Narathiwat province, PolOffs 
met with the leader of the Provincial Islamic Council, Abdul 
Rahman Samad; Deputy Provincial Police Commander Col. 
Krachang Suwannarat; and with local business leaders from the 
Narathiwat Industry Council.  In Pattani, PolOffs met with 
Dr. Phirayot Rahimmula and Dr. Chidchanok Rahimmula from 
Prince of Songkhla University; local Army Commander Col. 
Yotchai Yangyuen; prominent journalist Paret Lohasan; and 
local businessman Anusat Suwanmongkon.  In Yala PolOffs met 
with Dr. Ismail Lufti Japagiya, Rector of Yala Islamic 
College, and with leaders of the Young Muslim Association of 
Thailand. 
 
APPEARANCES 
----------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Traveling through Thailand's southernmost, Muslim 
majority provinces is surprisingly easy.  There is a 
deceptive calm for a region that is supposed to be under 
selective martial law.  The atmosphere has the outward 
appearance of normality as people go about their business, 
and security forces maintain a lax approach. The roads are 
excellent, and the roadblocks set up by Thai security forces 
go mostly unmanned during the day.  There are large numbers 
of people on the streets, and businesses are open.  People in 
public reacted generally positively when our obviously 
foreign group passed by.  Even at the Krue Se Mosque, the 
center of fighting during the attacks of April 28, locals 
seemed pleased to see a group of "tourists," complaining that 
the tourists who used to visit from Malaysia and Singapore no 
longer came. 
 
SECURITY SITUATION 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  Despite almost daily incidents of violence directed 
against symbols of Thai authority, local Thai security 
officials presented generally optimistic assessments of the 
violence.  Narathiwat's deputy Police Commander, Col. 
Krachang Suwannarat, characterized the ongoing violence as 
directly related to the activities of separatist groups. 
Col. Krachang said that local students who had studied 
abroad, specifically those who had studied in Indonesia, had 
been radicalized, and were returning to commit violence. 
However, Krachang felt that the situation in the south was 
improving.  He said recent arrests of pondok teachers 
involved in recruiting students to commit violence had 
disrupted separatist activity.  (Note:  While insisting that 
the situation was improving, Krachang did admit that the 
technology and sophistication of the attackers was continuing 
to improve.  During our conversation, Krachang casually 
showed PolOffs a cell phone detonator that he said had been 
removed from a diffused bomb, noting that bomb technology had 
improved.  End Note) 
 
¶5.  (C)  Col. Yotchai Yangyuen, Commander of the Pattani Army 
Circle, also put a positive spin on this year's increase in 
violence, claiming that recent attacks were in the "normal 
pattern."  Yotchai said army efforts to stop the violence are 
being hampered by inexperienced soldiers, and by the 
difficulty of getting information from locals unwilling to 
cooperate with uniformed security forces. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The feelings of local business leaders over the 
security situation was mixed.  Chinese-Thai Pattani 
businessman Anusat Suwanmongkon, owner of the CS Pattani 
hotel, gave an optimistic assessment of the security 
situation, blaming the sensationalist Bangkok media for 
exaggerating reports of violence in the south.  Anusat 
highlighted his personal good relationships with his Muslim 
neighbors and employees.  A much more grim outlook was 
provided by members of the Narathiwat Industrial Council. 
Also ethnically Chinese, they felt increasingly threatened by 
their Muslim-Malay neighbors.  They noted that local 
Chinese-Thai businessmen were usually armed and probably 
would leave if the situation continued to deteriorate. 
 
EDUCATION - THE CENTRAL ISSUE? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  Local Muslims remain extremely sensitive to outside 
interference with their traditional religious schools, but 
showed strong interest in broadening educational 
opportunities for their community.  Dr. Lutfi Japagiya, the 
controversial Rector of the Yala Islamic College, said that 
he hoped his rapidly expanding Pattani campus would be able 
to offer greater opportunities for local Muslims.  Japagiya 
readily admitted that his school received large donations 
from foreign sources, but said he was forced to accept 
international donations because of lack of funding from the 
Thai government.  Sounding a conciliatory tone, Japagiya said 
his role as an educator was to provide educational 
opportunities for his students.  To do that, Japagiya hopes 
to expand his college to 10,000 Muslim students, including 
1,000 foreign students, and teach them subjects beyond Islam, 
including IT, economics, Chinese, and English.  He said he 
wanted to teach his students who believe that non-Muslims are 
the enemy that this is not the case. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Abdul Samad, in his capacity as Chairman of the 
Narathiwat Islamic Council, oversees pondok schools in the 
province.  He claimed that local pondoks were not being used 
to distribute separatist literature or indoctrinate students. 
 He said that local youths were instead being "brainwashed" 
by outsiders.  Samad said the NIC held regular training 
programs for provincial religious teachers to prevent 
extremist teachings.  Like Japagiya, Samad hopes that a 
planned Islamic university for southern Thailand -- which he 
is lobbying to have located in Narathiwat -- would help 
prepare his students for a "globalized" world, by teaching 
them English and Chinese, in addition to Islamic studies. 
Samad was very moderate in tone and went out of his way to 
praise the U.S. tradition of religious freedom.  (Note: 
Samad invited PolOffs to view an ongoing training session for 
pondok teachers at the central Mosque.  PolOffs visited the 
training session and observed 200  teachers, male and female, 
participating in a "brainstorming" activity on how to improve 
education in the pondoks.  The group received PolOffs 
politely.  End Note.) 
 
"INJUSTICES" - WHAT DOES THE POPULATION REALLY WANT? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The consensus among our interlocutors was that most 
southern Thai Muslims do not necessarily want a separate 
state, but rather an end to the historical injustices they 
attribute to government authorities.  In some conversations, 
local Muslims blamed the Bangkok-based media for exaggerating 
the level of violence in southern Thailand, and asserting 
that many incidents were separatist related (Ref C), when in 
reality many are related to local business or personal 
conflicts.  Many Muslims complained   that heavy-handed 
police tactics were contributing to local resentment towards 
security forces. 
 
¶10.  (C)  According to Professor Perayot Rahimmula of Prince 
of Songkhla University in Pattani, the RTG exaggerates the 
threat of separatism.  Most southerners only want security, 
three meals a day, and the opportunity to send their children 
to school, he asserted.  Pirayot called the problem "a local 
issue," and denied a link to international terrorism.  The 
professor commented that the youths who participated in the 
28 April attacks against government targets had been 
manipulated into believing they were carrying out a religious 
jihad as expounded in the "Jihad in Pattani" booklets some 
carried.  In general, he felt that police brutality and 
insensitivity towards Muslims, and not separatism, was the 
key contributing factor for the worsening violence. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Pattani based journalist Paret Lohasan, who works 
for large, Bangkok-based outlets, agreed that the local 
population is not really interested in separatism, but is 
vulnerable to manipulation by separatists who exploit 
grievances stemming from everyday poor treatment at the hands 
of security forces and civilian officials. 
 
¶12.  (C)  PolOffs met with a several members of the Young 
Muslims Association (YMA) of Thailand in Yala.  Comparing 
this year's unrest to the historical separatist movement, 
they noted that the significance of religion was a new 
element when compared to separatist movements of the past. 
They claimed the public was more supportive of previous 
movements that based claims of autonomy of historical and 
cultural grounds, rather than for religious reasons.  Members 
also said that the youths behind the 28 April  attacks had 
been misled by poor religious teachings, a belief that black 
magic would protect them, and a sense they were part of a 
jihad.  The YMA members are angry over Thai security forces 
raids of mosques and pondok schools, and suspicious over U.S. 
intentions in the region.  They asked PolOffs about rumors 
that circulate in the South that the USG is inciting the 
violence for its own ends, and politely listened to denials. 
 
¶13.  (C)  COMMENT:  In our assessment, the problem of 
Thailand's "south" is localized in the southernmost, Muslim 
majority provinces.  The good infrastructure, clean streets, 
and large numbers of people going about their business might 
be deceptive given the many violent attacks that have 
occurred this year, but they do provide important context 
when measuring the scope of this problem.  Southern Thailand 
is not burning. 
 
¶14.  (C)  In our series of meetings we heard two common 
themes over and over from local Muslims: concerns about 
education; and a strong local feeling of "injustice."  Our 
Muslim interlocutors tend to blame the government and 
"outsiders" for southern problems, without exhibiting much 
willingness to assume responsibility for promoting 
non-violent solutions to grievances, however legitimate. 
 
¶15.  (C)  COMMENT:  Embassy believes that expanded public 
diplomacy efforts, focused on education/skills training, 
would be welcomed by a large part of the population. 
Bilateral security assistance focused on expanding the 
coordination and analytical ability of Thai security forces 
should also remain a priority for the USG.  However, 
uniformed Thai officials and other manifestations of the Thai 
central government presence are deeply resented by much of 
the southern population.  Accordingly, U.S. assistance to 
Thai law enforcement and security officials in the south 
should be kept as low-key as possible.  END COMMENT. 
JOHNSON